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Summary of thesis 
This thesis examines language in a range of modern and contemporary dystopian literary 
fiction, and argues for a reinterpretation of Whorfian linguistics as a means of advancing 
understanding of the dystopian genre's acknowledged propensity to influence the 
habitual world-view of its readership. Using close stylistic analysis, and with an 
emphasis on textual patterning, it identifies and examines two distinct and characteristic 
`languages' of dystopia, and considers the ways in which these discourses contribute to 
linguistic relativity as a dynamic process in the reading of these fictions. 
Chapter one defines more precisely the literary genre of dystopia, particularly in 
relation to notions of space and time, and emphasises the genre's necessary participation 
in the socio-historical circumstances of its conception and production (the site of a 
discourse here termed reflective language). The (re)placement of these environments in 
a futuristic setting is also examined and is shown to be marked by a second discourse, 
termed speculative language. 
Chapter two outlines the theoretical foundations of the study and supports its 
positioning at the interface between the study of language and the study of literature by 
drawing on theories from both disciplines to orient its subsequent analyses. In this 
chapter, the concept of linguistic relativity, or Whorfianism, is re-figured as a process 
intrinsic to the reading of dystopian narratives, and is combined with the more literary 
critical theory of cognitive estrangement. In order to maintain focus on the reader-text 
relationship, and to locate the analyses from a readerly perspective, some common, or 
`folklinguistic', beliefs about translatability and the `inadequacy' of language are also 
invoked. 
Chapters three, four, and five are devoted to case studies: chapter three discusses 
the non-Newspeak speculative language in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, and 
chapter four begins with an analysis of reflective language in the same novel before 
looking at three other twentieth-century 
dystopian texts (Katherine Burdekin's Swastika 
Night, L. P. Hartley's Facial Justice, and Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale). 
Chapter five brings together speculative and reflective language in its consideration of 
Atwood's Oryx and Crake, which also serves to bring this study into the twenty-first 
century. A summary and conclusions follow 
in chapter six. 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future, 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. 
What might have been is an abstraction 
Remaining a perpetual possibility 
Only in a world of speculation. 
What might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present. 
T. S. Eliot (1945) `Burnt Norton', Four Quartets, 11.1-10 
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1. Language and dystopia 
Language is the armory of the human mind, and at once contains the trophies 
of its past and the weapons of its future conquests. 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1817) Biographia Literaria 
1.1 Introduction 
The autumn of 2005 saw an exhibition of contemporary art entitled `The Real Ideal: 
Utopian Ideals and Dystopian Realities' installed at a UK city's leading art gallery. The 
pre-event marketing materials for the exhibition offered the following: 
Allow us to chllagene your idaes of utopia, yuor Real Ideal. Epxereince 
viusally stnunnig works in a range of media wicih conevy both the idael and 
harsehr reality of contmepraory life. ' 
The translocated orthography here illustrates and encapsulates the main concerns that 
motivate this study: it defamiliarises language sufficiently to challenge and destabilise 
perceptions of reality, while retaining just enough familiarity to fulfil its communicative 
aim; it subtly embodies the potential for disorder to be concealed within ostensible 
order; additionally, it serves to draw its readers' attention to the ways in which their 
preconceptions may be confronted, examined, and reconstructed. In short, it captures 
the essence of what this study considers: the distinctive manipulations, re-evaluations, 
creations, and re-presentations of language that characterise and animate conceptions of 
dystopia. The intention of this thesis is to examine the form and function of language in 
the context of dystopian narrative. More specifically, it focuses on two inter-connected 
linguistic strands which go to make up part of the complex narrative texture of these 
fictions; for the purposes of this study I have termed these speculative language and 
reflective language. By way of analysis of a range of post-1900 dystopian works, I 
shall elaborate on my formulation and understanding of these terms, and consider the 
ways in which self-reflexive, foregrounded, defamiliarised, non-standard - and often 
invented - language both sustains and constitutes the dystopian narrative project. 
Through this focus I shall argue for a genre-specific dystopian view of language as 
fundamentally implicated in world-view; moreover, through reinterpreting the relevance 
of Benjamin Whorf's conception of linguistic relativity, and applying this approach to 
dystopian writing, I argue that this Whorfian perspective functions beyond and outside - 
but through - the language of these narratives to disaggregate, transmute, and 
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reconstitute readers' perceptions, not just of the fictional world, but of the world beyond 
the fiction. The primary motivation underlying these investigations lies in dystopian 
fictions' universal postulate - whether explicit or implicit - that all possibilities of 
existence, all inter-relationships, all potentials (either within or beyond current 
comprehension), in this world or a future world, are intimately and inextricably encoded 
in language. Dystopian fictions evince the intrinsic connection between language and 
perceptions of reality, with each text contributing a compelling argument towards an 
understanding of how human existence is essentially predicated on the facility to use 
and manipulate language. Any attempt to encompass the entirety of this aspect of the 
dystopian impulse would be unmanageable given the magnitude of the field; my 
contribution, therefore, is limited to a detailed examination of the stylistic and affective 
properties of language in a small representative selection of dystopian texts written in 
English in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
Dystopian fictions are, according to Ildney Cavalcanti, `stories about language' 
(2000: 152). As `stories' they belong in the province of literary study; yet their being 
`about language' invokes the field of linguistic study. A stylistic approach - the 
application of linguistic concepts to elucidate and interrogate literary effects - brings 
together the superficially distinct disciplines of linguistics and literary studies; an 
alliance which is clearly applicable to this study given the hybrid nature of its subject 
matter. Accordingly, traditional stylistic methods, frameworks, and analyses are 
employed to explore and account for the consequence of language as it is foregrounded 
in these texts. The methodology used here relies in part on what Ronald Carter wryly 
terms steam stylistics (Gavins 2005: 405): that is to say, conventional interpretive 
analysis based on the systematic application of linguistic techniques, rather than the 
cognitive- or corpus-based approaches that have become highly visible in stylistics in 
recent years. While either of the latter approaches might yield interesting results in 
relation to the texts studied here, my aim is to use stylistic methods as the foundation 
upon which I might synthesise other approaches drawn from both the study of language 
and the study of literature. To this end, I incorporate relevant linguistic theory - 
primarily linguistic relativity - with theoretical notions from literary studies (the 
concept of cognitive estrangement in particular). Stylistics provides the practical 
instrument through which these theories are assessed, applied, and evaluated in an effort 
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to extend the existing body of academic work on the nature and import of language in 
dystopian fiction. 3 
Stylistic analysis also has a distinct advantage, in terms of the aims of this study, 
in that it acknowledges the triangulation between language (or text), meaning (or 
effect), and the reader. It recognises the reader as an integral element in the formation 
of meaning, and the reception of effect, rather than allowing that meaning might be 
made intra-textually and in isolation. While accepting that much of what is loosely 
termed `meaning' in language is necessarily codified and understood by consensus, my 
focus here is more often on language which challenges, inverts, subverts, and otherwise 
renders mutable the accepted definitions of itself and of language as a medium in a 
more general sense. In addition, much of the language I consider is essentially sui 
generis, existing only within the context of one dystopian text. To comment on 
`meaning' or `effect' in relation to the reader as recipient and generator of meaning in 
these linguistically non-conventional circumstances is often to position myself as 
`reader' in this tri-partite relationship. The rigour and systematicity of mediating this 
reception through a stylistic lens will, I hope, attenuate the worst excesses of 
subjectivity and the impressionistic, interpretive leaps that might otherwise undermine 
such an undertaking. While this is not the place to rehearse old arguments about the 
`objectivity' of stylistics (for example, the Fowler-Bateson controversy (see Fowler 
1971), or the McKay-Short debate (see Short et al 1998; Short & van Peer 1999), I 
work from the understanding that stylistic methodology has the capacity to produce 
balanced, accessible, and concordant readings of these texts. Moreover, where I 
mention `readers' in an abstract sense, as a representative collective of recipients, I refer 
not just to scholars either of language or literature; nor to the informed, astute, and 
responsive `ideal readers' construed by some reader-response theories (see, for example, 
Culler 1975); furthermore, I do not anticipate what Fish (1980) terms an `interpretive 
community' with a particular schema, ideology, or approach to the texts. My 
conception of `readers' is somewhat re-positioned from the norm. Given that dystopian 
fiction - often indivisibly from science fiction (see § 1.3.3) - is highly representative of, 
and implicated in, any conception of popular fiction with a wide appeal to a generalised 
reading public, it follows that any attempt to characterise its readership must necessarily 
assimilate its popular status - even insofar as `popular' may impute a pejorative sense. 
Consequently, where I use `the reader', `readership', or `readers' in this study, either as 
3 
formulators of meaning or as recipients of effects, it is with the understanding that any 
such meaning or effect is readily retrievable, accessible, and expressly defensible, since 
it will be supported and demonstrated by means of stylistic analysis. In taking 
advantage of the methodical thoroughness of stylistics, my aim is to accomplish 
readings which - so far as is possible within any interpretive framework - would 
represent a consensual majority interpretation among a diverse and heterogeneous 
readership. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I define more explicitly my 
understanding of what constitutes the genre of dystopia, and introduce the notion of 
these fictions as characteristically being distinguished by their incorporation of `two 
languages', one speculative, one reflective. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 focus on (re)defining 
dystopia in order to circumscribe much of the indeterminacy which surrounds the 
classification of the genre: § 1.2.1 and § 1.2.2 together locate dystopia in relation to place 
and time, both of which are vital to the categorisation of dystopia, in ways which differ 
from many other fictional genres. Taken together, these two sections develop a refined 
account of the dystopia-specific context upon which the subsequent sections depend. 
In order to come to an understanding of what dystopia is, however, it is equally 
important to be clear about what it is not. To this end, § 1.3.1 investigates the range of 
intersections between dystopia and those other genres with which it is sometimes 
conflated, and makes a distinction between those texts which are wholly dystopian and 
those which, while not entirely dystopian, exhibit dystopian elements. Of the many 
genres with which dystopia overlaps and intersects, utopia on the one hand and science 
fiction on the other present the most complex inter-relationships and interstices. An 
approach to clarifying the blurred boundary between dystopia and utopia is the subject 
of § 1.3.2, where the point of view of the focalising character (or characters) is invoked 
as a means of differentiating between these two closely related genres, while §1.3.3 
considers the engagement of dystopia with science fiction, and argues for the inclusion 
of dystopia within the more terrestrial reaches of this far-reaching genre. 
A central principle of this thesis, visible in its methodology, its theoretical 
positioning, and its analytical emphasis, is that the perceptions of the readership may be 
affected, altered, or amended as a result of reading dystopian fiction. Empirical studies 
which conclude that reading such texts results in a changed view of self and society are 
discussed in § 1.4, together with an examination of the ways in which the didactic 
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impulse, intrinsic to all dystopias, contributes to this adjustment of world-view. As 
noted above, this study identifies language as the locus of dystopia's remarkably 
powerful capacity to re-define its readers' outlook; the latter part of this chapter is, 
therefore, devoted to a preliminary delineation of the particular realisations of language 
which are common to all dystopian fictions. The three parts of section 1.5 together 
conceptualise the direction this study pursues in respect of language: §1.5.1 addresses 
the issue of whether `two languages' can be said to co-occur within the bounds of one 
text, and appeals to precedents established in stylistics, linguistics, and literary criticism 
to warrant such a partition in this study, while § 1.5.2 and § 1.5.3 introduce, in outline, 
the notions of speculative language and reflective language respectively. Speculative 
language is identified as dystopia's `language of the future', while reflective language is 
proposed as the genre's `language of the past'. Both of these linguistic strands depend 
on dystopia's conjunctions with a definable context: a sense of `place', which, as will be 
seen throughout this chapter (and indeed throughout the entire thesis) is essential to my 
exposition of dystopia's extraordinary effect on its readers. It seems fitting, therefore, 
to move now to an exploration of dystopian `place'. 
1.2.1 Dystopia in space: `elsewhere [... ] but here' 
While it may be true that no place has always seemed elsewhere or elsewhen, 
in fact all utopian fiction whirls contemporary actors through a costume dance 
no place else but here. 
Greenberg, Olander, and Rabkin (1983) No Place Else 
Throughout this study, I frequently make reference to language - and to readers - as 
they exist in the real world; on occasion, I discuss the real world as it is represented in 
dystopian fiction. Furthermore, there are some references to the dystopian authors' real 
worlds. In addition to these various configurations of reality, there are various 
configurations of unreality and unreal-reality: the fictional dystopian worlds, each of 
which, as I shall elaborate, has conjunctions with both the author's real world and the 
reader's real world. While accepting that, with reference to postmodernist thinking, 
neither `real world' nor `reality' can be presented as neutral terms, I continue to use 
both in this study, but with some qualification. 4 To disambiguate the non-fictional 
`real' worlds I employ two distinct terms, each defining a particular spatio-temporal 
relation. Firstly, to denote the contemporary real world - that is to say the empirically 
observable reality of the present known world -I follow Peter Stockwell (2000: 147 
and passim) and use base-reality. Secondly, to distinguish the historically-bound real 
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world of the author - the temporal circumstances from which a given dystopia emerges 
-I employ Tom Moylan's term, historical spacetime (2000: xii) (generally pre- 
modified by the relevant author's name) as a means to differentiate the `then-world' 
from the `now-world'. However, to disambiguate the fictional, dystopian realities, 
unrealities, and non-realities, and to locate them in relation to both base-reality and the 
historical spacetime of the author, is a much more complex task; one which requires an 
understanding of dystopia as depicting a futuristic, non-existent `no place' 
simultaneously with its envisioned `bad place', both of which embody some re-working 
of a `this place'. 5 Later in this introductory chapter I revisit the issue of `reality' when I 
examine the positioning of dystopia within the genre of science fiction (§1.3.3); in 
advance of that discussion, in this section I examine the critical movement towards 
acceptance of dystopia's deep-rooted location in some identifiable, more-or-less real 
`place'. 
Critical recognition of dystopia as emergent from, and merged with, a sense of 
`place' is a fairly recent development, held latent for decades by a doctrine of regarding 
dystopian place or space as analogous with a utopian sense of `nowhere'. Dystopia 
derives its etymological roots from Thomas More's coinage of Utopia to name both his 
imaginary island and eponymous book, published in Latin in 1516 and translated into 
English by Ralph Robinson in 1551.6 More's punning neologism, contrived from Greek 
ou (not) in combination with topos (a place) - meaning literally a place that is not or no 
place - invites the interpretation of the first syllable as eu (meaning pleasant or good) 
when transliterated via Latin back into Greek. This ingenious bilingual wordplay thus 
denotes a place that is non-existent while simultaneously being ideal. More elaborated 
this paradox in a short verse on the volume's flyleaf, which ends with the lines: 
Wherefore not Utopie, but rather rightly 
My name is Eutopie: a place of felicity.? 
Utopia, in its double sense of `good place' and `no place', was a late revision of More's 
original working title for the book, which was Nusquamus, from the Latin nusquam, 
meaning `not anywhere'. 8 Although this suggests More's intention may have been to 
advance the `placelessness' of Utopia over its idealism, the two senses - imaginary no 
place and exemplary good place - remain inseparably bonded in our understanding of 
the term today. 
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When John Stuart Mill coined the word dystopia in 1868 it was those qualities 
antithetical to the concept of utopia as a `good place' that he sought to name, while 
retaining the concept of `no place'. The Oxford English Dictionary records his invention 
in the following illustrative quotation: 
It is, perhaps, too complimentary to call them Utopians, they ought rather to 
be called dys-topians, or caco-topians. What is commonly called Utopian is 
something too good to be practicable; but what they appear to favour is too 
bad to be practicable. 
(The Oxford English Dictionary: earliest illustrative quotation for dystopia) 
Here, Mill acknowledges the double meaning embodied in More's invented term. His 
explanatory remarks include the notion of either state as chimerical: `too good to be 
practicable' or `too bad to be practicable' [my emphasis]. Yet this apparent antonym is 
not a complete inversion of the twofold signification of utopia. Mill's neologism 
inverts only one of its two concurrent meanings - bad as the converse of good - while 
preserving intact the parallel meaning - impracticable, imaginary. So this early 
conception of dystopia maintains More's original paradox - good / no place - by part- 
reversing it to bad / no place. 
Mill's coinage did not immediately gain currency, and, in 1952, when J. Max 
Patrick was reaching for a term to describe `utopia in the sense of nowhere; but [... ] the 
opposite of eutopia, the ideal society', he settled on the (re)formulation dystopia, `if it is 
permissible to coin a word' (Negley & Patrick 1952: 298). Like Mill's, Patrick's `new' 
word deliberately semi-inverts utopia, as he, too, maintains `the sense of nowhere' as an 
intrinsic semantic component while focusing on the inversion of eu- `good' to dys- 
'bad'. The retention of utopia's defining sense of `nowhere' in these neologisms figures 
dystopia as a genre relating to imaginary societies located in illusory settings: thought- 
experiments, far-removed from reality. 
Although three of the dystopian genre's defining texts - We (1924), Brave New 
World (1932), and Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) - had been published during the years 
between Mill's creation and Patrick's re-creation of the term dystopia, none was 
classified as such at the time of its publication. Instead, critics and commentators 
persistently attempted to index dystopian texts in terms of their relationship to the 
utopian genre. The range of classificatory labels employed include: utopian satire, anti- 
utopia, reverse utopia, negative utopia, inverted utopia, regressive utopia, cacoutopia, 
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non-utopia, satiric utopia, nasty utopia, negative quasi-Utopia, and sour utopia 
(Aldridge 1984: 5; Booker 1994a: 22n; Frye 1973: 28; Sisk 1997: 5). What is 
immediately apparent is the inclusion of utopia as a delimiting concept embedded in the 
various constructions. The relationship between dystopia and utopia is framed as inter- 
textual, mediated always through a utopian `no place'. Furthermore, the terms of the 
inter-text relationship are strictly those of progenitor and progeny, with `positive' utopia 
generating its `negative' offspring. This relationship is characterised by Krishan Kumar 
as `a chain of challenge and response' (1987: 128; 1991: 47), with utopia laying down 
the challenge to which dystopia provides the response. Anti-utopia (a term which 
Kumar considers synonymous with dystopia), he claims, is: 
formed by utopia, and feeds parasitically on it. It depends for its survival on 
the persistence of utopia. Utopia is the original, anti-utopia the copy - only, 
as it were, always colored black. It is utopia that provides the positive 
content to which anti-utopia makes the negative response. 
(Kumar 1987: 100) 
According to this view, dystopia - or indeed any of the negative manifestations of 
utopia listed above - is generated only in response to utopian textual stimuli: dystopia is 
a reaction or response to extant utopian literature, or utopian political tracts, rather than 
a response to an existing actuality. By incorporating, rather than inverting, the sense of 
`no place' inherent in our understanding of utopia, each of these terms perpetuates the 
sense that there is no connection with the author's historical spacetime, and denies the 
possibility that dystopia can be an independent genre addressing concerns that fall 
outside a previously-conceived utopia. 
One of the most widely used terms, anti-utopia, does adequately name this 
negative reaction to utopia; it describes the ways in which some texts criticise utopian 
ideals and utopian thought (Sargent 1975: 138). But dystopia is both more and less than 
anti-utopia. It is more in that it moves beyond criticism of the ideals portrayed in other 
(utopian) texts and encompasses an extra-textual, grounded world-view. It is less in that 
it may be defined more narrowly than anti-utopia. An anti-utopia could, conceivably, 
be equally utopian in its aims as the utopia to which it responds: criticism of the 
originating utopian text could take the shape of an alternative utopia which takes the 
essential tenets of the original and improves upon them - criticising the utopia of the 
source text, thus being anti-utopian. Consequently, any given dystopia may be 
simultaneously an anti-utopia, in that it may arguably be located in opposition to 
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utopian thought, but not all anti-utopias are necessarily dystopias in that they may not 
be directly concerned with any aspect of the author's empirically-observed society. 9 
Margaret Atwood, author of two of the dystopias considered in this study (The 
Handmaid's Tale and Oryx and Crake), has outlined the importance of the actual 
historical moment to the generative inspiration for her works. She frames this in terms 
of what she calls a what if. `Every novel begins with a what if, ' she states, `and then sets 
forth its axioms. The what if of Oryx and Crake is simply, What if we continue down 
the road we're already on? How slippery is the slope? '10 To expand Atwood's 
comments out to dystopia in general, and more specifically, the distinction between 
anti-utopia and dystopia, it is illuminating to accept firstly, that, as the author says, 
every book `begins with a what if. An anti-utopia would look at another utopia, a 
utopian tract, blueprint, or ideal, and ask `what if? ', and begin to set forth its axioms, 
framing a better or worse society. If a better, more ideal world were to be outlined, a 
secondary utopia - now an anti-utopia - would ensue. If the world depicted were worse 
than that of the source text, the result would be a text that is traditionally anti-utopian. 
On the other hand, when asking `what if? ', if authors - like Atwood - looked, not at 
another utopia, but at their own historical spacetime, and set forth their axioms based on 
their conception of this reality, either a utopia or a dystopia is possible. If the author 
outlines an apparently better, more ideal world than that which s/he perceives, a utopia 
would result. Only if the world portrayed is worse than the author's historical reality 
would a dystopia be formed. The essential difference, then, between anti-utopia and 
dystopia is that the latter is firmly grounded in the author's material and cultural reality, 
while the former need not be. As David W. Sisk (1997) remarks: 
Dystopian fiction is fundamentally concerned with the writer's present 
society and builds its horrific power on extrapolating current trends to what 
the writer considers their logically fearsome conclusions. Dystopian fiction 
borders on the hortatory polemic: anti-utopian fiction may (or may not) 
address the existing problems of its writer's world, but dystopia must 
always do so. For this reason, dystopian novels rarely attack specific 
utopian visions, lashing out instead at serious flaws within the writer's 
contemporary society. 
(Sisk 1997: 7) 
Dystopia, then, comments on `place' in a way that anti-utopia need not: the connections 
with, observations about, and criticisms of, the author's historical spacetime are always 
manifestly retrievable from the dystopian work. Thus, while it retains utopia's sense of 
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`nowhere', both in that it is essentially fictional, and in that its futuristic settings are at a 
remove from base-reality, it is its distinct conjunctions with reality that define and impel 
it. 
It is not until the latter part of the twentieth century that literary critics 
wholeheartedly accepted this notion of dystopian genesis being based on a concrete 
reality. Critics of the science fiction genre are foremost among those who locate 
narrative in relation to place (as well as to cultural, socio-political and historical 
aspects), and dystopian texts extensively overlap with this definitively `other-world' 
fiction (see § 1.3.3). Because science fiction has been routinely viewed as marginal to 
the conventional literary canon, critics in the field have striven particularly hard to 
demonstrate the significant ways in which science fictions are connected to, and 
comment on, the actual societies from which they originate. An attempt to locate 
explicitly the constructed settings of dystopias in relation to their authors' contemporary 
reality comes from science-fiction critic Darko Suvin (1998), who defines dystopia as: 
a community where sociopolititical institutions, norms, and relationships 
between its individuals are organised in a significantly less perfect way than 
in the author's community. 
(Suvin 1998: 170) [original emphasis] 
Suvin's definition makes clear the connection of the dystopian society to cultural and 
personal correlates situated in the author's society. This actualises the place - `the 
author's community' - as the locus which provokes the dystopian response, which 
contrasts markedly with earlier `placeless' definitions. 
Lyman Tower Sargent (1994; Claeys & Sargent 1999) similarly recognises the 
importance of the author's community as the inspiration for dystopian writing, but 
additionally, he invokes the reader's `place' as part of his definition. Like other 
commentators, he characterises utopia as `a nonexistent society described in detail', but 
unlike them, he goes on to situate this society as `normally located in time and space' 
(1999: 1). Dystopia, or negative utopia, he suggests, is: 
A utopia [a nonexistent society described in considerable detail and 
normally located in time and space] that the author intended a 
contemporaneous reader to view as considerably worse than the society in 
which the reader lived. 
(Sargent 1994: 9; Claeys & Sargent 1999: 1) 
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Sargent's definition emphasises dystopian `place' as directly relative to the reader's 
world - in other words, based in an actualised, concrete reality that the author intended 
the reader to recognise as such. In doing this, his definition of dystopia achieves further 
inversion of the paired significations inherent in More's original conception, while 
retaining the central interpretation of the depicted community as fictional. More's good 
place is countered by a `considerably worse' place, and his no place becomes relevant 
to a concrete location: `the society in which the reader lived'. The dystopian society is 
not the author's society reproduced with verisimilitude, but a speculative, future-based 
version of it, connected to reality by way of extrapolative threads. It re-places the 
author's society in a futuristic possible world as it delineates possible outcomes of 
present trends in clearly recognisable trajectories; moreover, it emphasises this `place' 
- the setting, society, or environment - as commensurate with the reader's `place'. 
Samuel R. Delany suggests that what is conventionally the `background' in 
realist (or, as he terms it, mundane) fiction, is foregrounded in science fiction in such a 
way as to `replace, displace, and reorganize the elements of the mundane world into new 
worlds' (1991: 525) [original emphasis]. The same is emphatically true of dystopia: its 
sense of `place' prevails - even over its sense of plot or characterisation - to the extent 
that Stockwell (2000) terms these texts architexts; a term designed to capture and reflect 
the inherent focus on what he calls their `conceptual architecture'. An architext, in 
Stockwell's terms, is `any science fictional narrative which configures a fully worked- 
out, rich world'; furthermore, this world `provides stylistic cues that encourage a 
mapping of the whole textual universe with the reader's reality' (2000: 204). 
Acceptance of dystopia as representing a bleak, dislocated - but possible - 
reality had, by the end of the twentieth century, become the dominant mode of 
interpreting dystopia. Consequently, the antonymical inversion of utopia's `no place' 
has been completed. Shifting the focus from ethereality to reality resulted in more 
confident assertions that dystopia comments directly upon - (re)produces, even - the 
society from which it emerges. The contemporary approach to dystopia, therefore, is to 
admit, encourage, and explore both its relevance to, and its referents in, the actualised 
`place' - the concrete, real-world concerns of its author. This fundamental shift in the 
critical focus on dystopia -a move from reading dystopia as social imagining to 
dystopia as social reality - has allowed critics to evaluate frankly and comment on the 
real-world referents of the fictions. M. Keith Booker, for example, takes this aspect as 
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the thesis of his book, The Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature: Fiction as Social 
Criticism (1994b) where he explains at the outset: 
I wish to underscore the role of dystopian fiction as social criticism. In 
particular, I emphasize throughout this study that the treatment of imaginary 
societies in the best dystopian fiction is always highly relevant more or less 
directly to specific "realworld" societies and issues. 
(Booker 1994b 18-19) 
Similarly, Tom Moylan advances the relevance of real-world issues as the central 
interpretational principle of his Marxist-oriented readings of dystopian texts. Moylan's 
`critical dystopia', like Booker's `dystopia as social criticism', takes as axiomatic the 
representation of reality inherent in the dystopian `place'. Dystopia has, Moylan 
remarks, `produced challenging cognitive maps of the historical situation by way of 
imaginary societies that are even worse than those that lie outside their authors' and 
readers' doors' (2000: xi). He continues: 
Its very textual machinery invites the creation of alternative worlds in which 
the historical spacetime of the author can be re-presented in a way that 
foregrounds the articulation of its economic, political, and cultural 
dimensions. [D]ystopian critique can enable its writers and readers to find 
their way within - and sometimes against and beyond - the conditions that 
mask the very causes of the harsh realities in which they live. 
(Moylan 2000: xii) 
One obstacle remains in reading dystopia as directly relevant to a given 
historical place. This lies in the apparently subjective judgement of what constitutes 
`considerably worse' or `less perfect' than the author's reality. " Suvin goes some way 
to resolving this problem in the continuation of his definition quoted above. Dystopia is 
`significantly less perfect [... ] than the author's community' when it is `seen by a 
representative of a discontented social class or fraction, whose value-system defines 
"perfection"' (1998: 170). There is little doubt that the dystopian world is viewed as 
flawed from the point of view of the focalising character (or characters) in any given 
dystopia, as their principal function is to highlight the injustice or inequality of the 
oppressive or totalitarian system under which they live (§1.3.2 considers the stylistic 
notion of focalisation as key to the reading of dystopian fiction). However, the 
temporal and spatial location of the reader in relation to the author is less 
straightforwardly predictable. For example, the ruling fundamentalist theocratic order 
of Gilead in The Handmaid's Tale is positively dystopian for Offred and most Western 
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readers. Yet how dystopian is the setting from the point of view of a religious 
fundamentalist who may regard such a society as a utopian ideal? 
Erica Gottlieb considers just this problem in Dystopian Fiction East and West: 
Universe of Terror and Trial (2001), which attempts to differentiate between the 
`classic' Western dystopia and narratives relating stories of oppression and the 
miscarriage of justice produced from within totalitarian societies that are the setting for 
yet other dystopian works. To this end, Gottlieb considers a range of political novels 
written under various phases of totalitarian dictatorship in the USSR, Poland, Hungary, 
and Czechoslovakia between 1920 and 1991, and notes that `these works are still clearly 
expressive of the dystopian impulse, although they deal with the writer's own society 
"as is"'(2001: 5). She concludes that one of the key differences between the two groups 
of fictions is that the characteristic Western speculative futuristic time-frame disappears 
in Eastern European works, to be replaced by `a nightmare world not as a 
phantasmagorical vision of the future but as an accurate reflection of the "worst of all 
possible worlds" experienced as a historical reality' (2001: 17). 
In these works, `place', in terms of the physical location of the author, is 
replicated - rather than speculatively constructed - as a dystopian `bad place'. 
Although these works may be regarded as having a dystopian element when viewed 
from the standpoint of one whose `value-system defines "perfection"' in Western terms, 
they cannot be properly said to be dystopias, since they lack the speculative, temporally 
dislocated aspect that defines the genre (which is explored further in § 1.2.2). While 
dystopia has a specific connection to real-world concerns, that is not to say that it 
reflects the author's historical spacetime in an uncomplicated mimetic fashion; rather it 
takes aspects of the author's reality as starting points for extrapolative projections and 
possibilities, and draws them out to horrific proportions. Dystopia's representation of 
`place', then, is one of its chief defining characteristics: to be categorised as dystopia, a 
text cannot locate its spatio-historical aspect in what is; instead it re-envisions salient 
aspects of what is, and transmutes them temporally into what could be. 
An advantage of working from the assumption that there is a genre-specific 
connection to `place' in dystopia is that it enables meaningful links to be made between 
actual socio-historical and cultural issues in the author's historical spacetime and the 
fictional treatment of the same. The understanding of dystopian `place' that underlies 
this study mirrors exactly that expressed by Booker: dystopias are, he says, `more or 
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less thinly veiled refigurations of a situation that already exists in reality' (1994a: 19). 
Throughout this study, I presuppose an explicit connection to real-world phenomena, 
and therefore assume that any fictional representation of language is based on - or 
extrapolated from - language as the author perceives it in his or her reality. 
1.2.2 Dystopia in time: `elsewhen [... ] but here' 
They spend their time mostly looking forward to the past. 
John Osborne (1956) Look Back in Anger 
Dystopia is a peculiarly recent phenomenon in literary terms: while anti-utopias have 
responded periodically to utopias ever since More's Utopia initiated the process, the 
dystopia proper - that is to say, the genre which derives its genesis and motivation from 
its author's historical spacetime rather than from utopia or utopian thought - is no older 
than the twentieth century. Concern with the development of the genre through time is 
evident across the humanities, through the interest of literary, political, historical, and 
philosophical scholars, and discussions of how and why this era should provide such 
rich resources for the dystopian imagination appear across similarly extensive 
disciplinary boundaries. 12 Such considerations are beyond the scope of this study, 
which, although firmly rooted in texts published in the twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, attends to temporal questions only insofar as they have the potential to impact 
upon language. This is, however, a significant potential, and one which requires some 
clarification, since the peculiarities of the way dystopian fiction is located in time are 
indicated by linguistic markers which, for the reader, locate the fiction in relation to 
complex temporal states. 
Dystopian fiction, along with its utopian counterpart, is, in part, defined by its 
idiosyncratic temporal positioning. Commonly set in a remote future, these fictions are 
ostensibly discontinuous with the present, yet are continuous with it via extrapolative 
links. Aldous Huxley's Brave New World (1932), for example, is set in the year `A. F. 
632', hence around six centuries into the future, given that 'A. F' ('After Ford') is taken 
to refer to the US motor tycoon, Henry Ford (1863-1947). Ford's pioneering and 
revolutionary assembly-line mass production methods immediately precede - and 
accordingly inform - the historical spacetime in which Huxley wrote and published 
Brave New World, with the famous Model T being produced by these then-novel 
techniques from 1908 to 1927. Consequently, at the point of publication, an aspect of 
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the author's historical spacetime - here, the emergence of mass-production methods - 
coincides temporally with the contemporaneous reader's base-reality (accepting that a 
1930s adult reader would have some cognisance of Henry Ford, his product, and his 
methods). So, at its simplest level - and in keeping with a New Historicist reading - the 
socio-historical temporal context of the text's production is inherently realised in its 
internal substance. In this respect, it does not differ from other genres whose influences 
and themes can be seen to be cotemporaneous with their conditions of composition. It 
does differ, however, in its presentation of these circumstances as though they occurred 
in the distant past, and have already become historical rather than contemporary. Brave 
New World, consonantly with other dystopias, begins in medias res, engaging its reader 
in this futuristic setting without ever explicitly acknowledging that it is the future. As 
Raffaella Baccolini notes, dystopias customarily `openýirectly on the nightmarish 
society, with no need for time and/or space dislocation for the dystopian citizen' (1996: 
343). 13 In short, the author's present is relocated to the past when viewed from the 
narrative perspective of the future. 
Brave New World is more specific than many dystopias in providing a fairly 
exact date for its temporal location. More characteristic of the genre is to suggest its 
projection into the future by way of an oblique reference to the past (which, of course, is 
some approximation of the author's present). David Karp's One exemplifies this 
implicative tactic quite effectively. Published in 1953, it opens, without any reference 
to temporal setting, in a busy dining hall peopled by timeless characters eating and 
conversing. However, as early as the third page, when the narrator, Professor Burden, 
lip-reads a fellow-diner's mention of the artist, Picasso, his musing on the name begins 
to suggest some temporal dislocation: `Early and middle twentieth-century painter, 
Burden decided. But he knew little about him. ' (p. 7). 14 The possibility of a historical 
standpoint lies in his reference to the `middle twentieth-century' since it occurs in a text 
produced almost exactly mid-twentieth-century. This, together with the reference to 
Picasso, who in his lifetime (1881-1973) was consistently prominent throughout 
Europe, gestures toward the future, although somewhat indefinably. The early allusive 
temporal signalling, however, is confirmed just a few lines later when, having heard 
another character ask, `Wouldn't you even care for one quick roll in the hay? ', Burden 
`didn't quite understand the meaning of the expression, which he knew was archaic 
English' (p. 7). To position modern idiomatic English as `archaic' is clearly to describe 
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a time so far into the future - if idioms such as this have fallen out of use and become 
incomprehensible - that the temporal distance must be measurable in centuries rather 
than decades. Dystopia propels its readers directly into this indefinite future, but 
simultaneously maintains contact with the author's present. In both Brave New World 
and One, it is a living human referent - Henry Ford in the former, and Pablo Picasso in 
the latter - that provides a point of reference from which extrapolative filaments trace a 
connective path from the present to the future; and the bi-directional nature of this path 
enables - encourages, even - the cognitive return journey, so that the present may be 
viewed from the perspective of a possible future. 
As will be elaborated, dystopia's peculiar relationship with time contributes to 
its didactic impetus. It does so largely because, in addition to its characteristic setting in 
the future and its explicit conjunctions with the author's present, it is further defined as 
a genre by its incorporation and interrogation of the historical past. Writing in 1967, 
Mark R. Hillegas cites the influence of `the governments of Hitler, Stalin, or Roosevelt' 
(1967: 4) on the genesis of the dystopian genre; by 1982, Sargent is able to add `Korea, 
Vietnam, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, the Gulag Archipelago, the rising rate of 
violent crime, the Cold War, the apparent failure of the welfare state, ecological 
disaster, and corruption' to this list of what he calls the `failure' of the twentieth century 
(1982: 577). At the end of the century, Moylan reflects on a `hundred years of 
exploitation, repression, state violence, war, genocide, disease, famine, ecocide, 
depression, debt, and the steady depletion of humanity through the buying and selling of 
everyday life' (2000: xi). These `terrors of the twentieth century' supply the historical 
material which motivates the dystopian nightmare: as Sisk affirms, `[t]wentieth-century 
history provides an embarrassment of riches with which dystopian writers construct 
fictions that are as plausible as they are bleak' (1997: 10). This focus on the mistakes 
and failures of the past is insinuated in every dystopian image of the future; crucially, 
for most authors of dystopias, the derelictions and disintegrations of the past provide 
salutary indications of the way the future could transpire. Terry Eagleton's (2005) 
articulation of this extraordinarily complex utopianist treatment of time captures some 
of its capacity to disorient: `we must', he says, `move backward into the future with our 
eyes fixed mournfully on that great heap of wreckage that is the past. ' 15 
Dystopia, then, can be figured as a double-sided temporal mirror: held up to the 
present, it reflects the past in one plane and the future in the other. Yet, if it is a mirror 
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it is a peculiarly distorted one: its reflection of the past is translucent, allowing history 
to filter through and shape the future; while its reflection of the future bears an uncanny 
- and enlightening - resemblance to the present. This commingling of past, present, 
and future is central to any understanding of dystopia at a generic and thematic level. 
Moreover - and of particular importance to this study - the realisation and execution of 
this aspect of the dystopian impulse is communicated to the reader largely by reference 
to linguistic markers of each of these temporal states. Chapter three considers the 
impact of `future' time in greater detail in its examination of speculative language, 
while chapter four looks at `past' time as represented through reflective language. As 
will become clear through the case-studies considered in these two chapters, time and 
language are intimately connected in dystopian fictions. 
1.3.1 Genre boundaries: dystopia's `matrix of amalgamates' 
To the extent that art approaches one or another of its boundaries, to that extent 
it gradually loses something of its essence and assimilates the essence of that 
which it borders upon. 
Gary S. Morson (1981) The Boundaries of Genre16 
The genre boundaries of dystopia are notoriously difficult to establish, most 
problematically where they collide and overlap with science fiction and utopia. As 
Edward Mozejko (2002) resignedly notes, `dystopian fiction does not lend itself to easy 
explanation'. He continues: 
[I]ts difficulty arises from the complexity of its matrix which amalgamates, 
as it were, a variety of narrative strategies ranging from satire and social and 
politically committed prose to utopian literature, science fiction, fantasy, 
and the absurd. It is placed at the intersection of all these generic paradigms, 
and with its futurological mind-set remains on the fringe of science fiction 
and as part of speculative literature. 
(Mozejko 2002)' 
Dystopia's `matrix of amalgamates' extends outward to include fable, allegory, and, in 
the case of Orwell's much alluded-to, re-interpreted, and adapted Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
even myth. Classification of the genre of dystopia has been examined at length, often in 
a quest to delineate absolute boundaries capable of unambiguous definition. Ultimately, 
however, most attempts are confounded by the complexity and heterogeneity of 
dystopia, and result in necessarily ambivalent categorisations, such as Gary Saul 
Morson's `threshold' or `boundary' works (1981: x), Baccolini's `genre-blurring' 
(2000: 13-34), and Moylan's `hybrid textuality' (2000: 147). In practice, it seems many 
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works of dystopian fiction may feasibly belong to more than one of Mozejko's 
intersecting categories concurrently. Since neither narratology nor genre classifications 
are the primary focus here, I consider genre only as a means to define the term dystopia 
more precisely as it pertains to this study. In succeeding sections, I pay close attention 
to the two most blurred boundaries: firstly, that separating dystopia from utopia, where 
it would seem that contradictory and mutually exclusive genre-categorising 
characteristics must exist between such polarised concepts (§1.3.2); secondly, that - if 
any such boundary exists - between dystopia and science fiction (§ 1.3.3). Prior to that, 
however, I shall consider the above-mentioned `intersections' with other genres, since a 
preliminary survey of these associations will clarify the understanding of dystopia that 
informs this work. Since the genres most closely allied to dystopia often incorporate 
treatments of language specific to, or characteristic of, their own genre - science fiction 
being a prime example (see §3.3.1) - it is important to the central aims of this study to 
differentiate, as far as is possible, between those other genres and what might be termed 
dystopia proper. 
Of those categories mentioned above, the `amalgamates' which are reciprocally 
inclusive in terms of dystopian genre classification include satire, allegory, and 
speculative fiction; indeed, Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and Atwood's The 
Handmaid's Tale and Oryx and Crake, each of which is treated in subsequent chapters, 
fit unequivocally into these categories. Satire, as a literary convention which exposes, 
ridicules, and derides the failings of people, institutions, and cultures, perfectly 
accommodates the dystopist's compulsion to depict societal shortcomings. 18 Allegory, 
likewise, covers and discovers co-existent layers of meaning beneath the obviously 
visible in much the same way that dystopia conventionally embodies correspondences 
between its internal concerns and their external manifestations. Of particular 
significance to this study is the co-classification of dystopian fiction with speculative 
fiction. Dystopia, in its very nature, is a genre marked by its speculative impulse - 
whether speculative is conceived either as deeply contemplative or as conjecturally 
extrapolative - and this particular aspect of genre classification will substantially inform 
the discussions of language in subsequent chapters. Satire, allegory, and speculative 
fiction, then, are subsumed within the conception of dystopia that underpins this study; 
moreover, each admits of, and indicates, the essential connections to an underlying 
sense of `place' as outlined above. 
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Fantasy, fable, myth, and the absurd, however, conspicuously lack the 
conjunctions with `place' that are so crucial to the definition of dystopia. Each of these 
categories may include fictional works which feature a significant dystopian element, 
but their delimiting conditions of genre definition render them discrepant with the 
dystopian genre per se. Fantasy, for example, routinely admits within its boundaries the 
impossible, the magical, and the supernatural; dystopia seldom does. Philip Pullman's 
`His Dark Materials' trilogy (Northern Lights (1995), The Subtle Knife (1997), and The 
Amber Spyglass (2000)), for example, is routinely read as dystopian children's 
literature. Yet, given that these narratives incorporate soul-eating Spectres, angels, and 
daemons which exist in worlds accessed through a `patch' which enables the 
protagonist to step `through the hole in the fabric of this world and into another' (The 
Subtle Knife (1997: 16)), they belong more definably to the genre of fantasy than they 
do to the genre of dystopia. 19 That is not to say a significant dystopian element does not 
permeate these texts; clearly it does, but I would suggest that the otherworldly fantastic 
elements exceed and subsume the dystopian elements, thus locating these texts 
generically more within fantasy than dystopia. Nevertheless, I acknowledge the `fuzzy' 
nature of the boundary between these two genres, and would suggest that to regard them 
as gradable, along a continuum from fantasy-dystopia to dystopia-fantasy might provide 
a workable solution. Pullman's trilogy, according to these criteria, might be usefully 
positioned as fantasy-dystopia, while the other end of the scale, where dystopia is 
predominant, would accommodate, for example, Doris Lessing's The Memoirs of a 
Survivor (1974). Lessing's text features a protagonist who, like Will in The Subtle 
Knife, enters a different time-space continuum by transcending physical barriers in the 
known world; unlike Will, however, Lessing's protagonist returns frequently to the 
novel's `real world', and reflects on a reality that is identifiably consistent with our 
own. I elaborate on the conception of more and less `reality-bound' in § 1.3.3; 
meanwhile, I reiterate that the understanding of dystopia I adhere to throughout this 
study takes as axiomatic the existence of a recognisable, textually evinced `place' in the 
form of a 'dis-placement of our reality' (Stockwell 2000: 211); hence only those fantasy 
narratives at the dystopia-fantasy limit of the spectrum are considered here. 
Returning to fable, myth, and the absurd as `intersections' with dystopia, I 
would indicate that, again, these genres, like fantasy, demonstrate an absence of a 
concretising `real' location; in addition, each has a specific narrative strategy that 
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distances it from dystopia. Fable, like dystopia, didactically conveys a lesson; but 
unlike dystopia, it is incumbent on the fabular tale to conclude with a moral, precept, or 
aphorism. Dystopia, characteristically, ends without resolution, leaving an open play of 
possibilities, and thus encouraging the reader to contemplate its contingency. L. P 
Hartley's Facial Justice (1960), often considered dystopian, counters this principle - its 
protagonist, Jael 97 conquers, eradicates, and supplants the totalitarian `Dictator' - and 
it is this plot conclusion which ultimately brings into question the novel's dystopian 
classification; indeed, in his introduction to the 1987 Oxford Classics edition, Peter 
Quennell amends his categorisation of the text from `tale' to `fable' (Quennell 1987: 5). 
Similarly, Orwell's Animal Farm (1945), subtitled A Fairy Story, exhibits a morally 
didactic and decisive ending, thus rendering it more fable than dystopia; yet despite this, 
its dystopian elements cannot be denied. As with the category of fantasy, above, this 
assimilation of non-dystopian characteristics does not preclude a text from including 
significant elements of dystopia; instead, it suggests an alternative primary genre 
categorisation, with dystopia as an ancillary - rather than principal - genre designation. 
Myth, as a generic order, has interesting intersections with dystopia: each serves 
as a means of accounting for the imperfections of humanity; each expresses 
fundamental truths about existence; each invites a new or metaphorical understanding of 
culture and society. Additionally, dystopia's peculiar relationship to time, 
encompassing past, present, and future, is perhaps most closely reflected in the 
`universal' qualities of myth. These correspondences notwithstanding, there are 
consequential differences between the two genres that make myth incompatible with the 
definition of dystopia used here. Once again, the main obstacle is discovered in 
dystopia's categorical insistence on establishing its narrative in relation to a tangible 
`place'. Throughout this study, the texts discussed are demonstrably located in, or 
around, twentieth-century Western societies; myth, however, requires no such historical 
anchorage; although it often purports to take place in the past, myth also can have a 
timeless and placeless quality, evincing a classic and multiform mode of existence. A 
given dystopia does, however, if subjected to the re-tellings, adaptations, and varying 
interpretations that distinguish myth, have the potential to develop into something 
approaching the mythical: aspects of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, arguably, have 
already attained mythical status. The novel's depiction of `doublethink', for example, 
has transformed into the present-day `doublespeak'; `Big Brother' and `Room 101' have 
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been adapted to name television programmes; and the adjective Orwellian connotes any 
authoritarian intrusion into privacy and liberty. Since both forms - dystopia and myth - 
centrally concern extreme or undesirable aspects of humanity, these convergences are 
probably quite unremarkable; indeed, to read dystopia as the contemporary equivalent 
of myth would be a productive interpretive convention. 20 However, the focus on 
dystopia's dependence on a particularised `place' throughout this study precludes such a 
reading. 
To make a distinction between dystopia and the absurd also necessitates 
consideration of dystopia's location in relation to some kind of reality. Moreover, it 
requires an understanding of the absurd as located in incomprehensible unreality. 
Additionally, the two genres diverge through their contrary presentation of purpose: 
dystopia manifests the purposeful, while the absurd exposes the purposeless. 21 Franz 
Kafka's The Trial (1925) exemplifies both the unreality and the purposelessness of the 
absurd, even while revealing recurrent dystopian elements. Josef K's arrest, trial, and 
punishment in The Trial are markedly congruent with the circumstances of Winston 
Smith's corresponding experiences in Nineteen Eighty-Four, which suggests that the 
two texts share a dystopian motivation. Yet, while the effect of totalitarian authority is 
seen equally in both texts, the rationale behind this authority is entirely absent from 
Kafka's work; there is never, at any point, any construction of a higher purpose 
impelling Josef K's trial. Also entirely absent from The Trial is any discernible sense of 
geographical or temporal location: the narrative pointedly declines to situate itself 
beyond vague and indeterminate references such as `one morning', `the street', and `the 
courtroom'. As with fantasy, fable, and myth, the absurd discloses the conventions of 
its dominant genre in such a way as to subordinate its dystopian elements. While the 
existence of such dystopian elements encourages `intersections' of these disparate 
genres with dystopia, they deflect - or at least discourage - such texts' inclusion in any 
postulated unalloyed dystopian `canon'. 
The `intersections' that Mozejko observes of dystopia with science fiction and 
utopian literature are somewhat more intricate, and are examined in more detail in 
§ 1.3.2 and § 1.3.3 respectively. His remaining category - `social and politically 
committed prose' - is one where some clarification would help specify the range of this 
study. Firstly, I note that, in its very temperament, all dystopian literature is inevitably 
socially and politically committed. But since there exist many other forms of socially 
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and politically committed prose, I realise that this area is potentially burdened with 
associations I would wish to avoid here. By way of an example, Steven Carter's (2000) 
A Do-It-Yourself Dystopia: The Americanization of Big Brother typifies socially and 
politically committed prose in a form which sets it beyond the scope of this study. This 
text, which considers, among other issues, the economic and social ramifications of the 
loss of individual freedoms in America today, aims, with reference to Orwell's Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, `to search for hidden oligarchies of the American self' 2000: back cover). 
While it is clearly socially and politically committed in its subject material, it is 
fundamentally non-fictional commentary mediated through a fictional dystopian focus: 
its constituent essays examine contemporary American society not as a literary 
construct, but as it exists as an actuality. Although I have already stressed the 
importance of dystopia's relationship to `place', crucially, it is the dis-location, or 
alienation of a recognisable `place' which contributes so profoundly to identification of 
the genre; any literal, accurate presentation of place as a present social reality lacks the 
imaginative dis-placement that characterises dystopia. 
The genre's amalgamation with allegory, to which I refer above, perhaps best 
elucidates the distinction between the dystopian treatment of socio-political issues and 
their realisation in other literary or non-literary forms. That the dystopian alternative 
social realities are temporally and spatially dislocated imaginary constructs - albeit 
intimately attuned to actual societies, events and trends in their authors' historical 
spacetime - is essentially allegorical, and encourages the reader's comprehension, 
assimilation, and subsequent transposition of correspondences and parallels between the 
textual and the material worlds. 22 This allegorical impetus bolsters dystopian fictions' 
sustained relevance and enables interpretations of the reader's base-reality mediated 
through the allegory. As Moylan notes, dystopian fiction invokes enlightening 
connections `between an individual reader's limited perspective, the estranged re-vision 
of the alternative world on the pages of a given text, and the actually existing society' 
(2000: xvii). Andrew Stone (2003) provides just such a topical - and allegorical - 
interpretation of Orwell's dystopia, and considers a range of what he suggests are 
`features of Nineteen Eighty-Four which should give the modern reader pause for 
thought'. He continues: 
The use of torture in a legal vacuum should remind us of the plight of 
`enemy combatants' held indefinitely and in legal limbo by the US at 
Guantanamo and Bagram, as well as the `terrorist suspects' denied due 
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process in Britain [... ]. This is a richly detailed vision of a society we should 
all want to avoid. 
(Stone 2003)23 
In Stone's analysis, the allegory inscribed in Orwell's delineation of Winston Smith's 
treatment in `Room 101' commutes, over half a century later, into a critique of 
contemporary `torture in a legal vacuum' at Guantanamo and Bagram, and silently 
appeals to the web of associative connotations encrypted in that allegory. It is precisely 
what Moylan terms the `estranged re-vision' (2000: xvii) of socio-political issues in 
dystopian fiction which creates its allegorical possibilities; non-fictional accounts are 
neither `estranged', nor are they `re-visions'. Victoria Brittain and Gillian Slovo's 
(2004) dramatisation Guantanamo: `Honor Bound to Defend Freedom', for example, 
transcribes interviews with detainees held at Guantanamo Bay (and their families) and 
reproduces letters, political debate, and legal opinion. Like those narratives emerging 
from within Eastern bloc societies discussed in Dystopian Fiction East and West: 
Universe of Terror and Trial (2001), Guantanamo depicts torture and oppression under 
a totalitarian regime as `a nightmare world [... ] experienced as a historical reality' 
(Gottlieb 2001: 17), but, unlike those narratives, Guantanamo is not fiction: it is 
testimony. In consequence of its verbatim reportage, it is essentially literal rather than 
metaphorical, and thus lacks the necessary figurative, allegorical, dystopia-defining 
distance. Political and social accounts which focus on factual, extant circumstances are 
non-fictional; dystopia is always fictional. 24 Dystopia, like utopia, `distinguishes itself', 
as Kumar confirms, `from other forms of [... ] society, and from other forms of social 
and political theory, by being in the first place a piece of fiction' (1991: 20). The 
conception of dystopia in this thesis solely pertains to fictional representations; I refer to 
dystopia here only insofar as it is understood to indicate the literary genre. 
The foregoing assessment of some of dystopia's complex `matrix of 
amalgamates' at their intersections with the other genres suggests a `cline of dystopian- 
ness', or a `relative dystopianity', which admits those texts revealing dystopian elements 
toward its lower reaches, but reserves its upper extent for those texts which cannot 
readily be appropriated by other genres. Throughout this study I focus primarily on 
those texts at the most unequivocally dystopian extreme of the scale; however I 
occasionally include discussion and analysis of some of those texts whose predominant 
genre classification lies elsewhere. The often-significant dystopian elements contained 
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in such texts render them suitable examples for an examination of their presentation of 
language, even if only as a means of comparison with more manifestly dystopian texts. 
1.3.2 Utopian boundaries: `a matter of point of view' 
Like all walls it was ambiguous, two-faced. What was inside it and what was 
outside it depended upon which side of it you were on. 
Ursula K. le Guin (1974) The Dispossessed 
Before examining the boundary between dystopia and utopia, it is necessary to point out 
that I follow Sargent (1999) in accepting all dystopias and all utopias as variants of his 
superordinate classification utopianism, or `social dreaming' (Sargent 1999: 1). 25 
Within utopianism, Sargent includes utopia, eutopia, dystopia, utopian satire, anti- 
utopia, and critical utopia (Claeys & Sargent 1999: 1-2), and uses the superordinate 
term to indicate `the imaginative projection, positive or negative, of a society that is 
substantially different from the one in which the author lives', the `primary 
characteristic' of which is `its nonexistence combined with a topos -a location in time 
and space', which must be `recognizably good or bad to the intended reader' (1999: 
1). 26 While accepting utopianism as a formal `umbrella-genre', I focus here exclusively 
on those texts which, in Sargent's terms would be `negative' and `recognizably bad to 
the intended reader': that is to say, dystopias. However, even within this narrowed- 
down field, the definition - and the distinction - between dystopia itself and its fellow 
sub-genres of utopianism is somewhat problematic; not least insofar as its situation and 
interpretation remains dependent on what Sargent terms the `intended reader'. 
The boundary between utopia and dystopia is indistinct, mutable, or contingent, 
in the view of those critics who consider the differentiation dependent on the relative 
critical positioning of the `intended reader'. In his 1965 essay, `Varieties of Literary 
Utopias', Northrop Frye expressed the belief that `what is a serious utopia to its author, 
and to many of its readers, could be read as a satire by a reader whose emotional 
attitudes were different' (1973 [1965]: 29). 7 Similar views are often seen: Kumar, for 
example, suggests that `anti-utopian satire can be read as utopia by those so minded' 
(1987: 105); while Lucy Sargisson notes not only that `one man's dream may be 
another's nightmare', but also that `feminists have pointed out that men's utopias are 
often women's dystopias'. 28 Anna Vaninskaya considers this confusion axiomatic: `that 
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one person's utopia can act as another's dystopia', she notes, `is a fundamental paradox 
of utopian thought' (2003: 83). 
These comments suggest that the reader's subjective judgement - his or her 
beliefs, opinions, and values - constitute the determining factor in distinguishing 
dystopia from utopia generically. John Carey would seem to corroborate this 
`viewpoint' approach when he insists that `dystopia is merely a utopia from another 
point of view' (1999: xii). Robert M. Philmus expresses much the same idea: `the 
difference between utopia and dystopia', he summarily states, `finally comes down to a 
matter of point of view' (quoted in Moylan 2000: 312n). If it is the constitution, 
governance, or ideological basis of the dystopian society itself that is being judged, it 
seems reasonable to assume that individual readers may come to different 
interpretations of whether this is a good (utopian) or bad (dystopian) system in 
principled accordance with their personal beliefs, opinions, or values. Carey favours 
this rationalisation, explaining that 'Orwell's Big Brother or the directors of Huxley's 
Brave New World [... ] are utopians in their own eyes' (1999: xii)29 Thus, in Carey's 
purview, a reader with a predisposition for insensate hedonism might perceive the 
society of Huxley's Brave New World as conceptually better than the society in which 
that reader lives, and therefore view it as utopian, despite its more prevalent reception as 
dystopian. Certainly, the opposite can be true: in spite of B. F. Skinner's assertions that 
his Walden Two (1948) was conceived and written as a utopia, it is `received by most 
readers as decidedly dystopian or even anti-utopian' (Moylan 2000: 73). Ultimately, 
these critical positions allow that different readers will read a text differently, which 
may well be true; however, for the purposes of this study, I shall focus on the stylistics- 
based notion of `point of view' as a functional basis upon which to build a generic 
distinction that allows for - and, to an extent, accounts for - this readerly disparity. 
Katie Wales defines point of view (in the context of its stylistic function in 
narrative fiction) as a concept which: 
entails not only the presence of a conceptualising character or focalizer, but 
also a particular way of conceptualising a world-view or ideology, whether 
the focalizer is a character or an implied author. 
(Wales 2001: 307) 
The `conceptualising character', orfocaliser is central to the understanding of what Paul 
Simpson (1993) calls `a projection of positions and perspectives' and `a way of 
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communicating attitudes and assumptions' (1993: 2). 0 It is also, I claim here, central to 
the understanding of whether a text is primarily utopian or primarily dystopian. The 
narrative `mood', or `psychological point of view' (Simpson 1993: 33), is always 
communicated through a character (or characters) representing the focalisation of the 
narrative. In dystopian fiction, focalisation is invariably through a character (or 
characters) positioned peripherally to the controlling structures, but always close 
enough to be directly affected by the actions of those in control. Winston Smith, the 
protagonist of Nineteen Eighty-Four, for example, occupies this mid-level estranged- 
yet-entangled situation: connected sufficiently to the Party to be to some extent aware of 
its machinations, yet externalised enough to be disaffected. The details of the fictive 
world that the reader of Nineteen Eighty-Four must assimilate are presented exclusively 
through Winston as the focalising character. As Roger Fowler (1995) has established, 
the whole text `is communicated through the sensations and thoughts of Winston Smith, 
without any authorial commentary [... ]. The reader is told things that s/he did not 
know, but nothing that Winston could not have known' (1995: 186-7). Given that 
focalisation, as Wales notes, inevitably entails an ideological perspective, the reader of a 
utopia or dystopia is drawn to an interpretation of the relative merits of the society (that 
is to say, its degree of dys- or u-topianism) by way of a narrative mediated through the 
ideological standpoint of this (usually malcontent) part-informed observer. 31 
If, then, the generic distinction between utopia and dystopia is based on readers' 
evaluation of the society as mediated through the ideological stance of the focalising 
character(s), rather than being based on an interpretation of the ideological stance of the 
societal infrastructure, it seems likely that there might be a higher incidence of 
agreement between readers as to whether a given text is utopian or dystopian. This 
hypothesis is the subject of an undeveloped reader-response pilot study I conducted in 
May 2003 with student-participants who had read Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and 
Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale (see Appendix I). 32 These participants were asked to 
consider eight characters in turn from each novel, and rank on a 1-5 scale how dystopian 
or utopian they (as readers) judged the society to be when viewed from the perspective 
of each character. Nineteen Eighty-Four's focaliser, Winston Smith, was allotted 
values of 1 or 2 (1 = completely dystopian, 2= mostly dystopian) by all respondents, as 
was The Handmaid's Tale's first-person narrator and focaliser, Offred. These results 
quite clearly demonstrate that readers are unified in their reception of these texts as 
26 
dystopian when viewed from the focaliser's perspective. However, when the 
participants responded to the same question in relation to characters who were 
identifiably part of the controlling powers, responses varied across the scale. Two 
characters from Nineteen Eighty-Four - Big Brother and O'Brien - evoked strong 
responses at both extremes of the continuum, and the same is true of Aunt Lydia and the 
Commander from The Handmaid's Tale. In most cases, readers' opinions are polarised 
at 1 (completely dystopian) and 5 (completely utopian), but all rankings from 1-5 were 
given to these representatives of the oppressive state. 
From these results, it would appear that the more closely a character is allied to 
the political structures of control, the more divergent the readers' judgement of where 
that character should be placed on the utopia - dystopia continuum. This suggests that 
it is the readers' appraisal of the overarching political structures that corresponds with 
the mutability and contingency identified by the above-mentioned commentators: while 
readers are unanimous in their response to the relative positioning of the focalising 
character, such difference of opinion as occurs is focused on the representatives of the 
controlling state apparatus. I would further suggest that those readers who accord a 
ranking at the `completely dystopian' extent of the spectrum here are likely to regard the 
text as unequivocally dystopian (especially given that this would be together with a 
`completely or mostly dystopian' reading of the focalising character's position). 
However, a ranking at the `completely utopian' end of the scale for the controlling 
power would explain much of the critical indeterminacy. In those cases where a reader 
allots a `completely or mostly dystopian' ranking to the focalising character, but also 
evaluates the representatives of the governing body as `completely or mostly utopian', 
there is potential for some generic confusion. 
The utopia-dystopia distinction, it would appear, relies less on the critical 
positioning of the reader, and more on the critical positioning of the focalising 
character: thus, his or her point of view. This remains true of a text with multiple 
focalisation. Brave New World, as an example, features several focalisers, including 
Bernard Marx, Lenina Crowne, and John the Savage. While variant ideological 
perspectives are revealed as a result of this shifting focalisation, all these characters are 
in some way disadvantaged by the command of the World Controllers, and all occupy a 
similar peripheral position in relation to the central governing structure. Despite the 
multiplicity of focalisation, the essential dystopia-defining pattern remains constant 
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across these focalisers: they all experience some constraint of freedom, individuality, or 
expression which is attributable to the system under which they live, and which they 
communicate - always negatively - via their focalising position, to the reader. 
This focaliser-centred approach may also help to disambiguate the reception of 
texts such as Walden Two, which, in authorial intention is entirely utopian, but in 
reception, more often dystopian. Walden Two is a planned community governed by the 
principles of behaviourism. The novel's focalising character, Professor Burris, is one of 
a party visiting the commune, and, from the outset, Burris adopts a sceptical attitude 
toward the behaviourist ethos described by Frazier, the community's architect and 
spokesperson. Burris's colleague and fellow visitor, Castle, is more than sceptical: he is 
appalled by the psychological manipulation and behavioural conditioning that 
characterises Walden Two, and believes Frazier is guilty of `one of the most diabolical 
machinations in the history of mankind' (Walden Two, p. 252). Because the focalising 
character - Burris - takes the role of problematiser himself, pointing out inadequacies in 
the system, and because the more aggressive problematising of Castle is mediated 
through Burris' focalisation, the inherent world-view and ideology of these characters 
inevitably colours the readers' perception of the community. Burris' and Castle's 
negative view of Walden Two dominates the narrative; it is only towards the end of the 
final chapter that Burris unexpectedly capitulates, and returns to live at the commune 
(Castle, however, remains unconvinced). Until that point of the narrative is reached, the 
reader has received only the negative perspective of his focalisation, which must 
contribute to the widespread reception of this intended utopia as dystopian. 
As Philmus states above, the distinction between utopia and dystopia `finally 
comes down to a matter of point of view'. Having based the utopia-dystopia distinction 
I use in this study on a consideration of the point of view of the readers taking part in 
the 2003 pilot study, I use the perspective - and point of view - of the focalising 
character(s) as a guiding principle in the selection of texts here. Where the focalising 
character is in some definable way disadvantaged by the society in which he or she is 
located - and, importantly, sees him- or herself as disadvantaged -I consider the text 
dystopian rather than utopian. Nevertheless, these selection criteria are not used entirely 
without qualification: I realise that this approach is not impermeable. The possibility 
still remains for a reader to evaluate the ideological doctrine of the fictional society as 
positive or ideal, and hence deem the text utopian, not least because, as Morson argues, 
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`genre does not belong to texts alone, but to the interaction between texts and a 
classifier' (1981: viii) [original emphasis]. 
1.3.3 Science Fiction Frontiers 
[T]he same word, or the same concept in most cases, means very different 
things when used by differently situated persons. 
Karl Mannheim (1936) Ideology and Utopia 
Any attempt to delineate dystopia generically must acknowledge its evident 
intersections with science fiction; any attempt to define the nature, extent, and position 
of boundaries between the two forms, however, must also acknowledge the inherent 
indeterminacy, inconstancy, and contradictions that characterise such an undertaking. 
To be able to speak of `science fiction' and `dystopia' as discrete forms suggests the 
presence of discernible boundaries, but my approach here is to accept such boundaries 
as exist as dynamic and provisional. This is, in no small part, because science fiction as 
a genre continues to engage in an endeavour to define itself, and, as John Clute and 
Peter Nicholls report, `no one has yet emerged with a prescription sufficiently inclusive 
to satisfy all or even most readers' (1999: 313). Darko Suvin has been foremost among 
those who have striven to define the limits of science fiction: since the early seventies, 
Suvin has persistently pursued incontrovertible generic distinctions. In his (1979) 
Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre, 
Suvin outlines the most influential and enduring definition of science fiction, which he 
states thus: 
[A] literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the 
presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose main 
formal device is an imaginative framework alternative to the author's 
empirical environment . 
(Suvin 1979: 7-8) 
In positing science fiction as the literature of `cognitive estrangement' (1979: 4), Suvin 
amply defines the understanding of science fiction which informs this study; I shall 
return to this aspect in chapter two, where I consider its implications in more detail. 
More pressing here, however, is the question of distinguishing dystopia - as an element 
of utopianism - from the science fiction field in toto. Suvin's delineation above would 
clearly encompass utopianism; similarly, his more nuanced definition of the formal 
properties of science fiction makes no distinction between the two: 
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[Science fiction] should be defined as a fictional tale determined by the 
hegemonic literary device of a locus and/or dramatis personae that (1) are 
radically or at least significantly different from the empirical times, places, 
and characters of "mimetic" or "naturalist" fiction, but (2) are nonetheless-- 
to the extent that [science fiction] differs from other "fantastic" genres, that 
is, ensembles of fictional tales without empirical validation--simultaneously 
perceived as not impossible within the cognitive (cosmological and 
anthropological) norms of the author's epoch. 
(Suvin 1979: viii) [original emphasis] 
Insofar as utopia and dystopia consistently illustrate a `fictional tale' based on `a locus 
[... ] significantly different from the empirical times [... ] nonetheless [... ] not impossible 
within the cognitive [... ] norms of the author's epoch', this definition would appear to 
subsume utopianism entirely. Later in the same work, Suvin's attempt to clarify the 
relationship results in more, rather than less, entanglement, since he states that science 
fiction is `collaterally descended from utopia [... ] if not a daughter, yet a niece of utopia' 
(1979: 61), which seems to position science fiction as a sub-genre of utopianism; yet, he 
also believes that the growth of science fiction has resulted in its `englobing of utopia' 
(1979: 61). Only retrospectively, he argues, can utopia be positioned as the 
`sociopolitical subgenre of science fiction' (1979: 61) [original emphasis]. This 
apparent confusion typifies science fiction's attempts to locate its own boundaries: 
defined too narrowly, they exclude works which would justify inclusion; yet defined too 
broadly, they include works which belong, generically, elsewhere. 33 
Veronica Hollinger questions what she sees as a `lack of consensus' in the field, 
asking: `is sf a narrative genre? a field of discourse? a mode of thinking? a body of 
literary texts? [... ] Where exactly are its borders (does it have borders)? ' (1999: 238). 
Patrick Parrinder responds to Hollinger, saying: 
In fact, the lack of consensus within SF studies (and also utopian studies) is 
not a sign of scholarly anarchy, still less of a malfunction within these 
disciplines. Rather, it reflects the presence of different critical communities 
with their own distinctive values, interests and priorities. 
(Parrinder 2000: 2) 
While agreeing with Parrinder's views here - and anticipating my own limiting of the 
field to a small corner of science fiction -I remain aware of Ruth Levitas' astute remark 
that `there is a temptation to try to delimit the field [of utopia] to one's own area of 
interest and set up boundaries which exclude large areas of material as not properly 
utopian' (1990: 4). Nevertheless, given the changeable outline of science fiction, the 
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potential immensity of its field, and the disputable nature of its many conjunctions and 
disjunctions across and between its boundaries and borders with utopia and dystopia, 
some limiting of the scope is indicated for the purposes of this study. 
Returning briefly to Hollinger's questions of consensus: in the same essay she 
proceeds by asking `When, if ever, should we call it science fiction, speculative fiction, 
sf? ' (1999: 238). This, as with many other questions, occupies commentators, critics, 
and writers of science fiction; again, it would seem to be an area where unanimity is 
absent. My intention here is to take advantage of the term speculative fiction, since it 
ties that section of the genre I examine to a more reality-bound model. Furthermore, 
this term parallels, and supports many of the linguistic concerns I treat here. From 
within the science fiction domain Judith Merril formulates a detailed definition of what 
constitutes speculative fiction; one which effectually enables and encourages the 
intersections and imbrications of dystopia with speculative fiction: 
Speculative fiction: stories whose objective is to explore, to discover, to 
learn, by means of projection, extrapolation, analogue, hypothesis-and- 
paper-experimentation, something about the nature of the universe, of man, 
or `reality' [... ]. I use the term `speculative fiction' here specifically to 
describe the mode which makes use of the traditional `scientific method' 
(observation, hypothesis, experiment) to examine some postulated 
approximation of reality, by introducing a given set of changes - imaginary 
or inventive - into the common background of `known facts'. 
(Merril, reproduced in Clute & Nicholls 1999: 312) 
Merril's definition of speculative fiction embraces several consonances with the 
interpretation of dystopia that underpins this study, while de-prioritising - or at least, 
allowing the side-stepping of - the more outlandish, unearthly or extra-terrestrial 
excesses typically found in the outer, most otherworldly, reaches of science fiction. Her 
identification of `projection' and `extrapolation' as being central to the ways in which 
readers might `explore', `discover', and `learn' - in other words, gain a new perspective 
on - `the nature of the universe' and "reality", is particularly relevant here, while her 
opinion that this is facilitated by way of an examination of `some postulated 
approximation of reality' goes right to the very heart of the dystopian proposition. In 
addition, as Clute and Nicholls point out, Merril's definition shifts the emphasis 
somewhat from `science itself to the idea of extrapolation', which enables a wider view 
of the genre to `depict social change without necessarily making much fuss over 
scientific development' (1999: 312). 
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In arriving at the view of speculative fiction - albeit not entirely indivisibly from 
science fiction - as that which bounds and encloses dystopia, I have been influenced by 
the views of Margaret Atwood, whose (ongoing) dialogue and debate with the science 
fiction community has largely clarified my own approach to the issue. Since Atwood is 
the author of two of the primary texts considered in later chapters: The Handmaid's 
Tale and Oryx and Crake, and since these texts, as dystopias, occupy exactly that 
professedly indeterminate generic area around and between science fiction and 
speculative fiction, I shall trace the author's vigorous justification of her decision to 
classify her works as speculative fiction - in preference to science fiction - as a means 
to demonstrate the more reality-bound nature of the former. 
In 1987, Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale was presented with the Arthur C. 
Clarke Award for `Best Science Fiction Novel of the Year', and was shortlisted for the 
Science Fiction and Fantasy Writers of America's `Nebula Award'. Despite this 
acknowledgement from within science fiction, Atwood elected to remain outside the 
classification; when asked (of The Handmaid's Tale), `Is it science fiction? ', she 
responded resolutely: 
No, it certainly isn't science fiction. Science fiction is filled with Martians 
and space travel to other planets, and things like that. That isn't this book at 
all. The Handmaid's Tale is speculative fiction in the genre of Brave New 
World and Nineteen Eighty-Four. Nineteen Eighty-Four was written not as 
science fiction but as an extrapolation of life in 1948. So, too, The 
Handmaid's Tale is a slight twist on the society we have now. 34 
With these remarks Atwood begins to make the distinction upon which she later 
elaborates: speculative fiction, in her view is reality-bound, connected extrapolatively to 
the historical spacetime of the author (here, both Orwell's `life in 1948' and her own 
contemporary `society we have now'); whereas science fiction, encompassing alien life- 
forms and space travel beyond current ability, is less constrained by terrestrial 
considerations. On the publication of Oryx and Crake in 2003, Atwood reiterated this 
conviction, observing `Onyx and Crake is a speculative fiction, not a science fiction 
proper. It contains no intergalactic space travel, no teleportation, no Martians': once 
again, she emphasises the reality-bound nature of the work, noting `it invents nothing 
we haven't already invented or started to invent'. 5 Clearly, the extrapolative 
possibilities are a genre-defining aspect for Atwood; that the fictive events portrayed 
could potentially occur in the future distinguishes speculative fiction from science 
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fiction. As she confirms, `science fiction has monsters and spaceships; speculative 
fiction could actually happen'. 36 
Atwood insists on making a distinction between speculative fiction and `science 
fiction proper'. The latter, she claims, `denotes books with things in them we can't yet 
do or begin to do, talking beings we can never meet, and places we can't go' (2004: 
513). Elsewhere, she offers `things [... ] such as going through a wormhole in space to 
another universe'37 as an example of the kind of less reality-bound possibilities which 
she sees as constituent of the genre she would term `science fiction proper'. In contrast, 
Atwood maintains, speculative fiction `employs the means already more or less to hand 
and takes place on Planet Earth' (2004: 513). She cites instantiations: `such as DNA 
identification and credit cards'38 to exemplify the positively reality-bound nature of 
these Earth-bound fictions 39 
In Atwood's view, speculative fiction `can speak of what is past and passing, but 
especially of what's to come' (2004: 515). Thus, speculative fiction when realised as 
utopia or dystopia, she continues, can `explore proposed changes in social organisation 
in graphic ways, by showing what they might be like for those living under them' (ibid). 
David Ketterer responds to Atwood's rejection of science fiction in this context, saying: 
Much science fiction is indeed best read, like much satire, as an estranged or 
distorted version of the world we know. Many of the aliens of science 
fiction are best read as disguised representations of women or of oppressed 
races and classes. In this way stories about extra-terrestrials can be 
mundanely recuperated for Atwood's sense of speculative fiction. 
(Ketterer 2005: 247) 
While acknowledging that less reality-bound science fiction may also have a 
representational quality, I would remain with Atwood's distinctions - especially in 
terms of things `already more or less to hand' and located `on Planet Earth' - as being a 
workable distinction between science fiction and speculative fiction, at least insofar as it 
pertains to dystopian fiction. 40 While according with Atwood's interpretation of the 
more reality-bound nature of speculative fiction in relation to science fiction, I differ 
from her on the relative positioning of the two. Atwood sees science fiction as a sub- 
genre of speculative fiction, proposing the latter as the `tree, for which science fiction 
[and others] are the branches' (2004: 513). Conversely, I prefer to position science 
fiction as the `parent' genre, with speculative fiction an issue from that source. Once 
again, this relates to more and less reality-bound concerns: science fiction, as a super- 
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genre, may include otherworldly alien life forms; speculative fiction, as I discuss it 
above, is confined to that which relates to this planet. Further - and in the tradition of 
nesting Russian dolls -I locate dystopia as a singular scion of speculative fiction: that 
particularised realisation which concerns human-to-human interaction rather than any 
configuration of human-alien contact. 
That is not to say that dystopia does not exist outside these parameters: Suzette 
Haden Elgin's Native Tongue trilogy, for example, features human-alien contact, and 
Ursula K. le Guin's The Dispossessed includes inter-galactic space travel; that these 
texts merit consideration of their significant dystopian elements is demonstrable by any 
genre-defining criteria. However, given that the primary concern of this thesis is 
language - more specifically, English language -I confine my primary analyses to 
those dystopian texts which are explicitly situated in terrestrial English-speaking 
locations, and imply communication between human subjects. While I refer on 
occasion to less reality-bound texts - for instance, Elgin's and le Guin's cited above - 
their role is augmentative rather than elemental to the purpose in this work. As will 
become clear in the discussion of Whorfianism that follows in chapter two, the notion of 
a `native' or `habitual' natural language is central to the direction of this study, and the 
subsequent textual analyses assume an English-speaking readership. 
1.4 Dystopia, didacticism, and the reader 
I'm not trying to predict the future. I'm just doing my best to prevent it. 
Ray Bradbury (1979) Beyond 1984 
Science fiction, according to Joanna Russ, is a particularly didactic genre (1975: 113). 
Dystopia, too, as a related genre, concerns itself overtly with the communication of an 
informative and instructive message. In addition to providing a didactic focus on the 
social and the historical, these fictions repeatedly foreground the political and the 
cultural in an explicit and didactic manner. While accepting that all literature could be 
construed as didactic to some extent, I argue here for dystopia as an exceptionally 
didactic genre: a body of literature that could be categorised by its attention to 
communicating an edifying message to its readership. 1 In this respect, Sisk's opinion, 
that `[d]ystopian didacticism borders on the hortatory polemic' (1997: 7), is a view I 
share; these narratives unapologetically promulgate diverse warnings - cautions against 
rash and reckless continuance of present trends in numerous areas - yet have essentially 
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one primal objective: to prevent their envisioned future from becoming a reality. 
Dystopia's `political effect', Frederik Pohl notes, `is to show how inevitably destructive 
one possible pathway into the future might be' (1997: 9). The didactic effect toward 
which a dystopian writer strives is to prevent this `possible pathway' to the future from 
being realised: as Sisk explains: `[i]f a writer warns of a reality that may not necessarily 
exist, but which, the author fears, could come about if no action is taken, this fulfills the 
genre's didactic mission' (1997: 162). 
For Kumar, dystopia's pedagogical impulse undermines its artistic or aesthetic 
novelistic qualities, since its `didactic purpose overwhelms any literary aspiration' 
(1987: 25). To some extent, the awkwardness of reconciling didactic function within 
the dystopian form does compromise the literary potency of these works, even while it 
strengthens their cogency; plot and characterisation are somewhat subordinated to the 
demands of the 'message'. 2 There has `long been a critical tendency to see utopian and 
dystopian fiction as sacrificing artistic merit in the interest of content', Booker concedes 
(1994b: 173), but he points out also that critical dismissal of dystopian fiction can `be 
attributed partially to a bias against literary works that are socially and politically 
engaged, from an apparent belief that such engagement somehow contaminates the 
works and deprives them of their pristine literary purity' (1994b: 174). This is not a 
substantive postulate in relation to dystopian fiction in Booker's view: `such literature 
gains its principal energies precisely from its literariness', he argues, citing its `ability to 
illuminate social and political issues from an angle not available to conventional social 
theorists and critics' (1994b: 175) Furthermore, Booker claims, the didactic impulse of 
dystopian fiction renders it more, rather than less literary: 
If the main value of literature in general is its ability to make us see the 
world in new ways, to make us capable of entertaining new and different 
perspectives on reality, then dystopian fiction is not a marginal genre. It lies 
at the very heart of the literary project. 
(Booker 1994b: 176) 
While an assessment of the relative centrality of these fictions to the broad body of 
twentieth-century literature would be illuminating, such an undertaking is beyond the 
aims of this project; instead, the focus here is on what Booker identifies as a conjoint 
`value' of dystopia with other forms of literature: its capacity to `make us capable of 
entertaining new and different perspectives on reality'. In terms of its form, dystopia 
customarily foregrounds distinctly new perspectives on reality - in common, arguably, 
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with other literary modes - but in terms of its function, it diverges from these other 
modes insofar as it consistently foregrounds its didactic intent in relation to these new 
perspectives. 43 
While most commentators on dystopian fiction acknowledge its didactic 
function, the degree of consequence they accord to it varies. Parrinder's (2000) 
somewhat hesitant view is that dystopia (under the umbrella of utopia and science 
fiction), has a `commitment to visions of human transformation', and `an inherent - 
though frequently fragile, ambivalent and compromised - potential for political 
radicalism' (2000: 2). Walter E. Meyers (1980), less diffidently, claims `strong 
didacticism' is one of the `distinguishing characteristics of the genre' (1980: 4), and 
proceeds to identify a categorical distinction between didacticism of purpose and 
didacticism of method. The former - that which Meyers recognises as `a vehicle for 
arguing the author's point in just the same way that a medieval morality play or one of 
Donne's sermons does' (ibid) - is the most commonly observed incarnation of 
dystopian didacticism, and that which is the most productive conceptualisation for this 
study. The latter, which is more obviously instructional - Meyers' example takes a 
science fiction text incorporating several pages of explanation about how conjectured 
spacecraft engines function - while relevant to some degree, is less applicable in the 
current context. Didacticism of purpose alludes to the candid political and social 
designs that inhere in these texts: designs which, according to Moylan, could inspire 
readers to `think about the world in ways not sanctioned by hegemonic institutions and 
ideologies', and encourage `willing readers' to reflect on their own base-reality `with 
new or clearer perceptions' (2000: xvii). More specifically, the `purpose' of this 
didacticism for Moylan, is to `raise [readers'] consciousness about what is right and 
wrong in that world, and even to think about what is to be done, especially in concert 
with others, to change it for the better' (2000: xvii). Dystopia's didactic disposition 
makes demands of its readers that go beyond the interpretive conventions of other 
genres: it attempts to engage readers in an exacting process of triangulation between the 
world of the text, the world of their base-reality, and their perceptions of each. This 
readerly response to the texts' didacticism is termed feedback oscillation by Suvin, who 
describes it as a kind of reciprocal interchange, which `moves now from the author's 
and implied reader's norm of reality to the narratively actualized [... ] and now back 
from those novelties to the author's reality, in order to see it afresh from the new 
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perspective gained' (1979: 71). The didactic potential of these fictions is similarly 
implied in Sisk's comment that `a dystopian work fails if it does not move its reader to 
compare his or her "real world" to the fictional society and consider how the latter could 
arise from the former' (1997: 9). 
In his 1986 study, Reader in a Strange Land: The Activity of Reading Literary 
Utopias, Peter Ruppert proposes a prescriptive framework for the way `the potential 
effects of literary utopias' [... ] `ought to be inferred' by readers (1986: 5) [my 
emphasis]. Ruppert's conception of an `ideal' reader, who engages with, and responds 
to, the invitations of the text is a reader-construct bearing many similarities to Moylan's 
`willing reader' (2000: xvii): one who will receive the text as an invitation to reflect 
upon his or her own society through the medium of the fictional world, extending and 
remodelling his or her perception of his or her own society in the process. Ruppert's 
framework depends largely on the didacticism of these texts for its effectiveness: the 
reader, who is positioned in a dialectical relationship with the text, is an `active 
producer of meaning', which `grows out of the interplay between social fact and utopian 
dream' (1986: 6). Although he allows that `different readers with different priorities, 
values and ideological commitments continue to read utopias in fundamentally different 
ways' (1986: 410), he also believes that dystopia didactically implies a more desirable 
alternative to itself, `the construction of which is left up to the reader' (1986: 116). 
Moylan's and Ruppert's beliefs here represent a common - if subjective - view of 
the efficacy of dystopian didacticism in its propensity for transforming its readers' 
perceptions. Pohl relates a similarly subjective popular impression in this area: `[t]here 
are people who maintain', he notes, `that one important reason why the year 1984, when 
it came, was nothing like the one described in George Orwell's novel was because the 
novel had warned its readers of what they must do their best to avert' (1997: 9-10). 
Such views, while subjective, are not without foundation. Reader-response 
experiments, based on objective methodological procedures, reach much the same 
conclusions. Brigitte Scheele and Norbert Groeben (1986), for example, measure the 
modification of psychology students' `cognitive-reflective function' (or `knowledge 
system') before, during, and after reading utopianist works (including Skinner's Walden 
Two and le Guin's The Dispossessed). The reader - or `recipient' - in this study, 
Scheele and Groeben note, `uses models of the world of aesthetic works actively, 
constructively, deliberately, and with self-determination to broaden, to improve and to 
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change his world experience, especially in the dimension of his (cognitive) world- and 
self-view' (1986: 529). Although this study is primarily an evaluation of its own 
methodological framework, the authors report briefly on the `modifications' they find: 
`the cognitive structures of the subjects', they conclude, had become, post-reading, 
`more extensive and differentiated in content as well as in regard to formal structure' 
(1986: 547). In confirming one of the initial hypotheses of their study - that which 
proposed that `a change in the behaviour of the recipient on a long term basis inevitably 
lies in the cognitive-reflective function' (1986: 528) - Scheele and Groeben provide 
substantive evidence of the capacity of these narratives to affect readers' perceptions. 
More recently, and from a qualitative-interpretive, rather than cognitive-scientific 
point of view, Kenneth Roemer contributes an extensive empirical intervention to the 
discussion of didacticism in utopian texts. His reader-response study, Reading Utopia, 
Reading Utopian Readers (2003), attempts to determine how utopias have become 
`important agents of changed perceptions and even changed realities' for their readers, 
and to establish `the processes they use to transform authors' "temperaments" and their 
words into personalized guides and inspirations' (2003: 3). Roemer cites the `didactic, 
often prescriptive, nature of and the strong non-fictional elements in much utopian 
literature' (2003: 119) as being central to readers' responses when texts `invite 
perceptual or even behavioural changes', and to `understand how readers transform no 
place into their own someplace' (2003: 60). Having undertaken his wide-ranging and 
meticulous study with 733 respondents, one of Roemer's important findings is that, 
post-reading, `each one of the 3,158 transformative associations described [by 
participants] reflect some form of altered view of self and society' (2003: 217). These 
results, in combination with Scheele and Groeben's, supply objective, empirical, and 
material validation to support the critical contentions outlined above: hard, data-driven 
evidence to confirm that reading dystopian fiction, and responding to its didactic 
overtures, can change readers' world-view. 
The notion of dystopia as implicated in the transformation or reconstruction of 
world-view is a theme which recurs throughout this study. Given the widespread 
critical belief in the effective properties of dystopian didacticism, together with the 
empirical evidence of its affective properties, I proceed from the position that the 
genre's perception-altering faculty is self-evident. The central concern of this thesis is 
to demonstrate the ways in which language - in the genre-specific speculative and 
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reflective manifestations I identify and examine here - is implicated in, precipitates, and 
engenders dystopia's remarkable propensity to redefine readers' understanding of the 
world and their own position in relation to it. 
1.5.1 Speculative and reflective language 
For according to the outward man, we are in this world, and according to the 
inward man, we are in the inward world [... ]. Since then we are generated out 
of both worlds, we speak in two languages, and we must be understood also 
by two languages. 
Robert Bly (1967) The Light Around the Body 
Dystopia, in common with much science fiction, distinguishes itself through its 
extraordinary exposition of language: neologism in particular characterises these 
fictions, and the popular conception of such narratives often centres on what Meyers 
identifies as `the introduction of an alien word [... ] in an effort to emphasize the 
"otherness" of the society which produced it' (1980: 7). Invented language is indeed a 
prevalent aspect of the defamiliarising and estranging strategies that dystopia typically 
presents, but it is by no means the sole method of linguistically proposing the future: 
recontextualisations, relexicalisations, and unexpected collocations of language are also 
frequently employed in the attempt to depict the dystopian prospect. Nor is invention 
confined to word-level interventions in language: these occur regularly from 
morphological, through lexical, to syntactic level. These persistently recurring 
linguistic phenomena which animate and inscribe the envisioned dystopian future, and 
which I have termed speculative language, are considered at length in subsequent 
chapters. 
In addition to the language of dystopian futures, I also address the language of 
the dystopian past. For the purposes of this study, I term this reflective language. 
Under this rubric I examine the propensity of these fictions to foreground, defamiliarise, 
and estrange (ostensibly) antecedent and archaic language by incorporating it 
conspicuously within the framework provided by speculative language in such a way as 
to encourage comparisons and contrasts. Reflective language, unlike speculative 
language, seldom exhibits invention, manipulation, or transformations; instead it is 
explicitly marked by its congruence with the commonplace, the prosaic, the familiar. 
Perhaps because of this apparently unremarkable conventionality, this category of 
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language in dystopia has received less critical attention than has the speculative variety. 
I aim to redress this imbalance through my focus on it here. 
Briefly, speculative language is the language of the future, while reflective 
language is the language of the past. The language of the present is markedly absent. 
Given the distinctive treatment of time in dystopia, as discussed in § 1.2.2, the present is 
invariably the past when viewed from the perspective of the dystopian future. While the 
dystopian future is elaborately constructed, the present is merely alluded to and 
insinuated, figured as history or antiquity. As I shall argue, language, realised as the 
two distinct yet interweaving strands, one speculative and one reflective, is consequent 
to the realisation of the dystopian future and past; moreover, together, the two language 
strands comment on, and contribute toward a (re)vision of the present. 
To posit the co-occurrence of two discrete `languages' within texts written in 
English is, I realise, somewhat contentious, and is addressed further in §2.2.3, where I 
revisit the debate within stylistics surrounding the possibility of `two languages' in 
William Golding's The Inheritors. In the meantime, I proceed from the position that 
two linguistic strands are indicated in relation to dystopian fiction, even while the same 
may not be a legitimate claim for all fiction. Moreover, I accept that to persist in calling 
these discrete forms languages is arguably untenable given the utility of the term 
discourse in modem linguistics; a term which is clearly more appropriate for, and 
applicable to, the linguistic phenomena I identify. While accepting that what I term 
speculative language and reflective language should rightly be termed speculative and 
reflective discourse, I use language throughout this work both to capture the efforts and 
ideals of the authors of these fictions, and to accord with earlier critical enquiries into 
language in the genre of dystopia. The work of other critics in this field provides ample 
precedent for this approach; and although differing in some fundamental respects from 
the specific instantiations of speculative and reflective language I discuss here, these 
critics unanimously assert the co-existence of two forms (and, often, two functions) of 
language in dystopian fiction. 
In his (1979) essay, `Metalinguistics and Science Fiction', for example, Eric S. 
Rabkin makes a distinction between two languages: `the reader's language' and `the 
language of the narrator or of a character' (also figured as `English and East Martian') 
(1979: 88; 90). Only in the latter - the language of the narrator or character - can `true 
neologism' occur, Rabkin says, drawing a distinct line between this and the 
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`transformations' that are possible in the language of the reader. Using the neologism 
kemmer from le Guin's The Left Hand of Darkness to exemplify the perception-altering 
metalinguistic function of character-bound language, Rabkin proceeds to contemplate 
the `implicit claim for the reality of [le Guin's] alternative world with its alternative 
values' implicated in this invented language (1979: 88). Transformations ('mere slang 
formations from current readers' language' (1979: 89)), on the other hand, do not have 
the capacity to `engage a code of alternative values as neologism would' (ibid). 44 In 
discriminating between these two linguistic strands, Rabkin is able to isolate one as the 
singular locus of neologism which can `present us with new intellectual categories' 
(1979: 93), and the potential (albeit unrealised, he notes) for `a true alternative 
ideology' (ibis). Rabkin's `East Martian', broadly defined, has some correspondence to 
the conception of speculative language used here, insofar as it is the site of neologism, 
while his categorisation of `the readers' language' - or English - is more closely allied 
to the notion of reflective language as I outline it here. 
Ildney Cavalcanti also identifies two disparate aspects of language in her (2000) 
`Utopias of/f Language in Contemporary Feminist Literary Dystopias', where she 
outlines her approach in terms of a `linguistic struggle' enacted within feminist 
dystopias, in which language represents an `instrument of both (men's) domination and 
(women's) liberation' (2000: 152). `Off language' describes women's movement, or 
escape, from the limiting structures of spoken language, while `of language' describes 
their movement toward language as a liberating medium with the potential for effective 
resistance. Cavalcanti's conceptualisation of `off language resonates with reflective 
language to some degree, since `off' language references the desire to access a utopian 
space outside the constraining and colonising properties of the hegemonic language. 
Reflective language, as I shall elaborate, similarly opposes the oppressive linguistic 
practices of dominant dystopian orders. `Of language is evoked in Cavalcanti's 
conception by, for example, the creation of a women's language in Suzette Haden 
Elgin's Native Tongue and The Judas Rose, in which women invent new language - 
which they term `encodings' - to articulate emotions and states of being specific to 
women, and which are inexpressible within the existing resources of language. `Of 
language', in its neologising and perception-altering capacities, resonates with 
speculative language to some extent, although it differs significantly in terms of 
function. Despite functional differences, mutatis mutandis, Cavalcanti's deli tion of 
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contrary - and contrastive - linguistic utilities embodied in feminist dystopias supports 
the intention in this study to disjoin the language of the fictions considered here. 
Cavalcanti's formulation of 'of' d `off' language addresses separate language 
strands in broadly thematic terms, examining specific instantiations before drawing 
genre-wide conclusions. Raffaella Baccolini's approach to the issue of distinct 
linguistic strands is similarly focused on structural strategies and narrative form. In her 
1995 essay, "`It's not in the Womb the Damage is Done": The Construction of Gender, 
Memory, and Desire in Katherine Burdekin's Swastika Night', Baccolini argues that 
dystopian narratives are `built around the construction of a narrative [... ] and a counter 
narrative' (1995: 293n), which represent oppression and resistance, respectively. 
Within this framework, she identifies `social' and `anti-social' language, with the 
former linked to the appropriation of language by the dystopic order, and the latter 
representing a distinct reappropriation of language as a means of resistance. Baccolini's 
distinctions are particularly relevant to the conception of speculative and reflective 
language, since in many (but not all) instances, the `narrative language' she outlines is 
broadly consonant with speculative language, while the language of the `counter- 
narrative' is functionally cognate with reflective language. 
Sisk's (1997) book-length treatment of dystopian language, Transformations of 
Language in Modern Dystopias, in common with Cavalcanti's and Baccolini's 
approach, proposes functionally dissimilar languages locked in a struggle for control. 
`Twentieth-century dystopias in English universally reveal a central emphasis on 
language as the primary weapon with which to resist oppression', he argues, while 
noting that this responds to `the corresponding desire of repressive government 
structures to stifle dissent by controlling language' (1997: 2). Sisk's presentation of 
embattled, adversarial languages implies - although does not identify formally - two 
manifestations of language, one tyrannically dominant, the other repressed but 
potentially insurgent. Sisk discusses the language of power and the language of 
resistance in relation to a number of dystopian texts before continuing the metaphor of 
confrontation in his concluding remark that `we must come to understand that the 
struggle for mastery of the world boils down to mastery over the word' (1997: 180). 
Sisk, together with Rabkin, Cavalcanti, and Baccolini, distinguishes between 
two linguistic strands evident in dystopian fictions. I coincide with these commentators 
in respect of this narrative strategy, since I similarly differentiate between two layers, 
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strands, or materialisations of language in these fictions. I diverge, however, from these 
critics insofar as they consider language chiefly in terms of its literary effects, or 
function; I focus to a greater extent on the form of the language, with function as a 
consequent - although still important - aspect. Literary criticism, as evinced by the 
above, offers perceptive and workable distinctions between the interconnected threads 
of language woven through dystopian narrative, but for a more technical approach to the 
formal qualities of disparate languages, it is necessary to appeal to examinations of 
language in these fictions which originate from within the discipline of linguistics and 
the study of language. 
Among linguistic approaches to dystopia, those which segregate distinct 
language forms include Roger Fowler's delineation of anti-language in relation to 
Burroughs' Naked Lunch and Burgess' A Clockwork Orange in the chapter `Anti- 
language in Fiction' in his (1981) Literature as Social Discourse: The Practice of 
Linguistic Criticism 45 Here, Fowler traces the dialogue, or dialectic, between standard 
language and anti-language, and looks at the ways in which this creates a true 
polyphony between reality and counter-reality. 6 Although Fowler is cautious about 
expressly claiming complete separation between the two opposed strands of language 
('anti-language is a process rather than a code' he offers), he proceeds to describe it as 
`a negotiation of status, identity and ideology between an official establishment and a 
group which diverges from its norms' (1981: 157). `Negotiation', together with 
`dialogue' implicitly entail the existence of two parties; given that these are, in Fowler's 
analysis, two individual forms of language, I would make a more definite division 
between language and anti-language than he does. In this respect, my view is closer to 
that of, for instance, Brian McHale (1996) and Paul Simpson (2004). McHale claims 
anti-language is `conducting an implicit polemic against the standard language and its 
world-view. It creates in effect an "anti-world-view", a counterreality of its own that is 
dialectically related to "straight" or "official" reality' (1996: 168), while Simpson 
echoes McHale in proposing `distance' between the two forms: 
Antilanguages are the semi-secretive languages born out of subcultures and 
alternative societies. These societies, `antisocieties', are consciously 
established as alternatives to mainstream society such that their relationship 
to the dominant social order is one of resistance, even active hostility. 
(Simpson 2004: 104) 
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Both McHale and Simpson figure anti-language as an alienated and removed entity, 
confronting standard language from a position of distance and representing an 
alternative, or counter-society or reality. A similar proposition is implied, if not overtly 
stated, in Fowler's work. 
Paul Chilton also outlines a separately configured language, but rather than an 
anti-language, Chilton identifies a sub-language present in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty- 
Four. In his (1983) essay 'Orwell's Conception of Language', he notes: 
What the novel depicts is linguistic conflict, and the process of linguistic 
imposition. The linguistic divergences are, moreover, presented not as 
variant dialects [... ] but as different languages. The socio-linguistic 
position portrayed is the following: a rigid codified language which is the 
preserve of an elite, and an oral vernacular (Oldspeak) which is spoken by 
the rest. 
(Chilton 1983: 103) 
In short, these linguistic assessments of the twofold nature of language in dystopia echo 
the literary opinions in the same area, and support the intention of this work to treat 
language in dystopian fiction as comprising two disconnected - yet not entirely 
autonomous - strands: speculative and reflective language. Although both linguistic 
and literary views illustrated above have influenced the direction of this study, its 
theoretical orientation is not optimally aligned with the views of any one particular 
linguist, literary critic, or school of thought in either discipline; the aim here is to 
extend, by way of rigorous analysis of linguistic form, existing notions of the function 
of dystopia's `two languages'. 
1.5.2 Future wor(l)ds 
To portray the future in the language of the present is inevitably to betray it. 
Terry Eagleton (2005)'Just My Imagination' 
`Most dystopian fantasies', according to Gorman Beauchamp, demonstrate a `failure of 
imagination in creating a "future language": a language, that is, reflecting the specific 
reality of the projected future' (1974: 463). 47 This thesis seeks, in part, to counter 
Beauchamp's assertion by demonstrating not only that dystopia, as a genre, is 
remarkably successful in its attempts to create elements of a `future language', but also 
that, in doing so, it reflects the `specific reality' of the future in ways not sanctioned by, 
or encoded in, current standard language. 48 
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Speculative language, as I have indicated, represents the language of the future 
in dystopia. That language in the real world changes over time is axiomatic: innovation, 
change, and development modifies, supplements, and mutates our language incessantly; 
even casual observers with no formal linguistic training would be aware of new forms 
and new meanings in language emerging intermittently in their own experience as 
language users. In many ways, dystopia is an accelerated microcosmic representation of 
the process of language change, presenting new language for novel concepts where 
these concepts differ from those which are known to exist. This accounts for much of 
the neologism found in these works, and, at this rudimentary level, responds to 
Beauchamp's assertion that dystopia fails to imaginatively present a 'future language': 
patently, through its neologising strategies, it does exactly that. However, this, I 
contend, is only the surface manifestation of the dystopian language impetus; other 
genre-wide strategies contribute to dystopia's fundamentally perception-challenging - 
and perception-altering - capacity. These strategies, which, as I shall elaborate, are 
essentially linguistically encoded and realised, refute Beauchamp's secondary 
contention: that dystopian fictive language fails to reflect a `specific reality of the 
projected future'. Chapter three of this thesis outlines the importance of neologism to 
the construction of an alternative reality in dystopia; in addition it considers further 
instantiations of speculative language, all of which contribute significantly to 
understanding and reception of the projected fictive future. I group linguistic 
inventiveness in dystopian fiction into four primary categories, all of which reflect 
futurity via novelty. These can be broadly defined as new words, new meanings, new 
permutations, and new contexts. 
This emphasis on new, manipulated, or transformed language in dystopian 
fictions is often linked symbolically to representations of thought-control at the behest 
of oppressive, totalitarian, or otherwise malevolent hegemonic orders, resulting in many 
commentators' assertion that it is, at some fundamental level, indicative of, or 
implicated in, a representation of Whorfianism. Myra Barnes, for example, suggests 
`all dystopian languages involve a measure of thought control' (1974: 150), a belief 
which supports her conviction that `all dystopian languages technically belong to 
Whorf (1974: 151). My primary argument in this study coincides, to an extent, with 
such views; language in dystopia is, I agree, implicated in perception-altering fictional 
scenarios. However, in terms of speculative language, I develop this proposition in two 
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related directions: firstly, I extend critical examination of the Whorfian function within 
the confines of dystopian fiction, to account for the ways in which linguistic relativity 
impacts intra-textually on the citizens of the postulated future. In so doing, I aim to 
increment those earlier studies which identify Whorfian explanations to account for 
linguistic phenomena in dystopia, but fail to develop or effectively interrogate this 
position. Sisk's (1997) Transformations of Language in Modern Dystopias adequately 
exemplifies this critical propensity to invoke - but not substantiate - Whorfianism. Sisk 
claims, in his assessment of language in Brave New World, for example, that `John 
exemplifies Wharf's theory taken to the extremity of its conclusions' (1997: 29); of 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, he asserts that `[i]mplicitly, Newspeak depends on Benjamin 
Whorf's theory that thought depends on language' (1997: 43); while, of Elgin's Native 
Tongue and The Judas Rose, he states that the author `takes the Whorfian hypothesis to 
its logical, if grim, conclusion' (1997: 119). Sisk's comments here broadly illustrate 
literary critics' under-specification, misinterpretation, or misapplication of Whorf's line 
of reasoning, as set down in a series of essays reproduced in John B. Carroll's (1956) 
edited collection, Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee 
Whorf. Much of the analysis in subsequent chapters endeavours to amend and augment 
erroneous or insufficient applications of Whorf s theories to the language of dystopian 
fictions. 
Secondly, I consider the influence of speculative language beyond the fiction. 
Continuing to refract my exploration through a Whorfian lens, I consider the extra- 
textual implications of language on readers' perceptions and world-view. Taking into 
account the essentially didactic propensity of dystopia, and its implicit relationship with 
base-reality, I consider how far - and by what means - dystopian uses of language 
embody the potential to enable readers to re-envision their own version of reality, and 
their relationship to it. 
Under the heading of speculative language in this study I consider language 
which articulates a state or action for which there is no current straightforward linguistic 
expression. Most prevalently, this is because the futuristic setting of these fictions 
requires the communication of postulates; that is to say, they necessitate the 
verbalisation of that which has not yet come into being. In this respect, much of the 
language I consider is more extrapolative than it is speculative: it takes as its generative 
roots some aspect of the current, known language and projects, extends, or estimates 
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these foundational properties outward - or forward - in an extrapolated curve into a 
possible future world. In its most literal sense, pertaining to its origin in mathematics, 
extrapolation infers unknown values beyond data which is known by extending trends 
observable in the known data on the basis that patterns visible in that which is known 
will continue into that which is not known. To extrapolate, then, entails some known or 
observable circumstance, whereas to speculate does not (necessarily); speculation may 
be no more than conjecture. For that reason, extrapolative would more accurately 
define many of the linguistic phenomena foregrounded in dystopian narratives, given 
that most exhibit discernible connections with the author's historical spacetime, and 
would reflect also the thematic extrapolation that characterises dystopia. However, 
speculative denotes much more than simply the act of estimating: it is also synonymous 
with deeply introspective thought processes (meditative, cogitative, hypothetical, and 
theoretical, for instance, are offered by most thesauri as synonyms). It is this twofold 
meaning of speculative that I aim to take advantage of in the discussion and analyses 
which follow; a coalescence and intertwining of projected language with contemplative 
language, resulting in a linguistic contribution to dystopia which mirrors its function not 
only as a thought experiment, but also as a thought-provoking and potentially thought- 
transforming genre. Its extrapolative genesis is, however, crucial to the understanding 
of language in dystopian fiction: the origin of speculative language in the standard 
language contributes significantly to the issues of perception and world-view to which I 
later refer. Consequently, some consideration of the standard language in dystopia is 
indicated: the extant language of the author's historical spacetime, or reflective 
language. 
1.5.3 Past wor(l)ds 
Oh, snatch this relic from the wreck! the only and the last 
And cherish in your heart of hearts the language of the Past! 
Michael Mullin (1869) The Book of Irish Ballads 
While speculative language, in its diverse - and visibly foregrounded - manifestations 
is customarily associated with the literary rendering of a futuristic dystopia, the role of 
less conspicuously marked language does not usually receive so much attention. Often 
unobtrusive, and not always immediately distinguishable from the surrounding narrative 
language, reflective language subtly and symbolically determines the dystopia's 
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immediate and distant past. This intimate correlation between language and the past 
echoes - encodes, even - the distinctive dystopian relationship with historical time in all 
its complexity and convolution. 
Reflective language, as I discuss it in this study falls into two broad categories: 
that which represents the distant past and that which represents a more recent past. Of 
course, given dystopia's peculiar temporal positioning, these are necessarily imprecise 
categorisations: for instance, those dystopian fictions temporally located in an 
indeterminate future deny accurate reckoning of not just their `present', but 
concomitantly, of their contributory `pasts'. Some - Russell Hoban's Riddley Walker, 
for example - are set in a future distanced by several millennia from the contemporary 
world, while others - as illustrated by Marge Piercy's Woman on the Edge of Time, set 
in the year 2137 - are located in the relatively close future. Yet others - as famously 
instanced by Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four - are positioned in a future so close at hand 
that the calendar has now swept over, and historicised, its postulated future. However, 
while the configurations of futurity and historicity may vary, one temporal plane 
remains constant across all dystopias: the `absent' present. As noted in § 1.2.1 and 
§ 1.2.2, dystopia emphatically comments on its own present by way of offering the 
author's historical spacetime as an indefinitely remote past, as seen from a future 
standpoint. One layer of reflective language, then, is that which identifies the `present' 
in dystopia; functioning as a mirror held up to the author's time and space, this 
particular linguistic representation is a reflection of the social, political, and temporal 
conditions underlying its origin, and captures those trends and tendencies which 
concern the author in his or her world. 
The second layer of reflective language I consider here extends the dystopian 
reach back in time from the conditions of the text's composition. Focusing on the 
historical past as it appears from the viewpoint of the author's historical spacetime, this 
language represents reflections on events, conditions, beliefs, values, and 
understandings of the past, which are insinuated in, and constitutive of, the presentation 
of the fictional dystopian society. In practice, the distinction between reflections `of 
and reflections `on' is frequently indistinguishable textually; moreover, since dystopia 
often re-envisions universal or eternal notions, the margins of these reflections merge, 
and render differentiation unworkable. The understanding of reflective language, 
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therefore, as it is used throughout this study, comprises both conceptions: language as a 
reflection of, and language representing reflections on, the dystopia's multifaceted past. 
Reflective language, as noted above, is seldom marked by the linguistic novelty 
which so often identifies speculative language; this manifestation of dystopian language 
more closely mirrors the standard. However, that is not to say it is unremarkable 
(although some examples are more accessible than others). Returning to Karp's One 
and Huxley's Brave New World, for example, instances of reflective language occur in 
each in a relatively unmistakable form, quite early in the narrative. In order to 
exemplify my conception of reflective language, I offer these particularly obvious cases, 
although those I discuss in later chapters are often a great deal more understated. An 
early example in One claims the reader's attention unambiguously. The protagonist, 
Burden, while contemplating his obligatory writing of reports on unorthodoxy in the 
Church State in which he lives, muses on the purpose of this procedure: 
It had nothing to do with the punishment of heresy. Punishment. Burden 
shook his head again at his own stupidity. There was no punishment. 
Punishment, punitive - odd the way the concept kept cropping up in his 
thinking. That was done with. It no longer existed as a socially accepted 
concept. 
(One, pp. 9-10) 
This instance of reflective language is unusually evident: the word punishment is not 
only italicised, it is repeated four times in succeeding sentences, and appears together 
with its adjectival form; additionally, lest its significance be overlooked, three accounts 
of its redundancy occur almost consecutively: there `was no punishment'; it `was done 
with'; it `no longer existed as a socially accepted concept'. To conceive of a culture 
where an entire fundamental concept such as punishment `no longer exists' is to 
contend that this is a world extraordinarily distant from that which is currently known: 
essentially, a futuristic or dislocated world. However, were it the case that this was in 
fact, a world where punishment was an archaic concept, its inhabitants would be 
unlikely to find `the concept kept cropping up in [their] thinking'. Essentially, 
reflective language such as this grounds the narrative in the circumstances of its 
originating time-frame: it both reflects the fact that the concept of `punishment' exists in 
the author's historical spacetime, and reflects on (or more accurately, as I shall 
elaborate, invites the reader to reflect on) the historically enduring and prevalent nature 
of the notion. 
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A similarly prominent example of reflective language is employed early in 
Brave New World. The Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning, having introduced a 
new cohort of students to the highly mechanised human reproduction laboratories, 
begins a question-and-answer session with the students, eliciting their understanding of 
the meaning of the word `parent': 
There was an uneasy silence. Several of the boys blushed. They had not yet 
learned to draw the significant but often very fine distinction between smut 
and pure science. [... ] 
`In brief, ' the Director summed up, `the parents were the father and the 
mother. ' The smut that was really science fell with a crash into the boys' 
eye-avoiding silence. `Mother, ' he repeated loudly, rubbing in the science; 
and, leaning back in his chair, `These, ' he said gravely. `are unpleasant 
facts; I know it. But, then, most historical facts are unpleasant. ' 
(Brave New World, p. 20) 
`Parent', `father', and `mother', then, are realigned conceptually, in keeping with the 
text's thematic concerns; recontextualised in order to equate to `smut'. Parenthood is a 
concept which, in this future world, embarrasses the students sufficiently to cause 
blushing and discomfort. Like `punishment' in Karp's text, `parent' has been 
conceptually challenged here; moreover, it is overtly referred to as an `unpleasant [... ] 
historical fact', emphasising its obsolescence, or archaic status, in terms of the novel's 
time-frame. Within the same stretch of text, `viviparous' is positioned as a similarly 
discomfiting concept, while a student's attempt to engage with such outdated historical 
notions sees his use of `decanted' corrected to `born' to stress the distinction between 
the world of A. F. 632 and Huxley's historical spacetime. This particular instantiation of 
reflective language, foregrounded in the characters' dialogue, confronts and 
defamiliarises the customary notions of natural reproduction and parenthood. More 
subtly, a second concept is being reflected upon here: the intervening narrative 
instigates the dystopian rationale underlying Brave New World by supplanting the 
concept of parenthood with the concept of science. Three illustrative examples of this 
displacement occur in this extract: 
very fine distinction between smut and pure science 
The smut that was really science 
`Mother, ' he repeated loudly, rubbing in the science 
The italicised words demonstrate the significantly recontextualised understanding of 
science that underpins Huxley's dystopia: parenthood, along with all its connotations of 
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conception, gestation, and childbirth, conflated into `smut', is figured as an unpleasant 
but inevitable factor to be understood as merely a developmental - but outdated - stage 
of scientific advance. Thus, this understanding of science in the future reflects on the 
understanding of science in the past (which is, more accurately, Huxley's 1930s 
present) and reconceptualises it in terms of dystopian possibility and potential. 9 
Focus on language - individual lexical items (as in One above) or related lexical 
fields (as in Brave New World here) - as a medium through which to communicate the 
estranged understandings of fundamental existential or historical concepts is a genre- 
wide feature; the foregoing are not isolated examples. I shall argue that the readers' 
customary, habitual world-view is overtly examined and challenged through such 
reflective language: ostensibly `standard' language, and, by extension its `standard' 
meanings, are contested, alienated, and re-evaluated. Reflective language, then, has a 
Whorfian aspect in this respect; like the speculative language to which I refer above, it 
is implicated in dystopia's inclination to influence world-view. However, while 
speculative language exemplifies this function both intra-textually and extra-textually, 
reflective language, I argue, reserves its affective function chiefly for the reader. 
Through detailed analysis of these representations of language in dystopian fictions I 
aim to develop existing scholarship in this area. Essentially, I attempt to offer linguistic 
evidence in support of, and to substantiate, beliefs such as that expressed by Moylan: 
that the act of reading dystopian fiction can `lead to an empowering escape to a very 
different way of thinking about, and possibly being in, the world [and] bring willing 
readers back to their own worlds with new or clearer perceptions' (2000: xvii). 
1.6 Narrative worlds 
We want wisdom. We want hope. We want to be good. Therefore we 
sometimes tell ourselves warning stories that deal with the darker side of 
some of our other wants. 
Margaret Atwood (2005) 'Aliens have taken the place of angels' 
The range of dystopian texts written in English is extensive and includes some 
renowned, canonical works as well as many less well-known examples of the genre; in 
addition there are numerous works with a significant dystopian element, and many 
whose genre classification is problematic in some respect. In selecting texts for this 
study I have attempted to examine a representative sample of those available, and, 
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overall, I examine a cross-section of familiar, or `classic', exemplars together with some 
less well-known titles. 
The selection criteria employed here rely largely on those aspects of dystopia 
discussed in the foregoing sections: a sense of `place' is crucial to my understanding of 
dystopia, and, consequently, the primary texts I discuss in chapters three, four and five 
are those explicitly located in relation to a Western - most often Anglo-American - 
setting. Temporal dislocation also figures significantly in my definition of dystopia, so, 
in each case, the `setting' to which I refer is `re-placed' into a futuristic time-frame 
(although some science fiction and fantasy texts with indefinable spatial and temporal 
co-ordinates are referred to occasionally in support of `mainstream' works). My 
distinction between utopia and dystopia aims for objectivity in being dependent on the 
point of view of the focalising character(s); I concede, however, that I rely to some 
degree on my own subjective view of what constitutes `good' (eu- or u-topian) or `bad' 
(dys-topian) for those characters in relation to their narrative world. Additionally - and 
vitally - all the texts I consider were originally written in English. This last criterion 
excludes Yevgeny Zamyatin's brilliant and influential dystopia, We (1924), which was 
originally written in the author's native Russian, and is thus only available in translation 
to English. Since I focus almost exclusively on linguistic form and function, the 
potential re-interpretations inherent in translation-shift render translated texts 
unworkable for the purposes of this study. In his introduction to the 1993 Penguin 
edition of We, for example, translator Clarence Brown comments on some of the 
vagaries intrinsic to accurate translation of invented or otherwise novel language: while 
he settled on OneState as the most apt transliteration of the Russian Yedinoe 
Gosudarstvo, his predecessors had variously opted for United State, Single State, and 
The One State (1993: xxiv); similarly, Brown decided on yuny as an abbreviated form of 
uniform, although he acknowledges the literal translation of Zamyatin's Cyrillic 
equivalent ought to be unif (1993: xxiii). Translation-shifts such as these would have a 
material impact on my analyses, especially those of speculative language. Reluctantly, 
therefore, I eliminate We together with any other works in translation. 
Given the focus of this study, and the selection criteria outlined in earlier 
sections of this chapter, We represents the first spatially- and temporally-bound dystopia 
of the twentieth century: that is to say, the first which does not feature a journey through 
time or space, or some form of magical or improbable dislocating device (such as an 
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inordinately long sleep) as part of its narrative strategy. Its exclusion from this work 
results in some imbalance, with most of the texts I consider appearing around mid- 
twentieth century onwards, and into the early twenty-first (although both Katherine 
Burdekin's Swastika Night, published in 1937, and Ayn Rand's Anthem from 1938, 
which are included, represent pre-war dystopian writing). Broadly speaking, this spread 
is representative of the genre, since the `dystopian turn' from utopian to dystopian 
imagining is predominantly represented textually by a post-war, contemporary 
concentration which intensifies through the seventies and eighties, and continues 
uninterrupted to the present day. Despite the breadth of the era covered in this study 
(1937-2003), which stretches across the modern and contemporary literary periods, and 
encompasses both modernism and postmodernism, a remarkably congruent genre- 
specific range of linguistic strategies emerges in relation to both speculative and 
reflective language. For that reason, there is no deliberate chronological sequencing of 
the texts; although I do begin with an early example (Rand's 1938 Anthem) in chapter 
two, and conclude with a recent text (Atwood's 2003 Oryx and Crake) in chapter five, 
the intervening chapters focus on texts from across the post-1900 historical range. 
The following chapter is concerned with establishing the theoretical foundations 
of the thesis, and integrates three otherwise unconnected approaches: firstly I revisit 
Benjamin Whorf's original writings on what he terms the linguistic relativity principle 
and reconstruct his work as a process of investigating the relationship between language 
and world-view. In the light of this reformulated notion of Whorfianism, I examine the 
opening page of Rand's dystopia, Anthem as a cumulative process of defamiliarisation 
for the reader. Secondly, I draw in discussion of some popular or `folk' beliefs about 
language. Translatability is the first of these, which, although often offered as a rebuttal 
of Whorfianism, would seem to corroborate rather than deny Whorf's principle when 
considered from the point of view of a broad-based, non-specialist readership. Strongly 
held beliefs about language as an inadequate medium through which to communicate 
the minutiae that constitute a world-view are also included under the heading of `folk 
linguistics', but here the beliefs are those expressed by authors of dystopias rather than 
their readers. These authors universally believe that there are states of being beyond 
language in addition to those which can be captured by the current lexicon, a belief 
which, I suggest, is manifest in their futuristic fictions. The co-existence of the familiar 
and the unfamiliar in language - the known and the unknown - underpins Whorf s 
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investigations, and also informs popular beliefs about language. The concluding part of 
the chapter, consequently, appeals to a literary theoretical position which explicitly 
acknowledges the fusion of the known and the unknown: Darko Suvin's concept of 
cognitive estrangement, which, originating in science fiction criticism, proposes that the 
interanimation of that which is within the bounds of experience with that which lies 
beyond (current) experience, is a defining characteristic of the genre. Together, these 
three approaches form a framework through which I examine and account for the 
`doubleness' of dystopia's characteristic language, with speculative language 
symbolising the unknown and unfamiliar, while reflective language represents the 
(ostensibly) known and familiar. 
Chapter three is dedicated to reconsideration of George Orwell's seminal (1949) 
dystopia, Nineteen Eighty-Four in the light of the theoretical framework I outline in 
chapter two, and focuses in depth on the speculative language in this text. While 
Orwell's conception of Newspeak has been examined at length in previous studies 
emanating from both literary and linguistic sources, the form and function of the non- 
Newspeak language occurring in the main body of the text - rather than in the 
Appendix, `The Principles of Newspeak' - has received less critical attention. I 
consider some socio-historical aspects of Orwell's non-Newspeak speculative language 
at the outset of this chapter, before identifying and categorising the various realisations 
of speculative language through which Orwell constructs his bleak and desperate 
dystopian future. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the effect of 
speculative language on the reader. 
Reflective language is the focus of chapter four, where I begin by continuing my 
examination of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, this time with reference to its 
instantiations of reflective language. The ensuing discussion of reflective language as it 
is presented in three further dystopian texts returns to the notion of focalisation, and 
develops this, together with an assessment of the ways in which the mode of narration 
impacts upon the reader's reception of reflective language. Katherine Burdekin's 
(1937) Swastika Night is examined, followed by L. P. Hartley's (1960) Facial Justice, 
and Margaret Atwood's (1985) The Handmaid's Tale. Although together, these four 
texts span much of the twentieth century, and they differ substantially in terms of 
setting, plot, themes, and characterisation as well as in divergent narrative strategies, 
they reveal a marked consonance in their treatment and presentation of reflective 
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language. As with earlier chapters, the emphasis remains on the effect of this language 
on the readers of these dystopias. 
Chapter five brings together the two linguistic strands that comprise dystopia's 
destabilising, reformulating didactic energy: Atwood's Oryx and Crake (2003) amply 
exemplifies both speculative and reflective language, and thus unifies the preceding 
discussions and analyses. Following examination first of the speculative language of 
this text, and then of its reflective language, I proceed to consider the influence and 
effect of the two `languages' in relation to each other, and assess the ways in which the 
two in conjunction contrive to accentuate the reader's understanding of, and response to, 
his or her conception of self and society. Since Oryx and Crake, published in the early 
years of the twenty-first century, brings this study almost up to date, it seems an apt text 
with which to conclude. 
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2. Language within and beyond experience 
To name is not to possess what cannot 
be owned or even known in the small words 
and endless excuses of human speech. 
Marge Piercy (1992) 'Mars and Her Children' 
2.1 Introduction 
Dystopian fiction is challenging. For its readers, it is challenging in several senses: 
typically, it is thought-provoking, stimulating, and demanding at the level of theme; 
confrontational, oppositional, and inherently political at the level of plot; dissenting, 
rebellious, and subversive at the level of character. Dystopia confronts its readers with 
their own taken-for-granted notions about self and society and compels them to examine 
and explore habitual beliefs. In short, dystopia challenges readers to (re)cognise 
reality. ' The ways in which language contributes to - or even initiates - this revision of 
world-view is the theme of this study; the textual analyses which follow in chapters 
three, four, and five will endeavour to demonstrate how language is implicated in, and 
propels the process of (re)cognition. In advance of that, in this chapter I outline the 
theoretical approaches which underpin and frame the subsequent examinations of 
speculative and reflective language in dystopia. 
Since stylistics provides the methodological `backbone' of this study, and since 
the inter-disciplinary nature of stylistics situates it somewhere between the study of 
language and the study of literature, it follows that this thesis will be similarly located at 
the interface of the two disciplines. For this reason, I invoke theoretical frameworks 
from both disciplines to orient my discussions. From linguistics I draw upon the notion 
of linguistic relativity (although Whorfianism is my preferred term, for reasons I shall 
elaborate below), and from a literary perspective, I use the concept of cognitive 
estrangement, which originates in the study of science fiction. In addition, I draw upon 
some less formal - but equally relevant - popular, or `folk' beliefs about language. If 
dystopia challenges habitual thought and automaticity of response, it does so chiefly by 
reference to habitual, unconscious use of language; if it succeeds in de-habituating 
thought, and stimulating renewed or altered awareness, it does so, I shall argue, by 
presenting language as the site of challenge and counter-challenge, where both familiar 
and unfamiliar language is foregrounded, interrogated, and assimilated. Since both 
Whorfianism and cognitive estrangement acknowledge, and to an extent, depend on, the 
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co-existence of the familiar (or the unconscious, the automatic, the habitual) and the 
unfamiliar (or the brought-into-consciousness, the de-automised, the defamiliarised), 
my intention is to draw on the salient points of both of these theoretical approaches in 
order to account for the ways in which language is implicated in the perception-altering 
capacity of dystopian fiction. 
2.2.1 Whorfianism: the preliminaries 
To be great is to be misunderstood. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1841) Essays: First Series 
To arrive at the salient aspects of what I here term Whorfianism it is necessary to cut 
through much of the dense tangle of competing inter-related interpretations, arguments, 
counter-arguments, construals (and misconstruals) that have grown out of - and almost 
entirely obscured - Benjamin Lee Whorf s original conception of what he called the 
linguistic relativity principle. Whorf's most explicit articulation of this `principle' is 
found in his 1940 paper `Linguistics as an Exact Science', where he explains it thus: 
[T]he "linguistic relativity principle, " which means, in informal terms, that 
users of markedly different grammars are pointed by the grammars toward 
different types of observations and different evaluations of externally 
similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers but 
must arrive at somewhat different views of the world. 2 
(Whorf 1956: 221)3 
Whorf s own delineation of the `linguistic relativity principle' is the one which guides 
and informs my application of the theory to the language of dystopian fiction: the term 
Whorfianism I employ throughout this work refers directly to the ideas described in 
Whorfls extant writings rather than the confusing - and often confused - plethora of 
interpretations, elaborations, and digressions that emanate from the inclusion of 
Whorf s insights within the broad-spectrum catch-all term Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. 4 In 
this respect, I follow Penny Lee, author of The Whorf Theory Complex: A Critical 
Reconstruction (1996), who adroitly summarises the main problem facing those who 
would discuss, analyse, or examine Whorf's theories in relation to any language-related 
issue: `[r]eferences to [Whorf's] ideas about relationships between language, mind, and 
experience are often made in texts written for students of language [... ]', she observes, 
`yet for most people knowledge of what he said is either second hand, or limited to a 
few frequently quoted statements' (1996: xiii). Lee returns to Whorf's original writings 
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in a substantive endeavour to disentangle Whorf's own beliefs from those of his 
predecessors, especially Edward Sapir (with whose work Whorf s own is frequently 
conflated), and Franz Boas. Although Whorl's ideas were extensively derived from the 
earlier work of anthropologists Sapir and Boas (which would account for the 
formulations `Sapir-Whorf hypothesis', `Whorf-Sapir hypothesis', and occasionally 
`Boas-Sapir-Whorf hypothesis'), his ultimate position differs from theirs in several 
respects. 5 This, together with consideration that `[Whorf's] overall theory is not 
explicated as such in any one place in his writings' (Lee 1996: 15) begins to explain 
why, as John A. Lucy notes, `[d]espite the significance of his work, it has often been 
greatly misunderstood' (1992: 8). Lucy's Language Diversity and Thought: A 
Reformulation of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis (1992) is designed to `correct 
many of the prevalent misunderstandings' (1992: 8), while Lee's monograph aims to `at 
least partially redress' the `unwarrantedly superficial interpretations of [Whorl' s] ideas' 
arising from `[h]asty and inadequate reading of his work' (Lee 1996: xviii) 6 For this 
reason I have drawn on the research of these scholars in coming to my own 
understanding of Whorfianism; in addition - and noting especially Lee's comments 
regarding insufficient attention to Whorl's original material -I refer extensively to John 
B. Carroll's (1956) definitive collection of Whorl's work, Language, Thought, and 
Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorl', and to the `Yale Report', which is 
reproduced for the first time (from Whorf's handwritten draft document) by Lee (1996: 
251-280), and which, she notes, `is probably as important in theoretical and historical 
terms as Carroll's 1956 collection' (1996: 251n). 
Some `misunderstandings' (Lucy 1992: 8) and `superficial interpretations' (Lee 
1996: xviii) of Whorfianism can be found in earlier analyses and critical assessments of 
dystopian fiction, mainly arising as a result of the conflation of Whorf's theories with 
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in its diverse entirety. In part, these misconceptions, some 
of which are discussed below, contribute to my decision to return to Whorfs original 
writings rather than employ the notion of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis without 
qualification. In addition, two further - and allied - considerations motivate this 
decision. Firstly, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has undergone such radical expansion 
across many disparate disciplines that it currently encompasses a bewildering collection 
of applications in, for example, anthropology, psychology, and philosophy, where its 
implications are considered in relation to an extensive range of cultural, societal, 
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political, and historical questions. Similarly, in the study of language and linguistics, 
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis serves as a kind of umbrella term, which subsumes 
linguistic relativity and linguistic determinism, as well as aspects of, for instance, 
prescriptivism and language development. Illustrative of the imprecision and fuzziness 
that surrounds the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis are the caveats which accompany any 
glossary-style definition of it: R. L. Trask's entry, for instance, in A Student's Dictionary 
of Language and Linguistics (1997) for Sapir-Whorf hypothesis reads: `The hypothesis 
that the structure of our language significantly affects the way we perceive the world', 
summarily followed by the note: `This hypothesis is controversial. ' (1997: 192). The 
hypothesis is indeed controversial, not just because linguists break into distinct `for' and 
`against' factions with regard to it, but also because, at the most basic level, its 
formulation as a hypothesis is nebulous. Neither Sapir nor Whorf ever labelled their 
investigations into the role of language in cognition as any kind of hypothesis; thus, no 
definitive or authoritative foundational statement of the hypothesis exists. Instead, 
commentators from various disciplines have, over the years, formulated and 
reformulated their interpretations of the precepts advocated in both Sapir's and Whorf's 
writings with the result that the hypothesis is multiply delineated and expounded, often 
reflecting some particular bias toward the disciplinary interest of the formulator 
(definitions from within anthropology and sociology, for example, focus on cultural 
relativity, while those from the cognitive sciences draw out the implications for 
perception and mental information-processing). 8 Consequently, the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis as a theoretical notion in its entirety is contentious at best, and overextended, 
diluted, and bleached of meaning at worst. 
Even within a single discipline, interpretations of the theory are manifold: an 
illustrative sample from within the study of language would include at least the 
following variations: 
[T]he Sapir/Whorf hypothesis, which states that language can determine our 
thought and behavior patterns. 
(Martyna 1980: 483) 
The fundamental observation of the Sapir/Whorf Hypothesis is that the 
structure of language shapes thought in profound and pervasive ways. 
(Wetherell, Taylor & Yates 2001: 58) 
According to what has come to be called the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, it is 
claimed that languages can differ radically in the way that they categorize 
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and structure the world, and that linguistic categories determine cognitive 
categories. Thus, the structure of one's language determines how one 
perceives and thinks about the world. 
(Barr et a11996: 716) 
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis also holds that language and thought co-vary. 
That is, diversity in language categories and structure lead to cultural 
differences in thought and perceptions of the world. 
(Samovar, Porter & McDaniel 2005: 215) 
[Sapir and Whorf maintain that] there is a causal relationship between 
semantic structure and cognition: that language influences thought, in the 
sense that its structure channels our mental experience of the world. 
(Fowler 1991: 4) 
From this small sample, it is clear that there are significantly dissimilar 
conceptualisations of the Sapir-Whorfian relationship of language to experience: it 
variously `determines', `shapes', 'categorize[s]', `lead[s] to', and `influences' thought 
(or `behavior patterns', or `cognitive categories', or `perceptions', or `mental 
experience'). Traditionally, those conceptions which make some strong claim that 
thought and language are interdependent and indivisible - that we are incapable of non- 
linguistic thought, or that we cannot conceptualise something for which our language 
does not include a label - are collected under the category linguistic determinism, and 
are largely discounted by modern linguistics. The weaker claims, however - those 
which cluster around the notion that language influences thought and perception - are 
grouped under the classification linguistic relativity. In general these claims are much 
more faithful to Whorf s original ideas, and my focus in this study remains at this 
`weaker' end of the spectrum, although mediated through Whorf's own words rather 
than secondary interpretations of what he may - or may not - have said. 
Secondly, and in a point related to the first, I return to Whorf as a foundational 
source of writings on linguistic relativity to counter any inclination to overstate the 
theory. Perhaps as a result of the want of a definitive originating statement from either 
Sapir or Whorf to limit or circumscribe the scope of their contentions, the concepts they 
outlined have been, on occasion, extended to untenable lengths. It has become 
unremarkable to see unsustainable exaggerations attributed to Whorf, most of which 
follow the pattern `Whorf states that if there is no word for x in a language, then x does 
not exist for the speakers of that language'. Less embellished, but still overstating 
Whorf's position, are ascriptions such as this from World Literature Today: `Whorf has 
60 
argued that any change in language will transform one's appreciation of the cosmos' 
(Jirgens 1998: 271). Attention to his writings confirms that Whorf's line of reasoning is 
a great deal more cautious than this argument - here directly credited to him - would 
imply. Similar amplifications appear in relation to the language of dystopian fiction: in 
his survey of the use of linguistics in science fiction, Aliens and Linguists: Language 
Study and Science Fiction (1980), Walter E. Meyers considers what he terms the Whorf 
hypothesis. While he begins by referring to Whorf's observations on the Hopi 
language, quoting Whorf's original words, Meyers proceeds to extend the fundamental 
tenets considerably: 
The Whorf hypothesis has a corollary: if it is true that our language 
determines our perception of reality, then whoever controls language 
controls the perception of reality as well. If language can be controlled, 
then would-be despots have available a subtle and efficient means of 
restricting thought. 
(Meyers 1980: 163) 
Meyers' `corollary' here demonstrates the apparently straightforward reasoning process 
by which elaboration of the originating tenets may seem like nothing more than an 
obvious deduction. From his preceding discussion of the Whorf hypothesis in terms of 
linguistic relativity (1980: 161), Meyers has broadened the discussion to include 
linguistic determinism ('our language determines our perception'), supplemented this 
with the suggestion that language and perception can be controlled ('whoever controls 
language controls the perception of reality'), and arrived at the conclusion that such 
controls pertain not just to language but to thought ('efficient means of restricting 
thought'). While such augmentation of Whorfianism may represent a useful approach 
to interpreting, say, Orwell's depiction of Newspeak in Nineteen Eighty-Four, where 
the fiction requires some level of belief that language, thought, or the perception of 
reality can be controlled, it does not represent the essential principles espoused in 
Whorf's own work. His writings demonstrate that he adopted a relativist stance (rather 
than the determinist position so often ascribed to him); and, it is worth noting, he never 
made any suggestion that language or thought could be `controlled'. The prevalence of 
overstatements of Whorfianism serve to attenuate the consequence of the provocative 
and astute insights his work does embody; insights which will be explored further in 
what follows. 
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Before turning to the germane details of Whorf's concept of linguistic relativity, I 
shall briefly consider the issue of the `misunderstandings' of his work to which Lucy 
(1992) refers. As a broad concept, linguistic relativity is routinely - and often cursorily 
- invoked as a means of rationalising the linguistic phenomena that characterise 
dystopian fictions, as is the case in David W. Sisk's critical assessment of the language 
of such texts, Transformations of Language in Modern Dystopias (1997), where the 
author states: `[o]ne theme found in all the novels herein discussed is a wholehearted 
acceptance of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, also called the "linguistic relativity 
principle"' (1997: 12). In a somewhat misguided effort to explicate the theory (and one 
which exemplifies the above-mentioned hazards of overstatement) Sisk claims: `In 
Whorf s conception, a person cannot understand any concept that he or she cannot 
frame in words' (ibid). Although this assertion neither represents Whorl's stance, nor 
accurately reflects his words, it is the following factually inaccurate statement which 
best corroborates Lucy's claim that Whorf is `greatly misunderstood' (1992: 8), and 
Lee's declaration that Whorf is both `misread' and `unread' (1996: 14): 
Edward Sapir's honing of Whorfs theory broadens the relationship between 
thought and language into a two-way exchange in which language and 
thought can influence one another, as opposed to Whorf s one-way idea. 
(Sisk 1997: 12) 
In fact, Whorf `honed' Sapir's earlier work, not vice versa (Whorf was the pupil of 
Sapir, who died in 1939, the year before Whorf formally described his principle of 
linguistic relativity); secondly, neither Whorf nor Sapir suggested the process was 'two- 
way' .9 However, given the preponderance of inaccurate definitions of the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis permeating the available literature, it is perhaps not surprising that erroneous 
presentations of it occur. 10 The ramifications of such fundamental misunderstandings, 
however, reach out beyond what may appear to be superficial pedantry on my part: they 
permeate into the application of the theory in subsequent critical assessments. This is 
the case with Sisk's use of Whorfs ideas in relation to dystopian fictions, where he 
would appear to make some claim for a proportional or gradable application of the 
theory, and one for which there could be said to be a limit-case. Sisk alludes to the 
work of Suzette Haden Elgin and asserts that she `takes the Whorfian hypothesis to its 
logical, if grim, conclusion' (1997: 119) in her Native Tongue and The Judas Rose, 
while John the Savage of Huxley's Brave New World `exemplifies Whorl's theory 
taken to the extremity of its conclusions' (1997: 29). In both cases, Sisk alludes to a 
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supposed end-point, threshold, or cut-off point of Whorfianism, which is an intractable 
argument to sustain, given Whorf's carefully considered use of `relativity' to describe 
his theory: relativity, even in simple terms, describes uniform relative motion. " This 
type of approach to Whorfianism is common - if fallacious - and relies on the kind of 
incremental expansion seen in Meyers' construction above: reasoned movement from 
`language influences perception' to `language determines perception', and from there to 
`language controls perception'. From this point, a slight movement yields `language is 
contingent on thought and thought is similarly dependent on language' or some 
comparable formulation. Since it could be argued that such exponential intensification 
of Whorf's initial concept has now become so general as to have become axiomatic, I 
make no claim here to rectify such misunderstandings and misapplications; my aim is to 
clarify rather than to correct. In returning to Whorf s original writings on the `principle 
of linguistic relativity', I offer an assessment of the utility and consequence of the 
original conception of Whorfianism as a theoretical approach through which to 
illuminate the particular instances of language which characterise dystopian literature. 
2.2.2 Whorfianism: the parameters 
We move in a world of language; unless we become aware of it, it can escape 
our attention and we notice it no more than a fish notices the water it swims in. 
Walter E. Meyers (1980) Aliens and Linguists 
Our knowledge of language is tacit: unless some aspect of it is called to our attention, 
we remain, for the most part, unaware of it. This factor is crucial to Whorf's explication 
of the connections between language and experience; his writings are punctuated by 
frequent references to this essential precondition to understanding the principles of 
linguistic relativity: in order to appreciate the potential of an alien language to encode 
reality differently, one must first acknowledge that one's native language is profoundly 
habitual and automatic. His most lucid treatment of this theme immediately precedes 
his 1940 definition of the `linguistic relativity principle', where he states: 
The phenomena of language are background phenomena, of which the 
talkers are unaware or, at the most, very dimly aware - as they are of the 
motes of dust in the air of a room, though the linguistic phenomena govern 
the talkers more as gravitation than as dust would. These automatic, 
involuntary patterns of language are not the same for all men but are 
specific for each language and constitute the formalized side of the 
language, or its "grammar" -a term that includes much more than the 
grammar we learned in the textbooks of our school days. (Whorf 1956: 221) 
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In Whorf's view, awareness of one's own language is at the level of `background 
phenomena', perceived as faintly as `motes of dust in the air of a room'; moreover, he 
here makes explicit the habitual nature of one's relationship with language. Elsewhere, 
he notes that `the forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of 
pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate 
systemizations of his own language' (1956: 252). Simply stated, his foundational 
argument is that, for most people - and as I shall argue, for most readers - language is 
deceptively transparent and instinctual: in short, automatised. In describing the 
customary view of language as `automatic', `involuntary', `unconscious', and 
`unperceived', Whorf does not make any claim that language is structurally or 
grammatically uncomplicated - in fact, he frequently highlights its complexity - but he 
does recognise that `[e]very language of course seems simple to its own speakers 
because they are unconscious of its structure' (1956: 82). Whorf terms this customarily 
unconscious linguistic status quo the habitual thought world (1956: 147), which is a 
term I adopt in this study, with the understanding that it is defined here just as Whorf 
defined it in his paper `The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behaviour to Language', 
where he explains: 
By "habitual thought" and "thought world" I mean more than simply 
language, i. e. than the linguistic patterns themselves. I include all the 
analogical and suggestive value of the patterns (e. g., our "imaginary space" 
and its distant implications), and all the give-and-take between language and 
the culture as a whole, wherein is a vast amount that is not linguistic but yet 
shows the shaping influence of language. In brief, this "thought world" is 
the microcosm that each man carries about within himself, by which he 
measures and understands what he can of the macrocosm. 
(Whorf 1956: 147) 
From this explanation, it can be seen that the habitual thought world is a functionally 
intricate and richly detailed world, but the crucial point is that it is an intra-linguistic 
world; it comprises only the world-view embodied in one's customary language. In 
Whorf's conception, this mental space, which `shows the shaping influence of 
language', indiscernibly influences the way a person `measures and understands' the 
world. 
Accepting that one's own language is deeply automatised is the first step 
towards understanding that it may not encode all possible ways of perceiving reality. 
This clearly raises something of an incongruity in respect of this study: in order to adopt 
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an analytical approach, I- like Whorf - must acknowledge the tacit nature of language 
while at the same time disregarding it. Some clarification is, therefore, indicated, which 
I attempt here before proceeding. My approach to the language of dystopian fictions 
originates from a position corresponding to Whorf s: I presuppose that, for most 
readers, language, as an everyday phenomenon, is habitual, automatic, and outside 
`critical consciousness and control' (Whorf 1956: 211). This stance is problematic in at 
least two respects. Firstly, the focus and direction of the present study requires detailed 
analyses of language, which entails a concomitant bringing into `critical consciousness 
and control', not just of the language itself, but also of the metalanguage employed to 
discuss and evaluate the language of the fictions. Secondly - and equally paradoxically 
- any consideration of linguistic relativity may inescapably embody its own linguistic 
relativity, as Lucy (1992) despairingly notes: 
If there is a linguistic relativity, then it may create real dilemmas for the 
conduct of research, because researchers themselves are not exempt from 
these linguistic influences [... ]. A linguistic relativity, if there is such, will 
not only lie out there in the object of investigation, but will also penetrate 
right into the research process itself. 
(Lucy 1992: 2) 
`This "reflexivity" is a general problem', Lucy concludes, and notes that it intersects 
with questions of developing an adequate methodology (1992: 2). For the purposes of 
this study, I appeal to methodology - more specifically, the analytical methods of 
stylistics - as mitigation in respect of both potential contradictions. As discussed in 
§1.1, I adopt, in my analyses, the position of reader, and, consequently, recipient of 
effects generated through language. Similarly, from this position, I grant that I may also 
be the recipient of the effects of linguistic relativity. I rely on the objective nature of 
stylistics, which Katie Wales (2001) qualifies as "`objective" [... ] in the sense of being 
methodical, systematic, empirical, analytical, coherent, accessible, retrievable and 
consensual' (2001: 373), to attenuate both the language-within-language and the 
relativity-within-relativity paradoxes (although I acknowledge both remain intractable 
dilemmas, and make no claim to have reached an unassailable solution). 
To return to Whorf s notion - that one must recognise `habitual thought' before 
coming to any understanding that there may be possibilities beyond this - is to 
acknowledge that this is problematic chiefly because of the habitual nature of language: 
its automaticity tends toward an inward self-perpetuation of unawareness. The 
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`difficulty of appraising such a far-reaching influence', Whorf confirms, `is great 
because of its background character, because of the difficulty of standing aside from our 
own language, which is a habit and a cultural non est disputandum, and scrutinizing it 
objectively' (1956: 138). The second step - recognising that other possibilities may 
exist - comes only when irregularities are brought into consciousness. In Whorf s own 
words, `if a rule has absolutely no exceptions, it is not recognised as a rule or as 
anything else; it is then part of the background of experience of which we tend to 
remain unconscious' (1956: 209). He continues: 
Never having experienced anything in contrast to it, we cannot isolate it and 
formulate it as a rule until we so enlarge our experience and expand our 
base of reference that we encounter an interruption of its regularity. The 
situation is somewhat analogous to that of not missing the water until the 
well runs dry. 
(Whorf 1956: 209) 
From this statement, it follows that, for Whorf to have reached his conclusions about 
linguistic relativity, he must first have furthered his own experience of language and 
expanded his `base of reference' with regard to it; similarly, by his own definition, he 
would have to have encountered an `interruption of its regularity' in order to formulate 
any hypotheses. Consideration of the ways in which he did so is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but Carroll's biographical introduction to Language, Thought, and Reality 
and Whorf's own explanations - especially those concerning the linguistic revelations 
he experienced during his work as a fire prevention engineer (1956: 134-137) and in 
relation to the Hopi language (1956: 137-159) - attest that he did indeed expand his 
linguistic knowledge far enough to encounter sufficient cross-linguistic `irregularities' 
to suggest a systematic base for his `principle of linguistic relativity'. 
If Whorf's first step is to recognise the automaticity of language, and his second 
is to move beyond automaticity to recognise the latent potential of language to 
`differently' package reality, his third is to examine other linguistically established 
world-views (which he did variously with the Hopi, Aztec, Hebrew, Nahuatl, and Maya 
languages (Lee 1996: xvii)). Only by empirically observing the ways in which other 
speech communities use their own `habitual thought worlds' to measure and understand 
their experience of reality was Whorf able to recognise discontinuities and discrepancies 
from one language group to another. As he notes in a letter to John Carroll, he gave `a 
good deal of attention' to `the psychic factors or constants of the American Indians in 
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the given linguistic community' in relation to `the organization of raw experience into a 
consistent and readily communicable universe of ideas through the medium of linguistic 
patterns' (1956: 102). In other words, Whorf s method necessitated gaining access to 
alien or other `habitual thought worlds'; only by encountering and becoming aware of 
other languages' differing configurations of world-view was he able to acquire the 
evidence for his comparative insights. His fourth step - and the one which receives 
most attention in critical terms - is to compare these languages with his own `habitual' 
language, and thereby reveal linguistically encoded differentiation in the perception of 
reality, or world-view. This stage, then, is Whorf's formulation of his `principle of 
linguistic relativity'. These four stages are retrievable from this well-known delineation 
of Whorf's thinking, which is often quoted as a definitive statement of his views: 
Stage 1: automaticity of habitual language: 
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. 
Stage 2: recognition ofpossibilities and linguistic irregularities: 
The categories and types that we isolate from the world of 
phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer 
in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a 
kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our 
minds - 
Stage 3: examination of other speech communities: 
and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We 
cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances 
as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to 
organize it this way - an agreement that holds throughout our 
speech community ... 
Stage 4: conclusion: the principle of linguistic relativity: 
... and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, BUT ITS TERMS ARE 
ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing 
to the organization and classification of data which the agreement 
decrees 
(1956: 213-214) 
These four constitutive stages of what I here term Whorfianism provide, in part, the 
basis for examining the language of dystopian fictions. What is suggested from 
Whorf s account of how he approached and formulated his `principle of linguistic 
relativity' is the possibility that exists for all readers, as native speakers of natural 
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languages, to weaken the influence of their own language upon thought by following 
the line of enquiry that Whorf follows. Dystopian fictions, more than any other genre, 
encourage the reader to participate in this process of questioning and reformulating - or 
at least becoming aware of - the conceptions and preconceptions that inhere in habitual 
language; in foregrounding, defamiliarising, and transforming language, they provide 
the `interruption of regularity' which is pivotal to a Whorfian understanding. In 
subsequent sections of this chapter I supplement the overall theoretical perspective for 
this study with other approaches; in the meantime, I consider an extract from the 
opening page of a dystopian text - Ayn Rand's Anthem (1938) - in the light of 
Whorfianism-as-process to demonstrate how this approach may contribute toward an 
account of the ways in which the reader's response to the language of dystopia is 
implicated in its consciousness-changing tendency. Anthem, in common with most 
dystopian fictions, begins in medias res, pitching the reader straight into the narrative 
world without the benefit of orienting description or background. This structural 
consideration is reflected in the language of Rand's text: the reader is presented with the 
language of the character's habitual, automised world-view; moreover, the peculiarities 
of its language appear without introduction or explanation. In effect, the reader's 
position is analogous to that of Whorf among the Hopi: the reader encounters an alien 
speech community, just as Whorf entered the speech community of his Native 
American research subjects. The narrative of Anthem begins: 
It is a sin to write this. It is a sin to think words no others think and to put 
them down upon a paper no others are to see. It is base and evil. It is as if 
we were speaking alone to no ears but our own. And we know well that 
there is no transgression blacker than to do or think alone. 
(Anthem, opening page) 
The first thing to note is that the language here would appear to be completely 
conventional: there is no evidence of neologism, or of typographical or structural 
deviation; the lexis, grammar, and orthography are standard, as is the syntax. The plural 
personal pronoun we appears twice, and the genitive our once, but there is no indication 
that there is any significance in this; at this point, it simply suggests that more than one 
referent is implied. Since, for the English-speaking reader, the language is essentially 
unmarked standard language, this opening paragraph invites an automatised response: 
the language has not yet been brought into consciousness. In Whorfian terms, the 
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language here is still a `background phenomenon', corresponding with the reader's 
habitual thought world. 
By the beginning of the third paragraph - still the opening page of the novel - the 
second stage of Whorfianism is suggested: 
It is dark here. The flame of the candle stands still in the air. Nothing 
moves in this tunnel save our hand on the paper. We are alone here under 
the earth. It is a fearful word, alone. The laws say that none among men 
may be alone, ever and at any time, for this is the great transgression and the 
root of all evil. 
(Anthem, opening page) 
While the language remains standard in most respects discussed above, specific 
inconsistencies in grammar and vocabulary begin to awaken recognition that this is not, 
in fact, either entirely ordinary language, or an entirely everyday, familiar world. 
Firstly, in `our hand on the paper' there is a disquieting lack of agreement for number 
between the plural possessive pronoun our and the singular noun hand which suggests 
that all is not quite as might be expected. Secondly, attention is drawn to an 
inconsistency of language at the level of lexis: alone appears for the third time on the 
opening page (and then twice more), and it appears with the plural pronoun and verb 
form. While we are alone is a grammatically well-formed phrase, and is certainly 
possible in English in some circumstances, its appearance here is beginning to suggest 
some irregularity. More specifically, this `irregularity' is of the kind that, for Whorf, 
indicates the bringing into consciousness of something which is no longer a 
`background phenomenon': automaticity is revealed and challenged. This is intensified 
by the short sentence which follows: `It is a fearful word, alone', since fearful directs 
focus more intently on alone as a concept. The discrepancy between the known world 
and the unknown world of the narrative is emphasised more sharply as the reader 
discovers the `laws' decree that `none among men may be alone'. From the point of 
view of a reader's world where the habitual patterns of language would suggest that 
alone, in general, would apply to a single referent, which `none among men' - 
understood as no-one - would corroborate, this language is becoming internally 
contradictory: the repeated alone seems incongruous in the context provided by the use 
of plural pronouns. As Whorf notes, it is only when `a rule has absolutely no 
exceptions' that it is `part of the background of experience of which we tend to remain 
unconscious' (1956: 209). Only by moving beyond the standard frame of reference - or 
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`encounter[ing] an interruption of its regularity' (ibid) - do we begin to recognise that 
other ways of framing the world are possible. This section of the narrative, then, is 
fulfilling the requirements of the second step of Whorfianism: it is extending and 
expanding the reader's base of reference, and providing the kind of linguistic 
inconsistencies and irregularities that could suggest the existence of other potential 
ways of perceiving the world. 
The third step of Whorfianism - the examination of another speech community 
or language - is invoked by the final sentence of the novel's opening page: 
And now there is nothing here save our one body, and it is strange to see 
only two legs stretched on the ground, and on the wall before us the shadow 
of our one head. 
(Anthem, opening page) 
This extraordinarily unfamiliar juxtaposition of plural pronouns with a singular referent 
- our one body, our one head - trenchantly denies and challenges the security and 
familiarity of the reader's habitual thought world; it disrupts the known and familiar 
patterns which are commonplace in his or her speech community, and unequivocally 
declares that this world - the world of the narrative - is not equivalent linguistically to 
the reader's world. This closely parallels the third stage of Whorfianism, where 
differences, variations, and inconsistencies of language (now de-automised and brought 
into consciousness) are considered, examined, and contemplated. In short, it alerts the 
reader to the possibility that the `reality' of the narrative world is differently configured 
to that which is known and familiar in the extra-textual world: that the characters' view 
of their world must be somehow differently constructed or constituted if they habitually 
refer to a single entity by using pronouns in the plural form. This third stage of 
Whorfianism-as-process arguably continues for the duration of the text: in gradually 
assimilating the language of the characters, the reader progressively comes to 
understand their consciousness or world-view. In the case of Anthem, it becomes 
apparent in the course of the narrative that the pronoun-to-referent irregularity equates 
to the group consciousness demanded by its collectivist society; similarly, the 
inconsistency of associating the plural pronoun with the word alone reflects the 
narrative world's communal disdain for individualism. 
In essence, the opening page of this novel represents the collision of two distinct 
habitual thought worlds: that of the reader with that of the narrating character. The 
70 
reader of Anthem is thus thrust into a kind of Whorfian role: s/he encounters a 
linguistically `other' world in the early pages of the narrative, one which challenges and 
disrupts a settled or automatic reception, and one which makes an implicit claim for an 
alternative way of signifying conception or constitution of world-view. If the reader of 
Anthem, like Moylan's `willing reader' (2000: xvii), accepts this didactic-linguistic 
invitation to think about the textual world in de-habituated ways, and is able to reflect 
this de-automatised world back onto his or her base-reality, then they may, as Moylan 
anticipates, return to `their own worlds with new or clearer perceptions' (2000: xvii). 
I make no claim that the typical reader of dystopian fiction will proceed to the 
fourth stage of Whorfianism, and will formulate a detailed account of the cause and 
effect of linguistic relativity; I do plan to demonstrate, however, that the characteristic 
transformations, creations, and manipulations of language in these fictions encourage - 
or even enact - the first three stages of Whorfianism in such a way as to motivate or 
induce a changed world-view for its readers. In making this claim for dystopian fiction, 
I am influenced by opinions from a non-linguistic perspective; from literary criticism, 
for example, comes the assertion that reading dystopia encourages `analytic thinking as 
a reader engages with the premises and puzzles of an intellectually demanding text' 
(Moylan 2000: xvii), and furthermore, that this engagement `requires consistent thought 
[and] mental leaps that stretch the mind beyond the habitual or the accepted' (ibid). 
While I concur wholly with this view, and aim to demonstrate, through the application 
of a linguistic theory, how language - and linguistic relativity - is implicated in such 
`mental leaps' in the reading of this literary genre, I remain aware that there are several 
obstacles which hinder the simple reassignment of a linguistic framework to a literary 
application; furthermore, even within the study of language, Whorfianism can be 
problematic (and is frequently problematised). It is to these issues I turn in the next 
sections. 
2.2.3 English and East Martian: dystopia's `two languages' 
Western culture has made, through language, a provisional analysis of reality 
and, without correctives, holds resolutely to that analysis as final. The only 
correctives lie in all those other tongues which [... j have arrived at different, 
but equally logical, provisional analyses. 
Benjamin Lee Whorf (1940) 'Languages and Logic' 
Whorf s principle of linguistic relativity has always been controversial, with linguists 
often polarised into distinct `for' and `against' factions with regard to it, while others 
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remain ambivalent (Stephen Murray, for instance, who observes, `[d]espite a 
widespread feeling that "There's something there, " no one has established quite what it 
is' (1982: 158)). Earlier twentieth-century trends in linguistic theories, such as Noam 
Chomsky's construal of the `universality' and `innateness' of language, at times, almost 
completely overshadowed it, while more recent theoretical developments (George 
Lakoff s notion of conceptual metaphor, for instance) have revived interest in the 
potential of Whorfianism to rationalise beliefs about the connection between language 
and perception. On the whole, Whorfianism remains contentious, yet compelling: as 
George Miller notes `if the Whorfian hypothesis is gone, it is not forgotten, for there is 
something right about it' (1978: 95). It is not my intention to rehearse the range of 
competing arguments here, since they are well-documented elsewhere; 12 rather I 
propose to outline, in broad terms, the principal objections to the theory where they 
pertain to this project and present some validation for the use of it here. In the main, 
opposition to Whorfianism centres on the issue of translatability, which presupposes the 
application of Whorfianism across at least two distinct languages. I shall return to this 
contra-Whorf argument below; but first, it is necessary to address the question of 
whether or not it can be said that there exist `different' languages in dystopian fiction. 
In §1.5.1 1 introduced the idea of two languages - that is to say, speculative and 
reflective language - in dystopian fiction, and discussed these in terms of a `language of 
the future' (i. e. speculative) and a `language of the past' (i. e. reflective). Reflective 
language, as I have noted, seldom differs qualitatively from the standard English of the 
author's historical spacetime; it is - at least in terms of form - essentially our own 
familiar language. Speculative language, however, differs significantly from standard 
English as we know it, and the difference is so marked in these fictions that it can 
constitute, I believe, a distinct `future' language. Although some commentators contend 
that dystopian treatments of language do not adequately capture or reflect the reality of 
a distant future - Beauchamp (1974), for example, claims that `their language is 
indistinguishable from our own, and thus anachronistic' (1974: 463) -I would suggest 
that dystopian fictional languages do represent a possible future development of new 
and different language. Given that the pace of language change transforms language so 
rapidly that we are content to talk about `Old English', `Medieval English', and 
`Renaissance English', for example as specific `languages'; it seems inconsistent that 
we are less inclined to assume that language change will render our own current 
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language a distinct, identifiable language from the vantage point of the future. 13 Whorf 
recognised that the language of the future would `facilitate advances in conceptual 
thinking' (Lee 1996: 247), and, while he made no claim that this would be an entirely 
different language, he does acknowledge that language will change in the future to 
reflect new ways of conceptualising the world: 
And now, turning to the more distant future [... ] to look at the subject of 
linguistics and its bearing upon thinking from the standpoint of the whole 
human species. [... ] We cannot but suppose that the future developments 
of thinking are of primary importance to the human species. They may even 
determine the duration of human existence on the planet earth or in the 
universe. The possibilities open to thinking are the possibilities of 
recognizing relationships on the mental or intellectual plane, such as will 
lead to ever wider and more penetratingly significant systems of 
relationships. These possibilities are inescapably bound up with systems of 
linguistic expression. The story of their evolution in man is the story of 
man's linguistic development. 
(Whorf 1956: 84) 
Dystopia, typically, expresses the possible `evolution' of a society in the distant future, 
and, as Whorf suggests, this evolution is `inescapably bound up with systems of 
linguistic expression': in reworking this world into displaced potential worlds, dystopia 
consistently maps out new linguistic territory, and refigures language into a 
representation of an alternative mode of being, of knowing, and of thinking about the 
world. Dystopia is crucially, to use Whorl's expression, `the story of man's linguistic 
development'. While I agree with Beauchamp that it is rare to see an entire narrative 
`create an imaginatively valid language reflecting the specific social and technological 
realities of the future' (1974: 464), and sustain it throughout (although Russell Hoban's 
Riddley Walker (1980) comes creditably close), there is sufficient linguistic innovation 
and creativity apparent in the speculative language of dystopian fictions to justify 
describing this as a separate future language. In this, I follow Eric S. Rabkin (1979), 
who, in his article `Metalinguistics and Science Fiction', distinguishes between `the 
language of the reader' and `the language of the narrator or of the characters' (1979: 
85). These separate languages -'English' and `East Martian' respectively in Rabkin's 
conception - feature consistently throughout dystopian narratives, insofar as Rabkin's 
`English' is the standard narrative language, and his `East Martian' is the speculative 
language, created by the author, and ascribed to the characters and their world. This 
language, which predictably occurs in dystopian fictions, is quite clearly not familiar 
everyday contemporary language; the characters speak the language of their 
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indeterminately futuristic world, while the narrative also speaks of - and in - this 
language of the future. Also of relevance to the discussion of `two languages' is 
Bakhtin's notion of heteroglossia, which, while not featuring explicitly in my 
discussions, supports the idea that a narrative may comprise more than one language. 
Sue Vice (1997) summarises Bakhtin's approach thus: 
Bakhtin uses the term `heteroglossia' to mean not simply the variety of 
languages which occur in everyday life, but also their entry into literary 
texts. These languages bring with them their everyday associations, which 
can of course include literary ones, as well as making their own in the 
textual setting. 
(Vice 1997: 18) 
Although Whorfianism in its original conception pertains to differing spoken 
languages, or language groups, rather than written languages per se, its fundamental 
tenets hinge on comparison of differences between languages. In positing the existence 
of two distinct languages in the dystopian fictions I consider here, my aim is to maintain 
the cross-linguistic integrity of the notion of Whorfianism while conveying its precepts 
to a literary context. In the effort to relate what is essentially a spoken-language theory 
to accommodate the differing demands of a literary narrative application, my approach 
has been informed by the work of earlier linguists, notably Myra Barnes, whose 
Linguistics and Languages in Science Fiction (1974) includes a foundational attempt to 
illuminate dystopian language use via Whorfian `metalinguistics', and Walter E. 
Meyers, whose Aliens and Linguists: Language Study and Science Fiction (1980) 
explicitly `is aimed at extending and to some extent correcting' Barnes' formative 
explorations (1980: 3). Additionally, in mediating this transfer through stylistic 
methodology, I appeal to the longstanding stylistic model of recognising that two 
distinct languages can co-exist within the bounds of one text written in English, a 
precedent which was established by M. A. K. Halliday in his landmark (1981) essay 
`Linguistic Function and Literary Style: An Inquiry into the Language of William 
Golding's "The Inheritors"'. In this piece, Halliday illustrates his conception of an 
ideational function of language (that which `serves as the expression of content [... ] 
through which the speaker or writer embodies in language his experience of the 
phenomena of the real world' (1981: 327)) by way of an analysis of the language of the 
two tribes of Golding's novel, The Inheritors (1955). Halliday concludes that the 
language of the last sixteen pages of the novel, which is the language of a second `tribe' 
(Language C) is so different from that used by the characters populating the rest of the 
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narrative (Language A) as to constitute a distinct language. In comparing these `two 
"languages"' (1981: 352), Halliday asserts that `[t]here is no doubt that the first 
paragraph is basically in Language A and the second in Language C' (1981: 349). In 
positing `two languages' Halliday initiated extensive discussions and exchanges within 
stylistics which took a variety of directions, 14 but significantly, as David L. Hoover 
points out, none of these critical debates actually `question the division of the novel into 
two languages' (2003: 347). Hoover has contributed a corpus-based computational 
stylistic analysis to the discussion in his (1999) Language and Style in The Inheritors, 
which he later augments with a further corpus-based cluster-analysis and frequency 
investigation in his (2003) article, `Multivariate Analysis and the Study of Style 
Variation'. In the latter study of The Inheritors, Hoover concludes that: 
[O]n the basis of a much fuller analysis of the structure and content of the 
vocabulary of the novel [than in his (1999) study], I argue that Halliday's 
division of the novel into two languages is a legitimate one. 
(Hoover 2003: 348) 
In the light of this recent, corpus-based evidence, which substantiates Halliday's 
original partition of one text into two discrete languages, I proceed from the 
understanding that there is a valid and justifiable case for proposing that two languages 
may exist within one fictional work written in `English'. Accordingly, I offer that 
speculative language (the language of the future) and reflective language (the language 
of the past) may be treated, both in stylistic and in Whorfian terms, as two separate 
languages. Furthermore, and acknowledging Halliday's influence on my thinking, I 
propose to show that each language encodes `a particular way of looking at experience' 
(Halliday 1981: 342); `a norm, a world-view, a structuring of experience that is 
significant' (1981: 354); and `the linguistic representation of experience' (1981: 355). 
2.3.1 The Greeks had a word for it: translatability and folk linguistics 
We handle even our plain English with much greater effect if we direct it from 
the vantage point of a multilingual awareness. 
Benjamin Lee Whorf (1940) 'Languages and Logic' 
While Whorfianism as a broad idea informs the theoretical outlook of this study, and it 
is in order to maintain the academic-linguistic veracity of this approach that I ground 
my discussion of it on the existence of two separate languages in dystopia, I move 
outside of a specifically academic framework in order to address the problem of 
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translatability in relation to Whorfianism. This is not to say that I abandon scholarly 
focus altogether; rather it is that I appeal to popular conceptions of language, or `folk' 
linguistics in order to respond to some of the more esoteric and abstruse anti-Whorf 
arguments. Since dystopian fiction is essentially a `popular fiction' genre, especially at 
its intersections with science fiction, and since this study repositions the notion of `the 
reader' to reflect this (see §1.1), I consider common, prevalent views of language as 
providing a more extensive, more readerly critical perspective. 
To outline the substance of the academic arguments I begin within the discipline 
of linguistics, where the main contra-Whorf line of reasoning revolves around issues of 
translatability, and is generally advanced as some permutation of the following, as 
presented in William Frawley's (1991) mordant summation of the typical anti-Sapir- 
Whorf hypothesis attitude: 
If the Sapir/Whorf Hypothesis is correct, then Whorf and Sapir themselves 
could not have known that it is correct. If language, culture, and thought are 
all bound up as they say, then Whorf and Sapir are forever trapped in their 
own language/culture/thought, and their hypothesis that language variation 
reflects cultural and conceptual variation is a figment of their own language, 
culture, and thought [... ] So, the only way for the Sapir/Whorf Hypothesis 
to be correct is for it to be incorrect. 
(Frawley 1991: 46) 
Since Whorf (and Sapir) were able to communicate their findings, the typical argument 
runs, their conceptualisations cannot have been determined by language, or they would 
have been unable to perceive or articulate the differences they found. In a similar vein, 
Donald Davidson's argument on translatability, presented in his essay `On the Very 
Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' (2001 [1974]) contends that because differences in 
languages can be explained in one's own language - as Whorf used his native English 
to explain the conceptual differences of the Hopi language - this necessarily means that 
those differences cannot be conceptual differences, or the translation would be 
impossible. Davidson finds it absurd that Whorf, `wanting to demonstrate that Hopi 
incorporates a metaphysics so alien to ours that Hopi and English cannot, as he puts it, 
"be calibrated", uses English to convey the contents of sample Hopi sentences' (2001 
[1974]: 184). Davidson's argument here would appear to rely on a complete 
equivalence of language - or linguistic symbol or sign - to meaning; the kind of 
absolute correspondence that is suggested only by the most extreme `prisonhouse' 
versions of linguistic determinism. David Crystal notes that such determinism `is 
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unlikely to have any adherents now' (1997: 15), yet the translatability argument 
continues as Crystal's comments demonstrate: 
The fact that successful translations between languages can be made is a 
major argument against [Whorfianism], as is the fact that the conceptual 
uniqueness of a language such as Hopi can nonetheless be explained using 
English. That there are some conceptual differences between cultures is 
undeniable, but this is not to say that the differences are so great that mutual 
comprehension is impossible. One language may take many words to say 
what another language says in a single word, but in the end the 
circumlocution can make the point. 
(Crystal 1997: 15) 
Crystal illustrates his point by reference to the range of words for hole in Pintupi, an 
Aboriginal language, which `takes between three and 14 English words to distinguish 
the various senses' (1997: 15). The most prolix circumlocution necessitated by this is 
for katarta, which is not succinctly translatable into English, and in Pintupi, defines `the 
hole left by a goanna when it has broken the surface after hibernation' (ibid). Crystal 
proceeds to balance his rebuttal of Whorfianism with what he calls `a limited salvation 
for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis' which he finds in psycholinguistic studies, and 
summarises thus: 
Language may not determine the way we think, but it does influence the 
way we perceive and remember, and it affects the ease with which we 
perform mental tasks. Several experiments have shown that people recall 
things more easily if the things correspond to readily available words or 
phrases. And people certainly find it easier to make a conceptual distinction 
if it neatly corresponds to words available in their language. 
(Crystal 1997: 15) 
The psycholinguistic studies to which Crystal refers will be, in all probability, empirical 
studies, complete with informant-participants: people who demonstrably `recall' and 
`make a conceptual distinction' more easily if there is a `readily available' or `neat' 
correspondence `available in their language'. In other words, if there is a one-to-one 
mapping of word onto concept that concept will be more clearly remembered, 
understood, and evoked. People (and here, in reproducing Crystal's non-specific term 
for language-users, I infer `readers' also) like to have access to a word which directly 
encodes and encapsulates a notion which might otherwise require a lengthy 
circumlocution. The numerous popular (non-academic) language reference titles in 
high-street bookshops are testament to this; thus it is to popular conceptions of language 
and its usage I now turn. 
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The notion that the English language cannot `label' certain concepts because it 
lacks the necessary expressive tokens is one that is firmly established in folk linguistics, 
or popular conceptions of language. Fuelling this anxiety is the belief that other 
languages do possess the elusive, all-encompassing, definitive lexicalisations which 
enable more accurate and meaningful communication of a range of perceptions and 
impressions. Indeed, several recent mainstream titles demonstrate the widespread belief 
that other languages possess words for things that cannot be succinctly or meaningfully 
labelled in English: concepts that are, it is supposed, untranslatable. 
Howard Rheingold's (2000) book: They Have a Word for It: A Lighthearted 
Lexicon of Untranslatable Words and Phrases, for example, expressly incorporates the 
idea of untranslatability in its title, thus seeming to confirm that English is somehow 
incomplete; that it lacks functional or descriptive equivalence with other languages. In 
his lexicon, Rheingold includes 150 words from 40 languages, which, he claims, have 
no counterpart in English. One such example is tingo, from the Easter Island language 
Pascuanese, defined as `outrageously aggressive borrowing behaviour' (2000: 18). In 
relation to tingo, Rheingold makes a distinction between those concepts we can know - 
or know of - and those concepts we can succinctly and precisely verbalise, saying: 
[T]he concept of outrageous borrowing as a form of social aggression is 
well known to most English-speaking people. But we don't have specific 
words for different kinds of outrageous borrowing. 
(Rheingold 2000: 18) 
It is perhaps because English so conspicuously lacks a concise word or phrase to 
describe such anti-social borrowing that this word appears again in the title of a more 
recent popular volume of words for which there are no direct equivalents in English. 
Adam Jacot de Boinod's (2005) The Meaning of Tingo and Other Extraordinary Words 
from Around the World records tingo as `borrowing things from a friend's house, one by 
one, until he has nothing left'. 15 The engaging unfamiliarity of other languages' ability 
to articulate concepts that English does not name is reflected in a third recently 
published volume, In Other Words: A Language Lover's Guide to the Most Intriguing 
Words Around the World (2005) by Christopher J. Moore. Moore's book similarly lists 
examples of words which lack a synonymous parallel in English. 
The very existence of titles such as these exemplifies two common beliefs: firstly 
that language - more specifically, the currently recorded lexicon of English - does not 
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encode or embody all possibilities, and secondly, that other languages do (or at least 
they encode or embody different or other possibilities). While linguists, as exemplified 
by Crystal, above, insist that the English language has the necessary and sufficient 
resources and creativity to articulate all potentialities, even if that requires 
circumlocution, this view conflicts markedly with popular opinion. Widely available 
lexicons such as Rheingold's, Jacot de Boinod's, and Moore's serve to perpetuate and 
reinforce the existing folk beliefs by, in effect, illustrating the `shortfall' of labels in 
English for certain things, states, and actions. Furthermore, they assume a pedagogical 
function: the back cover of Moore (2005), for instance, claims that it will give readers `a 
whole new vocabulary for those elusive things you never had a word for', while 
Rheingold's back-cover blurb suggests that these `genuinely useful words' have the 
capacity to `open up new ways of understanding and experiencing life'. Rheingold 
expands this point in his introductory remarks to the first chapter, `The Cracks Between 
our Worldviews', where he claims: 
[Y]ou should know that reading this book might have serious side-effects at 
a deeper level. Even if you read one page as you stand in a bookstore, you 
are likely to find a custom or an idea that could change the way you think 
about the world. 
(Rheingold 2000: 1) 
`It has to do with the insidious way words mold thoughts', Rheingold continues (ibid), 
and goes on to explain his quest to find `[w]ords that would open a window on the way 
other cultures encourage people to think and feel, and thus point out new ways for us to 
think and feel' (2000: 2). Rheingold reflects further on the connections between the 
words he sourced and their effect on world-view, both from his own perspective: `I 
found myself looking at the mundane elements of everyday life through a new kind of 
lens', he recalls, `which revealed to me dimensions in my familiar environment that I 
simply had not seen before because I hadn't known how to look' (2000: 4); and from 
the point of view of his readers, for whom `[flinding a name for something is a way of 
conjuring its existence, of making it possible for people to see a pattern where they 
didn't see anything before' (ibid). During the compilation of the book, Rheingold 
`gradually came to realize' he says, `that the collective human worldview is far larger 
than any one of our individual languages leads us to believe' (2000: 4); moreover, in 
consequence of this, he `became sympathetic to the idea that we think and behave the 
way we do in large part because we have words that make these thoughts and 
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behaviours possible, acceptable, and useful' (ibid). While Rheingold gestures in the 
direction of linguistics (and the beliefs of linguists in general) by sketching in the 
fundaments of linguistic relativity, he emphasises the popular, non-academic focus of 
his collection: `although I respect the need for formal, systematic study of language', he 
acknowledges, `I have never strayed too far from the idea that languages are living 
systems and are shaped by people who use words, not by linguists who study them' 
(2000: 9). 
Having established this non-specialist `folk' stance, he proceeds to make some 
interesting claims for the influence of language: not only can it `make visible that which 
was previously unnoticed [and] help us to see new characteristics and possibilities' 
(2000: 8), but also, the influence of language can `become an instrument of change' 
(2000: 5). In a passage which chimes conspicuously with the popular beliefs about 
language which figure so often in dystopian fiction, Rheingold claims: 
If you want to change the way people think, you can educate them, 
brainwash them, bribe them, drug them. Or you can teach them a few 
carefully chosen new words. I believe that the memes and messages 
conveyed by the entries in these pages have the power to change the way 
you see the world. [... ] Ultimately, I believe the foreign words collected and 
discussed here have the potential for transforming the way our entire culture 
sees the world. 
(Rheingold 2000: 5) 
The views expressed here may be at odds with the standpoint of linguistics as a science; 
nonetheless, they represent strongly held `common-sense' general beliefs about the 
power of language through which `a few carefully chosen words' ostensibly `have the 
power to change the way you see the world'. These views also adhere to the folk belief 
that language - and concomitantly, its meanings and associations - can be `given' - 
granted, conferred, or made available (as in these books' aim to present novel lexis and 
meaning). Rheingold is quite explicit with regard to his intention to empower readers 
and provide them with the means to perceive the world differently, urging them to 
understand that: 
[T]hese words are meant to be used. Some will make you see things 
differently, many will help you show others how to see in new ways. [... ] 
Go ahead and make these words an active part of your vocabulary. [... ] You 
will find a confident power when you muster the courage to help expand the 
scope of our language. 
(Rheingold 2000: 10) [original emphasis] 
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The kind of folk-linguistic notions Rheingold espouses - that new forms of language, 
encoding new ways of perceiving the world, are both available to those who would seek 
them out, and once learned, confer a certain `power to change the way you see the 
world' - are exactly the kind of folk-linguistic notions that arise out of - and feed into - 
popular beliefs that some things exist beyond experience, or beyond knowing, until they 
have been harnessed by language and brought into being by lexicalisation. This belief, 
in essence, is diametrically opposed to academic-linguistic thinking in terms of 
Whorfianism: the very argument that denies Whorfianism in some linguistic circles - 
that is to say, that cross-language translation is always possible, even if that necessitates 
lengthy circumlocution - is precisely the same argument which confirms folk-beliefs in 
Whorfianism. The lengthy circumlocution, in the shape of the wordy description and 
explanation (on occasion amounting to several hundreds of words of definition in the 
above-mentioned lexicons) necessary for accurate translation of a single-word concept 
from another language, stands as evidence, from the generalised non-academic 
viewpoint, that there are concepts encoded in other languages which have no equivalent 
in English. Moreover, it is only by absorbing these new, unfamiliar words into one's 
vocabulary, as Rheingold advocates, that the associated concepts can become known, 
understood, and used. 
These folk-linguistic beliefs often inform and underpin dystopian fictions, notably 
those which advance the notion that learning different words, or even a different 
language, will manifestly entail an altered world-view in the language-learner. Orwell's 
bleak depiction of Newspeak in Nineteen Eighty-Four stands as the paradigm case of 
this type of `enforced' Whorfianism, but other dystopias embrace the notion that 
characters' perceptions and behaviour can be altered by the introduction of new words 
into their vocabulary. David Karp's (1953) dystopia, One, for example, features a 
`psychosemanticist' whose expertise is called upon in the treatment of Professor 
Burden, the protagonist who is alleged to have perpetrated the grave crime of heresy. 
The expert explains: 
Essentially Burden is a problem in re-education. He must be retaught the 
meanings of words like a bright child who has, without instruction or 
guidance, constructed a world of words that sound the way he likes them to 
sound, mean what he likes to think they mean, and uses them the way he 
prefers to use them. After all, a man without words is a blank. We have to 
erase Burden's understanding and begin again. Change his appreciation, 
understanding, and use of words and you will change the patterns of his 
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thoughts and the motives that move him. You will only then permanently 
erase the basic heresies that he maintains. 
(One, p. 80) 
Significantly, the belief underlying this passage is that a change, or `re-education' in 
respect of language will result in simultaneous change in `the patterns of his thoughts 
and the motives that move him'. In essence, the novel's `psychosemanticist' appeals to 
exactly those popular beliefs about language that motivate the publication of lexicons of 
`untranslatable' words: the popular conviction that language not only encodes, 
encapsulates, or even enacts one's ways of knowing, understanding, and being in' the 
world, but also that there exists language `out there' - beyond habitual experience - 
which makes other ways of knowing and perceiving possible. Together with the belief 
- erroneous from the point of view of scientific linguistics, but feasible from the point 
of view of folk linguistics - that language can be `given' or `taken away', these popular 
conceptions of language and perception are comfortably compatible with treatments of 
language in dystopian fictions. 
At the infra-textual level - as seen in the extract from One, above - such notions 
often drive characterisation and plot, and rely, for their effectiveness, on the implicit 
understanding that language, and language users, have the above-noted qualities and 
potentials. In itself, this characteristic of dystopia, as other commentators have 
observed, is inherently Whorfian insofar as it evinces the fundamental premises of 
linguistic relativity (or, as is sometimes the case, linguistic determinism). In later 
chapters I attend to this intra-textual evocation of Whorfianism, but here my intention is 
to return from dystopian treatments of familiar and unfamiliar language to briefly 
examine the relationship of untranslatability - or language beyond experience - with the 
reader's extra-textual reception of language. As discussed in § 1.4, I work from the 
position that readers' perceptions of reality can be altered by reading dystopian fictions; 
similarly, Rheingold's comments above demonstrate the popular belief that readers' 
perceptions of reality can be altered by introducing them to new language. The obvious 
connection - that readers' perceptions of reality can be altered by the language of 
dystopian fictions - is a recurring theme in this study, and one which depends to some 
extent on taking into account unorthodox, folk-linguistic beliefs about the potency of 
language to act as an agent of changed perceptions. Whorfianism is thus implicated in 
this extra-textual relationship also; since lexicons such as the three examples cited 
above arguably `enact' a microcosmic version of Whorfianism for the reader, since the 
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reader becomes more linguistically self-aware through the process of scrutinising his or 
her own language in comparison to others (or through comparing other languages to his 
or her own). In effect, they acknowledge - or at least, presume - the existence of the 
reader's habitual thought world as a starting point, and proceed to demonstrate the ways 
in which other languages encode alternative ways of conceptualising the world. 
Potentially, as Rheingold repeatedly asserts, these lexicalisations of experience outside 
the familiar can `have the potential for transforming the way our entire culture sees the 
world' (2000: 5). Indeed, Rheingold himself exemplifies the Whorfian possibilities that 
inhere in bringing language into consciousness: he reports that the words that `have 
entered his own vocabulary', `affected his worldview' and which he `uses from time to 
time' over 25 years since he first sourced them include dirigiste, wabi, Sabi, dharma, 
and schadenfreude (all of which are included in his lexicon). 16 
2.3.2 For want of a word: linguistic inadequacy 
The question is simply of finding a way in which one can give thought an 
objective existence. 
George Orwell (1940) 'New Words' 
I remain in the field of folk linguistics, broadly defined, to examine some prevalent 
beliefs about the human facility to encode experience linguistically, but here the focus 
shifts from readers' beliefs about language to authors' beliefs about language. More 
specifically, I look at notions of language and perception as expressed by authors of 
dystopian fictions. Each of the authors discussed below has, at some point, commented 
on the inadequacy of language as a fully expressive tool, noting that there are some 
areas of experience that are beyond the current capacity of the language to convey. 
Significantly, however, these authors illustrate the belief that un-named experience can 
be actualised into ontological wholeness via language itself; that naming, or lexicalising 
prelinguistic concepts has the power to bring them into a shared consciousness. 
Linguistic inadequacy, in isolation, is often seen as proof positive that the Sapir- 
Whorf hypothesis (especially linguistic determinism) is flawed, or as Steven Pinker 
claims, `wrong, all wrong' (1994: 57). Pinker deploys the argument of linguistic 
inadequacy to refute the broad-spectrum hypothesis, saying: 
Think about it. We have all had the experience of uttering or writing a 
sentence, then stopping and realizing that it wasn't exactly what we meant 
to say. To have that feeling, there has to be a "what we meant to say" that is 
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different from what we said. Sometimes it is not easy to find any words that 
properly convey a thought. 
(Pinker 1994: 57-58) 
Pinker continues by asking `if thoughts depended on words, how could a new word ever 
be coined? ' (1994: 58). Pinker's argument here ('if thoughts depended on words') is 
aimed at the most extreme version of linguistic determinism, which, as we have seen, 
Whorf did not subscribe to, but nonetheless, these kinds of arguments are often 
advanced against linguistic relativity. Pinker later reluctantly notes that empirical 
testing of what he calls the `banal "weak" versions of the Whorfian hypothesis' (1994: 
65) `have actually worked' (ibid), and that in these experiments, `language is, 
technically speaking, influencing a form of thought', but rejects this finding with a 
dismissive `but so what? ' (1994: 66). The `so what? ' for these authors of dystopian 
fictions lies in the inherent `connectedness' of language and perception; the correlative 
that inexorably links language with experience: in much the same way that `finding a 
name for something is a way of conjuring its existence' (Rheingold 2000: 4) in terms of 
the issue of translation considered above, these authors disclose the belief that language 
- especially new language - can reconfigure ways of perceiving the world. 
Brave New World's author, Aldous Huxley, for example, was aware of the 
existence of states of being that are outside and beyond language. In his essay `Culture 
and the Individual' (1963), 17 Huxley insists that `words in the familiar language do not 
stand (however inadequately) for things'. He explains: 
The universe in which men pass their lives is the creation of what Indian 
philosophy calls Nama-Rupa, Name and Form. Reality is a continuum, a 
fathomlessly mysterious and infinite Something, whose outward aspect is 
something we call Matter and whose inwardness is what we call Mind. 
Language is a device for taking the mystery out of Reality and making it 
amenable to human comprehension and manipulation. Acculturated man 
breaks up the continuum, attaches labels to a few of the fragments, projects 
the labels into the outside world and thus creates for himself an all-too- 
human universe of separate objects, each of which is merely the 
embodiment of a name, a particular illustration of some traditional 
abstraction. 
(Huxley 1963)18 
This passage demonstrates Huxley's belief that language is not merely inadequate, but 
that it is radically incomplete. Only `a few of the fragments' of the potentiality of the 
continuum that is reality have been captured and subsumed into linguistic form; the rest 
remain, but are exterior to language. The lexicalisation of the segmentary parts that has 
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already occurred in a given culture represents the totality of that culture's language, and 
therefore a necessarily limited world-view, since, Huxley notes, `most of them naively 
believe that culture-hallowed words about things are as real as, or even realer than their 
perceptions of the things themselves'. 19 Only those who possess the capacity to see 
beyond the constraints of language, he believes, (citing artists, visionaries, and mystics) 
are able to `cut holes in the fence of verbalized symbols that hems [them] in'. 20 
George Orwell, similarly, in his essay, `New Words' (Angus et al 2000 
[1940? ])21 claims that `parts of our experience [are] now practically unamenable to 
language', and that `our language is practically useless for describing anything that goes 
on inside the brain' (2000: 3). Before proposing the deliberate, considered invention of 
new words to capture those abstract states that are `unamenable to language', Orwell 
examines several instances of linguistic inadequacy. Within these he includes dream- 
states, where, he maintains, `no words that convey the atmosphere of dreams exist in 
our language' (ibid); certain feelings, emotions, and responses, which constitute `things 
an ordinary man has to keep locked up because there are no words to express them' 
(2000: 9-10); and the capacity to reason, where he suggests `you are invariably aware 
that your real reason will not go into words' (2000: 3-4). The result of what Orwell 
frames as the disparity between language and meaning ('words', he says, `are no liker to 
the reality than chessmen to living beings' (2000: 3)), is a shortfall amounting to deceit 
on the part of the writer. `The art of writing', he asserts, `is in fact largely the 
perversion of words' because `the lumpishness of words results in constant falsification' 
(2000: 5-6). For Orwell, the root of the problem of linguistic inadequacy lies in the 
difficulty of coding certain concepts. His solution, accordingly, lies in inventing a 
vocabulary to name abstract concepts in such a way that they become easily codable; a 
system that exhibits an isomorphic correspondence between sign and signified, and that 
evinces a level of exactitude that is `like working out an equation in algebra' (2000: 6). 
This mathematically precise solution reflects Orwell's belief that language - or at least 
mid-twentieth-century English - requires radical modification, not only in order to 
express meaning fully and unambiguously, but also to render it less liable to 
prevarication. In order to effect this scheme to verbalise the previously unarticulated, 
Orwell proposes: 
What is wanted is to discover the now nameless feelings that men have in 
common. All the powerful motives which will not go into words and which 
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are a cause of constant lying and misunderstanding, could be tracked down, 
given visible form, agreed upon, and named. 
(Orwell 2000: 10) 
This necessity to supplement and extend language at a fundamental level arises, for 
Orwell, from the need to identify and name thoughts and perceptions that he considers 
inexpressible within the current resources of the language; in short, he offers the 
creation of new language to address and resolve the inadequacies he identifies. 
Huxley's and Orwell's conceptions of language as a medium unequal to the task 
of encoding the extent or magnitude of human existence could be termed a 
macrocosmic view of the inadequacy of language; both believe that there are 
unlexicalised states of being both within and beyond experience that remain outside of 
communication. A related but microcosmic view inheres in the theory that the currently 
available lexicon is deficient in its capacity to express adequately the perceptions of an 
entire section of its users: more specifically, women. Feminist scholars, including Julia 
Kristeva, Helene Cixous, and Luce Irigaray have variously expressed the view that 
language `silences' women by encoding only masculine perceptions, and have proposed 
the adoption of a `women's language' to redress this imbalance (Squier and Vedder 
2000: 320-321). The view that language inadequately communicates the consciousness 
of women is the central argument of Dale Spender's Man Made Language (1982). 
Spender outlines her belief that `the English language has been literally man made and 
that it is still primarily under male control' (1982: 12), which, she says, perpetuates the 
`invisibility or "other" nature of females', since they are obliged to communicate their 
conception of female reality only in terms of the patriarchal order from which male 
language-as-norm renders them deviant. In a passage that significantly echoes Orwell's 
beliefs about the consequences of linguistic inadequacy, she says: 
Language is our means of classifying and ordering the world: our means of 
manipulating reality. In its structure and in its use we bring our world into 
realisation, and if it is inherently inaccurate, then we are misled. If the rules 
which underlie our language system, our symbolic order, are invalid, then 
we are daily deceived 
(Spender 1982: 2) 
Linguistic inadequacy, thus expressed, relates not only to unlexicalised potentiality, but 
also to previously-lexicalised states that incompletely or inaccurately represent the 
perceptions of a given group within society; in this case, women. 
86 
Suzette Haden Elgin, writer of the dystopian Native Tongue trilogy, feminist, and 
pro-Whorfian linguist, exemplifies Spender's beliefs, noting women's `constant tension 
and frustration that comes of not having words for the things [they] want to say', and 
suggests, by way of analogy: 
Think of foot-binding. It's easy to list the restrictions foot-binding places on 
a woman and to understand what removing those restrictions would mean. 
An inadequate language (one of the hypotheses in Native Tongue) imposes 
less obvious but equally repressive constraints; it could be called tongue- 
binding. 22 
Elgin's response to this particular manifestation of language inadequacy is twofold: 
firstly, her response is to lexicalise those states she believes are outside of language, by 
creating Läadan, a fully-functional `female language' (Squier and Vedder 2000: 305). 
Läadan, Elgin notes is `the first language constructed by a linguist and designed to 
express the perceptions of women'23; secondly, she produced the Native Tongue trilogy, 
a series of dystopian fictions in which Ldadan is central to the plot. Her aim in both 
cases is to test several hypotheses, including; `that change in language brings about 
social change, rather than the contrary', and: 
that if women were offered a women's language, one of two things would 
happen-they would welcome and nurture it, or it would at a minimum 
motivate them to replace it with a better women's language of their own 
construction 24 
The intention of Läadan, in its fictional context is to lexicalise (or, in the words of the 
Linguist women of Native Tongue, `encode') `a chunk of the world that so far as we 
know has never been chosen for naming before in any human language' (Elgin 2000: 
22); in its real-world context, Elgin originated Läadan for the specific purpose of 
plugging the `gaps' she perceived in the language available to express the perceptions of 
women. In an appendix to Native Tongue, Elgin gives some examples of the kinds of 
experiences that are lexicalised in Läadan but not in contemporary English. Her 
introductory remarks to this glossary are notably resonant with the issues of 
translatability discussed in §2.3.1 above, as she says `[a]s is true in the translation from 
any language into another, many words of Läadan cannot be translated into English 
except by lengthy definitions' (p. 302). One such lengthy definition - of the Läadan 
word doroledim - requires 178 words to explain its meaning, but others can be defined 
somewhat more economically: nühäam, for example, is elucidated as `to feel oneself 
cherished, cared for, nurtured by someone; to feel loving-kindness' (p. 302). Both 
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within and beyond the fiction, Elgin confirms the opinion that there are areas of 
experience specific to women that remain outside language; in addition, she 
demonstrates a belief that these areas have to be named - or brought into language - 
before they can exist. 
Elgin's view is shared by Marge Piercy, author of feminist dystopias Woman on 
the Edge of Time and He She and It. Piercy similarly feels disadvantaged by the 
shortfall between the vocabulary which is available and that which she feels is 
necessary to actualise a concept. In particular, she suggests that without the appropriate 
language with which to explicate a complex concept, there can be no tangible 
understanding of it. For Piercy, this includes the insufficiency of language to represent 
the female condition. Speaking, for example, of the early lack of a feminist vocabulary, 
she says: 
[T]here is no vocabulary for discussing your situation, when you're a 
woman before there is language of feminism, trying to understand what it's 
like to be a woman, you have no concepts, no vocabulary for even 
understanding your own situation. 25 
In their musings on the inadequacy of the available language, what all these writers 
reveal is an awareness - perhaps more acute because they are writers - that their current 
language does not precisely capture every eventuality they would wish. Each identifies 
a concept, a way of being, an abstraction, or a belief, that seems to exist beyond 
language, and while linguists would offer circumlocution as a solution, and anti- 
Whorfans would note that they have adequately (and proposition-defeatingly) used 
language to articulate what they claim is inarticulable, the authors amply demonstrate 
the popular folk belief that language does not always possess the capacity to verbalise 
all perceptions. 
This common belief permeates the fictional worlds: the chicken-and-egg language 
problem that Piercy outlines in relation to the language of feminism, above, is realised 
as a fundamental communicative impasse between the present and the future in Woman 
on the Edge of Time. Luciente, a time-travelling character from the future utopia of 
Mattapoisett attempts to explain that, in her time - the year 2137 - understanding of 
cognitive capabilities and potentials has developed to a stage where cross-temporal 
telepathic communication is a reality. However, while this development has been 
matched by a concomitant evolution of language in the future, both the concept and its 
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lexicalisation are absent in the fictional present. The mismatch between the future- 
bound proposition and the present lexical inventory is such that a frustrated Luciente 
declares: 
To explain anything exotic, you have to convey at once the thing and the 
vocabulary with which to talk about the thing.... Your vocabulary is 
remarkably weak in words for mental states, mental abilities, and mental 
acts- 
(Woman on the Edge of Time, p. 42) 
A similar belief about the paucity of language is expressed by the character, Grace, in 
Elgin's Native Tongue, in which the multi-lingual women of the Lines spend their days 
communicating with extra-terrestrial alien species. While the young girls of the 
community have learned the `female language' Läadan from birth, and can thus express 
female perceptions fully, the older women lack much of the language. Grace remarks: 
What that must be like. Not to be always groping, because there aren't any 
words - while the person you want so desperately to talk to gets tired of 
waiting and begins talking of something else. To have a language that 
works, that says what you want to say easily and efficiently, and to have 
always had that? No loves, I cannot imagine it. I am too old. 
(Native Tongue, p. 267) 
The dystopian-fictional representation of linguistic inadequacy parallels the authors' 
views on the subject in the real world. As a means of bringing these unlexicalised 
perceptions into consciousness, Orwell proposes language - notably, invented language 
- as the key to unlocking its own potential, submitting: 
The solution I suggest is to invent new words as deliberately as we would 
invent new parts for a motor-car engine. Suppose that a vocabulary existed 
which would accurately express the life of the mind, or a great part of it. 
Suppose that there need be no stultifying feeling that life is inexpressible, no 
jiggery-pokery with artistic tricks; expressing one's meaning simply [being] 
a matter of taking the right words and putting them in place. 
(Orwell 2000: 6) 
Orwell's solution to the problem as he sees it in his own historical spacetime is the 
solution which is extensively adopted in dystopian fiction: to invent new language in 
order to encapsulate an otherwise inarticulable concept. The phenomenon I term 
speculative language throughout this study depends, to a great extent, on these authors' 
belief that the currently available lexicon is inadequately equipped to encode all that is 
asked of it; in order to communicate a not-yet-known perception existing in some future 
89 
world, they believe that they must move outside, or beyond the known language. 
Elgin, for example, invents Läadan, while Piercy coins the verb intersee to describe the 
particularly psychic level of communication Luciente enjoys in her future world. Not 
only do these authors subscribe to the folk view that there are states and abstractions 
that are beyond the capacity of current language to verbalise, they actively imagine 
perceptions beyond current knowledge, in futuristic worlds, and bring them into being 
through language. This would seem to be indicative of a writerly Whorfian-style 
process: these authors have all recognised that language sets up certain channels of 
thought; moreover, they all express the desire to break out of these channels, to 
challenge and subvert them by reaching beyond the existing lexicon. The dystopian 
imagination achieves exactly the effect these authors strive towards: dystopian fictions 
characteristically transcend, spatially and temporally, the known world - and its 
language - and actualise, in narrative form, the unknown. In dystopian fiction, 
language assumes the twofold task of presenting reality and a state beyond reality; it 
communicates the known and the unknown, the familiar and the unfamiliar. 
Essentially, in giving substance - through language - to states both within and beyond 
experience, dystopia simultaneously articulates the present and verbalises the 
ineffable. 26 
2.4 The mundane meets the exotic: cognitive estrangement 
[A] new society is generated in the author's mind, transferred to paper, and 
from paper it occurs as a convulsive shock in the readers mind, the shock of 
dysrecognition. 
Philip K. Dick (1990) Preface to Collected Stories 
A distinct contrast recurs throughout the discussions of language in this chapter: that 
between the known and the unknown, the familiar and the unfamiliar, the habitual and 
the extraordinary. Essentially, in each area considered so far, language existing within 
the bounds of experience is examined in relation to language existing beyond the 
bounds of experience. Everyday, customary language, as Whorf notes, is a `background 
phenomenon', routinised, automised, and largely beyond consciousness. It is brought 
into focus, into consciousness, and foregrounded, however, when it is considered in 
relation to unfamiliar, strange, or alien language(s), or what Whorf terms exotic 
language. Musing on the `difficulty of standing aside from our own language [... J and 
scrutinizing it objectively' (1956: 138), he comes to the conclusion that: 
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[T]he problem, though difficult, is feasible, and the best approach is through 
an exotic language, for in its study we are at last pushed willy-nilly out of 
our ruts. Then we find the exotic language is a mirror held up to our own. 
(Whorf 1956: 138) 
Through consideration of `an exotic language', then, in Whorf's opinion, we are 
impelled (`pushed willy-nilly') out of our habitual thought worlds ('our ruts'), and 
challenged to examine our world-view in relation to the world-view encoded in the 
exotic language, which is a `mirror held up to our own'. This juxtaposition of two 
worlds - and their languages - also underlies linguist and science fiction writer Samuel 
P. Delany's approach to explaining the challenging nature of science fiction through its 
strange syntax in his (1977) The Jewel-Hinged Jaw: Notes on the Language of Science 
Fiction. Delany, in the extract below, applies the Saussurean notion of the syntagmatic 
and paradigmatic axes to account for the significant schism (in science fiction) between 
the unfamiliar or `wholly unexpected' and the familiar or `mundane' language. `[W]hat 
science fiction does', he claims is, 
to take recognizable syntagms and substitute in them, here and there, 
signifiers from a till then wholly unexpected paradigm. The occurrence of 
unusual, if not downright opaque signifiers in the syntagm focuses our 
attention on the structures implied [... ]. This focusing does not occur in 
mundane fiction. 
(Delany 1977: 255-256)27 
Delany's investigations into language in this volume, and in his later (1984) Starboard 
Wine: More Notes on the Language of Science Fiction deal with science fictional texts 
at the more outlandish, extra-terrestrial, alien end of the spectrum, where anything is 
linguistically possible; as such, much of the material he looks at falls outside of the 
scope of this study. I briefly refer to his work here though, to take advantage of his 
conception of mundane fiction, and, more pertinently, to adopt his claim for the genre- 
specificity of these particular linguistic phenomena. Delany recontextualised the term 
mundane to describe any fiction which is not science fiction; that is to say, realistic, 
mimetic fictions set in familiar worlds. Mundane language characterises mundane 
fiction just as extraordinary language characterises science fiction, in Delany's view. 
Dystopian fictions, with their futuristic settings in potential alternative worlds, are, as 
discussed in § 1.3.3, a sub-genre of science fiction, and in a very similar sense imagine 
the unimaginable; realise the unknowable; foresee the unforeseeable. Yet, unlike much 
science fiction they reveal and interrogate mundane worlds (see § 1.2.1). The animation 
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of this meeting of the exotic and the mundane is largely achieved through the 
deployment of speculative - or exotic - language set against a background of reflective 
- or mundane - language, each brought sharply into focus with relative reference to the 
other. Just as Whorf shows that habitual language is best brought into focus by 
reference to exotic language, Delany shows that the extraordinary language of science 
fiction is best brought into focus by reference to mundane language. 
The coincidence and interanimation of the familiar and the unfamiliar is also the 
vital, defining aspect of Darko Suvin's delineation of the influential science fiction 
theory of cognitive estrangement, which he outlines in his (1979) Metamorphoses of 
Science Fiction. Science fiction, Suvin argues, is: 
[A] literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the 
presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose main 
formal device is an imaginative framework alternative to the author's 
empirical environment. 
(Suvin 1979: 8-9) [original emphasis] 
Estrangement, in Suvin's view, `differentiates [science fiction] from the "realistic" 
literary mainstream', while cognition distinguishes science fiction from myth, folktales, 
and fantasy (1979: 7-8). Cognition (the known and familiar) co-exists with 
estrangement (the unknown and unfamiliar) in Suvin's conception. His argument, in 
essence, is that the prime concern of these fictions is not to draw readers' attention to 
the details of exotic alien worlds and galaxies, but rather, to use these familiar-yet- 
unfamiliar settings to confront taken-for-granted notions about their own environment 
and ways of being, and advance the possibility that there are other perspectives from 
which to view their world. 
In formulating his theory of cognitive estrangement, Suvin draws on the Russian 
Formalist theory of defamiliarisation (ostranenie) and also Berthold Brecht's theory of 
the `alienation effect' (Verfremdungseffekt), both of which rely to some extent on 
assessing or gauging the familiar by reference to the unfamiliar. Brecht's `alienation 
effect' suggests that in drama, the audience should be estranged from the action to the 
extent that they are aware that what they witness is a defamiliarised illusion, and thus 
become aware of the potential to extend the freshly perceived knowledge out into their 
lives beyond the theatre. Defamiliarisation, in Formalist terms, is the function of art 
(including literature) to make strange, or challenge, the habitual, the automatised, and 
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thus restore, or refresh, the novelty of perception. In his essay `Art as Technique', 
Formalist Viktor Shklovsky considers the habitual, noting: 
Habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture, one's wife, and the fear of 
war. `If the whole complex lives of many people go on unconsciously, then 
such lives are as if they had never been. ' And art exists that one may 
recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the 
stone stony. 
(Shklovsky 1965: 12) 
Here, Shklovsy outlines the central tenet of defamiliarisation: art has a perception- 
challenging function, insofar as it makes the familiar unfamiliar, and conveys a 
consciousness of things as they are freshly perceived, rather than as they are customarily 
known. While the early Formalist focus was on art in its widest sense, the Prague 
School theorist, Bohuslav Havränek defines this defamiliarisation effect in terms of the 
automisation and foregrounding of language in his essay `The Functional 
Differentiation of the Standard Language' (1932), where he explains: 
By automization we [mean] a use of the devices of the language, in isolation 
or in combination with each other, as is usual for a certain expressive 
purpose, that is, such a use that the expression itself does not attract any 
attention. 
[... ] 
Byforegrounding we [mean] the use of the devices of the language in such 
a way that this use itself attracts attention, and is perceived as uncommon, as 
deprived of automization, as deautomatized. 
(Havränek 1932: 10) 
The automisation of language, as discussed above, is the crucial first stage of 
Whorfianism, or the habitual thought world, while foregrounding, or bringing into 
consciousness, represents the second stage, or the point at which inconsistencies or 
irregularities are perceived (see §2.2.2). Carl Freedman's interpretation of Suvin's 
theory, in his Critical Theory and Science Fiction (2000), figures this contrast between 
foregrounding and automisation as a dialectic between estrangement and cognition. 
Estrangement, Freedman suggests, `refers to the creation of an alternative fictional 
world that, by refusing to take our mundane environment for granted, implicitly or 
explicitly performs an estranging critical interrogation' of cognition (2000: 16-17). He 
continues: 
But the critical character of the interrogation is guaranteed by the operation 
of cognition, which enables the science-fictional text to account rationally 
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for its imagined world and for the connections as well as the disconnections 
of the latter to our own empirical world. 
(Freedman 2000: 17) 
The idea of cognitive estrangement as a dialectic - the interplay of ostensibly 
contradictory principles - is illuminating here, since it contributes to an account of the 
ways in which the familiar and the unfamiliar may interact - and, as I shall elaborate, 
the ways in which reflective and speculative language may interact. In conflating the 
theoretical perspectives of ostranenie and Verfremdungseffekt into his proposal for 
science fiction as `a literature of cognitive estrangement' (1979: 4), Suvin argues that 
science fiction presents readers with an aspect of their reality `made strange', or 
defamiliarised by way of a new perspective `implying a new set of norms' (1979: 6). 
This approach almost exactly parallels Whorf's conception of the principle of linguistic 
relativity: his `habitual thought world' is the known, the familiar, the automatised, just 
as Suvin's `cognitive' represents the understood, the accepted, the norm. Similarly, 
when Whorf speaks of `expand[ing] our base of reference' and `encounter[ing] an 
interruption of its regularity' (1956: 209), he is effectively speaking of defamiliarising 
the familiar, or what Suvin calls `estrangement'. In both instances, emphasis falls on 
the assumption that outside the realm of perceptual evidence - of what we know that we 
know - there are potentially other ways of knowing and understanding the world that 
are as yet unfamiliar, but nevertheless exist `out there', beyond current experience. 
Suvin's theory of cognitive estrangement proposes science fiction literature as the locus 
of challenging and (re)cognising the automatised and habitual, while Whorfianism 
isolates language as the medium within which world-view resides, and different, 
`exotic' languages as the means of (re)cognising reality. This study draws on both 
views, and proposes the specific language of dystopia as exemplifying both cognitive 
estrangement and Whorfianism, since, in its presentation of reflective and speculative 
language, it exemplifies the familiar and the unfamiliar, the cognitive and the estranged, 
the habitual and the exotic. 
Cognitive estrangement is a potently present feature of the texts to be discussed 
in subsequent chapters; the fictitious futuristic worlds, extrapolatively connected to our 
own, coherently dislocate our sense of reality as they reflect, emulate, and challenge the 
familiar by reference to the unfamiliar. The reader's habitual thought world is 
confronted, and a settled sense of being is challenged; ultimately, perceptions of self 
and society - or self in society - are questioned as an alternative way of being unfolds. 
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Language plays a vital, constitutive role in this re-conception of the world. In the next 
chapter I examine Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four in the light of Whorfianism and 
cognitive estrangement, and consider the ways in which speculative language 
exemplifies both approaches. 
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3. Speculative language in dystopia 
Bold ideas, unjustified anticipation, and speculative thought, are our only 
means for interpreting nature ... our only instrument for grasping her. And we 
must hazard them to win our prize. 
Karl Popper (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
3.1 Introduction 
George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) symbolises the genre of dystopia: as 
David Sisk (1997: 37) notes, `readers who know of no other dystopian work - indeed, 
readers unfamiliar with the word dystopia - will almost certainly know (or know of) 
Orwell's proleptic nightmare'. It is `the composite political dystopia', according to 
Harold L. Berger, who considers it such a definitive text that `previous fictional 
totalitarian societies seem but anticipations and later ones variations of Orwell's' (1988: 
426). With its relentlessly bleak delineation of an oppressive totalitarian state, and its 
charting of the hopeless resistance of one man, which culminates in defeat, despair, and 
crushed acquiescence, it is probably the genre's most shocking and brutal glimpse into a 
dystopian future. More pertinently, its depiction of domination and tyranny through 
extreme control of language (in the form of Newspeak) is the most radical dystopian 
example of language being used as an instrument of control. In this respect, Newspeak 
epitomises linguistic determinism, the model which most readily comes to mind when 
prompted by observations such as Tom Moylan and Raffaella Baccolini's that: 
Throughout the history of dystopian fiction, the conflict of the text turns on 
the control of language [... ]. Language is a key weapon for the reigning 
dystopian power structure. 
(Moylan & Baccolini 2004: 5-6) 
Such is the notoriety of Orwell's concept of Newspeak, a language designed gradually 
to narrow the range of ideas and restrict independent thought, that it has come to define 
- rather than be defined by - the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: numerous language reference 
works cite Newspeak as the exemplar of extreme linguistic determinism in practice. 
Trevor A. Harley's (2001) The Psychology of Language, for instance, includes a 
glossary entry which illustrates just how Newspeak has come to symbolise linguistic 
determinism: to define the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Harley explains: 
In George Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, language restricted the 
way in which people thought. The rulers of the state deliberately used 
"Newspeak", the official language of Oceania, so that the people thought 
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what they were required to think. "This statement ... could not 
have been 
sustained by reasoned argument, because the necessary words were not 
available" (Orwell, 1949, p. 249, in the appendix, "The principles of 
Newspeak"). This is a version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. 
(Harley 2001: 80) 
Despite its eminent status with reference to the question of language and thought, I 
consider Newspeak only tangentially here. While acknowledging that no study of 
language in dystopian fiction would be complete without some mention of Orwell's 
invented language, my intention in this chapter is to explore speculative language - the 
language of the future - in the novel's main narrative in terms of its stylistic qualities 
and possible perceptual effects on the reader, rather than restricting my discussion just 
to Newspeak and its potential to affect thought, beliefs, or behaviour. Furthermore, 
Newspeak has received a great deal of critical attention since the publication of 
Nineteen Eighty-Four in 1949, and the area is already heavily debated and documented 
in terms of the ways in which Newspeak accords with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (at 
least with more deterministic interpretations). Over thirty years ago, in 1974, the 
already-burgeoning weight of scholarly attention prompted Myra Barnes reluctantly to 
give the issue `less attention [... ] than it deserves' (1974: 155) in her study Linguistics 
and Languages in Science Fiction, while a full two decades later, Roger Fowler echoes 
Barnes' comment in The Language of George Orwell (1995) where he notes not only 
that 'Orwell's views on "Newspeak" have been extensively discussed', but also that 
`one begins by despairing of saying anything fresh about it' (1995: 181). ' Yet another 
decade on, I am similarly hesitant to attempt yet another intervention into the Newspeak 
debate, and, although I outline some earlier critical approaches below, I do not engage 
with the determinist position they explore; my approach is focused more on the 
language of the main text, rather than Newspeak per se, and my theoretical perspective 
remains firmly on the relativist Whorfian side of the deliberations. 
Although it is unlikely that Orwell had any direct knowledge of Whorf s (or 
Sapir's) work (Milroy & Milroy 1998: 38), most of the available studies attending to 
language in Nineteen Eighty-Four focus primarily on Newspeak's Sapir-Whorfian 
connections: Sisk, for example, suggests that `[i]mplicitly, Newspeak depends on 
Benjamin Whorl's theory that thought depends on language' (1997: 43), while Walter 
Meyers believes that `the frightening potential of linguistic relativity is the largest cloud 
on the already-gray horizon of George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four' (1980: 163). 
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Barnes (1974) also, in a chapter entitled `The Language of Thought Control', considers 
Orwell's text among `richly Whorfian' dystopian examples (1974: 158), and confirms 
that `[t]he Newspeak language in Orwell's 1984 is probably the world's best known 
fictional, imaginary language' (1974: 155). A brief sketch of the range of views on the 
plausibility and efficacy of Newspeak would include comments from within literary 
criticism, such as Krishan Kumar's claim that `[i]t has been impossible for all but the 
most literal-minded reader to take Orwell's invention of Newspeak as anything but 
satiric' (1987: 321), and Sisk's opposing view that `most readers find the Newspeak of 
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four a plausible and terrifying instrument of totalitarian 
thought control, which "could work"' (1997: 12). Views from linguists tend more 
towards Kumar's position: Fowler's belief - that `Newspeak is a fallacy, and Orwell 
knows it' (1995: 211) - contributes succinctly to the debate, while James Milroy and 
Lesley Milroy summarise the prevailing view from within linguistics, saying: 
It is true that an authoritarian government can directly limit freedom of 
thought and public expression of ideas, but it cannot directly intervene in 
language structure in order to destroy the human capacity to exploit 
linguistic resources. All languages change and vary despite attempts to fix 
and standardise them. Orwell's `Newspeak' exemplifies an impossible 
extreme of the prescriptive ideology. 
(Milroy & Milroy 1998: 38) 
Similarly, Elizabeth Traugott and Mary Pratt appeal to the inherent creativity of natural 
language as a rebuttal of the assumptions which underpin Orwell's presentation of 
Newspeak: 
[Newspeak] overlooks the creative nature of language that makes the 
uttering of new sentences in new contexts possible and thereby opens up the 
possibility of new ranges of meaning. It denies any notion of semantic 
features that can be reused in different groupings of sound-meaning 
correlations. It denies the possibility of saying one thing and meaning 
another, as in puns and ironic statements [... ]. In reality, people are always 
having new thoughts and seeking out new words to express them. In short, 
Orwell's discussion presents an incomplete view of what human language 
is, and to the extent that this is so, Newspeak is not a real possibility. 
(Traugott & Pratt 1980: 109) 
My position in this study echoes the latter two points: while I acknowledge Orwell's 
linguistic inventiveness in his representation of Newspeak, and recognise it as an 
example of speculative language, I accord with the view that linguistic determinism, at 
least insofar as it is espoused in Newspeak - as a systematically manipulable means of 
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controlling and diminishing independent thought - is simply untenable outside of the 
world of the fiction. It would seem that it is also untenable within the world of the 
fiction, since Orwell demonstrates, in an exchange between Winston Smith and his 
lover, Julia, that Newspeak words alone do not circumscribe or control thought. In 
response to Winston's question `do you know the Newspeak word goodthinkful? 
Meaning naturally orthodox, incapable of thinking a bad thought? ', Julia's reply, `No, I 
didn't know the word, but I know the kind of person right enough' (p. 138)2 lays bare 
the fallacy of Newspeak. Newspeak, however, appears only rarely in the main 
narrative, and, while I shall attend briefly to those instances, my chief interest in this 
chapter is not in the potential of language to control the perceptions of the characters 
(the declared purpose of Newspeak), but focuses instead on the ways in which 
speculative language challenges, defamiliarises, and brings into consciousness the 
perceptions of the readership. In order to examine the relationship of Whorfianism and 
cognitive estrangement to readers' perceptions I concentrate on the form and function of 
Orwell's other `non-Newspeak' speculative language, paying attention to the linguistic 
strategies by which the main text (rather than the Appendix, `The Principles of 
Newspeak') is constructed. The greater part of this chapter is devoted to analyses of the 
four main language-specific strategies by which Orwell - and, as I shall suggest, other 
authors of dystopias - create an estranged, futuristic, perception-challenging re-visioned 
world. Neologism and neosemy (that is to say new word forms and new meanings 
attached to existing word forms), perhaps the most accessible and obvious linguistic 
strategies, are investigated in Orwell's work, and world-construction in terms of phrasal 
units and narrative structure is also explored. Prior to that, I begin with an account of 
the speculative language of Nineteen Eighty-Four in its socio-historical context as a 
means of assessing the impact that diachronic language change may have in the years 
which intervene between the author's historical spacetime and a contemporary reader's 
base reality. As with the direction of the rest of this study, my focus remains on the 
relationship between language and perception; in what follows it will become clear that 
Whorfianism, in combination with cognitive estrangement, is significantly implicated in 
Orwell's speculative language. 
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3.2 Speculative language in time and place 
The main reason most people don't use metric measurements is that they 
don't think in metric. 
UK Metric Association (2005) Think Metric! 
Writers of dystopias have to achieve a complex linguistic balance. Firstly, they need to 
project their language to a point at which it plausibly represents the kind of language 
change that might have occurred at the time of their futuristic setting. Secondly, they 
must take into account any restrictions or prescriptions that may - and typically will - 
have been made to the language by an autocratic state. Thirdly - and most importantly 
for this study - they must describe, and lexicalise, concepts and areas of experience that 
currently (in the author's historical spacetime) are beyond being. Fourthly, and in order 
to achieve their didactic purpose, they must maintain the link with `place' and base- 
reality which differentiates dystopia from other genres such as fantasy (see §1.2.1). 
Finally, they must still present the reader with language that is understandable and does 
not violate the principle of communication that they customarily expect a novel to 
provide. Orwell achieves this multifaceted linguistic balancing act with remarkable 
acuity in Nineteen Eighty-Four, and contrary to widespread opinion, he does so within 
the compass of the main narrative, rather than simply relying on Newspeak as the 
medium for communicating the speculative nature of his dystopia. Nineteen Eighty- 
Four looks towards a future much less temporally distant than is usual for dystopias: the 
calendar date 1984 has long since passed, which has prompted some commentators to 
suggest that the novel's proleptic force is spent. However, this atypically brief temporal 
dislocation enables - encourages, even - an assessment of the speculative language 
originating in Orwell's historical spacetime in comparison to the language of 
contemporary base-reality. By returning, figuratively, to the time (1948) and the place 
(post-war Britain) of the text's composition, my aim in this section is to examine 
Orwell's means of encoding and communicating his perceptions of a totalitarian 
dystopian future, and to contextualise his linguistic strategies with reference to the 
language of today. 
The tension between the familiar and the unfamiliar that typifies dystopia is 
evident in the opening sentence of Nineteen Eighty-Four. Beginning with an 
unremarkable locative proposition: `It was a bright cold day in April', it seems entirely 
consistent with traditional narrative sequencing, and perfectly familiar. The following 
100 
clause, however: `and the clocks were striking thirteen' abruptly signals something 
unusual in its unexpected use of thirteen. A clock striking thirteen is anomalous, and 
disrupts the familiarity set up in the preceding part of the sentence; it becomes a 
conceptual irregularity that is foregrounded, defamiliarised, and estranged. Even today, 
clocks do not habitually strike thirteen, but, because the concept of a clock displaying 
13: 00 is not so unusual to a contemporary reader, it is less cognitively alienating than it 
would have been in Orwell's time. To understand the full import of its speculative 
function in the novel it is necessary to consider how the conjectural combination of 
clock and striking thirteen could have been perceived as symbolic also of ominous 
portents pertinent to Orwell's post-war Britain, rather than simply representative of the 
alien and threatening quality of the totalitarian world of Oceania. 
By 1948, although the twenty-four hour clock had been adopted by the 
administrative systems of the military, rail networks, and aeronautics, to aid precision in 
scheduling, it was not used outside of these applications in Britain. However, much of 
Continental Europe at this time used the twenty-four hour system in preference to the `2 
x 12' system operative in Britain. Consequently, references such as that to `thirteen' 
(and, later in the opening chapter, `it was nearly eleven hundred' (p. 11), and `he had to 
be back at work by fourteen-thirty' (p. 29)) were to a system then popularly known as 
the `Continental Clock'. Given that Britain had recently been at war with much of 
Europe, connotations actualised by such reference might include not only foreign, alien, 
and other, but conceivably also connotative links to the recent hostilities. At this 
elementary level of speculative language, the language is known, insofar as these 
individual 'lexemes - thirteen, eleven, hundred - are familiar. They become estranged, 
or defamiliarised, only when used in specific unfamiliar contexts, and even then, only 
by comparison with the prevailing norms of standard language. Speculative language at 
this lexical level subtly challenges the reader's perceptions while not overtly estranging 
the language itself. 
Science fiction commentators are familiar with the analogical positioning of the 
reader as a visitor to a strange land: this comparison, I would suggest, might usefully be 
extended to incorporate the kind of `dysrecognition' (Dick 1990), or cognitive 
estrangement that the mid-twentieth-century reader might experience as s/he encounters 
the `strange land' of Oceania where fundamental units of measurement are 
defamiliarised. Furthermore, the `foreign' or alien quality of such language resonates 
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with second-stage Whorfianism (see §2.2.2), since it is brought into consciousness 
because it breaks with, or challenges, the norm, the habitual, or expected. In Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, not just the measurement of time, but all weights and measures are 
expressed in unfamiliar-yet-familiar units. Currency is expressed in the monetary units 
of dollars and cents, and dimensions are expressed in metric units. The following 
examples all occur within the early pages of the first chapter: `more than a metre wide' 
(p. 3), `A kilometre away' (p. 5), `bought the book for two dollars fifty' (p. 8), and `a 20 
kilo bomb' (p. 10). Metric weights and measures, like the twenty-four hour clock, were 
not familiar in post-war Britain, which remained staunchly imperial in its measurement 
systems. It was not until many years later, in 1965, that the British government 
recommended that the imperial system should be abolished in favour of the metric, and 
outlined a 10-year plan for its implementation (although this project for `international 
alignment and harmonization' has only, to date, been fully accomplished in Eire, and is 
not yet complete in the UK mainland). Thus, while the language of the Systeme 
international d'unites is perhaps only minimally irregular to a twenty-first-century 
reader, especially those readers educated after the mid-1970s, when British schools 
adopted a policy of teaching metric units, it would be far more cognitively challenging - 
and speculative - to a contemporaneous reader. More saliently, in the immediate post- 
war wave of patriotism (and at a time when the British Empire still had many offshore 
colonies), to conjecture upon such a radical change to an established system would be to 
articulate a perceived threat to Britain's independence, character, pride, and national 
identity. 
While Orwell's choice to use alien units of measurement in the construction of his 
fictional world to some extent reflects and represents the fictional future division of the 
world into three blocs: the superpowers of Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia, it also 
represents a disturbing concern Orwell perceived in his historical spacetime, which is 
considerably less prominent today, and may even be practically invisible to a young 
contemporary reader. In common with other dystopias, Nineteen Eighty-Four depicts a 
world that is flawed in comparison to the author's community, a world in which trends 
and tendencies evident in the author's historical spacetime are extrapolated and 
extended to undesirable lengths. Orwell considered the possibility of widespread 
metrication just such a flaw, as evidenced by his prognostications in his 1947 Tribune 
column, `As I Please', where he opines: 
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Another thing I am against in advance - for it is bound to be suggested 
sooner or later - is the complete scrapping of our present system of weights 
and measures [... ] there is a strong case for keeping on the old 
measurements for use in everyday life. 
(Angus et al 2000 Vol 4: 305) 
Orwell was never a man to withhold an opinion. Many of these strongly-held 
convictions find didactic expression in the language of his novels; three of his essays 
written during 1946 ('Why I Write', `Politics and the English Language', and `The 
Prevention of Literature'), for example, are frequently cited as formative to Nineteen 
Eighty-Four. Peter Huber (1994) suggests the novel is largely `a palimpsest' of his 
earlier writings, citing numerous examples of what he terms Orwell's `self-plagiarism' 
(1994: 8). In the Tribune article Orwell outlines a view that will influence his later 
decision to use the language of the metric system in Nineteen Eighty-Four; and, it is 
worth noting, his explanation of his misgivings about metrication in the real world also 
reveals his own experience of cognitive estrangement, and a notably Whorfian 
perspective: 
[T]he metric system does not possess, or has not succeeded in establishing, 
a large number of units that can be visualised. There is, for instance, 
effectively no unit between the metre, which is more than a yard, and the 
centimetre, which is less than half an inch. In English you can describe 
someone as being five feet three inches high, or five feet nine inches, or six 
feet one inch, and your hearer will know fairly accurately what you mean. 
But I have never heard a Frenchman say, "He is a hundred and forty-two 
centimetres high"; it would not convey any visual image. 
(Angus et a12000, Vol 4: 305) 
Orwell's clear belief here that the metric system `does not possess ... units that can 
be 
visualised', and that it `would not convey any visual image' illustrates his inability to 
conceptualise the physical dimensions denoted by these unfamiliar measures; they are 
simply beyond the bounds of his perception. This immediately recalls Whorf's central 
argument that: 
We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we 
do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way 
- an agreement that [... ] is codified in the patterns of our language. 
(Whorf 1956: 213) 
Orwell's speech community - English-speaking 1940s Britain - agrees to calibrate its 
weights and measures in imperial units, thus the dimensions signified by the language 
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used to describe these are conceptually available and familiar or, in Orwell's words, 
`canbe visualised'. Had he used his speech community's units -yard, mile, pound- in 
place of metre, kilometre, kilo, the language would have been unremarkable and non- 
speculative, encoding nothing more than regular communication, and, by extension, the 
kind of normal cognition which supports an automatised reading. If his intention, on 
the other hand, were simply to illustrate the `otherness' of the fictional world, he might 
have constructed creative neologisms to name weights and measures, relying on the 
strangeness of the language to suggest an alien system. This strategy, however, would 
induce only estrangement, since the reader would be unacquainted with both the lexis 
and the proportions denoted. His use of the existing, but essentially extrinsic, alien, 
language of the metric system facilitates linguistic intelligibility and conceptual 
alienation simultaneously: in other words, cognitive estrangement. 
This language is also speculative: not just because the author is speculating on a 
hypothetical possibility that the way he divides up his world may be displaced, but also 
because this linguistic-cognitive overthrow in the novel is so comprehensive that its use 
has already become deeply habituated for the inhabitants of Oceania. Fowler (1995) has 
shown that the entire text is focalised through Winston Smith; it is through Winston's 
perceptions that this speculative metric dislocation is communicated. `Everything that 
Orwell wants to say about totalitarianism', Fowler notes, `is communicated through the 
sensations and thoughts of Winston Smith, without any authorial commentary' (1995: 
186). The markers of free indirect discourse that Fowler identifies as indicative of 
Winston's world-view can be seen in the following examples, all of which are 
attributable to Winston, and all of which illustrate his habitual, automatic use and 
understanding of metric terminology: 
Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimetres inside your skull (p. 29) 
He had walked several kilometres over pavements, and his varicose ulcer was 
throbbing (p. 85) 
They were perhaps four metres apart when the girl stumbled (p. 111) 
`Free indirect thought is used to make Winston's thoughts immediate to the reader', 
Fowler (1995: 190) notes, and this seeming unplanned, immediacy is apparent not just 
in Winston's automatic use of metric measures in his inner-thought world, but is also 
seen quite clearly in his conversations with other characters; exchanges which reveal 
their equal familiarity with, and habitual use of, metric language. Winston's lover, 
104 
Julia, for example, on bringing supplies to their illicit meeting place above Mr 
Charrington's shop, says `It's Inner Party coffee. There's a whole kilo here' (p. 147), 
while Party member O'Brien, Winston's interrogator and torturer, refers to the stars as 
`bits of fire a few kilometres away' (p. 278). These signifiers of weights and measures 
have become codified in their language, each describing a distinct unit in the perception 
of each member of the speech community. 
Orwell does make one brief contextualising reference to imperial measures 
through the voice of a minor character. When Winston visits the prole quarter and 
attempts to elicit first-hand accounts of life before the current regime, he offers to buy a 
drink for the elderly prole he meets in a pub. The exchange between the prole and the 
barman provides an indication of the existence of a former system: 
`You telling me you ain't got a pint mug in the 'ole bleeding boozer? ' 
`And what in hell's name is a pint? ' said the barman [... ]. 
`Ark at 'im! Calls'isself a barman and don't know what a pint is! Why, a 
pint's the 'alf of a quart, and there's four quarts to the gallon. 'Ave to teach 
you the A, B, C next. ' 
`Never heard of'em, ' said the barman shortly. `Litre and half litre - that's 
all we serve. There's the glasses on the shelf in front of you. ' 
`I likes a pint, ' persisted the old man. `You could'a drawed me off a pint 
easy enough. We didn't 'ave these bleeding litres when I was a young man. ' 
ý. 91) 
This conversational extract provides the essential link to referents in Orwell's historical 
spacetime: in this case, the familiar British imperial measures. Much of any dystopia's 
didactic force is contained in its ability to enable the reader to make enlightening 
connections between the fictional world and his or her own base-reality; thus, if 
speculative language were to be only speculative - simply a conjectural attempt at 
sketching a futuristic language - the opportunity to infer relevant and meaningful 
connections from text to reality might be missed. Here, it is not the focalising character, 
Winston, who elucidates these connections (as we have seen, he is entirely conceptually 
indoctrinated into the metric system), but a `very old man ... who must 
be eighty at the 
least', who would have been `middle-aged when the Revolution happened' (p. 90). The 
older man's comments -'A 'alf-litre ain't enough [... ]. And a 'ole litre's too much' (p. 
92) - echo Orwell's own opposition to metric measures on the grounds that the 
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measures are, to him, arbitrary and strange. Orwell's contemporaries, like him, would 
be familiar only with imperial standards and the language that betokens them: the `pint', 
`quart', and `gallon' of the above extract, as Orwell confirms in the Tribune article, 
where he writes: `Rods and acres, pints, quarts, and gallons, pounds, stones and 
hundredweights, are all of them units with which we are intimately familiar, and we 
should be slightly poorer without them (2000: 305-306). Moreover, the familiarity of 
the naming of these measures denotes a level of comfortable security which Orwell 
regards as absent from the language used to describe metric equivalents: the `names of 
the units in the old system are short homely words', he claims. `Putting a quart into a 
pint pot is a good image', he continues, `which could hardly be expressed in the metric 
system' (2000: 306). For Orwell, as for the elderly prole (who might conceivably 
represent Orwell's contemporaries, given the novel's time-frame), the imperial 
measures are `homely words', while the alien metric measures disturb and disrupt 
perceptions of what constitutes appropriate, visualisable units. However, the barman, a 
`young man' (p. 92) has no conception of what measure the term `pint' might denote, 
and knows only the litre and half litre measures. Thus, while the language denoting 
measurement in the text corresponds with the perceptions of the barman (and Winston, 
Julia, O'Brien, and the rest), the solitary voice of the elderly prole represents Orwell's 
and his contemporaneous readers' historical spacetime, and thus maintains the 
necessary connection to `place'. 
Other than in this short but illuminating exchange, little attention is drawn to this 
fundamental shift in the way Oceania's citizens `cut nature up, organize it into concepts, 
and ascribe significances as [they] do' in their weights and measures. Instances of 
speculative metric language are unmarked typographically: there is, for example, no use 
of italics such as would customarily signify inclusion of a foreign word. All the 
measures featured are represented in orthographically standard forms. Nor is there any 
explanation or gloss within the text, or allusion made to any reason underlying this 
change; it is simply unmarked: presented as the norm. This is especially notable in 
comparison to the treatment of Newspeak in the main text, for example: 
There was even a word for it in Newspeak: facecrime, it was called (p. 65) 
[A]rtificial insemination (artsem, it was called in Newspeak) (p. 69) 
There was a word for it in Newspeak: ownlife, it was called, meaning 
individualism and eccentricity (p. 85) 
Crimestop, they called it in Newspeak (p. 291) 
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Each example of Newspeak language here is introduced by, or clarified by, a 
metalinguistic tag: `it was called', or `they called it'. Furthermore, in each case it is 
named as Newspeak, rather than the standard narrative language, and it is further 
distanced from the standard narrative language where the introductory clause `there was 
a word for it' is used. Italicisation marks each instance, emphasising its foreignness and 
also acting as an indicator of novelty. These features, which anticipate and foreground 
the unfamiliarity of Newspeak, are entirely absent from examples of metric 
terminology, which is presented in the standard, unmarked narrative form. There is no 
obvious re-assignment of meaning; as far as can be surmised from the text, the metric 
terms denote exactly those quantities they signify in the real world. In short, units of 
metric measurement are presented as mundane and ordinary, natural, automatic, 
habitual language, while Newspeak is marked by its presentation as unfamiliar and 
exotic. As with the plural pronoun use in Rand's Anthem (see §2.2.2), Orwell's use of 
metric units represents the language of the habitual thought world of the characters who 
populate the fictional world; they do not question it or notice its irregularity: it is, for 
them, deeply automatised, and indicative of their world-view. In effect, there are 
different `levels' of speculative language in Orwell's text: while both Newspeak and the 
metric terminology are clearly intended to indicate the text's futuristic setting, only the 
latter is presented as the norm in this world. Newspeak is emblematic: its marked 
presentation emphasises its symbolism, its exaggeration, its worst-case-scenario quality. 
Newspeak is part of the plot of the novel; a device which overtly exploits the dangers 
inherent in totalitarian control. The metric terminology, meanwhile, is not part of the 
plot. It is part of the background, the setting, the habitual world. As such, it subtly - 
covertly, even - mirrors and enacts the possibilities which, the reader is given to 
understand, inhere in Newspeak: it compels the reader to re-calibrate and re-envision his 
or her perceptions in order to understand the world of the text. 
The accepted, automatic, unmarked exchange of one system of measurement for 
another symbolises the conceptual dislocation of the world of Oceania from the post- 
war reality, while at the same time it maintains a discernible connection between the 
two worlds. The gap between these two worlds is considerably narrower for today's 
reader, at least in terms of weights and measures, than it would have been for a reader 
sharing Orwell's historical spacetime. Arguably, the fact that today's reader may 
automatically use, understand, and visualise metric units as part of their habitual 
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thought world is evidence of the prescience of Orwell's dystopian vision and confirms 
the author's belief that: `something like NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR could happen. This is 
the direction in which the world is going at the present time' (Orwell 1949, reproduced 
in Crick 1980: 152-153). Although Orwell was referring here to the `political, social 
and economic foundations of the contemporary world situation' (ibid), his comments on 
the speculative nature of his novel could apply equally to speculative metric language 
through which he symbolises `the direction in which the world is going at the present 
time'. 
However prophetic Orwell's use of metric terminology, it could not be argued 
that he - or the text - is responsible in any way for the gradual adoption of these terms 
into contemporary use; nor is he the only dystopian author to employ this strategy: 
Aldous Huxley similarly marked off the clock into 24 hours, and linear distance in 
metric units several years earlier in Brave New World (1932), where the progress in 
foetal growth, for instance, is measured on a conveyor belt `travelling at thirty-three and 
a third centimetres an hour', and a complete gestation cycle is `[t]wo hundred and sixty- 
seven days at eight metres a day' (Huxley 1932: 9). Nevertheless, there are instances of 
speculative language used by Orwell to depict the nightmare world of Oceania which 
will be very differently received by today's readers than would have been the case for 
readers in post-war Britain, and these are directly attributable to Orwell's linguistic 
speculation. Many terms from Nineteen Eighty-Four - for example, `Big Brother', 
`Newspeak', `Room 101', `doublethink', `Thought Police' - have now entered the 
language, and `Orwellian' is established as an adjective describing any overbearing 
repression of personal liberty, yet none of these existed with its current connotations in 
the immediate post-war era when the novel was published. For a contemporaneous 
reader, the above constructions (with the exception of Orwellian, which was a much 
later entry into the lexicon) would be unfamiliar. All of the above are now established 
in the English language, and are codified in its lexicon (the Oxford English Dictionary, 
for example), and, for a modem reader, signify quite a different concept than would 
have been the case at the point of publication. 
Taking Orwell's construction of `Big Brother' as an example, his re- 
appropriation of a term connoting, in its literal sense, benevolence and protection 
would, in all likelihood, have been alienating and defamiliarising for a reader of his own 
historical period, and would probably have been interpreted as indicative of the novel's 
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satire. However, a reader of today cannot encounter this construction with the same 
world-view or perception as could an early reader: Big Brother now, defined in the 
Oxford English Dictionary as `an apparently benevolent, but ruthlessly omnipotent, 
state authority', carries with it all the associations of tyrannical oppression, constant 
surveillance, and authoritarian repression of free-will suggested by the originating text. 
Yet it exists independently as a signifier outside of the text, and is part of the habitual 
lexicon of most speakers of English, including those who have not read the novel. In 
my experience, at least throughout the time I have been working with dystopian fictions, 
a week seldom passes without some mention of Big Brother - or the associated 
adjective Orwellian - in the media, usually with reference to intrusive or unwarranted 
surveillance or some threat to civil liberties. 5 Although he was deliberately speculating 
in his linguistic construction of this term, Orwell could not have predicted, nor could his 
early readers have known, that the expression would enter the public consciousness in 
quite the way it has. What Orwell has accomplished in the naming of Big Brother 
stands as testament to the perception-changing potential of the language of dystopia: he 
has lexicalised, and brought into consciousness and world-view a new, previously un- 
named, chunk of experience. 6 
It is worth reiterating that none of the above-mentioned speculative language is 
Newspeak. As Fowler has previously noted, `no `pure' example of Newspeak is given 
in the text of the novel' (1995: 219). `In the year 1984 there was not as yet anyone who 
used Newspeak as his sole means of communication', the Appendix `The Principles of 
Newspeak' reports, and notes that the date by which Newspeak `would have finally 
superseded Oldspeak (or Standard English, as we should call it)' was expected to be 
2050 (p. 312). In the case of `Thought Police', for example, which appears throughout 
the main text in this form, the Appendix records its Newspeak realisation as thinkpol (p. 
321), a clipped construction which reflects the intensely rule-bound nature of the 
proposed language. The tone of the Appendix is `quite clearly satirical', Fowler 
observes, and Newspeak is presented as `the implausible fantasy of an overconfident 
regime', part of the `myth about Nineteen Eighty-Four to the effect that Orwell predicts 
a future in which thought can be controlled by an artificial language' (1995: 211). 
Newspeak, in its final form, is also inconsistent with the author's aim of communication 
with his readership: a novel entirely written in the proposed language would be 
unintelligible (and, as Beauchamp ironically notes, would carry the `difficulties of 
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telling a story of rebellion in a language that would render rebellion impossible' (1974: 
466)). In the Appendix, Orwell is acknowledging the satire of Newspeak: he is 
exposing it as iconic and symbolic; an extreme - yet untenable - version of the 
speculative language he employs much more subtly and insidiously throughout the 
narrative, for example, in his shrewd re-calibration of space and time, weights and 
measures. It is also in the Appendix that Orwell acknowledges that language change is 
a gradual process, not one that can be achieved or imposed instantly. He suggests that a 
time-frame spanning more than 66 years (from 1984 to 2050) will be necessary for the 
complete replacement of the old language with the new. The language of the main text 
is, therefore not Newspeak at all: it is instead Oceania's version of `East Martian': the 
language of the focaliser, Winston, and the characters (see §2.2.3), a language which 
exists somewhere on the speculative continuum of language change between the 
language of Orwell's historical spacetime and the language of the distant date he 
projects for the implementation of Newspeak. From the perspective of a future almost 
as far distant from Orwell's historical spacetime as his proposed time-frame for the 
adoption of Newspeak, it becomes possible to see the impact of language change on 
perception more clearly, as one considers the sociolinguistic positioning of readers of 
different generations. Moreover, it is disturbingly possible to see the ways in which the 
speculative language of the novel moves ever closer to base-reality, continually 
narrowing the gap between speculation and actuality. 
3.3.1 The form of the wor(l)d: neologism 
New words are the birth certificates of change - change in attitudes, in mores, in human relations, in technology, in the social and economic landscape, in 
the natural world. 
Cullen Murphy, foreword to Anne H. Soukhanov (1995) Word Watch 
Dystopia, like science fiction, its `kindred estranged genre' (Suvin 1988: 35), is 
characterised by neologism, and Nineteen Eighty-Four accords with this model even 
beyond the obvious inclusion of Newspeak. Realist, `mundane' fictions seldom 
neologise, save perhaps for occasional place names, but dystopia invariably does, as a 
means of constructing and communicating the alternativity of its fictional world. 
Dystopia differs from science fiction, however, insofar as it does not have an 
established `code' of neologism, such as that explained as follows in Damien 
Broderick's (1995) Reading by Starlight: Postmodern Science Fiction: 
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[S]f is written in a kind of code [... ] which must be learned by 
apprenticeship. [T]he coding of each individual sf text depends importantly 
on access to an unusually concentrated `encyclopedia' -a mega-text of 
imaginary worlds, tropes, tools, lexicons, even grammatical innovations 
borrowed from other textualities. [T]he sf neophyte must work her way into 
the specialised narrative structures and vocabulary of sf . 
(Broderick 1995: xiii-xiv) 7 
Dystopia does not possess this genre-specific, inter-group vocabulary: each dystopian 
text must create its own linguistic world without recourse to the lexical short-cuts and 
jargon enjoyed by science fiction. Dystopias are less flamboyantly neologistic than 
science fiction because, Broderick argues, they `sharply rein in their lexical 
inventiveness, reflecting the impoverished world they guardedly deploy' (1995: 15). 
While I agree with Broderick's claim that dystopias are less elaborate in their lexical 
inventiveness, I would suggest that this is less contingent on their `impoverished 
worlds', and more indicative of their obligation to maintain the connection to `place': 
there is inevitably a more visible gesture towards realism in dystopian fiction than is the 
case with much science fiction. Dystopia, therefore, constrains its neologism in the 
direction of verisimilitude, while science fiction, is freer to neologise innovatively. 
Meyers (1980) identifies two levels of neologism in science fiction: elementary 
and higher level. Elementary neologism is `the introduction of an alien word together 
with a denial of the exact translatability of that word in an effort to emphasise the 
"otherness" of the society which produced it' (1980: 7), which Meyers illustrates by 
reference to Poul Anderson's use of the word choth to designate `a basic social unit, 
more than a tribe, less than a nation, with cultural and religious dimensions 
corresponding to nothing human' (Anderson, cited Meyers 1980: 7). 8 At this 
elementary level, Meyers notes, `the new coinage stresses the alienness of the situation', 
and `bestows precisely the denotation he wants on the word, while avoiding unwanted 
connotations of words already in currency' (1980: 8). Higher-level neologism 
introduces a new word without any gloss or definition, thus it `brings to the context in 
which it appears only the associations suggested by its form', Meyers claims, and 
furthermore, `if the wordmaker perceives those associations keenly, they can help 
establish the tone of the story by connotation alone' (1980: 8). Meyers culls examples 
of higher-level coinages from Theodore Sturgeon's (1949) `The Huckle is a Happy 
Beast' which include: Lirht, Hvov, fardled, funted, and fupped, none of which, he notes, 
is explained or defined in Sturgeon's text. Dystopian neologism, while drawing on 
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characteristics of both elementary and higher-level neologism, differs from both: often, 
dystopia introduces a new word without definition, and, in general, it introduces such 
words as a marker of `otherness'. However, quite differently from Meyers' examples 
from science fiction, dystopian neologism is rarely designed to appeal to `only the 
associations suggested by its form', or to avoid `unwanted connotations of words 
already in currency'. The converse more accurately defines dystopian neologism: it is 
precisely designed to reflect or to suggest some connotative link to language in the 
author's historical spacetime as a means of drawing on the familiarity of those 
associative links, thus reinforcing the connections with `place'. 
In this respect, dystopian neologism more closely mirrors the word-formation 
processes which occur in natural language, while science fiction neologism is more 
spontaneously imaginative. As linguist Grover Hudson (2000) notes, in the creation of 
non-fictional new words `[i]t is not evident that language places any limits on 
imagination, or therefore on new possibilities of meaning. The opposite is as likely: 
only the possibilities of coherent meaning place limitations on language' (2000: 241). 
The consequence of this leads Hudson to formulate what he terms the principle of 
limited novelty, which he bases on the observation that new words with both new 
meaning and new form occur only rarely, whereas new words with either new meaning 
or new form do occur frequently. 9 Hudson's expression of the principle of limited 
novelty reads: `[n]ew meanings are preferred in old forms, and new forms are preferred 
in old meanings' (2000: 241). As a result of this principle, Hudson asserts: 
[R]arely are new morphemes entirely new, and this partial familiarity of 
most new words, being familiar in either form or meaning, presumably 
helps to make them more effective and therefore more acceptable than they 
would be otherwise. 
(Hudson 2000: 241) 
What is true of neologism in actual language change holds true, in most cases, for 
neologism in dystopia: `partial familiarity' is maintained, while some level of 
unfamiliarity is introduced in order to destabilise and dislocate the word's meaning, as 
will be seen in Orwell's word-formation strategies in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Before 
examining the neologism of Orwell's dystopia, however, it is necessary to define 
neologism more specifically, especially in terms of the `form' and `meaning' 
mentioned in Hudson's principle. 
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In The Poetics of Science Fiction (2000), Peter Stockwell develops a taxonomy 
of neologism-types in science fiction language, garnered from 130 neologisms listed 
under the entry for `Terminology' in Clute and Nicholls (1993) The Encyclopedia of 
Science Fiction. The resulting taxonomy, like Hudson's `principle', makes a clear 
distinction between form and meaning (2000: 115-131): new forms, or `word-shapes', 
are termed neologisms in Stockwell's model, while `new meanings attached to existing 
words' he terms neosemes (2000: 119). Appositely, for a discussion of neologism, 
Stockwell coins the term neosemy to describe the latter process; a term which I make 
use of here in my discussions of the ways in which Orwell exploits the potential of 
meaning-shift in the language he uses in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Both neologism and 
neosemy `constitute new uses of a word', Stockwell notes, and both are `important in 
the linguistic practice of [science fiction]' (2000: 119). Since both neologism and 
neosemy contribute to the linguistic strategies by which dystopian fictions are 
constructed, I adopt Stockwell's model in this chapter as an organising principle 
through which to consider the various realisations of word-formation, although I adapt it 
slightly to reflect the fact that I consider here the language of just one text, rather than a 
whole genre over its entire history. 
Stockwell sub-divides neologism into six types: creation, borrowing, derivation, 
compounding, shortening, and inflectional, while his nine sub-categories of neosemy 
are broadening, narrowing, metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, litotes, 
quality shift, and recontextualisation (2000: 120). I shall consider instances of these 
categories where they occur in Nineteen Eighty-Four, and although I find - as 
Stockwell finds in science fiction - that not all categories of neologism or neosemy are 
equally - or at all - represented, those that do occur provide a kind of microcosmic view 
of the processes of the kinds of language change that Orwell speculates may have 
occurred by the time of the futuristic setting. 
Beginning with neologism, the first sub-category, creation, is `the prototypical 
form of neologism' (Stockwell 2000: 123), and describes the entire invention of a new 
word. Meyers' examples from science fiction - choth, for instance - characterise 
creation, and, as noted above, this type of neologism rarely occurs in dystopia; indeed, 
there is not one example of `pure' creation in the whole text of Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
including its examples of Newspeak (except perhaps in the naming of Oceania, which 
might occur in any fictionalised setting). While expressions such as artsem (p. 69) may 
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appear at first sight to be wholly invented, closer examination reveals this example to be 
the product of a combination of shortening and compounding derived from art-ificial 
in-sem-ination. The absence of true creation-type neologisms in Orwell's dystopia is 
representative of the genre, and reflects dystopia's emphasis on maintaining a 
perceptible connection with, and focus on, the world from which it extrapolatively 
emerges: the language, like the setting, plot, and characterisation, must be recognisably 
continuous-yet-discontinuous with the author's historical spacetime. For this reason, 
dystopian neologism inevitably discloses its etymological origins in its morphemes. '0 
Borrowing from other languages is common in natural language, and English 
has historically borrowed extravagantly from many other languages. Borrowing in 
science fiction, in addition to drawing on words and morphemes from terrestrial 
languages, `can be from ostensibly alien language systems', Stockwell notes (2000: 
125), although the problem this raises is that `since in reality we don't know any alien 
languages, the borrowing is always ostensible and therefore analytically speculative' 
(2000: 126). Such borrowing as occurs in Nineteen Eighty-Four is exactly this kind of 
`ostensible' borrowing: Newspeak is positioned as an alien language, and where 
expressions from this language are mentioned in the main text, they are introduced with 
all the stylistic paraphernalia that indicates its status as an alien language system. As 
already mentioned, none of the characters actually speaks Newspeak, and attention is 
drawn to the alienness of the language where it does occur, as in Emmanuel Goldstein's 
recorded speech replayed during the `Two Minutes Hate'. Watching the recording, 
Winston observes: 
Goldstein was delivering his usual venomous attack upon the doctrines of 
the Party [... ] and all this in the rapid polysyllabic speech which was a sort 
of parody of the habitual style of the orators of the Party, and even 
contained Newspeak words: more Newspeak words, indeed, than any Party 
member would normally use in real life. 
(p. 14) 
That Winston finds it necessary to remark that Goldstein uses `Newspeak words' 
underlines the alterity of this language and its contrast to the narrative norm. 
Additionally, his use of the intensifier even reinforces the strangeness and 
unexpectedness of Goldstein's use of these words, and establishes Newspeak as an 
unfamiliar language (although the actual Newspeak words he uses are not reproduced in 
the text). On the rare occasions that Newspeak words are incorporated into the main 
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narrative, they are distinctly treated as borrowings from another language: as I have 
already noted, such words are italicised, glossed, and introduced with a metalinguistic 
tag, as in the following example relating to the activities of the Ministry of Truth: 
`There was even a whole sub-section - Pornosec, it was called in Newspeak - engaged 
in producing the lowest kind of pornography' (p. 46). Here, Pornosec receives the 
standard typographical and explanatory markers accorded to any newly borrowed or 
unfamiliar foreign word or expression seen in written discourse. This stands in pointed 
contrast to Orwell's methods for introducing a word or expression that emanates from 
the controlling powers, but that is not Newspeak. For example: 
The messages he had received referred to articles or news-items which for 
one reason or another it was thought necessary to alter, or, as the official 
phrase had it, to rectify. 
(p. 41) 
[T]he Ministry of Plenty had issued a promise (a `categorical pledge' were 
the official words) that there would be no reduction of the chocolate ration 
during 1984. 
(p. 42) 
In both cases here, the foregrounded expression - to rectify, and a `categorical pledge' 
- originates in the dominion of the Party, but it is not the alien language, Newspeak. 
The metalinguistic tags still occur - the official phrase, and the official words - but 
these expressions are derived from the standard narrative language rather than from 
Newspeak, and although scare quotes mark the second example, drawing attention to it, 
it does not receive the typographical marking that characterises borrowing from 
Newspeak. This language is not alienated; its lexis is that of the standard, and, as a 
result it does not have the distancing `otherness' of the borrowed Newspeak 
expressions. The occasional inclusion of a Newspeak word in the main narrative, on the 
other hand, represents what Stockwell terms borrowing from an `ostensibly alien 
language system', and carries with it the altemativity of the society that produced it. 
Newspeak is also responsible for most instances of the neologising processes of 
derivation, compounding and shortening in the text, but these processes all occur in 
other `non-Newspeak' speculative language. Stockwell's remaining category of 
neologism - inflectional extensions - he acknowledges, is not always considered 
neologism proper (2000: 130), but he includes it in his framework for completeness. 
Since the emphasis here is on vocabulary rather than on grammar, I shall disregard 
inflection here. (Although Orwell discusses the inflectional qualities of Newspeak in 
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the Appendix (pp. 315-316), its main function is to maintain the `rules' and `regularity' 
of Newspeak. ) 
The addition of - or affixing of - morphemes to a word creates neologisms by 
derivation, and is particularly productive in the formation of Newspeak terms, where 
prefixing generates antonyms such as ungood by means of affixing the negative 
morpheme un- to an existing word; the suffix -Jul forms all adjectives; and -wise is 
suffixed to generate all adverbs. Newspeak is also characterised by compounding (of 
which Newspeak itself is an example, being an adjective + verb compound of new and 
speak), and shortening contributes to the `clipped' style of the language, with forms 
being abbreviated as seen in Ingsoc for English Socialism. Compounding and 
shortening are the processes Orwell cites in the Appendix, `The Principles of 
Newspeak' where he notes that the words of the `B vocabulary' `consisted of two or 
more words, or portions of words, welded together in an easily pronounceable form' (p. 
317). Yet these three neologising processes construct expressions throughout the text 
that are not Newspeak, but, like Newspeak, still convey alienating, defamiliarising and 
threatening qualities. New words, in and of themselves, can make people feel 
intimidated, as morphologist Valerie Adams (1973) observes; people may even find 
neologism `offensive' (1973: 1). `Innovations in vocabulary', she continues, `are 
capable of arousing quite strong feelings in people who may otherwise not be in the 
habit of thinking much about language' (1973: 1-2). Orwell's narrative clearly depends 
on this alienating force of unfamiliar language, since neologisms accumulate densely, 
especially in the early part of the text, where multi-word compounds - Hate Week, 
Ninth Three-Year Plan, Thought Police - quickly build up a bewildering world, while 
derivations - Junior Anti-Sex League, for example - confound the norm both 
linguistically and conceptually, and shortening, as seen in the abbreviated telescreen (in 
combination with compounding) suggests the futurity both of the narrative `landscape' 
and its technological status. With the exception of `telescreen', which is accorded the 
tag `it was called' and some explanation, these neologisms, all of which occur within 
the first nine pages of the narrative, appear without introduction or definition. Dystopia, 
as mentioned earlier, invariably opens in medias res, catapulting the reader straight into 
the alternative world, destabilising immediately his or her conception of what 
constitutes the norm, and challenging - and denying the reassurance and stability of - 
his or her habitual thought world. The neologisms - new word forms, it must be 
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stressed - appearing in the early pages Nineteen Eighty-Four map out the new territory 
that the reader encounters. Just like the `stranger in a strange land' of science fiction, 
the reader visits a new physical location, with new and unfamiliar labels attached to it; 
an alternative world differently constituted to the reader's known and familiar base- 
reality. However, just as dystopia is never completely estranged from base-reality, 
neither is its language ever completely detached from the language of base-reality (or, at 
least, the author's historical spacetime). The communication of this different-but- 
analogous location is maintained by selecting, in every case mentioned above, 
morphemes that are known and familiar to the reader, and (re)building them into new 
constructions which structure the world of the future. New word forms, in short, 
actually form the material world of the dystopia. However, it is the potency of neosemy 
- new word meanings - which really impels the dystopian project, and it is to examples 
of neosemy in Nineteen Eighty-Four that I now turn. 
3.3.2 The meaning of the wor(l)d: neosemy 
Human language is an embarrassment for evolutionary theory because it is 
vastly more powerful than one can account for in terms of selective fitness. 
David Premack (1985) Cognition 
If neologism assembles the dystopian world, neosemy disassembles it. By maintaining 
the known contours of words while shifting and displacing their familiar meanings, 
neosemy incrementally destabilises habitual perceptions and challenges the reader to 
(re)perceive the strange futuristic world signified through the language of its 
inhabitants. Neosemy both symbolises and enacts the dystopian impulse as it penetrates 
any automatic reception of meaning, disaggregates it, and reorders it, while preserving 
ostensibly - and often deceptively - known form. Stockwell describes neosemy as `a 
sort of linguistic entropy by which all words mutate or disappear from current usage', 
and emphasises the ongoing nature of this process in natural language, where words 
`undergo shifts in meaning from the moment they are coined to the moment they "die"' 
(2000: 119). Readers, therefore, might be expected to be familiar with the notion of 
their language progressively shifting, but dystopia intensifies, accelerates, and 
condenses the process to such a degree that it subverts any taken-for-granted 
expectations, and, indeed, often inverts them, as will be seen in the following examples 
of neosemy from Nineteen Eighty-Four. 
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The first sub-type of neosemy identified by Stockwell - broadening - refers to 
an extension of meaning from the specific to the general, as seen in the English word 
holiday, which originally signified a religious work-free day - holy day - but has 
broadened to include any work-less day. Orwell resourcefully exploits the potential of 
broadening to satirical effect in Nineteen Eighty-Four, with examples such as 
spontaneous in the `spontaneous demonstrations' (p. 24), which are organised by a 
committee. The word, it is suggested, has mutated beyond its meaning of unplanned, 
impulsive to incorporate its antonymical sense of structured, planned. Satire is 
undeniably an element of many of the examples of broadening in this text, but some 
examples are more central to communicating the very `dystopian-ness' of the text. The 
department where Winston works - the `Records Department' - is one such example. 
This is not a Newspeak expression: the Appendix details its Newspeak form as recdep; 
thus it is part of the language of the characters, the language of the future. `Records 
Department' is also part of the language of Orwell's - and his readers' - historical 
spacetime, at least in terms of its form, and signifies an administrative area dealing with 
what the Oxford English Dictionary defines as `evidence about the past, especially a 
written or other permanent account of something'. The extensively broadened meaning 
attached to the existing word form of Record in its Oceanian sense admits radically 
modified and extended meaning, where `permanent' mutates into transitory, and 
`evidence' becomes nothing more than forgery, as Winston `verifies' historical 
accounts, and `rectifies' the official records in line with the Party's orders. The 
broadened sense of Record in the narrative world which transforms the specific meaning 
(enduring, accurate, historically faithful report) to the general (ephemeral, transient, 
historically mutable report) maintains the essential connection with the primary known 
sense, insofar as it preserves the notion of a written account (report), but extends this 
familiar concept to incorporate new - and disconcerting - meanings. As with other 
neosemic shifts, the word shape remains unchanged, which makes this a particularly 
effective way to confront and unbalance perceptions: the familiarity of the word form 
invites an automised, habituated response which is gradually challenged as the reader 
becomes aware of, and assimilates, the wider implications embedded in the 
neosemically broadened word. 
Paradoxically, the converse process to broadening - narrowing - has a similar 
destabilising effect in dystopian writing. Narrowing is the specialisation of meaning, 
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and accounts for the progression from the general to the specific in neosemy (Stockwell 
cites the example of `meat', which in Early Middle English meant food in general 
(2000: 120), and Hudson offers `brave' which in Shakespeare's phrase `brave new 
world' meant `bright and gaudy' (2000: 261)). Orwell prominently appeals to the 
notion of narrowing in his depiction of Newspeak, where words such as free are 
`stripp[ed] [... ] of unorthodox meanings, and so far as possible of all secondary 
meanings whatever' (p. 313). However, Newspeak's declared intention to redefine 
words so that all `ambiguities and shades of meaning had been purged out of them' (p. 
314) is likely to be dismissed as unfeasible by most readers, many of whom might be 
outraged by the idea that all the abstract connotations of a word like `free' could 
somehow be wiped out of consciousness. Yet narrowing of meaning occurs throughout 
the main text. The generic term novel, for example, loses its inherent connotations of 
creativity and imagination as it becomes clear that fiction is produced on `novel-writing 
machines', or `kaleidoscopes' and consists, Julia tells Winston, of `six plots, but they 
swap them round a bit' (pp. 136-137). Equally indicative of narrowed meaning is the 
fact that the words of songs are `composed without any human intervention whatever' 
(p. 144). The same is true of the wider, familiar meaning of news, which is narrowed to 
define just the (provisional) information that the Party deems reportable, while history 
as a concept has diminished to the `official' version (p. 162). Orthodoxy has specialised 
meaning, according to the lexicographer, Syme, who tells Winston `Orthodoxy means 
not thinking - not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness' (p. 56). The lexical 
tokens - novel, songs, news, history, orthodoxy - remain the same as their real-world 
counterparts, but a narrowed, more specialised area of meaning is signified by these 
superficially familiar words. Including, or alluding to, such narrowed vocabulary is a 
particularly effective way for the dystopian author to symbolise both the disparities and 
the similarities between the projected world and the reader's world since it invites a 
comparison between the pared-down, reduced meaning and the fuller range of 
signification available beyond the fiction. 
This manoeuvring and manipulation of meaning is typical also of metaphor, 
Stockwell's next category, which, in natural language, consciously draws attention to 
perceived resemblance between the language it uses to describe a concept and the 
existing language which it attempts to substitute. Within the category of metaphor, I 
subsume metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, litotes, and quality shifts, since all these 
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incidences of neosemy entail some level of metaphorical extension or projection. Over 
time, meaning shift in metaphorical language can occur, Stockwell notes, `when 
creative metaphorical neologisms lose their original sense', resulting in `dead' 
metaphors which are `popularly not regarded as metaphors at all, but as having a literal 
coincidence of denotation and reference' (2000: 120-121). The `death' of a metaphor is 
a long-term process in natural language, but is a process which is expedited and 
exploited to unsettling effect in dystopian fiction, where the results of diachronic 
language change are presented as already having happened by the time of the future- 
based time-frame. As a particularly effective example of the destabilising potential of 
speculative language, dystopian metaphorical language exists in a relationship of 
peculiar `doubleness' with language in the readers' base-reality, a relationship which 
hinges on readers' tacit understanding that this speculative language is the language of 
the future. 
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell recurrently embeds innovative creative 
metaphor in his future language - that of the narrative and characters - but presents it in 
such a way as to deny its novelty. In this way, the synecdoche of Room 101 or Airstrip 
One is invisible to the characters - in terms of their language these expressions have 
become commonplace, dead metaphors - but it is startlingly new and heavy with 
creative inference for the reader, who, unlike the characters, is encountering the 
formulation for the first time. Similarly, the hyperbole of `victory' in Victory Gin and 
Victory Cigarettes is unremarkable within the narrative world, where the characters are 
daily conditioned by reports of ostensible victories, but marked by its absurdity for the 
reader positioned beyond the linguistic boundaries of the fiction. These products in the 
fictional world also exist in metaphorical relationship with their extra-textual 
counterparts - the referent of `gin', for example, being quite different in the reader's 
reality from the `synthetic' alcohol denoted by the same referent in the text. Language 
which is understood to have an unambiguous, non-metaphorical meaning in the reader's 
world - alter, and recta, for instance - assumes the status of litotes when seen in the 
light of Winston's job of `correcting' the Party's news items, as do the understated 
expressions slips, errors, misprints, and misquotations as referents of the deceitful 
falsification he is required to commit. Quality shifts of considerable magnitude are 
apparent to the reader as the meaning of spies, for example, (with reference to children 
reporting to the authorities their parents' and others' `symptoms of unorthodoxy' (p. 
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26)) has become elevated to a commendable and worthy occupation for children. These 
examples, all of which are linguistically innovative in terms of the language of Orwell's 
historical spacetime - and remain so to the reader over half a century later - present the 
metaphorical language of the future as having undergone neosemic meaning-shift to the 
extent that it has already become part of the characters' habitual thought world, 
unremarkable, and unnoticed. The characters use this language automatically, and seem 
unaware of its metaphoricity. The reader is thus presented, in each case, with a 
complexly layered metaphor, which, as in his or her real-life language, is decodable via 
its shared referents. However, in the case of dystopian metaphor, the reader has not only 
to process the decoding in terms of his or her own language, but must also duplicate the 
process in terms of the characters' language, in an act of triangulation resembling 
Suvin's notion of `feedback oscillation' (see § 1.4), as referents in both the real and the 
fictional world are invoked in order to make sense of the linguistic construction. 
Like neologism, neosemy challenges the reader to (re)consider - and compare to 
his or her own world - the kind of society which might produce and use this futuristic 
language. However, unlike neologism, which identifies, labels, and builds the future 
world, neosemy takes existing language and re-defines it in terms of its re-placed time 
and space. One further category of neosemy perhaps best illustrates this process of re- 
definition: recontextualisation, which is considered in more detail in the following 
section. 
3.3.3 The perspective of the wor(l)d: recontextualisation 
There are little constellations of language here and there, and the meaning of 
a word changes according to its context in the constellation. 
Margaret Atwood (1990) Conversations 
Recontextualisation, the final category of neosemy, is, Stockwell explains, `a global 
textual effect of changing the meanings of words' (2000: 121). In contrast to the earlier 
categories treated above, which are equally applicable to natural language, 
recontextualisation is a text-specific type of neosemy, one where `the peculiarities of the 
text world affect the semantic field of a word' (ibid). By way of example, Stockwell 
cites the semantic well-formedness of the phrase `The king is pregnant' on the planet 
Gethen in Ursula le Guin's science-fiction text (1981) The Left Hand of Darkness, 
where the inhabitants are genderless save for occasional periods - called kemmer - 
where either male or female sexual characteristics temporarily develop. In keeping with 
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the peculiar circumstances of this alternative text world, "`king" is neither male nor 
female, and so "The king was pregnant" is semantically well-formed' (Stockwell 2000: 
122). Thus, the alternativity of the text world sanctions and rationalises the 
recontextualised lexical meaning of an existing word, king, which does not 
automatically carry the semantic component `male' in this Gethenian context. `Since 
science fiction deals centrally with alternative realities, there are many examples [of 
recontextualisation]', Stockwell observes (2000: 121). Like science fiction, dystopia 
also textually evinces an alternative reality, but unlike science fiction, dystopia's 
alternative reality is more exactingly defined by, and more essentially related to, the 
earth-bound reality from which it develops. For this reason, dystopian 
recontextualisations are generally more restrained than those found in extra-terrestrial 
science fictions. While semantic clashes do occur in dystopian text worlds, they are 
seldom so radical or disconcerting as the `pregnant kings' of Gethen; instead, dystopia 
relies on a more prosaic method of recontextualising language: collocational clashes. 
The difference between the two is slight; a matter of degree rather than of classification, 
since a semantic clash is (usually) also a collocational clash; however, dystopia 
typically takes advantage of the neosemic potential of collocational conflict by 
deliberately placing known - and normally unconnected - words in combinations in 
such a way that the union results in a recontextualised meaning far more complex than 
the combined meaning of the individual words. 
In dystopian fictions, this linguistic `synergy' typically gains its force from the 
unexpected combination of two or more known words into neosemic multi-word units 
which reflect the habitual world-view of the text's speech community. Since these 
novel linguistic amalgamations do not exist outside of the text world, they are 
intimately bound up with, and indicative of, the alternativity of the text world, but 
because they are constructed from linguistic tokens existing in the reader's reality, they 
bring with them to the new context, the connotations, associations, and denotations that 
they encode in the world beyond the text. Examples encountered in the early pages of 
Nineteen Eighty-Four include Hate Week, Thought Police, and Memory Hole, all of 
which are constructed from recognisable, conceptually available words in seemingly 
incompatible or anomalous collocations, and all of which create new lexical items 
which evoke the dystopian world of Oceania. As with most of the examples of 
neosemy considered above, this language is not Newspeak (Thought Police, for 
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instance, is rendered thinkpol in Newspeak (p. 317)); it is part of the language of the 
characters, and is used habitually. The first instance of Thought Police occurs on the 
second page of the narrative in a section of Winston's free indirect thought, and appears 
as a brief reference before the narrative moves off in an unrelated direction: `It was the 
police patrol, snooping into people's windows. The patrols did not matter, however. 
Only the Thought Police mattered' (p. 4). While the importance of this construction is 
foregrounded - it is capitalised, as would customarily mark proper nouns, and is 
predicated on the verb mattered - it is not introduced, glossed, or accompanied by any 
explanatory tags in the way that marks the inclusion of Newspeak in the text. This 
stands in distinct contrast to the treatment of telescreen earlier on the same page, which 
is described ('an oblong metal plaque like a dulled mirror'), rephrased ('the 
instrument'), and marked for novelty with a metalinguistic tag ('it was called'). The 
innovative and estranging force of the construction Thought Police is not a feature of its 
constitutive lexemes, each of which is a well-known, frequently used word, nor is it 
attributable to meaning-shift within either word individually - thought, in this context, 
still denotes the cognitive capability it denotes in standard English, and police retains its 
nominal meaning of regulatory force - rather it is the extraordinary collocational clash 
of this pairing which provides its shocking, estranging, and destabilising force. 
The combination of an abstract noun premodifying a concrete noun is 
commonplace in English, as is the compounding of nouns into multi-word phrasal units; 
the coinage is morphologically, grammatically and syntactically well-formed, and could 
- theoretically, at least - have been generated from the resources of the standard 
language at any point in history. That thought police - or any synonymous version of it 
- was never coined prior to Orwell's use of it is indicative of the futuristic context of the 
dystopian world where concepts exist that are not named within the lexicon of English. 
These concepts only exist in the world of the text. In order to bring such a concept into 
being, the dystopian author names, or labels it. The formulation of these clashing 
lexical tokens, however, is not an arbitrary process: in drawing together known 
constituent lexemes, the author draws together at the same time their inherent 
connotations, first of all alluding to the familiarity of known concepts, but then swiftly 
subverting and challenging any automatised response by means of an abrupt 
combinatorially achieved estrangment of those concepts. By selecting terms which fail 
to collocate in English, (since there is no known referent for the resulting pairing in that 
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language), but which do collocate in terms of the dystopian language, these neosemes 
recontextualise meaning only by way of adjacency, and only on the terms of the 
narrative's own language. Similarly, the phrase Hate Week also retains lexical 
familiarity in both worlds, but only has a referent in the context of the text world. The 
relationship between the recontextualised expression and the concept it denotes is one of 
contradiction and paradox with the referents of its constitutive lexemes in the real 
world: while both hate and week retain their base-reality meanings, the combination, in 
drawing on other similar formulations draws attention to the disparity between the two 
worlds. Other examples which occur in the text exemplify the same collocational clash, 
and often a similar linguistic structure: memory hole, for example, the customary name 
of the paper-evidence disposal chutes which are built into the walls of the Ministry of 
Truth, is constructed from the same abstract noun + concrete noun combination as 
thought police, while Reality control - although the second term is less concrete - 
shows the same kind of composition. In each case, the collocational clash arises from 
the sheer incongruity of combining an abstract noun reflecting fundamentally 
unrestrained human capacities, emotional responses, or perceptions (thought, memory, 
hate, reality) with a concrete noun which confines, restricts, or governs it (police, hole, 
week, control). 
Recontextualisation following this same basic structure occurs throughout the 
dystopian genre, and is a particularly effective linguistic strategy, since it meets all the 
requirements outlined at the beginning of §3.2: it emphasises the language change the 
author imagines will have occurred in the future, and reflects the ways in which 
language may be manipulated by an autocratic state; importantly, it lexicalises new 
concepts - concepts which are not named prior to their appearance in the text (as seen in 
§2.3.2, Orwell, like other writers of dystopias, firmly believes that there are areas of 
experience outside the current lexicon). The requisite dystopian connection to `place' is 
accomplished by the use of familiar language, and by alluding to its real-world 
referents, which also facilitates the communicative aim (this is not indecipherable or 
wholly invented language). For the reader, the result of this recontextualising process is 
that s/he encounters a phrasal unit which first encourages and then resists an 
automatised reading: while the language itself is of the world of his or her base-reality, 
the concept it denotes is of the new reality played out in the text. In this respect, 
recontextualisation differs little from the other instantiations of neologism and neosemy 
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detailed above. Where it does differ - and significantly so - is that neither the shape or 
the meaning of the individual constitutive words is changed; only the condition of its 
collocational clash communicates the revisioned world; in the case of Nineteen Eighty- 
Four, a world where thought can be policed, memory can be disposed of through holes, 
a week can be set aside to celebrate hatred, and reality can be controlled. 
3.3.4 The location of the wor(l)d: narrative structure 
Structurally, dystopias, as noted above, open in medias res. Linguistically, too, 
dystopias plunge the reader into the new world with only limited preliminaries, 
explanation or introduction of speculative language. In general terms, the physical form 
of the displaced dystopian world is accorded some introduction (and this is where 
neologism chiefly occurs), while the aspects that contribute to an understanding of the 
ways in which the dystopian world differs from, yet is also similar to, the world from 
which it extrapolatively arises, are accorded fewer orienting cues (this being where most 
instances of neosemy are found). The latter category represents the area where 
dystopian speculative language is at its most perception-challenging and destabilising; 
where it both defamiliarises the familiar and normalises the unknown, bringing the not- 
yet-happened into being and demonstrating the consequences of its existence. By 
taking two examples from the opening page of Nineteen Eighty-Four - poster of Big 
Brother and Hate Week - and considering these in relation to their positioning and 
treatment in terms of the narrative structure, my aim is to demonstrate the ways varying 
degrees of estrangement contribute towards the reader's perceptions of the dystopian 
world in comparison to his or her own world. 
Analysis of these examples' informational content in terms of given and new 
information afford some insight into their relative positioning. Given information, 
particularly at the beginning of a narrative, is that which appears as `information already 
known to the participants: either supplied in the co-text; or presupposed from the 
situational context, or from the (wider) context of assumed common knowledge' (Wales 
2001: 179), and tacitly assumes a shared frame of reference between the reader and the 
details of the text. New information, on the other hand, `is not known, or not assumed 
to be known, to the addressee', Wales explains, or is that which `is regarded as 
particularly "newsworthy"' (ibid). The treatment of poster of Big Brother is quite 
different from the treatment of Hate Week in terms of its given (or `known') and new 
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(or `unknown') presentation, and demonstrates a recurrent type of structural patterning 
in dystopian narratives. 
The first two paragraphs of Nineteen Eighty-Four (represented schematically in 
Fig. 1) comprise three thematic strands: firstly, Winston's journey from outdoors to his 
seventh-floor flat; secondly, his en-route observation and description of the poster of 
Big Brother, and thirdly, a short parenthetical interpolation of circumstantial detail. 
Both Winston Smith and Victory Mansions are introduced in the second sentence, and 
both are introduced without preliminary remark: `Winston Smith, his chin nuzzled into 
his breast in an attempt to escape the vile wind, slipped quickly through the glass doors 
of Victory Mansions'. These two named entities then provide the referents to which 
much of the ensuing given information in this extract anaphorically refers. Winston is 
the antecedent referent of his chin, his breast, and so on, while Victory Mansions 
accounts for the hallway, the wall, the stairs, the lift, the flat, and similar locative 
information. These unremarkable examples are similar to those found at the outset of 
traditional `mundane' narratives. However, the poster of Big Brother, prior knowledge 
of which cannot be assumed or inferred, is introduced in a series of clauses denoting 
new information: a coloured poster, an enormous face, a man of about forty-five, each 
of which is marked for novelty by the use of the indefinite article. The only phrases 
marked for given information in relation to the poster are those which refer to 
information introduced in an immediately preceding clause (so `It' is a pronominal 
reference to its antecedent poster, and the face refers to its antecedent an enormous 
face). The figure of Big Brother is a dystopian world-constitutive element of Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, and this chain of clauses introduces the concept of him in a pattern typical 
of the presentation of new information. The indefinite articles which introduce each 
new aspect to the reader make no assumption of prior knowledge, and permit the reader 
an incremental, staged introduction. This new presentation contrasts with the later 
reference to the poster at the end of the paragraph, where, having being introduced as 
new, it is now preceded by the definite article: `the poster with the enormous face', 
which marks it as given. 
This presentation contrasts distinctly with the presentation of Hate Week, which 
is not only introduced as given information, but also occupies a structural position 
which reinforces its ostensible status as normalised, circumstantial detail. As Fig. 1 
shows, the opening paragraphs track Winston's journey from the street to his flat 
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(sections 2,4, and 6). Interwoven into his journey is the description of the poster of Big 
Brother (sections 3 and 7). The description of the poster becomes part of the 
description of Winston's journey, as it exists physically: `tacked to the wall' of the 
hallway, and `on each landing, opposite the lift shaft'. The remaining section of text 
(section 5), containing the reference to Hate Week, does not constitute part of the 
physical journey; rather it appears as background information, inserted parenthetically 
between two sections detailing Winston's journey: 
It was no use trying the lift. Even at the best of times it was seldom working, 
and at present the electric current was cut off during daylight hours. It was 
part of the economy drive in preparation for Hate Week 
The first sentence here provides a cohesive link to Winston's journey, explaining his 
choice of the stairs rather than the lift, so it is not entirely disconnected from the 
surrounding text, but from this point, the narrative abruptly moves out from the local 
detail of the journey to the wider background. The second sentence, beginning with the 
fixed idiomatic expression `even at the best of times', moves away temporally from the 
journey to make an extraneous, timeless statement, which is presented as new 
information, insofar as it informs the reader of a factual circumstance that could not 
have been previously known or inferred from the text - that the lift seldom functioned. 
Returning to the narrative time with `at the present', the remainder of this sentence is 
similarly introducing new information that the reader could not be expected to know or 
infer; the cutting off of the electric current is intrinsic to the text world, rather than 
being knowledge available in the world of the reader. However, the final sentence of 
this section is marked as given: the economy drive, with its definite article, suggests 
information already known to the reader, and Hate Week is presented as though it is a 
well-known event (compare, for example, the unmarked presentation of `in preparation 
for Christmas', which would assume a shared frame of reference). Hate Week is, like 
the cutting off of the electricity, specific and intrinsic to the world of the novel - and as 
unknowable for the reader - but its presentation as given deceptively suggests that this 
is known, commonplace, familiar information. 
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1. It was a 
bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen. 
Introductory 
material 
2. Winston's Winston Smith, his chin nuzzled into his breast in an 
journey (1) effort to escape the vile wind, slipped quickly 
through the glass doors of Victory Mansions, though 
not quickly enough to prevent a swirl of gritty dust 
from entering along with him. 
The hallway smelt of boiled cabbage and old rag 
mats. 
At one end of it a coloured poster, too large for 
3. indoor display, had been tacked to the wall. It 
Poster of depicted simply an enormous face, more than a metre 
Big wide: the face of a man of about forty-five, with a 
Brother heavy black moustache and ruggedly handsome 
(1) features. 
4. Winston made for the stairs. Winston's 
journey 
(2) 
5. 
Parenthetical 
material 
------------------------------------------------------ 
It was no use trying the lift. Even at the best of times 
it was seldom working, and at present the electric 
current was cut off during daylight hours. It was part 
of the economy drive in preparation for Hate Week. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
6. The flat was seven flights up, and Winston, who was 
Winston's thirty-nine and had a varicose ulcer above his right 
journey ankle, went slowly, resting several times on the way. 
(3) 
7. On each landing, opposite the lift-shaft, the poster with 
Poster of the enormous face gazed from the wall. It was one of 
Big those pictures which are so contrived that the eyes follow 
Brother you about when you move. BIG BROTHER IS 
(2) WATCHING YOU, the caption beneath it ran. 
FIG. 1 Schematic representation of thematic strands 
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To the text's focalising character - Winston - this is, of course, simply part of the 
ordinary daily routine in Oceania, which would seem to account for the understated 
presentation. But the poster of Big Brother is also a familiar part of the landscape for 
Winston, yet it is presented quite differently: it is described and introduced to the 
reader, while Hate Week is accorded neither description nor introduction. As noted 
earlier, Big Brother is neologism -a construction with new form - while Hate Week is 
neosemy, or a construction with new meaning, and while the former physically 
delineate the dystopian world, the latter act to defamiliarise it. To an extent, this 
accounts for the differing introduction of these two terms in the opening of the 
narrative: Big Brother is a structural component of the text world, representing the 
totalitarian government, while Hate Week is an abstraction of the ruling powers' mode 
of operation and authority. The reader is `formally' introduced to the concept of Big 
Brother, but s/he meets the notion of Hate Week as something given, accepted, and 
unremarkable within the fictional framework; it is known to Winston, although not to 
the reader. While it represents a minor circumstantial detail to him - as shown by the 
perfunctory reference to it - it is marked as a significant dislocation of reality for the 
reader principally because of its conceptual unfamiliarity. 
To consider this structural difference in terms of foregrounding and 
backgrounding is also illuminating. In traditional, mainstream, realist narrative, the 
parenthetical presentation of Hate Week as given information would identify it as a 
background detail; however, in dystopian fiction, the `taken-for-granted background 
(the setting), as Moylan notes, actually is `the foreground (or driving force behind the 
whole creation)' (2000: 5). Moylan develops this idea from Samuel R. Delany's 
extensive explorations into this process of reversal in science fiction (Delany 1984; 
1991), and extends Delany's observations to encompass dystopian narrative structure. I 
return to Delany's original theorising of this aspect in relation to science fiction since 
his consideration of the effects of this structural realignment on the reader are 
particularly pertinent to the direction of this study. I do, however, take advantage of 
Moylan's prior application of Delany's work to dystopian fiction, and assume that 
Delany's comments are equally appropriate to dystopia. 
Delany's work on science fiction is characterised by its focus on the reader, and 
the ways in which s/he might receive and respond to the language, syntax, and structure 
of science fiction. The `foregrounded background' theory he outlines is, for him, a 
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genre-defining difference between science fiction and `mundane' literature. Delany's 
main contention is that, while mundane literature in general attempts to re-create 
`reality', science fiction's relation to reality is `one of dialogic, contestatory, agonistic 
creativity' which creates `a significant distortion of the present that sets up a rich and 
complex dialogue with the reader's here and now' (1984: 177). This triangulation 
between the reader's world and the fictional world hinges on the foregrounding of the 
background, or what Delany calls the privileging of object over subject. Where 
mundane literature focuses on the subject - character or plot - science fiction focuses on 
the object, or the setting or delineation of the fictional world. This results, Delany 
suggests, in a fundamental adjustment to the reading process: 
Because the world of mundane fiction is fixed, at least in comparison with 
the multiple worlds of science fiction, when we read some distortion in the 
representation of the world in a piece of mundane fiction we are led to the 
questions, Why did the character (the fictive subject) perceive it this way? 
or Why did the writer (the auctorial subject) present it this way? ' 1 
(Delany 1984: 145) [original emphasis] 
In contrast, because of science fiction's concentration on the setting, or object world, if 
the reader should encounter some detail that differs from, or contradicts, his or her 
knowledge of the real world, s/he would, Delany believes, instead ask, `How would the 
world of the story have to be different from our world in order for this to occur? ' (1984: 
146) [original emphasis]. Speculative language such as Hate Week (or, indeed, any of 
the other examples mentioned above), is exactly the kind of `background' detail that 
dystopia subtly foregrounds: this re-formed and re-appropriated language ostensibly 
constructs the backdrop against which the characters play out their roles, yet the setting 
is foregrounded because of the disruptive, disorienting incongruity of the language in 
which it is embodied. In order to decode and make sense of such language, the reader 
(who, according to Delany, will be engaged in questioning how the fictive world differs 
from his or her own) is compelled to consider similar linguistic constructions which fall 
within his or her frame of reference. While I cannot presume to represent the cognitive 
processing of all readers, it seems reasonable to suggest that, in order to decode the 
textual detail Hate Week, readers will refer to similar, conceptually available forms; 
Easter Week, or Enterprise Week, perhaps, or any one of the many charity or profile- 
raising periods nominated xxxxx Awareness Week which occur in their base-reality. 
Given the word-initial capitalisation of Hate Week, this is more likely than alternatives 
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such as, say, Thursday week or working week. Delany's theory finds application in 
respect of Hate Week (and, by extension, other constructions such as Thought Police) 
because the decoding process requires the reader to ask the question he proposes - 
'How would the world of the story have to be different from our world in order for this 
to occur? '. From the point of view of a base-reality where Week, capitalised and pre- 
modified typically signifies an annual week-long period designated to draw attention to 
or celebrate a particular topic, the world of the story differs significantly in its notion of 
a week-long observance of hatred, yet understanding the construction depends on its 
similarities to these existing constructions in the reader's world. A minor modification 
to Delany's question accommodates this linguistic triangulation process: `How would 
the language of the world of the story have to be different from the language of our 
world in order for this to occur? '. Speculative language, in this case, is the site and 
stimulus of `the rich and complex dialogue with the reader's here and now' to which 
Delany refers; the `background' is foregrounded by means of speculative re- 
presentations of the language of the present, re-creating itself as the language of the 
future. 
3.4 Speculative language, perception, and the reader 
As an extreme example of linguistic determinism, Newspeak is designed to restrict the 
thoughts and perceptions of its users, as the lexicographer, Syme, explains to Winston: 
Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of 
thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, 
because there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that 
can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly one word, with its meaning 
rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten [... ] 
Every year fewer and fewer words, and the range of consciousness always a 
little smaller. 
(p. 55) 
Newspeak is, in many respects, speculative language as the term is understood in this 
study: it is a fictional representation of a language of the future, and is explicitly 
designed radically to alter the world-view of its users. It differs, however, from the 
speculative language I identify above, and in significant ways. Firstly, and crucially, it 
is part of the plot of Nineteen Eighty-Four: the linguistic enactment of the tyranny of the 
Party, the totalitarian power which attempts to control the freedom and freewill of its 
citizens in every sphere of human existence. Orwell emphasises its presentation as a 
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fictional construct, not only by appending `The Principles of Newspeak' as a kind of 
grammar and glossary which accentuates its alien or `other' status, but also, as noted 
earlier, by means of introducing - and translating - every instance of Newspeak in the 
main text. The language is presented to the reader, but s/he is not expected to decode it; 
it is essentially extrinsic to the process of communication between text and reader. 
Speculative language, on the other hand, is not part of the plot - it is part of the 
communicative process; language the reader must decode throughout the reading 
process. In this respect, the relationship between the reader and speculative language is 
much more direct and personal than that which pertains between the reader and 
Newspeak. As Sisk notes, not all readers will respond to all the invitations of the text; 
moreover, there exists part of the readership for whom 
the only meaningful requirement that Newspeak must satisfy is that of 
plausibility as a self-contained fictive construct. Bluntly, Newspeak has to 
appear as if it could do what the Party intends it to do [... ]. Read on this 
level, Newspeak succeeds as another terrifying aspect of the Party's crusade 
to wipe out dissent. 
(Sisk 1997: 49) 
When seen as a `self-contained fictive construct', the concept of Newspeak becomes 
one that readers may choose to - or choose not to - engage with. The same is not true 
of speculative language, since it permeates the communicative act and even comprises 
the very medium of the communication. To read the text at all, the reader is compelled 
to assimilate speculative language, the language of the future. 
Secondly, and in a point connected to the first, insofar as it relies on the notion 
of Newspeak as a fictional construct, Newspeak is designed to act upon the citizens of 
the future; to control their capacity to communicate and to think. In other words, its 
design acts on the characters rather than the readers. Speculative language, by contrast, 
has no discernible effect on the characters at all: they use this language habitually and 
without comment. Instead, at the heart of speculative language is the writer's desire to 
make the language of the text impact upon the reader; to use the potential of the author- 
reader relationship to communicate the awful possibilities of the dystopian world. 
A third distinction between Newspeak and speculative language is also relevant 
to this study: functionally, Newspeak is designed to restrict the perception of its users. 
Paradoxically, speculative language is designed to broaden perception (although by this 
I mean the perceptions of the readers, rather than those of the characters). Speculative 
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language encourages - facilitates, even - the process of triangulation between the 
fictional world and the real world, since it has referents - and thereby meaning - in both 
dimensions. As noted above, speculative language invariably adheres to the `principle 
of limited novelty', exhibiting either new meaning in existing word-forms or existing 
meaning in new word-forms; rarely in dystopian fiction is the new form and new 
meaning combination seen (although this occurs regularly in extra-terrestrial science 
fiction). This results in dystopian speculative language characteristically being an 
unsettling and destabilising interanimation of the familiar and the unfamiliar, a fusion of 
the known with the unknown. In short, it is a coalescence of the established language of 
the present with the yet-to-be-determined language of the future, and one which - like 
metaphor - requires the reader's cognisance of both fields in order to process and 
retrieve meaning. Unlike metaphor, however, where an abstract meaning (typically) 
maps onto a more concrete meaning, speculative language has a concrete referent in 
each of its time frames: the core meaning of the constituent lexemes in hate, week, 
memory, hole, thought, police, reality, and control, for example, is the same in both the 
real and the fictional worlds; only through extraordinary combination and 
recontextualisation do reappropriated meanings emerge. The reader's awareness of this 
`doubleness' of the language expands his or her perception of what is encoded in 
language to include what could be encoded by the language, since the blending of both 
actuality and possibility necessitates awareness of both. Arguably, this amalgamation 
of linguistic signification suggests the reader might ask Delany's question, `how would 
the world of the story have to be different from our world in order for this to occur? '; in 
other words, the energy of speculative language is contained in its propensity to 
challenge the reader's habitual acceptance of language, and perceive that this 
deceptively transparent medium is as liable to manipulation, distortion, and corruption 
as the dystopian world itself. In this respect, speculative language is much more than 
simply a microcosmic representational symbol of the dystopian world: rather it is a 
portentous exemplification of how the malignity and horror of the dystopian world 
could insidiously and inexorably emanate from the reader's own world. 
The design of speculative language is such that cognitive estrangement is 
invariably visible: this language presents the reader with a communicative medium 
which is continuous with his or her own, insofar as the language (or at least its 
constituent morphemes) is familiar and never resists interpretation, yet it is 
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discontinuous in that, while closely resembling the language of the reader's world, it 
subtly infuses futuristic unfamiliarity into each word, destabilising meaning and 
challenging taken-for-granted perceptions. The same unsettling combination of known- 
yet-unknown language places the reader in an almost involuntary `Whorfian' position, 
whereby s/he is invited to negotiate a route through the interpretative process which 
closely resembles the stages of Whorfianism outlined in §2.2.2. Firstly, speculative 
language is presented as the norm for the world of the future. As the preceding 
examples from Nineteen Eighty-Four have demonstrated, this language is used 
habitually by the inhabitants of the dystopian future; it is their standard mode of 
communication. In other words, it illustrates what Whorf terms the `background 
character' of language: it quickly becomes clear to the reader that the language of the 
future is as automatised for the fictional characters as their own language is to them: 
`part of the background of experience of which we tend to remain unconscious' (Whorf 
1956: 209). Secondly, as the reader encounters anomalous language of the nature 
discussed earlier in this chapter, its dissonance, or irregularity is brought into 
consciousness. This process, enacted in Nineteen Eighty-Four by metric terminology, 
for example, and other neologism, neosemy, and recontextualisation, alerts the reader to 
the possibility that a different world-view inheres in the language s/he encounters; that it 
is only superficially familiar, and that what it encodes represents a radically different 
way of conceptualising the world. As Whorf explained, it is necessary to come into 
contact with some contrast to the norm in order to appreciate not only that there is a 
norm, but also that other alternatives are possible. Speculative language provides 
exactly this `contrast to the norm': the reader is confronted by language which 
challenges and even subverts the norm while indirectly maintaining a clear connection 
with the `norm' of the reader's habitual language. Whorf's third stage - his examination 
of alternatively constituted world-views - is a process which engages the reader 
throughout the entire reading of the narrative: repeatedly, s/he must dismantle and 
reconstruct language in order to grasp the discontinuities and discrepancies between the 
language of the dystopian future and the language of the non-fictional present. The 
final stage of Whorf anism - the process of comparing and assessing the differences in 
world-view encoded within the language - is contingent on the reader: if s/he responds 
to the invitations of the language, s/he will come to understand that this language, 
formed extrapolatively from elements of his or her own language, reveals a world 
formed extrapolatively from his or her own world. 
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Speculative language then, takes linguistic elements from this world and distorts 
and contorts them in order to communicate a possible world-view of the future; one that 
draws in the reader as a participant in the process as s/he negotiates and retrieves 
signification and significance from disordered language. However, speculative 
language alone does not entirely drive the dystopian project: speculative language 
provides only the language of the future. The language of the past - that which I have 
termed reflective language - contributes equally to the extraordinary perception-altering 
propensity of dystopian fiction, as well as to its peculiar relationship with time and 
`place'. Accordingly, an examination of reflective language, together with some 
discussion of its connections with speculative language, will be the subject of the 
following chapter. 
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4. Reflective language in dystopia 
Language is testimony: it contains geological strata of past events and out-of- 
fashion values. 
Ben Pimlott (1989) Introduction to Nineteen Eighty-Four' 
4.1 Introduction 
Speculative language, as outlined in chapter three, constructs and animates the world of 
the dystopian future, presenting the reader with unsettling formulations and re- 
formulations of language; manipulations and transformations that are consistent-yet- 
inconsistent with the language of the world beyond the fiction; language representative 
of what could be if current trends continue unchecked. However, speculative language 
alone does not communicate either the potential threat of the dystopian future or its 
undeniable connections to the societal circumstances of its composition. One important 
contribution that this study makes to the critical assessments of language in dystopian 
fiction is to recognise that speculative language - especially where the future is 
conceived as communicable chiefly through the estranging qualities of neologism - 
functions most effectively when considered in tandem with known and familiar 
language, or that which I term reflective language. Reflective language, as noted in 
§ 1.5.3, is the language. of the past. While speculative language encodes the futuristic 
temporal status of the dystopian fiction, reflective language anchors it to what went 
before. If speculative language exists at the furthest-distant extent of the extrapolative 
thread which ties dystopian narratives to base-reality, then reflective language exists at 
the opposite end of the thread; the point from which the dystopia emerges. To discuss 
this language as `the language of the past' in terms of naturally-occurring language 
would be largely unworkable: not only does natural language transcend temporal 
boundaries, and largely resist categorisation into neat temporal divisions, but much of 
the lexicon moves in and out of use and fashion, meaning that - in general, at least - 
language cannot be accurately `dated'. Dystopia, however, as outlined in § 1.2.2, has a 
peculiarly complex relationship with time, which results in the author's historical 
spacetime (which may or may not coincide temporally with the reader's base-reality) 
being positioned as the indeterminately distant past when viewed from the perspective 
of the dystopian future. Moreover, the present (that is to say, the author's empirical 
present) is always absent from dystopian narratives, except by way of analogy with this 
fictionalised past. Reflective language takes two main forms, both of which relate to 
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time and temporal positioning. Both of these will be discussed in this chapter: firstly 
language which identifies the trends and tendencies of the immediate past and the 
present upon which the dystopian author founds his or her fictional world (which might 
be conceptualised as reflections of the present) and secondly, language from a further 
distant past (which, crudely, could be thought of as reflections on the past). These 
representations of reflective language will be developed throughout this chapter, 
supplemented by some consideration of the ways in which reflective language interacts 
with speculative language, and each gains didactic energy from the other (although the 
latter aspect is considered in more detail in chapter five). While there are significant 
differences between speculative language and reflective language, there are also points 
of convergence. One of these is the potential of reflective language to affect the 
perceptions of the reader; this aspect is also examined here. 
George Orwell's (1949) Nineteen Eighty-Four provides those examples of 
speculative language discussed in the preceding chapter; the same text also features 
examples of reflective language, and I introduce some of these in the early part of this 
chapter as a means of defining more precisely my understanding and use of the term 
reflective language. As with the treatment of Orwell's speculative language, I take 
examples for analysis from the main narrative, rather than from his invented language, 
Newspeak. From Orwell's immediate-post-war dystopia, I return to an earlier, pre-war 
era in my reading of Katherine Burdekin's (1937) Swastika Night. Originally published 
under the pseudonym `Murray Constantine', Burdekin's anti-fascist dystopia posits a 
world some 700 years in the future which imagines a fascist-controlled state, 
incorporating Germany and Britain, where `Nazism has been elevated to a militaristic 
religion predicated on the glorification of male tyranny and the absolute diminution of 
women' (Schneider 1997: 42). Andy Croft believes Burdekin's dystopia influenced 
Orwell's dystopian writing, `especially the way he adapts some of the anti-Fascist 
techniques and ideas from the book into anti-Socialist ones' (quoted in Patai 1984: 315 
n30); I note here that Orwell's techniques for introducing reflective language are indeed 
similar to those employed by Burdekin. L. P. Hartley's (1960) Facial Justice is next to 
be considered, a text which differs from the other texts examined in this study in that it 
is narrated by an unidentified narrator who explicitly frames the text as a `story'. This 
narrative perspective, to some extent, has an impact on the presentation of reflective 
language, although Hartley's text shares some common ground with other dystopias in 
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its strategies for incorporating reflective language. Margaret Atwood's (1985) The 
Handmaid's Tale is the final text to be examined in relation to reflective language; this 
is the only text in this study which features a first-person narrator, a strategy which also 
is shown to have some effect on the presentation of reflective language. These four 
texts span much of the twentieth century, embracing both modem and contemporary 
literary periods, yet the focus on reflective language - the narrative strategies by which 
it is introduced, the categories of subject matter, and the relationship with time, place, 
and the reader - remain remarkably consistent. These consistencies draw together these 
four texts, and consideration of the ways in which reflective language has the potential 
to affect readers' habitual world-view and perception locates these analyses in relation 
to the overall aims of this thesis. 
4.2 Nineteen Eighty-Four and `the destruction of words' 
The obsolescence and destruction of words and phrases cuts us off from the 
nobility of our past, from the severed masses of our race overseas, far more 
effectually than any growth of neologisms. 
H. G. Wells (1903) Mankind in the Making 
Speculative language, as seen in chapter three, manipulates and re-forms language to 
construct an imagined future world and populate it with unfamiliar concepts, strange 
ways of being, and novel ways of understanding. Reflective language, by contrast, 
draws on existing language to describe existing concepts, and relies on the regular 
word-form and its associated denotations to communicate the same basic understanding 
as applies in the extra-textual world. In short, its form is essentially standard language, 
and its meaning is exactly that which pertains in the reader's and the author's empirical 
reality. However, in the context of dystopian writing, there is one aspect in which this 
apparently standard language differs radically from its extra-textual realisations: 
dystopian societies commonly deny the very existence of a given concept by the simple 
expedient of eliminating the language which encodes the concept. The basic model of 
reflective language takes as axiomatic the notion that if the sign does not exist then 
neither does the signified. This simple mechanism serves ostensibly to eradicate those 
concepts which the dystopian societies' controlling powers deem unacceptable within 
the limits of their dominion. Reflective language then, would seem to be a self- 
defeating contradiction, a paradoxical use of language as the medium which denies the 
existence of itself; an elaborate oxymoron wherein an existing non-existent concept 
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must be delineated in order to name that which is nameless. Dystopian texts reveal 
some creative mechanisms and means to incorporate the artifice and contrivance that 
inheres in reflective language, several of which are presented in Orwell's Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, so it is to this text I turn to outline the fundamental parameters of 
reflective language. 
Nineteen Eighty-Four expressly acknowledges the co-existence of two languages: 
Oldspeak and Newspeak. Oldspeak, as discussed in chapter three, is not actually 
Standard English as we know it in the twenty-first century, nor is it the language of 
Orwell's historical spacetime. As deployed in the text, it is a kind of hybrid transitory 
language with its roots in the language of post-war Britain and its developing shoots 
reaching out into the hypothetical language of the future. The focalising character of 
the novel, Winston Smith reaches out of this linguistic framework to grasp the language 
- or at least, selected lexical tokens - of the absent present (which is his past) and draw 
these into his narrative as a means of reflecting on the present (which is the author's 
historical spacetime) as though it were a lost past, an irretrievable Golden Age. In turn, 
the reader is introduced - or re-introduced - to the language of his or her base-reality as 
an estranged symbolic representation of an earlier era, and consequently, through 
language, experiences the peculiar temporal `doubleness' that characterises dystopia. 
The paradox that is reflective language recurs throughout Orwell's narrative; indeed, 
towards the conclusion of the text, in a conversational exchange between Winston 
Smith and Party official, O'Brien, Winston, weary and almost defeated, acknowledges 
the contradictory and duplicitous potential that inheres in a language which is the means 
of denying its own being: 
`You do not exist, ' said O'Brien. 
Once again a sense of helplessness assailed him. He knew, or he could 
imagine, the arguments which proved his own non-existence; but they were 
nonsense, they were only a play on words. Did not the statement, `You do 
not exist', contain a logical absurdity? 
(p. 272) 
`[T]he arguments which proved his own non-existence' to which Winston alludes 
belong in the field of metaphysics rather than linguistics. Explorations in philosophy 
are beyond the scope of this thesis, but from a purely linguistic point of view, to address 
an interlocutor by use of the second-person pronoun while sharing the same physical 
space entails - or assumes - the existence of the hearer. It is, therefore, as Winston 
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suspects, a `logical absurdity' for you, a pronoun which occupies the subject position, to 
be figured as not a subject; moreover - and crucially for this study - the means to refute 
the assertion relies on `a play on words': words are the only mechanism available, in 
narrative fiction, through which to make the claim that that which is - or exists - is not. 
Reflective language embodies this claim in Nineteen Eighty-Four, as in other dystopias, 
by claiming - or proclaiming - that which no longer exists in the realm of the fiction 
does actually exist. Freedom, happiness, love, privacy, and friendship are counted 
among those things no longer existing in the grim future world of Oceania; history, the 
past, laws, and science are also non-existent concepts within the fictional world, yet the 
language that betokens their one-time existence - each of the lexemes listed above - 
appears in the text in exactly the form given here. For the fiction simultaneously to 
disclaim and affirm the existence of such concepts, a number of textual strategies must 
be invoked, and these are present in Nineteen Eighty-Four as in most other examples of 
the dystopian genre. Firstly, the past - which these words represent - must be erased or 
rendered mutable. This is achieved in Orwell's dystopia by the continual rewriting of 
all records of anything preceding the present instant: Winston's job in the Ministry of 
Truth, where he is required daily to `amend' and `rectify' news reports to suit the needs 
of the Party's propaganda machine, ensures that: 
Day by day and almost minute by minute the past was brought up to date. In 
this way every prediction made by the Party could be shown by 
documentary evidence to have been correct, nor was any item of news, or 
any expression of opinion, which conflicted with the needs of the moment, 
ever allowed to remain on record. All history was a palimpsest, scraped 
clean and reinscribed exactly as often as was necessary. 
(p. 42) 
Secondly, the population of the dystopian future must be denied access to books. All 
reading matter - in some texts, even the very act of reading itself - is considered 
reactionary. A literate society, it is assumed, with unrestricted access to language (and, 
by extension, access to prohibited words and their associated concepts) is potentially 
incendiary, and less amenable to autocratic control. Hence, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
there were `persons whose duty it was to track down and collect all copies of books, 
newspapers and other documents which had been superseded and were due for 
destruction' (p. 43), so that it was `very unlikely that there existed anywhere in Oceania 
a copy of a book printed earlier than 1960' (p. 101). This thematic strategy recurs 
throughout dystopian fiction; indeed, the entire plot of Ray Bradbury's (1954) dystopia, 
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Fahrenheit 451, revolves around this perceived need to destroy reading matter if stasis 
is to be achieved, and the populace is to be subdued. 
Thirdly, the controlling powers of the dystopian society must recognise the 
inherent power of language to communicate, encode, and embody revolutionary 
potential, and take action to prevent this. The Party of Nineteen Eighty-Four manifestly 
recognise the possibility of insurgence having a basis in language, and deploy 
Newspeak to deter rebellion in the short term, and prevent it entirely in the longer term. 
The proposed function of Newspeak is so well known that there is no necessity to 
rehearse the full range of its purpose here, although it is worth reproducing some 
relevant comments made by Syme, a lexicographer employed by the Party to work on 
the `definitive' Eleventh Edition of the Newspeak Dictionary, since his Party-faithful 
remarks encapsulate the optimal dystopia-wide conditions against which reflective 
language engages. In the canteen of the Ministry of Truth, Syme fervently remarks to 
Winston: 
By 2050 - earlier, probably - all real knowledge of Oldspeak will have 
disappeared. The whole literature of the past will have been destroyed. 
Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Byron - they'll exist only in Newspeak 
versions, not merely changed into something different, but actually changed 
into something contradictory of what they used to be. Even the literature of 
the Party will change. Even the slogans will change. How could you have a 
slogan like "freedom is slavery" when the concept of freedom has been 
abolished? 
(p. 56) 
Winston, of course, as the novel's rebellious and dissenting focalising character, is 
vitally aware of the term freedom, and all that the word denotes. `Freedom', he writes 
in his forbidden diary, `is the freedom to say that two plus two makes four. If that is 
granted, all else follows' (p. 84). While the adherents of the Party's dictatorship, like 
Parsons, `one of those completely unquestioning, devoted drudges on whom, more even 
than the Thought Police, the stability of the Party depended' (p. 24), and the child-like 
enthusiast, Syme, accept the Party's edicts, Winston constantly questions the principles 
upon which the ruling powers establish their dominance. In this respect, he is similar to 
most other dystopian protagonists: he refuses, until absolutely and forcefully compelled, 
to relinquish his individuality and freewill to the dictates of the totalitarian government. 
This aspect of Winston's characterisation represents the fourth - and crucial - narrative 
strategy which enables and empowers reflective language: Winston is, in common with 
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many dystopian rebels, effectively bilingual. He negotiates a tortuous path between the 
language that represents the dystopian future and the language that represents the past. 
The latter is invoked as a measure of the values, beliefs, and different understandings of 
self and society that obtained before the ascendancy of totalitarian tyranny. Winston is 
aware that he differs from most of his fellows: when he is apparently the only person 
present who recognises the deception intrinsic to the Party's propaganda regarding 
production statistics, shortages, and rationing, he asks himself `Was he, then, alone in 
the possession of a memory? ' (p. 62); yet it is this memory - especially the memory of 
earlier language - that enables him to assess, judge, and renounce the current regime. 
The words he recalls are, as already mentioned, exactly the same words in form and 
function that exist outside the fiction, so the difficulty for the dystopian author is to 
introduce these words into a fictional world in which they no longer exist. This is 
achieved intra-textually in Nineteen Eighty-Four as a result of Winston's `bilingual' 
aptitude: his knowledge and memory of the past, and the language of the past. It is 
achieved stylistically through Winston's focalisation together with a range of 
metalinguistic strategies which, in general, introduce a word, often explicitly as a word, 
or lexical token, in order to deny its existence, or to assert its extinction. Many of the 
examples listed at the beginning of this section -freedom, happiness, love, privacy, and 
history, for instance - are complex, multi-sense abstract nouns, and as such, resist 
simple classification or definition; by beginning the following analysis with reference to 
more concrete nouns, my aim is to illustrate that the stylistic devices employed to 
negotiate the complexities of temporal discontinuity characterise the presentation of 
reflective language. 
At the most elementary level, the futuristic setting of the novel itself substantiates 
a claim for linguistic obsolescence. Winston's observation that `The pen was an archaic 
instrument' (p. 8), for instance, is a simple declarative structure, the copula of which 
conforms to the simple past tense of the narrative. The subject pen is positioned as 
belonging to a previous era by the simple use of the adjective archaic in the predicate. 
This tactic, which acts to reinforce the temporal distance between the textual world and 
the actual world, does not unduly estrange the concept of pen; it simply draws attention 
to the fact that it has become outdated, superseded by concepts which are represented by 
the speculative language of Oceania: the `ink-pencil' and the `speak-write' (pp. 8-9). At 
a slightly more developed level, there is direct acknowledgement that the governing 
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powers are attempting to control or proscribe language. Thus, when Winston describes 
his neighbour as `Mrs Parsons', he almost immediately recants with the parenthetical 
statement, `("Mrs" was a word somewhat discountenanced by the Party - you were 
supposed to call everyone "comrade")' (p. 22). Here, the influence of the Party is 
plainly seen, although it is disapproval of certain naming and titles that Winston 
mentions, rather than an outright prohibition; Mrs still exists in Oceania in much the 
same form as it exists outside of the fiction ('with some women one used it 
instinctively', Winston notes (p. 22)). Significantly though, it is overtly introduced as a 
linguistic entity: it was a word. The parenthetical sentence would make sense without 
metalinguistic reference: 'Mrs' was somewhat discountenanced by the Party is a well- 
formed clause, especially given the use of quote marks to direct focus to the word Mrs 
itself. The reflexive use of a word, however, is seen throughout the text in examples of 
reflective language, and functions to illustrate the ostensible mutability and instability 
of language. For example, in the following extract, language is similarly self-reflexive: 
He turned round. It was his friend Syme, who worked in the Research 
Department. Perhaps `friend' was not exactly the right word. You did not 
have friends nowadays, you had comrades: but there were some comrades 
whose society was pleasanter than that of others. 
(p. 51) 
Initially, Winston uses `friend' in its familiar, extra-textual sense, before observing that 
`Perhaps "friend" was not exactly the right word'. The meaning of friend is brought 
into sharp focus through Winston's apparent doubt that it is `the right word'. His later 
comment - that `there were some comrades whose society was pleasanter than that of 
others' - resonates with the well-known altered `Commandment' of Orwell's earlier 
dystopia Animal Farm, which reads `All animals are equal. But some animals are more 
equal than others' (Orwell 1945: 90). The satire and internally contradictory irony that 
is directed upon the word equal in the latter example is apparent in the word comrade in 
the former. Comrade is not synonymous with friend, and the distinction between the 
two is clear here. The more significant clause for the purposes of elucidating the 
stylistics of reflective language, however, is that which occurs between the 
metalinguistic question and its ironic negation: You did not have friends nowadays. The 
pronoun you is the generic pronoun, replaceable by one, denoting the general and 
inclusive nature of the utterance, and the tense of the verb is carried by its auxiliary did, 
rather than in the negation not, or in the main verb have which appears in the bare 
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infinitive form. All these markers are consistent with the simple past tense form of the 
narrative, where the aspect is perfective (as seen in the verbs turned and worked in the 
above extract). What marks friends as reflective language is its adjacency to, and 
modification by, the temporal adverb nowadays. Meaning at this time, or in these times, 
nowadays marks the disjunction between narrative time and the reader's - or author's - 
present; it overtly acknowledges the artifice of the fictional (re)presentation of the future 
by self-reflexively encoding the temporal disparity. Given that the entire narrative 
begins in medias res, and continues in this vein throughout, ostensibly speaking from 
the vantage point of a future world, the inclusion of the temporal adverb should be 
unnecessary - and indeed, is. As with other sentence adverbials (nevertheless, 
moreover, however, for example) the paired clauses lose none of their surface meaning 
if the adverb is removed: compare you did not have friends, you had comrades with the 
original, and it becomes clear that this would follow the pattern of the dominant 
narrative tone. Nowadays is dispensable; optional, even. Orwell's deliberate use of it 
(and I assume deliberate use, since this pattern, and others similar to it, are seen 
repeatedly in relation to reflective language), acts like a linguistic beacon, proclaiming 
the temporal disjunctions that inhere in the narrative, and - vitally - drawing attention 
to the noun in question: here, friends, and all that word connotes. 
The denotation of the foregrounded word, as seen in friends, above, remains 
unchanged. Sometimes termed conceptual meaning, denotation is the `most central part 
of the meaning of a word' as defined by R. L. Trask (1997); more specifically, it is `that 
part of its meaning which is intrinsic to it and which is always present, independent of 
context and free of association' (1997: 50). The connotative meaning (which `means 
about the same as associative meaning' (Trask 1997: 52)), or `[t]hat part of the 
significance of a word which goes beyond its strict linguistic meaning and includes all 
of its associations, whether personal or communal' (Trask 1997: 51) is central to any 
discussion of language and its effect on perception, and it is connotative meaning to 
which Orwell's reflective language appeals. The denotative meaning of words is 
continually figured as clashing and conflicting with their futuristic connotations. For 
example, the embedded narrative, `The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical 
Collectivism', ostensibly authored by Emmanuel Goldstein, features a lengthy 
discussion of the incessant but spurious state of conflict which apparently continues 
between the state of Oceania and either Eurasia or Eastasia, depending on the whims 
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and machinations of the Party. This propaganda machine has re-defined the word war, 
according to the narrative, where Goldstein claims: 
The war is waged by each ruling group against its own subjects, and the 
object of the war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to 
keep the structure of society intact. The very word `war', therefore, has 
become misleading. It would probably be accurate to say that by becoming 
continuous war has ceased to exist. 
(p. 207) 
Here again, attention is drawn to the subject war and its denotative meaning by means 
of introducing it in terms of a lexical token: [t]he very word. It is claimed that the word 
`has become misleading' because, in the world of the future, it has gained a new range 
of associative, or connotative meanings; meanings that contradict its earlier sense. This 
`earlier' sense is, of course, the understanding of the term in Orwell's historical 
spacetime, which is positioned as the past from the narrative viewpoint. Moreover, this 
developed sense of the word, within the narrative framework, suggests that, effectively 
`war has ceased to exist'. This strategy - introducing a word only to deny its existence 
- typifies much reflective language, and is seen frequently in Winston's discourse, 
where it is assumed that the denotative meaning remains outside of the narrative - and 
in the reader's consciousness - but connotative meanings, drawn from the dystopian 
future, have mutated the word, in some instances, beyond recognition and in others, 
beyond utility. 
In a conversation with Julia, Winston attempts to explain just how the post- 
Revolution era in Oceania differs from earlier times; that records have been destroyed, 
books re-written, streets and buildings re-named (p. 162). In an attempt to explain the 
gravity of this situation, Winston appeals to Julia: 
Do you realize that the past, starting from yesterday, has been actually 
abolished? If it survives anywhere, it's in a few solid objects with no words 
attached to them [... ]. History has stopped. Nothing exists except an 
endless present in which the Party is always right. 
(p. 162) 
The past `has been actually abolished', and `[h]istory has stopped' according to 
Winston's explanation; `[n]othing exists', he claims, yet in so doing, he invokes - by 
naming - the very denotations the text denies. History and the past are vital constitutive 
elements of any dystopia, including Orwell's, since these narratives' didacticism is 
intimately bound up in their (re)presentation of the present (that is to say, the author's 
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historical spacetime) as the past; as history, in order that the reader might recognise (and 
possibly even respond to) the dire warnings of the text. The words history and past 
retain denotative meaning in the narrative - or, at least, in Winston's consciousness, 
which is being communicated here - and that denotative meaning is that of the reader's 
understanding. The entire range of connotative meaning, however, has been 
fundamentally transformed by the circumstances of the narrative, to the extent that both 
states no longer exist. Textually, this is achieved not by Newspeak-style elimination of 
the words themselves - they must be present even if only to deny their own existence - 
but by the contradiction between verb and subject. This contradiction - here, stopped 
governing history, and abolished governing the past - is only a contradiction in terms of 
language outside of the text; within the world of the text, both are perfectly well- 
formed. The textual agreement between history and stopped, as with the past and 
abolished is a conceptual absurdity in the extra-textual world; a collocational 
impossibility. 
In short, reflective language is the language of the author's and the reader's 
reality, incorporated into a fictional world which challenges or denies the words' 
existence; moreover, reflective language typically comprises linguistic markers of those 
complex concepts upon which the fundamental essence of human existence depends. 
Winston muses on just such `obsolete' concepts here: 
The thing that now suddenly struck Winston was that his mother's death, 
nearly thirty years ago, had been tragic and sorrowful in a way that was no 
longer possible. Tragedy, he perceived, belonged to the ancient time, to a 
time when there was still privacy, love, and friendship, and when the 
members of a family stood by one another without needing to know the 
reason. 
(p. 32) 
Tragedy, like privacy, love, and friendship, belong `to the ancient time' in Winston's 
strange new world. The `ancient time' - in other words, the text's absent present; the 
author's present - is figured as a Golden Age, a time when such language actively 
denoted the concepts known to the author and reader rather than their re-configured or 
eradicated meanings. Reflective language presupposes that words are indicative of, or 
constitutive of, their denotations, and, furthermore, that they have the facility to enact 
their connotations. For example, when Winston is discussing the past with the elderly 
prole in the pub, he mentions to the old man his understanding that `[e]very capitalist 
went about with a gang of lackeys' (p. 94). 
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`Lackeys! ' [the elderly prole] said. `Now there's a word I ain't 'eard since 
ever so long. Lackeys! That reg'lar takes me back, that does. I recollect oh, 
donkey's years ago- 
(p. 94) 
Significantly, it is the word lackeys which brings about the prole's memory of the past: 
a clear indication that language is conceived - at least in terms of fictional dystopian 
narrative - as being intrinsically connected to cognitive functioning, or perception. The 
characters see linguistic tokens as mapping onto, or directly representing, certain 
memories, consciousness, and states of being. This phenomenon is, broadly stated, 
characteristic of the distinction I make, in general terms, between reflections of and 
reflections on: the treatment of history, freedom, the past, for instance, is a reflection of 
the dystopian present, while Winston's musing on tragedy, privacy, love, and 
friendship, and the old man's language-provoked memories are reflections on the 
dystopian past, or, at least, so much of the past as is accessible. This distinction is not 
always clearly distinguishable, and therefore is not always sustainable, but would seem 
to occur quite often; as such, it is worthy of mention, even though it does not contribute 
consequentially to the direction of this study. Another fairly clear example, however, 
does appear in Nineteen Eighty-Four, and I include it here since it represents a recurrent 
trope in dystopian fictions. 
Given the genre's habitual reliance on devices such as the banning of books, the 
obliteration of history, and attempts to effect control of access to language, it is scarcely 
surprising that rebellion often takes the form of reclaiming language and the culture of 
literacy. Hence Winston's private insurrection is to write a diary: to create a permanent 
record of life in a world where other records are mutable; to recover literacy; to restore 
his claim to unfettered use of language in a society which proposes to restrict and 
remove language. As Mario Klarer remarks: `Only in a tradition based on literacy, in 
which the past is archived, is it possible to place the present in relation to the past' 
(1995: 129). Klarer's comments are made in respect of Margaret Atwood's The 
Handmaid's Tale, yet the substance of his argument applies across the dystopian genre: 
a culture of orality will inevitably re-emerge as literacy is threatened. This belief 
accounts for another instantiation of reflective language which is found recurrently in 
dystopian fictions: a renewed awareness that orally transmitted artefacts are implicated 
in any understanding of history. Consequently, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the rhyme 
`Oranges and Lemons' assumes greater significance for Winston as he struggles to 
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maintain a personal link with the past. The rhyme, to him, represents `a composite 
picture of the room where his mother had spent her last days, and the little room over 
Mr Charrington's shop, and the glass paperweight' (p. 186). Winston makes explicit 
the connection between the rhyme and the past when re-introduced to wine (which 
`aroused in Winston dim memories of something seen long ago' (p. 178)) during a visit 
to O'Brien's flat: 
Winston took up his glass with a certain eagerness. Wine was a thing he had 
read and dreamed about. Like the glass paperweight or Mr Charrington's 
half-remembered rhymes, it belonged to the vanished, romantic past, the 
olden time as he liked to call it in his secret thoughts. 
(p. 178) 
The rhyme, in common with the examples of reflective language detailed in the 
foregoing discussion of Nineteen Eighty-Four, belongs `to the vanished, romantic past, 
the olden time'. Patently, to the reader, wine and folk-rhymes, like freedom, friendship, 
love, and the rest, belong to the present, a present which is rendered as a past Golden 
Age from the dystopian future stance. While the dystopian future is delineated by 
means of speculative language, its contributory past is encapsulated and communicated 
by means of reflective language. The reader is invited to negotiate and assimilate the 
distorted connotations and denotations of both dystopian languages in order to arrive at 
a new (re)cognition of the present and its possibilities. The ways in which this process 
relates to cognitive estrangement and Whorfianism are discussed further at the 
conclusion of this chapter. Prior to that discussion, and having outlined the basic 
parameters of reflective language, I consider examples from other dystopian texts which 
are mediated through differing modes of narration. Katherine Burdekin's (1937) 
Swastika Night is the first of these; a dystopia which pre-dates Orwell's by more than a 
decade, and, consequently, cannot draw on the Second World War and its immediate 
aftermath for its influence or subject matter. 
4.3 Swastika Night and `words that are lost' 
Even words get lost. Lost words, wild words without a home wander 
endlessly for years, sometimes lifetimes, before they resurface and make an 
impression in a different time. 
Mike Golden (1999) The Buddhist Third Class Junkmail Oracle 
Although, as Daphne Patai observes, there is `no direct evidence that Orwell was 
acquainted with Swastika Night', she further notes that `only the internal similarities 
148 
suggest that Orwell, an inveterate borrower, borrowed from Burdekin' (1985: xii). 2 
Katherine Burdekin's dystopian novel, first published in 1937, and re-issued in 1985, 
undoubtedly has much in common with Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, and the 
correspondences between the two that Patai enumerates are extensive. She notes, for 
example, that both novels depict totalitarian regimes; both imagine a world where 
individual thought, memory, history, and books have been destroyed (the ideal 
conditions under which reflective language thrives, as noted in relation to Nineteen 
Eighty-Four). Additionally, both feature a world divided into distinct empires, and a 
hierarchical structure of control; both maintain a secret opposition called a 
`Brotherhood'; both also include a secret book, an eternal mythical leader, and a 
rebellious protagonist (Patai 1985: xii-xiv) 3 Despite the manifold parallels, there are 
also significant dissimilarities between the two texts which impinge on their relative 
representation of reflective language: firstly, Swastika Night is set some seven centuries 
into the future, unlike the same-century future of Nineteen Eighty-Four. Secondly, 
although both texts feature an embedded narrative in the form of a reactionary, 
clandestine book, that of Swastika Night is considerably more prominent throughout the 
narrative. Finally, Burdekin's narrative is more reliant on the function of a `delineator 
figure', a role which will be expanded upon in what follows. 
Swastika Night, set in `this year of the Lord Hitler 720' (p. 11), presents a world 
divided into two Empires in a constant state of conflict: the Nazi Empire (where the 
action takes place) and the Japanese Empire. Much speculative language constructs the 
Nazi Empire, where a mythologised seven-feet tall, blond, athletic Adolf Hitler, who 
`exploded' from the head of his father, God the Thunderer, is worshipped as the god of 
this holy Empire. The feudal and intensely patriarchal society is controlled by Teutonic 
Knights, who, as priests, also control the church ('We had the sense not to have priests 
and Knights. That always leads to trouble' (p. 135)). Women, having historically 
submitted to the Empire's `Reduction of Women' strategy, are caged, demeaned, and 
unvalued; they dress in uniform `dirty brown' clothes, and are shaven-headed and 
coweringly subservient. They are of equivalent status to breeding animals, and, as 
Nickianne Moody notes, `have been reduced to empty vessels, with no name, no voice 
and no language of their own' (2000: 181). During the course of the quarterly church 
service, the `Women's Worship', the Knight reminds the women of `the Lord Hitler's 
supreme condescension in allowing them to still bear men's sons and have that amount 
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of contact with the Holy Mystery of Maleness' (p. 9). In this strictly hierarchical 
society, Christians, like Orwell's proles, are contemptible and considered beneath the 
trouble of policing; a Christian woman is `the lowest thing, / The meanest, filthiest thing 
/ That crawls on the face of the earth' (p. 7). Procreation - at least the production of 
valued sons - is a cheerless duty for the Nazis, among whom homosexuality is common 
(and the only legitimised form of relationship). Within this framework, Burdekin 
composes a withering attack on fascism specifically through a critique of the ideology 
of patriarchy, which she positions as central to, and underpinning, fascism. 
The routines, the beliefs, the values, and the ethos of this militaristic society are 
related through varying focalising characters: firstly Hermann, a loyal Nazi farmworker, 
from whom focalisation shifts to the Knight, von Hess, and from him to Alfred, the 
protagonist, a visiting `pilgrim' from the subject-nation England. Focalisation 
subsequently shifts between these characters. The mode of narration, being omniscient, 
allows access to the thought processes of these three characters, although - in contrast 
to Orwell's dystopia - reflective language seldom occurs in the characters' interior 
discourse. The mode of discourse does influence the presentation of reflective language 
to some extent, as does the degree of temporal dislocation from the time of writing. 
Both of these factors, in turn, influence the narrative structure: Swastika Night is almost 
entirely dependent on its embedded text -a secret chronicle of the political and social 
framework of the Empire - in order to relate the history and development of the society, 
since its origins predate living memory by many centuries. This historical account, 
hand-written on parchment by `Friedrich von Hess, Teutonic Knight of the Holy 
German Empire, of the Inner Ten' and handed down through many generations of sons 
of the same noble line, is now in the charge of Hermann's `family Knight' (or feudal 
master), also called Friedrich von Hess. Having outlived his three sons, von Hess finds 
himself with no heir to succeed him as custodian of the precious `real book, the only 
one in the world' (p. 74), and settles on Albert, the English visitor, as the only example 
of a real `man' (in contrast to the `ageless boys' produced by Germany's excessively 
militaristic regime) to be the inheritor of the secret knowledge. Consequently, much of 
the narrative is occupied by conversations between Alfred and von Hess, interspersed 
by extracts from the Book 4 
These conversational episodes take a form more traditionally seen in utopian 
fictions, whereby - as with Thomas More's prototype Utopia -a visitor to a community 
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is given a guided tour by a representative of the society (the delineator figure) who 
promotes the political ethics, the organisational principles, and the belief systems of the 
organised society in response to questioning by the visitor. In employing this narrative 
strategy, Burdekin provides, through von Hess's intimate knowledge of the contents of 
the Book, access to the historical past reaching back to the early days of the Reich 
(Hitler's rise to power and the `Twenty Years War' in Europe, which presciently 
anticipates the Second World War). The Book, then, is the essential link with the 
author's historical spacetime (the beginnings of the history being contiguous with the 
time the novel was written); it is also largely the source of reflective language in 
Swastika Night. 
Reflective language in Burdekin's novel, as in Orwell's, is language 
representative of a bygone age from the futuristic dystopian standpoint, and language 
representative of the here and now from the reader's standpoint. The status of language 
is already somewhat complex in Burdekin's text, since the characters ostensibly speak 
in a combination of English and German (when the English Alfred and the German 
Hermann converse, they do so `each in his own language, understanding, but not 
straining themselves to form foreign words' (p. 19)), but the text is presented almost 
entirely in English. The Book, although originally written in German, is translated 
(without any acknowledgement that this is translation) by von Hess, whose 
conversations with Alfred are held in English. Since this is done silently in the text, I 
make no inferences about translation. Alfred does question von Hess, the delineator 
figure, on the subject of language, asking `If you wanted to Germanise us, why did you 
let us keep our own language and our own script? It's bound to hold Englishmen 
together if they have a different language' (p. 135). The response von Hess gives 
encapsulates the philosophy of Aryan superiority which informs and sustains the Nazi 
supremacy: 
We didn't want to Germanise you in any way except in making you accept 
our philosophy and your inferiority. If our blood and our language are 
sacred we cannot have every little Russian and Italian and English boy 
acquiring our language as a birth language. It is not fit for such as you to 
have by right, you must learn it for our convenience, that's all. 
(p. 134) 
Other than this exchange, and the occasional acknowledgement, as mentioned above, 
that different languages are being spoken, the issue of language as a controlling 
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mechanism - in contrast to Nineteen Eighty-Four - does not figure in Burdekin's novel; 
nor is it a plot device as it is in Orwell's dystopia. Swastika Night does, however, 
correspond with Orwell's text in one significant aspect of reflective language: this 
language identifies, and brings into sharp focus, those values, states of being, and ways 
of understanding the world that have been threatened or eliminated by the new order. 
So while the reflective language of Nineteen Eighty-Four revolves around the freedoms 
of the lost past -privacy, love, friendship, happiness, history - the reflective language 
of Swastika Night falls into two main lexical fields that might be conceptualised as 
`domestic' and `political'. The former reflects on the segregation and subjection of 
women, and the consequent breakdown of the family unit under the Nazi regime (a male 
child is `removed' from his mother at eighteen months of age, and is reared by `skilled 
men, trained men' who `bring him up to manhood' (p. 10)); the latter reflects the 
broader ideological foundations of the dystopian world. Both encourage the reader to 
compare his or her world -a world which retains this reflective language - to the 
dystopian world in which it is absent. 
Reflective language in the domestic sphere in Swastika Night includes marriage, 
family, and wife, for example, while the political sphere is represented by examples such 
as Socialism and democracy. Because the novel is set so many hundreds of years into 
the future, all knowledge of these words has been lost; only von Hess, through his 
knowledge of his ancestor's Book, knows the words and their associated conceptual 
meanings. Thus, not only is von Hess the delineator figure, he is the only character who 
is bilingual (in the sense that Winston Smith is bilingual (see §4.2 above): knowing and 
understanding both speculative and reflective language). In addition, as mentioned 
above, the text assumes each of the main characters is bilingual in English and German, 
a fact that is alluded to in the following extract, but which has no actual stylistic effect. 
Here, von Hess is discussing, with Alfred, the life of the `Holy One', Hitler: 
"[... ] The records of his personal life, if there were any, were lost or 
destroyed. It is certain that he never married, but whether he had 
intercourse with women in a sexual sense or not, we do not know. " 
"Married? " said Alfred. "I'm sorry, sir, that's a German word I don't 
know. " 
"It's a lost word. It occurs nowhere except in von Hess's book. Being 
married means living in a house with one woman and your children, and 
going on living continually with her until one of you dies. It sounds 
fantastic, doesn't it? that men ever lived with women. But they did. " 
(p. 69) 
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Apparent translation problems are responsible for Alfred's lack of understanding 
initially, yet it soon becomes clear that the word married no longer has currency in 
either English or German; it is `a lost word'. Only in a society where language is not 
recorded and codified in books and dictionaries, only in a society where history prior to 
the new order is denied, could a word ever become so `lost' that it `occurs nowhere' 
except one book, yet that is the claim made by Burdekin's text; a claim well-supported 
by the historical circumstances of the previous seven centuries, during which most of 
the population (including most men) have become illiterate. Even the original Friedrich 
von Hess had to write the Book `all from memory' because books `were all being burnt. 
Destroyed' (p. 74). The notion of `lost words' accounts for much of the reflective 
language in Swastika Night; moreover, as indicated by von Hess's lengthy definition of 
the term married above, it is clear that the associated concept is similarly lost in the 
fictional world. Certainly the same is true of the idea of families: von Hess assumes that 
Alfred will not understand the concept. `Alfred, you may not know it', the Knight 
begins, 
but the Christians in their communities don't live like we do, men and 
women separately. They live in families, that is the man, the woman, and 
their children, sons and daughters, all together. 
(p. 69) 
The emphasis falls clearly on families since it is italicised in the text; furthermore von 
Hess feels bound to explain the denotative meaning, as with marriage, above. An 
associated word - and concept - is defined by von Hess later in the text, when he says 
(of his forbear Friedrich von Hess): `His wife (that's the woman he permanently lived 
with)' (p. 86). It becomes clear that, in the future world of Swastika Night, a whole 
lexical field has disappeared; become `lost' language. Without the benefit of a planned 
language policy, as seen in the Newspeak of Nineteen Eighty-Four, the Nazi regime has 
succeeded in eliminating - except for the Book's precarious but tenacious recorded 
instances - an entire semantic network. 
A second lexical field is similarly `lost' in this totalitarian future: that which 
encompasses notions of any other political framework beyond the militaristic, 
imperialistic autocracy which rules the German Empire. Again, emerging from 
conversations between von Hess as delineator and Albert as visiting questioner, the 
language which encodes a concept is shown to be lost, as is the very concept itself. 
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Speaking of the early days of the Reich, von Hess explains that its rulers wanted to 
eliminate any historical records which might remind them that Empires can both `rise, 
and fall' (p. 78). He continues: 
It was not enough for them to know that they now ruled a third of the world 
[... ] they wanted to forget that there ever had been, in Europe, any other 
civilisation at all. There was so much beauty they had not made, so many 
books they had not written, [... ] and so many ideas of human behaviour 
which were anathema to them. Socialism, for instance, was absolutely 
smashed, practically, but the idea was still there, in men's minds. No, 
Alfred, I will not stop to tell you what Socialism was. You can read it in the 
book. 
(p. 78) 
Having established the pattern - that the Book contains `lost' words that are beyond 
Albert's linguistic competence - the text silently assumes his questioning of the word 
Socialism. It is clear that von Hess knows the word and its meaning; clear also that the 
earlier von Hess possessed the same knowledge, an idea which, back then, `was still 
there, in men's minds'; tacitly, too, the text presumes the reader's familiarity with the 
concept of Socialism. Albert alone does not understand the language because it, 
together with its associated conceptual meaning, we are given to understand, is 
forgotten. As seen in examples of reflective language from Orwell's Nineteen Eighty- 
Four, discussed earlier, the indication of the status of the language (and concept) is 
embodied in an adjacent verb: here, the past form of the copula in `what Socialism was'. 
Carrying the sense is no longer, the inclusion of was here discloses Socialism as another 
`lost' word. 
Democracy is yet another of Swastika Night's `lost' words. Following a lengthy 
discussion between von Hess and Alfred about issues of leadership and government, 
Alfred questions the efficacy of `blind obedience to any man' (p. 146). `Without 
knowing anything about democracy', responds von Hess, `you have found the flaw in it' 
(ibid). The suggestion that Alfred is unaware of the ideological concept, or its name, is 
confirmed when Alfred, `frowning with concentration', offers `I don't think people 
ought to chuck - what did you call it? democracy, just because it's difficult' (p. 147). 
His hesitation over the naming of the concept - what did you call it? - emphasises 
Alfred's lack of familiarity with the word democracy while simultaneously 
foregrounding the word for the reader. There are evidently more `lost' words in von 
Hess's Book: as Alfred makes ready to leave Germany and return to England with the 
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Book in his custodianship, he confesses to being concerned that he will be unable to 
understand all of it. The Knight responds by saying: `Von Hess says a half-witted man 
can understand it. If there are, as there must be, words that are lost now, you will guess 
their meaning from the context' (p. 151). Throughout Burdekin's text, `words that are 
lost now' occur: in addition to those noted above, rape no longer exists, either as a word 
or as a crime (p. 13); love, while not lost, is transmuted ('[m]en in those days could love 
their women' (p. 71)); history is distorted ('there was some history? ', asks Albert, `It 
wasn't all darkness and savagery? ' (p. 74)); women `are nothing, except an incarnate 
desire to please men' (p. 82); surnames, at least among ordinary citizens, are a lost 
concept, replaced by numbers (p. 133); literature is lost ('we killed [... ] our literature - 
that is all gone' (p. 121); the concept - and words - of monarchy have disappeared 
('[w]hen there were no more dynastic kings in Germany, and history had vanished, the 
word vanished too' (p. 125)). In essence, much that characterises the values and belief 
systems of the author's historical spacetime, is posited as `lost' in the dystopian future, 
and this is achieved largely with reference to the claim that if the language that names 
the concept is lost, then the concept itself is lost. 
The narrative strategies of using an informed delineator figure as a point of 
liaison between the fictional past and present, an interested, questioning (and rebellious) 
protagonist, an omniscient narrator, and an embedded text, allow Burdekin to present 
the reader with a richly detailed picture of the development of, as well as the 
consequences of, the futuristic dystopian society. Language, the dystopian author 
proposes, matches and parallels the stages of dystopian evolution: speculative language 
charts the development of the future society, while reflective language is invoked to 
encapsulate the demise - and ultimate disappearance - of the values of the real-world 
present. Burdekin's mode of narration differs from Orwell's: where Orwell's 
protagonist, Winston Smith, communicates all the reader learns about the totalitarian 
society, Burdekin's strategy permits several viewpoints to be assimilated. The focus on 
reflective language, however, remains remarkably consistent across both texts: each 
interrogates the meaning of the language of the present, and each estranges it by 
presenting it as the language of the past. Importantly, each makes the implicit claim 
that the substance and worth of the concepts signified by reflective language are fragile 
and threatened; moreover, each shows how easily the conceptual meanings of words 
could slip away together with the words themselves. 
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4.4 Facial Justice and `words which [... ] vanish from the language' 
The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there. 
L. P. Hartley (1954) The Go-Between 
L. P. Hartley's Facial Justice, written between January 1953 and September 1959, and 
published in 1960, employs a mode of narration seldom seen in dystopian fiction: a self- 
conscious, or self-reflexive narrator relates the account of the future dystopian society 
from the temporal point of view of the historical spacetime of the author. While there is 
just one focalising character - the rebellious protagonist, Jael 97 - the narrator's 
presence is impressed on the reader throughout by way of intrusive interpolations, 
digressions, and commentary. This results in a dystopian narrative where reflective 
language is frequently introduced by, or remarked upon, by the narrator, rather than 
only by the characters. Additionally, the verb group structures, which, as seen in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four and Swastika Night, often reflect the peculiar temporal 
positioning of reflective language, are particularly notable since they vacillate between 
the present (narrator's) time and the future (narrative) time. The opening paragraph 
illustrates the unusual temporal dimensions of the novel: 
In the not very distant future, after the Third World War, Justice had made 
great strides. Legal Justice, Economic Justice, Social Justice, and many 
other forms of justice, of which we do not even know the names, had been 
attained; but there still remained spheres of human relationship and activity 
in which Justice did not reign. 
(p 9)s 
The `not very distant future' remains indeterminately vague throughout the text, 
although it becomes clear that the `Third World War', which `all but eliminated the 
human race' (p. 24) was a war of apocalyptic proportions. The narrator, whose use of 
we in the above extract assumes a shared diectic and temporal frame with the reader, 
takes an entire chapter (ch. 3, pp. 24-31) to relate the historical circumstances leading 
up to the inception of the New State, thus declaring his or her status as the delineator 
figure. Most dystopian fictions feature a delineator figure who is also a character, and 
whose discourse is located within the confines of the textual world; most dystopian 
fictions also begin in medias res and only gradually reveal how the dystopian world 
evolved. Facial Justice counters both generic conventions in its use of an omniscient 
and informed narrator; it does, however, conform to the norms of the genre in its 
presentation of a dire and ominous future. 
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The dystopian society of New State began when half of the underground cave- 
and tunnel-dwelling population of a post-atomic, war-devastated England escaped from 
an even harsher totalitarian regime, the `English Underworld', where `scientists had 
devised ways of making people physically and mentally uncomfortable of which we, in 
these unenlightened days, know nothing' (p. 26). Led by a mysterious and disembodied 
`Voice', a community of `about a million in all' emerges into a desolate waste of mud 
and latent radioactivity to establish a new society, the ideological underpinnings of 
which are progressive and egalitarian. The narrative opens some fifteen years into the 
existence of this superficially utopian society where privilege, superiority, and 
individualism in any sphere of life is actively discouraged. All female citizens (who are 
named after Biblical murderers and required to wear sackcloth and ashes to express 
their humility) are graded from Alpha through to Gamma to classify their physical 
attractiveness. To be an Alpha is considered an abomination in New State, tantamount 
to deliberately causing unwarranted jealousy among less `facially privileged' women, 
and `leads to inflammation of the ego' in the owner of the face (p. 11). To be a Beta, 
however - the standard `stock face off the peg' (p. 16) - is to be socially acceptable. 
The ostensibly benevolent ruler of New State, the `Darling Dictator', has decreed, 
therefore, that all women of Alpha status shall be `Betafied'; that is, undergo plastic 
surgery to remove the envy-causing Alpha face and have it replaced with a standardised 
Beta face. 
The narrative opens with the protagonist, Jael 97, reporting to the `Equalisation 
(Faces) Centre' in preparation for facial surgery, since her beauty has caused other 
women to protest. `It was my eyelashes they mostly picked on', Jael 97 tells her friend, 
Judith 91, explaining `[o]ne woman complained she had lost several nights' sleep just 
thinking about my eyelashes. She felt they were digging into her, she said' (p. 13). 
Absolute equality is to be maintained in all aspects of this collective society, and this is 
enshrined in their language too: words overtly signify ideological and conceptual 
meaning in New State, a fact which is emphasised by formulaic rituals which must be 
observed when certain words are uttered. When Jael 97 almost utters such a word the 
narrator explains the rituals involved: 
Equality and Envy - the two E's - were in the moral sphere the positive and 
negative poles on which the New State rotated. The one attracted, the other 
repelled. Either word, once uttered, involved the speaker in a ritual dance - 
a few jerky, gymnastic capers for Envy, a long, intricate, ecstatic exercise 
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for Equality. Some were excused both on medical grounds but the rest did 
their utmost to avoid these verbal pitfalls. The abbreviations Good E and 
Bad E were exempt from ritual consequences, as were their facetious 
counterparts, Good Egg and Bad Egg. A curtsey for Equality and a token 
spit for Envy were concessions to time-saving that came later. 
(pp. 12-13) 
Language in New State, then, is frequently foregrounded: dances, curtseys, and spitting 
are formally performed if a `verbal pitfall' is encountered, although `good' words are 
encouraged (for instance, `the word "level" had no ritual consequences' (p. 13)). In 
addition, the `Darling Dictator' issues a range of language-based `Edicts', requiring 
citizens to learn ever-changing alliterative epithets which reinforce the ideology of the 
State. Not to have memorised a current epithet (for instance, `Alpha is Antiquated' (p. 
22)) is to risk a fine from a passing `Inspector'. Further language controls are planned 
to support the cause of equality (although these are to be implemented in the future, 
rather than within the time-frame of the narrative). In the case of the `tyranny of the 
Objective Case', for example, Jael 97's suitor, Dr Wainewright, reports: 
Lots of people thought that the cases should be standardised - it wasn't fair 
for a word to be governed by a verb, or even a proposition. Words can only 
be free if they're equal, and how can they be equal if they're governed by 
other words? [... ] They want to standardise the language [... ] so that no one 
shall be better at writing than anybody else. Only quite simple words will 
be allowed, because it's so embarrassing for other people not to know them. 
(p. 207) 
It is against this background, where speculative language creates a world dominated by 
excessive zeal for equilibrium and equivalence ('the Horizontal View of Life, or On the 
Level as it was sometimes more familiarly called' (p. 60)), that reflective language 
occurs. Some instances recall the thematic concerns of Nineteen Eighty-Four and 
Swastika Night: families, for example, `were still permitted but they were very much 
frowned on' (p. 29), and the self, or ego is a forgotten concept; yourself, Judith 91 notes, 
`doesn't exist' (p. 163). Other examples of reflective language draw attention to issues 
of possession, since the notion of ownership and property is condemned in this future 
world. When Jael 97, recovering in hospital following her facial transplant, insists on 
keeping a dying flower `[b]ecause it's mine', the ward Sister admonishes her, saying, 
"`Mine" is not a word you ought to use' (p. 86), and continues: 
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We only use it because we haven't found a substitute. We can say it's 
"yours", of course, but yours means everyone's. "In my charge", you ought 
to say, or "in my care" or "in my keeping". 
(p. 86) 
Pronouns, along with their associations with individuality and possession, often are at 
the centre of the dystopists' focus on language: Ayn Rand's use of the plural pronoun 
we in place of the singular I in Anthem (see §2.2.2) is indicative of similar concerns of 
the collective over the individual, while Marge Piercy's use of the generic third-person 
pronoun per as a substitute for the gender-marked him and her in Woman on the Edge of 
Time also reflects (among other things) that text's concern with egalitarianism. As a 
closed class of grammatical, rather than lexical, words, pronouns are more difficult for 
the writer to manipulate (as seen in Newspeak, where they are one of the very few 
word-classes to be `allowed to inflect irregularly', and follow `their ancient usage' 
(Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 316)), yet, unlike other categories of grammatical words, 
pronouns carry conceptual as well as associative meaning. Thus it is the conceptual and 
associative meanings encapsulated in the word mine - connotations of possession, 
privilege, and desirability - to which the Sister objects. The foregrounding of the term, 
together with its proscription in the new society, directs the reader's attention to the 
word and all it conveys (in the future and in the absent present), in this instance, without 
recourse to narratorial intervention. 
The narrator is overtly present in many instances throughout this text, however, 
acting as the delineator figure, and providing contextualising information. Reflective 
language is, on some occasions, explained by the narrator, although on other occasions 
it emerges from the characters' dialogue and internal discourse. The novel shifts 
repeatedly between these narrative modes, resulting in somewhat different treatments of 
reflective language. In a conversation with the Inspector who visits her in hospital, for 
example, Jael 97 looks forward to `when the spring comes, or what they used to call the 
spring' (p. 119). This pattern resembles many of the examples given above from 
Nineteen Eighty-Four and Swastika Night: a character refers to the obsolescence of the 
word - here spring - in the temporal circumstances of the narrative future, while 
alluding to its existence in the past (the reader's and / or author's present). A 
metalinguistic tag, they used to call, directs attention to the noun, and the verb form 
used, together with the infinitive to call, expresses the habitual action taking place in the 
past but not continuing into the present (which is, of course, the future here). The 
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delineator-figure narrator's treatment of the same subject is characteristically 
historically informed: 
Mental habit dies hard; the survivors of the Third World War helped out 
their thoughts with pre-war images. In the New World there was no frost, 
no soft spring mornings - the war had swept them away, along with all the 
other changes of climate, temperature and season; they had this uniform 
perpetual March [... ]. But the language hadn't adapted itself to the new 
meteorological conditions; it was still, as ours is now, a storehouse of dead 
metaphors, still retained phrases like `at daggers drawn', though no one in 
the New State had a dagger. 
(p. 116) 
The presence of the narrator is marked by the use of as ours is now, which clearly aligns 
him or her temporally and spatially with the reader (rather than the characters) by 
assuming a shared frame of reference. Similarly, the use of they in they had this 
uniform March excludes the narrator from the pronoun, and locates him or her at some 
distance from the events narrated, while the temporal adverb now signals the present 
(rather than the future) world. The narrator's omniscience is signified by his or her 
capacity to take an overview, encompassing factual details that the characters could not 
know. So when the narrator comments that `the language hadn't adapted itself, and 
was `a storehouse of dead metaphors', s/he is drawing on a panoramic temporal view 
incorporating the past, present, and future. This contrasts with Jael 97's world-view, 
which is constrained by the temporal limits of her memory, and a vague knowledge of 
history. In a passage of free indirect discourse, Jael 97 addresses much the same issue 
as the narrator: 
Some writers said that history had come to an end with the Second World 
War; how little they knew! She herself could not remember that time; but 
this was like another incarnation and needed a new language. Why, in those 
days a meal had courses. Nominally it still had: [... ] contained in three 
capsules [... ] and the metaphors drawn from eating in the old days, such as 
a square meal, were totally undescriptive of them. 
(p. 116) 
Jael 97's musing on language here draws on her limited knowledge of the language of 
the past, and although she is able to take a somewhat historically informed view, she 
does not have access to the same range of trans-historical knowledge of language that 
the narrator enjoys. While the narrator is able to speak for all `the survivors of the Third 
World War' and discuss their relationship to language - especially metaphor - in 
general terms, Jael 97 is able to draw on only that knowledge to which she has access in 
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her much narrower temporal field. Jael 97 can only speak for herself; the narrator, in 
contrast, speaks of the entire population of New State, and identifies himself or herself 
with the totality of the readership in the use of the inclusive pronoun ours. The 
narrator's interpolations are prominently didactic, reminiscent of the so-called `info- 
dump' device (James & Mendlesohn 2003: 5) common to much early science fiction 
narratives, whereby technical information, communicated ostensibly to an inter- 
narrative audience, is actually intended to instruct the reader. Jael 97's less 
information-dense reflections on language are, I would suggest, more effective in the 
communication of reflective language, since the reader sees its effects on the character 
at a personal level, rather than simply receiving generalised information. 
The immediacy of the characters' personal experiences of, and attitudes to, 
reflective language would seem to articulate far more lucidly the link between language 
and perception than the narrator's overtly didactic intrusions on the subject. Perhaps 
usefully conceptualised as covertly didactic, the characters' own reflections on language 
elucidate their belief that language `contains', or `packages' meaning, and furthermore, 
the belief that if the container - or the word - disappears from the language, so too does 
its content. Two further examples from Facial Justice exemplify this covert 
didacticism. The first comes from an article Jael 97 writes following her decision to 
rebel against the extremes of imposed societal equivalence. Acting as an agent 
provocateur, she addresses the populace through the columns of the newspaper, with 
the intention of inciting insurgence: 
Instead of sports at which this or that man wins, stirring up, it has to be 
admitted, a faint whiff of Bad E in his "rivals" or "competitors" (to use 
words which, some of us dare to hope, will soon vanish from the language), 
we shall have sports at which all the entrants win, or lose. And those two 
words, which have occasioned so much needless heart-burning in the past, 
will become indistinguishable and so lose their sting. 
(p. 200) 
Jael 97's intention at this point is to encourage awareness of the value of individuality 
by satirically claiming advocacy of the extremist `equalisation' position. Emphasis is 
drawn to wins by way of italicisation, while "rivals" and "competitors" are enclosed by 
scare quotes which similarly concentrate focus on these words; the lexical field of 
individual sporting achievement is invoked, only to be immediately revoked by the 
assertion that these are words that the author hopes `will soon vanish from the 
language'. The underlying message, albeit ironically intended here, is that the concept 
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of sporting achievement -a cause of envy, or `Bad E' - will vanish together with the 
words which express it. The stress remains likewise on the relationship between word 
and concept in the later part of this extract, where, it is claimed, the difference between 
the denotation of win and lose will become imperceptible if the concepts the words 
express are disordered and intermingled. For the reader in the extra-textual world, the 
notion of `equalising' the meaning of verbs which are polar opposites is absurd, but this 
very absurdity directs the reader's consciousness to the words and their meaning in both 
temporal dimensions: in other words, it encourages comparison between the 
connotations that inhere both inside and outside of the narrative. 
A second example from a character, or characters - the dissident group of 
`conspirators' called the `Dancing Class' - also illustrates covert didacticism emanating 
from reflective language, but in contrast to Jael 97's suggestion that eliminating a word 
will erase the associated concept, this group suggest that drawing a forgotten word back 
into the language will reinstate its attached concept. Having decided to mount a poster 
campaign as a means of provoking insurrection, the group is occupied in selecting a 
persuasive slogan to capture the notion of individualism as a valid alternative to the 
excesses of collectivism, and are searching for a word which `will express the opposite 
idea and ideal of fairness' (p. 154). In response to the Chairman's request for `an 
attractive-sounding synonym for unfairness' (p. 157), the word merit is suggested. 
`Merit has been soft-pedalled for a long time, because it leads to Bad Egg' the Chairman 
notes, and he further observes, `The word may have dropped out of the language - it's 
ages since I saw or heard it used' (pp. 157-158). Focus on the word merit is continued 
as the deeply conditioned citizens in the group refrain from suggesting a slogan 
containing the word for fear of being seen as `competitive' or attempting to seem 
`cleverer than our neighbours' (p. 158). Eventually, a group member asks: `Doesn't 
merit speak for itself? ', to which the Chairman's responds: `It used to [but] nowadays 
it's silenced. That is one of the things that we complain of. Somebody must speak up 
for it' (pp. 158-159). This exchange reinforces the idea that language is the locus of 
ideology, that a word can `contain' or `embody' a concept; it also relies on the existence 
of the word, together with its full range of connotative meanings, outside of the text, in 
the reader's world, where it can `speak for itself'. 
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The lexical field of individualism that is signalled by reflections on the words 
win, lose, rivals, competitors, and merit is one that is characterised as `Bad E', or envy 
in Facial Justice, since it is supposed these words all suggest inequality to some extent. 
As seen with examples of reflective language from other texts, in the dystopian world 
such undesirable words are depicted as having `dropped out of' or `vanished' from the 
language, or have become `silenced'. The futuristic setting of the dystopia sanctions the 
proposition that language change of such significance could feasibly have occurred 
between the author's historical spacetime and the future the narrative anticipates. 
Indeed, reflective language largely draws its potency from this propounded temporal 
dislocation, since it is this futuristic (re)vision of the reader's own language which 
activates the process of triangulating comparison, or feedback oscillation, to use Suvin's 
term (Suvin 1979: 71; see §1.4). Such feedback oscillation would appear to function 
most effectively when it is the perceptions of the characters that are being 
communicated, as seen in Winston's contemplations of language in Nineteen Eighty- 
Four, Albert and von Hess's discussions about language throughout Swastika Night, and 
the characters' views on the subject expressed in Facial Justice. Where a self-reflexive 
narrator, who also occupies the delineator-figure role, steps beyond the temporal 
boundaries of the narrative and mediates between the temporal dimensions, a measure 
of feedback oscillation, I would suggest, is lost to the reader. Because the delineator- 
narrator makes explicit the artifice of the absent present being portrayed as the past by 
locating himself or herself not only in that absent present, but also in alignment with the 
reader (see, for example, the narrator's remark, `we, in these enlightened days, know 
nothing' (p. 26), or `by that time many more were known than we know now' (p. 28)), 
the reader is deprived of the opportunity to make those connections for himself or 
herself. Traditionally, dystopian fictions `show' rather than `tell'; `they leave the act of 
reconstruction up to the reader', according to Peter Ruppert (1986: 103-104), who also 
argues that they `force us to assume a more critical and detached position toward all 
social propositions, including the ones they offer' (1986: 62). The narratorial 
interventions in Facial Justice, with their informed cross-temporal overview, it would 
seem, expropriate the reader of `the act of reconstruction' and assume for the narrator `a 
more critical and detached position', resulting in less effective - and affective - 
reflective language. 
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4.5 The Handmaid's Tale and `so many unsaid words' 
The more you begin to understand the language of the past the more grows 
your conception of the living world not seen by outward sight. 
Albert Christy (2003) Numeral Philosophy 
If the overtly didactic delineator-narrator strategy of Swastika Night on occasion 
diminishes the force of reflective language, then it would follow that an `unmediated' 
approach would intensify the effectiveness of this `language of the past'. Margaret 
Atwood's (1985) The Handmaid's Tale, narrated in the first person by its focaliser and 
protagonist, Offred, purports to be the first-hand account of a subject living under the 
dictates of a fundamentalist totalitarian theocracy some time in the early part of the 
twenty-first century. To refer to this text as `unmediated' is, of course, to collude with 
the deception of all narrative fiction mediated through an author, and I use the term with 
the appropriate reservations; as a narrative strategy, however, the first-person epistolary 
approach employed by Atwood to frame her dystopia does communicate the immediacy 
and the implications of reflective language with notable cogency. Atwood's dystopia is 
perhaps second only to Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four in terms of prominence, and has 
received a great deal of critical attention; the two texts share a common concern with 
institutional controls of language. Language is a key motif in The Handmaid's Tale: 
issues of access to language, control through language, literacy and orality, gender and 
language, and power and language, for example, have occupied much of the critical 
reception of the text (see, for example Sisk (1997), Howells (2006), Klarer (1995), 
Cavalcanti (2000), Cohen (2001), Kauffman (1992)). My intentions here are quite 
narrowly defined in the light of the wide-ranging discussions of language in this text: I 
examine only that language which Offred reflects on as belonging to, or differing from, 
her lost past. Sisk notes the many examples of `past' language in The Handmaid's Tale: 
`[m]ore than anyone or anything else', he notes, `Offred remembers old words that are 
now proscribed or whose meanings have been rendered obsolete or heretical' (1997: 
110). Sisk makes a further observation that is important to the direction of my 
argument here; following his assertion that `Offred is deeply sensitive to the importance 
of names and words', he says: 
Her knowledge of how Gilead's government works or how it seized power 
in the first place is very limited - but her understanding of what the 
revolution has done to language is profound. We discover what it is like to 
live in Gilead primarily from Offred's thinking about language. 
(Sisk 1997: 110) 
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Offred's understanding of the structure and aims of the controlling powers of Gilead is 
indeed limited: her field of vision is limited in almost every respect; she is aware only 
of her immediate environment, and has almost no access to knowledge beyond her 
`reduced circumstances' (p. 18). 6 The reader, therefore, shares this constrained access 
to information with Offred; there is no enlightening embedded narrative in The 
Handmaid's Tale as seen in Nineteen Eighty-Four and Swastika Night, nor is there 
much reliance on an informed delineator figure (although the Commander has some 
discussions with Offred about the ideology that underpins the establishment of the 
society, these are brief and relatively uninformative). Unlike Facial Justice there is no 
omniscient narrator figure; the only narrative point of view available in The 
Handmaid's Tale is Offred's. In comparison to the other dystopias considered in this 
chapter, the narrative world-view is narrower in several respects: firstly, the focalising 
character exists in a particularly restricted environment, enjoying fewer freedoms - of 
choice, of mobility, of communication - than other protagonists, even Winston Smith. 
Secondly, the time-frame is more limited: although the details are vague, it would seem 
to be set in the very early years of the twenty-first century, and features a protagonist 
who has clear and detailed memories of life before the regime (as an adult, in contrast to 
Winston's childhood pre-revolution memories). Thirdly, the totalitarian administration 
is still in its infancy ('Things haven't settled down, it's too soon' (p. 23)) and operates 
in a future quite temporally close to the past which Offred recalls. This narrower focus 
has an impact on the reflective language which occurs in this text: on the whole, 
Ofred's reflections on language focus on the specific rather than the general, the 
personal details of her changed life, rather than the impact of the new regime on the 
whole society. That is not to say that the narrative does not engage with wider issues - 
clearly it does exactly that - but that its reflective language is more personal, more 
immediate, and consequently, more effective in reaching the reader's perception. 
Offred's autobiographical narrative is explicitly directed to a future reader, 
addressed as you, and `[i]n addition to giving voice to a woman who is barred from 
language', as Nancy A. Walker notes, `this method suggests Offred's efforts to take 
narrative control over a situation in which she is essentially a prisoner' (1995: 175). 
Offred's urgency to tell her personal story, to communicate the horror of her life and 
loss under the new order, drives the narrative, which alternates structurally between 
accounts of her daily existence in Gilead and memories of her earlier life. These 
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divergent temporal states are marked by speculative and reflective language 
respectively: the dystopian world is built with new language - Guardians of the 
Faithful, Angels, and Eyes, for example - while Offred's quiet moments of reflection 
are marked by reference to the language of the past. A recurrent pattern of reflective 
language - one also noted in the texts examined above - is to introduce a word or 
phrase which no longer has currency in the dystopian world, and this is a pattern which 
emerges regularly throughout Offred's tale: 
Smells fishy, they used to say; or I smell a rat (p. 28) 
That was freedom. Westernized, they used to call it (p. 38) 
Not right now. Not, as they used to say, at this juncture (p. 101) 
They used to say that. Exciting, they used to say (p. 105) 
Of having something on me, as they used to say (p. 191) 
What does he control, what is his field, as they used to say? (p. 195) 
Exactly the same construction seen, for example, in Jael 97's comment, `when the 
spring comes, or what they used to call the spring' (see §4.4 above) is repeated in each 
instance here: they used to call or they used to say draws the reader's attention to some 
word or idiomatic expression indicative of the narrative past but simultaneously 
indicative of the reader's present. The use of the generic pronoun they, however, 
suggests generalisation rather than immediacy, as do the verb phrases used to call and 
used to say, since both express a non-specific past tense. More directly expressive of 
the relatively brief interval (in dystopian terms) between the author's historical 
spacetime and the proposed narrative time are the references to language as language 
belonging to another era. While she is contemplating `a version of reality I learned in 
the former time', Offred recalls `Networking, one of my mother's old phrases, musty 
slang of yesteryear' (p. 212); elsewhere, she recollects `Humungous, word of my 
childhood' (p. 37). Both of these italicised words lucidly bespeak the late twentieth 
century, since both are coinages from the late 1970s; networking, in its sense of `making 
use of a network of people for the exchange of information, etc., or for professional or 
other advantage' was not recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary until 2003, and its 
earliest illustrative quotation in that volume is dated 1976. Similarly, humungous, 
which has been listed as `Current Slang' in the OED since 1993, does not seem to have 
been present in the language prior to 1970, the date of its first illustrative quotation. 
The same is true of zilch, a word Offred spells out during an illicit game of Scrabble in 
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the Commander's study. In answer to the Commander's challenge, "`Is that a word? "', 
Offred responds by saying "`It's archaic"' (p. 193). Zilch also is listed as `Current 
Slang' in the OED together with an illustrative quotation dating from 1966. This type 
of reflective language, then, is quite firmly anchored to the era of its emergence: while it 
is `musty slang of yesteryear' for Offred, it is marked for its recentness in the extra- 
textual world. This language, fashionable in the era of the text's publication, and 
figured as outdated in the narrative future, is more generation-specific than the general 
they used to say, and consequently more immediately recognisable as a temporal marker 
for the reader. In addition, the absence of the metalinguistic tag in these instances 
means the temporal disjunction inheres in the relative age of the word itself, rather than 
being marked only in the verb phrase. 
Offred is very aware of the importance of verbs and their tenses. She repeatedly 
corrects her narrative when she feels she has used an inappropriate verb. When 
speaking of her missing husband, for example, she amends the verb to reflect her hope 
that he is still alive, saying: `Luke wasn't a doctor. Isn't' (p. 43); similarly, of her friend 
Moira, she says: `She was still my oldest friend. Is' (p. 181). After learning that her 
mother has been sent to clear up toxic waste, she reverses this verb-amending process: 
`The understatement of the year, was a phrase my mother uses. Used' (p. 148). Again 
reminiscing about Luke, she berates herself for thinking of him in the past tense: 
And he was, the loved. One. 
Is, I say. Is, is, only two letters, you stupid shit, can't you manage to 
remember it, even a short word like that? 
(p. 239) 
Offred's repeated self-correction indicates the relatively recent rise to power of Gilead's 
fundamentalist oligarchy, and underlines her hope that life will return to normal for her 
(although even the word normal itself becomes defamiliarised when towards the end of 
the narrative she reports, `Things are back to normal', then immediately questions her 
own use of the word: `How can I call this normal? ' (p. 294)). Her constant adjustment 
of verb tenses is, for Offred, an important means of maintaining a link with her earlier 
life, of keeping it tangible. Just as the use of the present tense gives life to Offred's 
memories, so the use of the narrative present tense gives immediacy and vitality to 
reflective language. Direct speech - always present tense - contributes forcefully to the 
efficacy of reflective language here, since it resonates unequivocally with the reader's 
own automatised language use. The doctor at Offred's routine monthly examination, 
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for example, greets her: "`How are we getting along? " he says' which she immediately 
identifies as `some tic of speech from the other time' (p. 70). A similar greeting is 
foregrounded by its estrangement for Offred when she visits the Commander's study for 
the first time: 
"Hello, " he says. 
It's the old form of greeting. I haven't heard it for a long time, for years. 
Under the circumstances it seems out of place, comical even, a flip 
backward in time, a stunt. I can think of nothing appropriate to say in 
return. 
(p. 147) 
Both hello and how are we getting along are unmarked in the extra-textual world: the 
former prevails customarily as a standard form of greeting in English, while the latter is 
perfectly familiar in the context of doctor-patient discourse. For the reader, neither is 
remarkable until it becomes estranged by the circumstances of its use in the text; only 
then does either of these expressions assume any reflective quality. The use in both 
examples of he says in the narrative present tense - in contrast to the used to say 
formulation of previous examples - brings the discourse into a notably immediate 
present. A similar effect is achieved in the present-tense focus on the word out in the 
following extract: 
"Tonight I'm taking you out. " 
"Out? " It's an archaic phrase. Surely there is nowhere, any more, where a 
man can take a woman out. 
(p. 243) 
Out, or taking you out -a perfectly unremarkable construction outside of the text - is 
figured as an archaic phrase within the text. That such phrases as this, or the standard 
greetings above, should be supposed archaic, speech from the other time, the old form, 
or a flip backward in time directs the reader's attention powerfully towards the 
dystopian temporal disjunction; moreover, in focusing on the potential consequences for 
everyday expressions which the reader uses regularly, this strategy communicates more 
immediacy than is evident in other methods of incorporating reflective language. 
Offred is crucially aware of the ways in which language has changed within her 
lifetime, and while she is conversant with the new connotations which have attached 
themselves to old language, she also remains in touch with the original meanings. 
Offred is The Handmaid's Tale's essential bilingual link between the language of the 
future and the language of the past. This is illustrated in her reflections on changing 
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meaning resulting from her new circumstances. The details of her illicit first meeting 
with Nick, the Commander's chauffeur, she recounts thus: 
"No romance, " he says. "Okay? " 
That would have meant something else, once. Once, it would have meant: 
no strings. Now it means: no heroics. It means: don't risk yourself for me 
if it should come to that. 
(p. 274) 
As with examples of reflective language considered throughout this chapter, a word or 
phrase from the author's historical spacetime - and the reader's base-reality - is 
incorporated in the narrative only to be reconfigured and reconstituted within the terms 
of - or perhaps more saliently, within the times of - the dystopian future. Offred 
experiences an enforced narrowing of her world-view, and as a consequence of that, her 
reflections on language represent the minutiae of her constrained daily life. Although 
she, in common with other focalising characters in other dystopias, contemplates the 
larger, abstract issues - freedom (p. 38), privacy (p. 75), and love (p. 231; pp. 237-38) 
for example, which figure also in Winston Smith's reflective language - on the whole 
she considers language in the domestic sphere. Offred's narrow world-view does mean 
that her knowledge of the power structure and its intentions is, as Sisk notes, very 
limited. However, the immediacy of the first-person autobiographical narrative 
communicates the grim reality of life under the new regime with chilling effectiveness, 
since we witness the repercussions of totalitarianism from a deeply personal viewpoint. 
The reader is invited to participate in, or identify with, Offred's story by repeated 
instances of seeing their own language - the language of their base-reality - reflected 
back at them but distorted, perverted, or eliminated altogether by a tyrannical regime. 
4.6 Reflective language, perception, and the reader 
Reflective language is in itself an extremely effective tool for drawing the reader's 
attention to the potential horrors of any dystopian society: the professed attrition or 
annihilation of language common to all of these texts mirrors the destitution and 
destruction of societal values in dystopia. When considered together with its opposite 
force - speculative language -a fuller and much more alarming image of a possible 
future emerges. Reflective language stands in contrast to speculative language: the two 
are antithetical realisations of language in terms of dystopian fiction. Reflective 
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language details the past while speculative language outlines the future; reflective 
language portrays the absent present as a Golden Age while speculative language 
presents the future as the Age of Terror and Fear. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, for 
example, privacy, as reflective language is the converse of the speculative-language 
constructions Big Brother and telescreen; freedom contrasts with Room 101; history and 
memory are opposed by Records Department and memory hole. The co-presence and 
interanimation of these two linguistic strands is the focus of my examination of 
Margaret Atwood's (2003) dystopia, Oryx and Crake, which follows in chapter five. In 
advance of that discussion of dystopia's `two languages', I consider some of the ways in 
which the reader may receive and respond to reflective language. 
The form, the visible contour, of reflective language, as noted at the beginning 
of this chapter, is exactly that which exists outside of the fiction in the reader's base- 
reality; the meaning also corresponds with that which exists in the reader's 
consciousness of the extra-textual world. And yet, despite this apparent coincidence of 
form and meaning, reflective language challenges and confronts the reader's habitual or 
automatised reception of language. It does so chiefly by denying its own existence 
while simultaneously - and perceptibly - existing. In short, words such as freedom, 
history, privacy, love, and family denote the same in both dimensions, but, dystopia 
declares their future obsolescence as a means of drawing attention to the values and 
beliefs that inhere in the concepts these words encode. Like speculative language, 
reflective language is cognitively estranging, but the operation of cognitive 
estrangement is almost inverted: where speculative language is unfamiliar - or 
estranging - at first, but this estrangement is followed by cognition - or appreciation of 
its familiarity (see §3.4), reflective language is at first familiar, but then becomes 
estranged by the circumstances of the text. Suvin's original conception of cognitive 
estrangement does not assume particular ordering of its two components: he refers 
simply to `the presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition' (1979: 8-9), 
which allows that the functions may occur in either sequence. In either order, the 
peculiarities of dystopian language hinge on challenging and defamiliarising readers' 
tacit understanding of language; in speculative language the movement is from 
unfamiliar to familiar, while reflective language moves from familiar to unfamiliar. In 
both cases, the reader is compelled to attend to the ways in which language represents 
the world(s). 
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A similarly reversed relationship is discernible between reflective language and 
Whorfianism. Where speculative language positions the reader as a kind of `Whorfian 
investigator' by default (see §3.4), by way of presenting new or different language as a 
new or different way of conceptualising the world (as Whorf saw the Hopi language, for 
example), reflective language engages the reader as `Whorfian investigator' of his or 
her own language (as Whorf, in investigating `exotic' languages, was compelled to look 
more closely at his own language for the purpose of comparison). Importantly, 
reflective language also engages the reader earlier in the process - at the first stage of 
Whorfianism, in fact, where the investigator becomes aware of the automaticity of 
language. As Whorf remarks, awareness of one's own language is as `background 
phenomena' of which one is as `dimly aware' as one is of `motes of dust in the air of a 
room' (1956: 221). Typically, as readers, we process language unconsciously - or at 
least, we process our known, native, familiar language unconsciously. `Every language 
of course seems simple to its own speakers', Whorf comments, `because they are 
unconscious of its structure' (1956: 82); moreover, this unconscious processing is 
indicative of what Whorf terms the habitual thought world (see §2.2.2), which is `the 
microcosm each man carries about within himself, by which he measures and 
understands what he can of the microcosm' (1956: 147). Reflective language, as 
ostensibly the reader's own known and familiar language, would appear at first to 
conform to Whorf's expectations of what it is that comprises a habitual thought world. 
One of the obstacles, Whorf notes, to appreciating the unconscious nature of our 
relationship with language is `because of its background character, because of the 
difficulty of standing aside from our own language [... ] and scrutinizing it objectively' 
(1956: 138). Reflective language compels the reader to `stand aside from [his or her] 
own language' and see it afresh, since it is foregrounded by its very claim to non- 
existence: the presentation of this language as obsolete, as `lost' or `vanished', when it 
still exists in the reader's world and consciousness, acutely draws focus on to it - or 
estranges it - and presents it as exactly the kind of `interruption of regularity' that, for 
Whorf, triggers the process of investigation. Dystopian presentations of reflective 
language encapsulate those states and understandings of the world which constitute - at 
least in the Western world - the values of self and society. In proposing that this 
language will have disappeared in the dystopian world of the future, the concomitant 
proposition is that if the language disappears, then so too will the concept it 
encapsulates. The didactic warning of reflective language parallels Whorf's comment 
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that `[t]he situation is somewhat analogous to that of not missing the water until the well 
runs dry' (1956: 209). 
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5. Oryx and Crake: two cultures, two languages 
Language is the only instrument of science, and words are but the signs 
of ideas. 
Samuel Johnson (1755) Preface to Dictionary of the English Language 
5.1 Introduction 
In his 1956 Rede Lecture at Cambridge, C. P. Snow famously conceptualised the 
emerging schism between the Sciences and the Arts as the `two cultures', asserting that: 
[T]he intellectual life of the whole of western society is increasingly being 
split into two polar groups. [A]t one pole we have the literary intellectuals 
[... ] at the other scientists [... ]. Between the two a gulf of mutual 
incomprehension. 
(C. P. Snow 1959: 4) 
Margaret Atwood's (2003) Oryx and Crake extrapolates this cultural division to a point 
where it has become axiomatic: her dystopian vision of the United States in the twenty- 
first century imagines the Sciences as an inexorable imperialistic hegemonic power, and 
the Arts as an outdated and frivolous irrelevance with no practical application, a 
division reflected unmistakably in the `two languages' of the novel. Scientists - or 
`numbers people' - are highly valued, and live and work inside closely-guarded gated 
communities called `Compounds' owned by giant multi-national biotech corporations; 
`word people', on the other hand - the `literary intellectuals' at the opposite pole of 
Snow's `two cultures' - are marginalised, considered wholly inferior to the scientists, 
and of value only for such trivial tasks as writing advertising copy, or `decorating the 
cold, hard, numerical real world in flossy 2-D verbiage' (p. 221). 1 Oryx and Crake 
differs from the other dystopias considered in this study in that it does not propose a 
despotic totalitarian government; however, science, together with commerce (from 
which it has become indistinguishable), forms an absolute and indomitable supremacy 
which controls almost every aspect of human existence. Atwood's dystopia, which 
Coral Ann Howells calls a `ferocious satire on later modem American capitalist society' 
(2006: 164), speculatively extends not only the division between the Sciences and the 
Arts, but also extrapolates the potential for destructive human exploitation inherent in 
the now-prevalent tendency for scientific research and development to be driven and 
funded by government-sanctioned corporate interests. Alan Luke (1992) suggests that 
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the post-war collaborations between science, government, and commerce - in base- 
reality - have changed the fundamental nature of science, to the extent that: 
What counts as `science' in the period since World War II has been focal in 
the development of Western nation states, to the point where historical 
`winners' and `losers' in economic, strategic and geopolitical realms are 
assessed in terms of technological and scientific prowess [... ]. What has 
come to count as science in technocratic culture is the applied, the corporate 
and the profitable. 
(Luke 1992: xi) 
Atwood takes this existing alliance of scientific endeavour with legislative authorisation 
and corporate fiscal interest and draws out from it a possible future where the scientific 
quest for human perfectibility (through, for example, advances in genetic engineering, 
pharmaceutical technology and embryology) is fiercely competitive, and scientists 
working on development projects are closely monitored by a network of armed guards 
(known as `CorpSeCorps') in order to forestall attempted industrial espionage. 
Environmental devastation provides a bleak setting for the fictional future: `as time 
went on', Atwood writes, `the coastal aquifers turned salty and the northern permafrost 
melted [... ] the vast tundra bubbled with methane and the drought in the midcontinental 
plains regions went on and on, and the Asian steppes turned to sand dunes' (p. 27). 
Against this grim background, powerful coalitions of science and commerce ruthlessly 
vie to develop and market products which exploit the widespread pursuit of perpetual 
youth, the expectation of cures for all ailments and disease, and the demand for 
improved leisure and personal happiness. Along with other thematic concerns that 
Atwood extrapolates in Oryx and Crake, the beginnings of these trends are clearly 
visible in the contemporary world, the author's historical spacetime being far closer 
temporally to the contemporary reader's base-reality than in other texts examined in this 
study. The fictional future too, is closer at hand: `around 2025' according to Howells 
(2006: 163), and 2027 in the estimation of J. Brooks Bouson (2004: 140). The novel, 
Atwood claims, `invents nothing we haven't already invented or started to invent', 2 and, 
as with all dystopias, this discernible basis in the circumstances of the present 
contributes to its didactic force. As Howells notes, `Atwood shares the dystopian 
impulse to shock readers into an awareness of dangerous trends in our present world' 
(2006: 164). 
The author's approach to this didactic task is characterised by division: a `two 
cultures' theme pervades the narrative throughout, from structure through to theme and 
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characterisation. The narrative divides into distinct `before' and `after' perspectives, as 
the novel's focalising character, Snowman, apparently the only human survivor of an 
apocalyptic chemically induced catastrophe, muses on the events leading up to the mass 
destruction of humanity in a series of flashbacks which reach back as far as his early 
childhood in the Compounds. There, as the only child of scientist parents, he observed 
at first-hand the development of transgenic animals bred for human organ 
transplantation. The `after' temporal perspective sees Snowman attempting to survive 
the consequences of this earlier scientific development, where pigs with human 
neocortex tissue growing in their brains have become feral and stalk him with cunning 
intelligence; dogs with the genetic material of wolves spliced into their DNA hunt in 
packs; and other genetically mutated creatures constantly threaten his safety and peace 
of mind. 
The pre-apocalypse world Snowman recalls also reveals a sharp cultural and 
social division - `the divided world of haves and have-nots' (Bouson 2004: 143) that 
separates those who live within the protected and affluent Compounds from those who 
live beyond those boundaries in the `pleeblands'. The inhabitants of the pleeblands, like 
Orwell's `proles', are peripheral and unguarded, but unlike the proles, the pleebs have 
become chaotic and disordered - `the addicts, the muggers, the paupers, the crazies' (p. 
31) - and are kept subdued by `BlyssPluss Pills' which provide `an unlimited supply of 
libido and sexual prowess, coupled with a generalised sense of energy and well-being', 
protection against `all known sexually transmitted diseases, fatal, inconvenient, or 
merely unsightly', in addition to which, they `prolong youth' (p. 346). This popular 
medication also - without the knowledge or consent of its users - acts as `a sure-fire 
one-time-does-it-all birth-control pill for male and female alike, thus automatically 
lowering the population level' (p. 347), a side-effect which Atwood satirically employs 
to give some indication of the far-reaching controlling mechanisms made possible by 
ostensibly benign advances in science and technology. 
Within the walls of the various commercially funded Compounds, the cultural 
divide is that which separates scientists and non-scientists distinctly into the `two 
cultures' of the Sciences and the Arts, or, in Atwood's formulation, `numbers people' 
and `word people'. Snowman - also known as Jimmy (his pre-apocalypse name) - is 
unmistakably a word person; `a mid-range student, high on his word scores but a poor 
average in the numbers columns' (p. 204), while his childhood friend, Crake - the 
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novel's brilliant but flawed scientist - is a numbers person of notable genius, who could 
`crank out the differential equations in his sleep' (p. 204). In a society where scientific 
intellect is highly valued, and aesthetic pursuits deemed risible, Jimmy (Snowman) is 
markedly inferior; a puzzling disappointment to his scientist father, and destined to 
attend a second-rate Arts College, `The Martha Graham Academy', which `was named 
after some gory old dance goddess of the twentieth century', and had been `set up by a 
clutch of now-dead rich liberal bleeding hearts from Old New York' (pp. 218-219). In 
his post-disaster musings, Snowman recalls that `a lot of what went on at Martha 
Graham was like studying Latin, or book-binding: pleasant to contemplate in its way, 
but no longer central to anything' (p. 219). Science, on the other hand, is central to 
everything, and Crake, as a `top of the class' numbers person finds himself being bid for 
by `rival EduCompounds' at the `Student Auction', is `snatched up at a high price by 
the Watson-Crick Institute', which is `like Harvard had been back before it got 
drowned' (p. 203), and is thus assured of employment with a prestigious scientific- 
commercial Compound upon graduation. Jimmy, on the other hand, drifts through his 
undistinguished early career writing advertising copy - `verbal fabrications' (p. 292) - 
to sell the products developed by science. In his position as a `wordserf' (p. 253), he 
`discovered quite soon that, corporately speaking, he was a drudge and a helot' (p. 291). 
If Crake represents `the scientists' of C. P. Snow's `two cultures', then 
Snowman-Jimmy represents the `literary intellectuals', or the Arts. In Atwood's 
dystopian extrapolation of this inequitably divided world, the Sciences are privileged 
over the Arts to a significant - and ultimately disastrous - degree. The language of 
Oryx and Crake is similarly divided across these boundaries: as I shall demonstrate in 
this chapter, speculative language constructs the futuristic ascendancy of science and 
commerce, while reflective language looks back from this future perspective to 
contemplate a less divided, less recklessly intensive, more humanitarian, and more 
aesthetically aware age. In a telling inversion of the scientific dominion, reflective 
language, it will be seen, depicts the Arts as at least as necessary, as intrinsic, and as 
vital as the Sciences to the continued survival of civilisation, or, in the words of the 
original motto of the Martha Graham Academy (now obscured by the new slogan, `Our 
Students Graduate With Employable Skills'): Ars Longa Vita Brevis (p. 220). 
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5.2.1 The speculative language of science 
Science is beginning to find that there is something in the Cosmos that is not 
in accord with the concepts we have formed in mounting the spiral. It is trying 
to frame a new language by which to adjust itself to a wider universe. 
Benjamin Whorf (1941) The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behaviour to Language' 
The language Atwood uses to build and detail the world of the future - proteonome, 
neuro-regeneration project, hyoid apparatus, neocortex control systems, bioprint, 
neural-impulse monitor, hostile bioforms, rapid-maturity gene, expandable 
chromosphores, for instance - is formed from a bewildering combination of real 
science, pseudo-science, and informed neologism. In tapping into the language of 
science to depict her vision of a hostile and ruinous dystopian future, Atwood is 
extrapolating - and exploiting -a linguistic phenomenon that exists in her historical 
spacetime and also in a contemporary reader's base-reality. The language of science 
already enjoys a level of prestige and authority unparalleled by other forms of discourse, 
and a claim to neutrality and transparency which is tacitly acknowledged by most 
readers. As David Locke points out, `[s]cientific language has traditionally been viewed 
as "pure functional notation"' (1992: viii); furthermore, this belief in the integrity of 
scientific discourse has become institutionalised in Western culture to such an extent 
that `[i]t is not too fanciful to say', as M. A. K. Halliday and J. R. Martin claim, `that the 
language of science has reshaped our whole world view' (1993: 10). The language of 
science is a `form of language that began as the semiotic underpinning for what was, in 
the worldwide context, a rather esoteric structure of knowledge', Halliday and Martin 
note, yet they also contend that this language `has gradually been taking over as the 
dominant mode for interpreting human existence' (1993: 11). In essence, whether the 
reader recognises the hegemonic status of scientific language or not, it is likely that, as a 
twenty-first-century reader, his or her world-view is already influenced - albeit perhaps 
imperceptibly - by the preponderance of scientific (and pseudo-scientific) discourse 
which makes up his or her language. 
In the extra-textual world, the language of science has penetrated the discourse 
of commercial, industrial, and political arenas, where its characteristic language 
constructions - especially nominalisation - have been adopted in the interests of 
authority, clarity, and precision. However, as Halliday and Martin suggest, where the 
language of science is `borrowed' into corporate discourse, it is, `largely a ritual feature, 
engendering only prestige and bureaucratic power. It becomes a language of hierarchy, 
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privileging the expert and limiting access to specialized domains of cultural experience' 
(1993: 15). Halliday and Martin also acknowledge that the `reshaping' of `our whole 
world view' occasioned by the ascendancy of scientific language is not an unqualified 
benefit, since `it has done so in ways which (as is typical of many historical processes) 
begin by freeing and enabling but end up by constraining and distorting' (1993: 10). 
Benjamin Whorf himself would doubtless have agreed with their conclusion: one of 
Whorls central beliefs is that `no individual is free to describe nature with absolute 
impartiality, but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks 
himself most free' (1956: 214). The prestige and authority of the language of science, 
then, is already deeply embedded in the consciousness of modern readers; Atwood's 
speculative extrapolations of this language, therefore, build on, and take advantage of, 
an aspect of linguistic knowledge which is, for the reader, already profoundly 
habituated. 
Atwood prefaces the novel with an epigraph taken from Jonathan Swift's (1726) 
Gulliver's Travels: 3 
I could perhaps like others have astonished you with strange improbable 
tales; but I rather chose to relate plain matter of fact in the simplest manner 
and style; because my principal design was to inform you, and not to amuse 
you. 
Swift's claim to instruct rather than inspire, adopted by Atwood, is remarkably resonant 
with the declared aims of scientific writing: technical language is a medium designed to 
impart information, rather than to entertain. As Herman M. Weisman notes in his 
(1980) Basic Technical Writing, scientific - or technical - language is not literary or 
imaginative language. Indeed, Weisman's argument opposes, or polarises, the two 
modes of discourse: 
Literature is concerned mainly with our thoughts, feelings, and reactions to 
experiences. Its purpose is to give us insight. Technical writing concerns 
itself solely with factual information; its language does not appeal to the 
emotions nor to the imagination, but to the intellect. Its words are exact and 
precise, and its primary purpose is to inform. Its information is the activity 
and progress of science and technology. 
((Weisman 1980: 8), quoted in Locke (1992: 4-5)) 
To consider Atwood's prefatory assertion of didactic intent in direct comparison, line by 
line, with Weisman's claim for the veracity of scientific language is to reveal numerous 
correspondences: 
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I could perhaps like others have astonished you with strange improbable tales 
Literature is concerned mainly with our thoughts, feelings, and reactions to 
experiences 
but I rather chose to relate plain matter offact 
Technical writing concerns itself solely with factual information 
in the simplest manner and style 
Its words are exact and precise 
because my principal design was to inform you 
and its primary purpose is to inform 
and not to amuse you 
its language does not appeal to the emotions nor to the imagination 
In appropriating Swift's words for her epigraph, Atwood is not only signalling the 
didacticism of her dystopian text; she is also alluding to the authority of the language of 
science, making a claim for the factual, informative nature of its discourse, and, by 
association, making the same claim for her text. Oryx and Crake is, of course, 
literature; the epigraph represents a self-consciously satirical duplicity, but one that is 
followed through in the novel's frequently scientific tone. 
In a flashback which appears quite early in the novel, Snowman contemplates 
his parents' involvement, as scientists, in a top-secret project to breed a transgenic pig 
to provide organs suitable for transplant into humans. They `explained to Jimmy when 
he was old enough' what this meant (p. 26). The relevant passage is excerpted here, 
since it typifies both the scientific tone and the speculative language of the novel: 
Jimmy's father worked for Organlnc Farms. He was a genographer, one of 
the best in the field. He'd done some of the key studies on mapping the 
proteonome when he was still a post-grad, and then he'd helped engineer the 
Methuselah Mouse as part of Operation Immortality. After that, at 
Organlnc Farms, he'd been one of the foremost architects of the pigoon 
project, along with a team of transplant experts and the microbiologists who 
were splicing against infections. Pigoon was only a nickname: the official 
name was sus multiorganffer [... ]. The goal of the pigoon project was to 
grow an assortment of foolproof human-tissue organs in a transgenic 
knockout pig host - organs that would transplant smoothly and avoid 
rejection, but would be able to fend off attacks by opportunistic microbes 
and viruses, of which there were more strains every year. A rapid-maturity 
gene was spliced in so the pigoon kidneys and livers and hearts would be 
ready sooner, and now they were perfecting a pigoon that could grow five or 
six kidneys at a time [... ]. A great deal of investment money had gone into 
Organlnc Farms. 
(pp. 25-26) 
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The dystopian textual world of Oryx and Crake, where the commercial-science 
research-and-development principle predominates, is clearly communicated in this 
passage; the construction of the `foregrounded background' (see §3.3.4) of the future 
science-driven society is established through the use of a distinctly scientific register, 
sustained by the inclusion of many of the characteristic linguistic conventions of non- 
literary scientific discourse. Among these is the feature Halliday and Martin term 
lexical density, or the relative proportion of lexical (or content) words to grammatical 
words per clause, which is typically high in scientific language. Lexical density is a 
variable quality: while the general tendency for informal spoken language is 
approximately two lexical words per clause, and for planned writing about four to six, 
scientific writing is considerably higher, often with a value between ten and thirteen per 
clause (Halliday & Martin 1993: 76). One clause taken from this extract - `The goal of 
the pigoon project was to grow an assortment of foolproof human-tissue organs in a 
transgenic knockout pig host' (lexical words italicised) - has a lexical density value of 
thirteen, which represents the upper - or most scientific - end of the range. Much of 
this lexical density occurs as a result of the clustering of content words within the four 
noun phrases, which, together, contain twelve of the thirteen lexical words. Two 
particularly dense strings of four lexical items appear here without any intervening 
grammatical words: foolproof human-tissue organs and transgenic knockout pig host. 
Science customarily presents itself linguistically by using this kind of heavily pre- 
modified noun phrase since it represents an efficient and precise method of 
concentrating high informational value into compact syntactic constructions. It has also 
become ritualised, to the extent that it has become a functional intra-group shorthand 
notation system which eschews the use of `superfluous' language. Noun phrases with 
similarly dense pre-modification of the noun occur throughout Oryx and Crake, for 
example: 
analogue mammalian sex pheremones (p. 267) 
a modified form of Kirilian-energy-sensing algae (p. 237) 
the most efficient low-light, high-density chicken farming operation (p. 238) 
Lexically dense noun phrases help to define the scientific tone of this extract at 
structural level, but the vocabulary used here is probably a more explicit indication of 
its scientific design. The subject-specific terminology creates an identifiably scientific 
lexical field: the Latin-derived taxonomical classification, sus multiorganffer, the 
180 
pigoon's `official name', for example, is indicative of specialisation at the highest levels 
of science, while what might be termed `discipline-specific' terminology, such as 
genographer, proteonome, microbiologists, and transgenic also contribute to the 
establishment of a scientific lexical field. Less specialised still is the group of familiar 
terms, including transplant, infections, microbes and viruses, and gene, which, while 
being well-known vocabulary, remain identifiably representative of a scientific lexical 
field. Atwood also mimics the impersonal, detached tone customarily employed in 
scientific discourse: in the above extract, this typically `objective' effect is intensified 
by the use of nominalisations in place of the verbs from which they were derived. The 
use of rejection, rather than their being rejected, for instance, closely imitates the 
method by which science customarily turns processes into `things' to which other things 
are predicable (a method which also effaces any suggestion of agency). Use of the 
passive voice also has a depersonalising effect, and can be seen here in the construction 
was spliced in which similarly eliminates agency. 
The language of science is the dominant, prestige language of the dystopian 
future; the domain of the scientists, or `numbers people' such as Crake, whose own 
language reveals his habitual reliance on scientific constructions. Jimmy recalls, for 
example, Crake's views on love and sex: 
Falling in love, although it resulted in altered body chemistry, and was 
therefore real, was a hormonally induced delusional state, according to him 
[... ]. As for sex per se, it lacked both challenge and novelty, and was on the 
whole a deeply imperfect solution to the problem of intergenerational 
genetic transfer. 
(p. 227) 
The same depersonalised and detached tone that typifies scientific discourse is present 
in Crake's language: love is `a hormonally induced delusional state', and elsewhere, he 
categorises unrequited love as `a series of biological mismatches, a misalignment of the 
hormones and pheromones' (p. 195). In the dystopian world Atwood envisions, 
`problems' such as these are solved by an increasing dependence on `trained 
professional' sex-workers, `a system' Crake claims is preferable to real relationships 
since `it avoids the diversion of energies into unproductive channels, and short-circuits 
malaise' (p. 244). The issue of sex being `a deeply imperfect solution to the problem of 
intergenerational genetic transfer' is resolved by agencies which trade in the made-to- 
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measure `designer' babies that have become widely available thanks to advances in the 
human genome project, genetic engineering, and embryology. 
The language through which Atwood communicates this science-controlled, 
investment-led futuristic world is a compelling blend of existing scientific language 
together with a considerable measure of speculative language. Returning to the passage 
detailing Jimmy's father's involvement in the Organlnc-funded transgenics project, 
there are several examples of speculative language which, as seen with the speculative 
language of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four in chapter three, linguistically construct the 
dystopian world while maintaining recognisable links with the language of the author's 
historical spacetime. The `principle of limited novelty' (see §3.3.1) applies equally to 
Atwood's speculative language as it does to Orwell's (and, indeed, to most instances of 
speculative language in dystopia), even in the case of the bizarrely named pigoon, 
which is perhaps the most obvious neologism here. To coin this word, Atwood has 
extrapolated from existing word-formation practices: the same practices that have 
yielded other equally odd-sounding combinations, such as tigon, coined in 1927 to 
name the offspring of a tiger and a lioness, which was followed in 1938 by liger to 
describe the young produced by the pairing of a lion and a tigress. In a similar vein, the 
Oxford English Dictionary records zedonk (in the UK) and zonkey (in the US), both of 
which are contrived by clipping and blending composite parts of the parents' names, 
zebra and donkey. In her (2005) article `Dis/integrating animals: ethical dimensions of 
the genetic engineering of animals for human consumption', Traci Warkentin cites 
geep, which is `a sheep and goat hybrid, containing genetic material from both species', 
and explains that a `transgenic organism is one that has been microgenetically 
engineered so that its genome contains material derived from a different species' (2005: 
83). While the method of producing such hybrid animals has changed due to advances 
in scientific knowledge, the method of coining a new name for a new species has 
remained the same since at least the early twentieth century; the neologistic strategy 
which creates pigoon is one with which readers are familiar. Similar examples appear 
throughout the text: wolvogs (p. 11) are a combination of wolves with dogs; rakunks (p. 
43) a hybrid of racoons and skunks; snat is `an unfortunate blend of snake and rat' (p. 
57); and `the spoat / gider [is] goat crossed with spider to produce high-tensile spider 
silk filaments in the milk' (p. 234). 
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The pigoon's `official name', sus multiorganifer, is extrapolated from present- 
day linguistic reality in much the same way. This is a new species, being bred to 
produce five or six harvestable kidneys at a time, and as such, requires a new name. 
Science already employs a systematic Latin-based taxonomy to classify mammals by 
species and characteristics, and the name sus multiorganifer is constructed from this 
source. This neologism can be broken down into its constituent morphemes as follows: 
sus (Latin: pig or hog) 
multi (Latin: much or many) 
organ (Latin: tool or sense organ) 
i (for ease of articulation between consonants) 
fer (Latin: to bear, carry, or hold) 
Each of these morphemes, as defined in Ronald Wilbur Brown's (1956) Composition of 
Scientific Words, is meaningful within the field of taxonomical naming; the principles 
for this type of word formation are well established in the biological sciences. 
Moreover, if such an animal were ever to exist, the chances are that its taxonomical 
name would be much as Atwood has invented it here. Essentially, she has speculatively 
constructed this fictional name on principles extrapolated from scientific base-reality. 
Other lexical examples in this extract include genographer (decodable literally as 
`mapper of genes'), and proteonome, neither of which exists in real science, but both of 
which are speculatively constructed from known morphemes that do exist in the realms 
of current science. 
The speculative language that Atwood invents here builds an imagined future 
which is markedly continuous-yet-discontinuous with the circumstances of its 
conception and production. In encouraging the reader to make the connections between 
the fictional world and his or her own world, speculative language invites a dialogue 
between the temporal states of now - or what is - and the future - or what could be. As 
Howells (2006) notes, Oryx and Crake `thinks through these stages of scientific 
enlightenment to their possible negative consequences, which, given human nature (as 
we know it) need to be taken into account' (2006: 163). Howells' argument is 
essentially a response to the text's didacticism; one which is repeated in numerous 
reviews of the novel. Bouson (2004) likewise comments on the didactic impulse of 
Oryx and Crake: `Atwood', she notes, `sounds a warning about the slippery slope we 
are going down in our contemporary culture of science' (2004: 153); moreover, she 
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records Atwood's comment that if she `could select "one motto" for the way we should 
approach genetic engineering', it would be "`Think it through"' (2004: 153-154). 
Warkentin (2005) suggests that the novel itself provides the necessary space to consider 
its didactic message: 
Oryx and Crake provides a transitional narrative space for the discussion of 
current biotechnological philosophies and practices in Western society and 
where they might lead to in the not-so-distant future. 
(Warkentin 2005: 83) 
While none of the above critics isolates language specifically as the locus of the 
didacticism to which they appeal, a response from within the field of genetic science 
does explicitly identify the language of Oryx and Crake as the prompt which compels 
the initiation of discussion. Anthony Griffiths, Professor of Genetics at UBC 
Vancouver, writing in the journal Canadian Literature (2004), 5 acknowledges the 
didacticism of Atwood's dystopia, saying that the book `seems to have a strong message 
about science (specifically genetics)', 6 but protests that it `uses genetic engineering as a 
lightning rod for wrath aimed at the negative outcomes of science in general'. 7 From 
his perspective as a geneticist, Griffiths proceeds robustly to defend genetics as a field 
of science that `has produced better food plants and animals, better clothing, new 
medicines, and new approaches to human disease therapy's (all of which are satirically 
treated in Oryx and Crake). Griffiths then cites rakunk, snat, and wolvog as examples 
of Atwood's misinterpretation of the present state of technology, and asserts that: 
Her misconception can be inferred from her reference to the hybrids as 
"splices". In genetics, what Atwood refers to as splices are called 
transgenics [... ]. Indeed, Atwood makes reference to a transgenic that has 
actually been made, a goat genome into which spider silk genes have been 
inserted in such a way that the silk is secreted into the goat's milk [... ]. 
However, this animal, dubbed a "spoat or gider" is referred to in Oryx and 
Crake as a product of a cross of goat and spider. It certainly did not come 
from a cross, whether a cross is viewed as a mating or some type of forced 
fusion [... ]. The transgenic origin of the real-life spoat is quite different 
from the supposed origin of the impossible hybrids such as rakunks and 
snats. 
(Griffiths 20 )9 
That Griffiths' takes issue with Atwood's `scientific' language, particularly her use of 
`splice' and `cross' as synonymous with `transgenic', is indicative of the text's didactic 
warning having been received, understood, and - significantly - responded to from the 
viewpoint of base-reality genetic science. Oryx and Crake, like all dystopias, blurs the 
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boundaries between the present and the future, between the real world and the fictional 
world; so too the language of dystopia mediates and negotiates the boundaries between 
what is and what could be. In the case of Oryx and Crake, Griffiths' response to the 
novel's provocative fusion of existing language and speculative language represents a 
critical dialogue taking place in that space between fiction and reality, a dialogue which 
affirms and ratifies the didactic power of the text. Crucially, the speculative language 
Atwood employs - splice, in this instance - is sufficiently plausible to induce the 
geneticist's response. As Griffiths notes, `there are no fantastic futuristic technologies 
such as morphing, teleporting, or hyperdrive' in Oryx and Crake, which suggests to him 
that `the genetic examples in the book must be presumed to be possible with technology 
not much more advanced than that which we have at present'. 1° In essence, Griffiths' 
comments here make a clear distinction between the kind of creative neologism that 
typifies `hard' science fiction (see §3.3.1) and the speculative language that typifies 
dystopia: while words such as morphing, teleporting, and hyperdrive signal `fantastic' 
(therefore implausible) technologies, words such as splice signal, for him, that which is 
`presumed to be possible'. 
The language which depicts the `science' viewpoint of the text's `two cultures' 
is throughout the narrative a compound of existing scientific language and 
extrapolations of the same. The naming of the `spoat / gider', for example, which, as 
Griffiths confirms, does actually exist both linguistically and corporeally, validates 
Atwood's subsequent naming of her fictional hybrids. Similarly, existing scientific 
language substantiates speculative scientific language throughout the novel. The 
morpheme bio, for example, a familiar and lexically productive prefix in scientific 
language, yields bioprint (p. 21), hostile bioforms (p. 32), HotBioform (p. 60), bioform- 
proofed (p. 237), biolab (p. 57), biosuits (p. 278), bioterrorism (p. 379) and bio attack 
(p. 382), each of which is responsive to elementary decoding. As happens in real-world 
scientific language, words cross class boundaries: Atwood's recontextualisation splice, 
the noun form of which induced Griffiths' scathing response, functions as a verb 
('splicing against infections' (p. 25)), and also appears in the adjectival position ('their 
single-molecular-layer splicing project' (p. 87)), and is re-nominalised to produce 
`splicers' (p. 404), to name the scientists who develop new splices. Splice, both as noun 
and as verb, it transpires, is central to the plot. The process of `splicing' produces more 
than just hybrid creatures: the virus which wipes out the human population is a 
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`supervirulent splice' (p. 398) created by Crake's `hand-selected' splicers, and encysted 
in the universally popular BlyssPluss Pills. 
Also concomitant with base-reality science is the notion of transforming 
complex scientific concepts into less scientific-sounding language as a means of aiding 
communication for the non-scientist general public. When the spliced virus begins to 
destroy whole communities, the `CorpSeCorps chief declares New New York a disaster 
area' (p. 398), and the media panic escalates, Snowman notes news reporters had `given 
the virus a name, to make it seem more manageable. Its name was JUVE, Jetspeed 
Ultra Virus Extraordinary' (p. 398). Chillingly resonant with base-reality acronyms like 
AIDS and SARS, coined as initialisations of lengthy terms, this process is used to 
`make it seem more manageable' linguistically as well as conceptually. The `scientific' 
neologism and neosemy of Oryx and Crake mimics base-reality processes of word- 
formation and meaning shift. The result is a cogent and acute didactic energy which 
continually alternates the reader's focus from within the narrative to without as s/he 
identifies internal and external referents of the language. The dystopian world of Oryx 
and Crake, however, relies on more than just scientific language in order to achieve its 
didactic purpose: speculative language in the field of marketing and commerce forges 
more direct links with the reader, positioning him or her in the role of consumer of the 
products of scientific development as s/he recognises the distinct links between 
Atwood's language of the future and the language of the present. 
5.2.2 The speculative language of commerce 
The culture of scientific development-led commerce that characterises Atwood's 
depiction of a possible future is revealed and reinforced throughout Oryx and Crake by 
way of a steady accretion of speculative language which names - and thus 
conceptualises -a range of products, services, and consumer goods that have shaped the 
values and expectations of the futuristic society. Often satirical, even to the point of 
pastiche, the language Atwood creates to delineate her market-driven, corporate-funded, 
consumer-oriented fictional world is a disturbingly resonant elaboration of the language 
of her historical spacetime; one that contemporary readers will doubtless recognise. 
The process of word-formation imitates (and, as will be seen, occasionally exaggerates) 
the same process in base-reality. As Peter Stockwell points out: 
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Framing a new concept for a science fiction narrative, and then finding a 
plausible name for it, is the same process as devising a snappy marketable 
name for a newly conceived product. 
(Stockwell 2000: 135) 
Atwood devises `snappy marketable name[s]' for her conceptions to such an extent that 
almost every aspect of life in the future is a branded - or re-branded - extrapolation of 
the developments visible in the contemporary world, from corporate interest and 
funding in education through scientifically developed food and production methods to 
medical and cosmetic enterprise. 
Snowman's fragmented narrative encompasses flashbacks to the early days of 
his friendship with Crake at school, where the two were classmates at `HelthWyzer 
High' (p. 81), a privately run Compound school funded by HelthWyzer, the prestigious 
corporation which employs the boys' parents. Private Compound schools such as these 
are `awash in brilliant genes', while beyond the walls of the Compounds were `those 
dump bins they still called "the public system"' (p. 204). The reflective language 
construction they still called draws attention to the division between the `old' public 
system of education and the `new' selective commercially funded system where the 
emphasis is on educating the pupils in skills which are marketable and economically 
useful in preparation for their anticipated entry into the world of scientific and 
commercial development. The names of the subjects taught at HelthWyzer high include 
Neotechnology (p. 63), Geolonomics (p. 71), Nanotech Biochem (p. 87), and VizArts (p. 
220). The aggregation of familiar morphemes in unfamiliar combinations, clipping, and 
compounding, together with a move towards abbreviation and simplified respelling, 
produce neologisms that typify the kind Atwood employs throughout the novel to depict 
the increasing commercialisation of life. VizArts, for example (which supersedes `Film- 
making and Video Arts, who needed them? ' (p. 220)), equips students to use computer 
animation, digital enhancement techniques, and downloadable software to create 
`whatever they wanted'; Jimmy's contribution to the class is to `put together a naked 
Pride and Prejudice and a naked To the Lighthouse, just for laughs' (ibid). This 
attrition of the Arts is echoed in the language which describes it: Visual Arts is 
abbreviated, compounded, and the [s] of Vis substituted with [z] to produce a reduced, 
snappy, phonetic emulation characteristic of the techniques used in marketing in base- 
reality. A similar technique of reduction and simplification is apparent in the company 
name HelthWyzer: as with VizArts, a semi-phonetic orthography sees [s] replaced with 
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[z] and the unrealised [a] deleted from health. Internal capitalisation marks both 
constructions, a phenomenon which has become more prevalent in marketing and 
branding since the late twentieth century (the Microsoft Corporation's software program 
PowerPoint is one familiar example, and Apple Computers' iPod another). 
The same technique of internal initialisation occurs in the names of the faculties 
at the EduCompound, the Watson-Crick Institute, the commerce- and science-driven 
university at which Crake studies after HelthWyzer High. The JigScape Faculty (p. 
234), NeoGeologicals (p. 235), and NeoAgriculturals (p. 237) develop and produce 
prototype consumer goods which are then patented and marketed. When Jimmy visits 
Crake at Watson-Crick, he is shown `fake rocks' in the grounds, which absorb water 
during periods of high humidity and release it in times of drought; `originally developed 
at Watson-Crick', Crake tells Jimmy, `and now a nice little money-spinner [... ] 
Rockulators was the brand name' (p. 235). Derived from a combination of rock with 
regulator, the branding of the product follows present-day trends in naming new 
products. Watson-Crick is also developing a transgenically mutated food-producing 
unit, which Crake shows to Jimmy: 
What they were looking at was a large bulblike object that seemed to be 
covered with stippled whitish-yellow skin. Out of it came twenty thick 
fleshy tubes, and at the end of each tube another bulb was growing. 
(p. 237) 
This food-production unit, which, to Jimmy, is `like an animal-protein tuber' (ibid) is a 
genetically engineered chicken bred to produce chicken breasts in two weeks, which is 
`a three-week improvement on the most efficient low-light, high-density chicken 
farming operation so far devised' (p. 237); it is also highly lucrative for its developers, 
who `got half the royalties for anything they invented', which, as Crake remarks, is `a 
fierce incentive' (ibid). As with all new products, this requires a new name, and as with 
Atwood's speculative language discussed above, the neologism she uses features 
abbreviation, simplified spelling, and compounding: `ChickieNobs, they're thinking of 
calling the stuff', Crake reports (ibid). Although this neologism may seem to be 
pushing the limits of plausibility and credibility, its formation has established base- 
reality antecedent models upon which to draw, the `McChicken' products from the fast- 
food chain, McDonalds, being just one example. 
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Many of the names of food products in Oryx and Crake reflect similar mass- 
market commercialisation, while the scarcity of naturally occurring foodstuffs resulting 
from environmental degradation is also encapsulated in the branding of food. The 
brand names of SoyOBoyburgers (p. 85), SoyOBoy sardines (p. 273), and CrustaeSoy 
(p. 244), for example, are testament to the shortage of real meat and fish caused by the 
impact of global warming on agriculture. Word-initial and internal capitalisation mark 
these as commercially produced and heavily marketed goods, while soy stew (p. 272), 
soydog (p. 293), and soyafries (p. 370) have become so commonplace that the inclusion 
of soy in the naming of food is perfectly unremarkable to the characters. The 
established use of soy as a habitual pre-modification to the names of foodstuffs in the 
dystopian future world is made clear when Jimmy and Crake graduate from HelthWyzer 
High: at their graduation ceremony, which HelthWyzer liked to do `in the old style, 
with marquees and awnings and the mothers in flowered hats', the catering for the event 
includes `Happicuppa coffee, and little plastic tubs of SoYummie Ice Cream, a 
HelthWyzer Own Brand, in chocolate soy, mango soy, and roasted-dandelion green-tea 
soy' (p. 203). The artificial nature of food is similarly reflected in other unremarked- 
upon products, which include melted butter substitute (p. 76), coconut-style layer cake 
(p. 83), cheesefood (p. 101), and - with irony apparent in the extra-textual world even if 
ostensibly no longer noticeable within it -a can of imitation Spam (p. 179). 
The primary area of investment for the corporate giants is not food, however; 
rather it is in the development of technologies with a medical or pharmaceutical 
application, and equally in the expansion and marketing of products which prevent or 
retard the ageing process and promise physical and mental wellbeing and cosmetic 
perfection. The boundaries between the strictly health-related medical fields and the 
pursuit of immortality have become indistinguishable, and any person with sufficient 
personal wealth expects to be able to purchase either or both. Consequently, 
development scientists pursue both fields indiscriminately: the technology which 
produces multiple organs for transplantation also yields a cure for ageing skin as part of 
the `neuro-regeneration project' (p. 63). Jimmy's father, for instance, moves on from 
Organlnc to `NooSkins [... ] a subsidiary of HelthWyzer' (p. 60), where he works on a 
project where pigoons are used to `develop skin-related technologies' (p. 62). The aim 
of the project is to `find a method of replacing the older epidermis with a fresh one' 
Jimmy's father explains to him; `a genuine start-over skin that would be wrinkle- and 
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blemish-free', and as he remarks, `the rewards in the case of success would be 
enormous' (p. 62). The name of the company - NooSkins - is also the name of the 
product, and features in its marketing: `NooSkins for Olds, said the snappy logo' (pp. 
62-63). 
The tendency towards orthographic simplification, compounding while retaining 
the original word-initial capitalisation, and near-phonetic representation seen in the 
branding of foods is repeated here in NooSkins. These features recur throughout the 
names of companies and their products: the Fountain of Yooth Total Plunge (p. 205), 
for example, is a beauty treatment which, according to Jimmy, `rasped off your entire 
epidermis' (ibid), AnooYoo is the `minor Compound' where Jimmy is employed to work 
on `the promotionals' (p. 288), CryoJeenyus specialises in cryogenic storage of the 
wealthy deceased in anticipation of their later `resurrection' (p. 264), and the 
RejoovenEsense Compound (known familiarly as the Rejoov Compound) is the location 
of Crake's eugenic Paradice project (p. 178). In the case of NooSkins, Yooth, AnooYoo, 
and RejoovenEsense (or Rejoov), the phoneme /u: /, which is variously realised as <ew>, 
<ou>, and <u> in present-day orthography, appears as <oo> consistently, which is 
satirically suggestive of the reductive emphasis of the marketing of the future, and 
arguably an extrapolation of the move towards phonetic spelling seen in current 
company names such as Vodafone (fone rather than phone) and Reebok (where the 
standard spelling is rhebok). Similarly, in repeatedly including internal capitalisation 
Atwood echoes the present day trend seen in some company names: eBay, FedEx 
(which, like VizArts, is clipped), and GlaxoSmithKline, for example. 
Any suggestion of cynicism in the naming of the commercial science-run culture 
of the future is doubtless deliberate: Jimmy, as a `word person' is regarded as inferior 
by the scientists, and his narrative is characterised by sardonic references to the trivial 
status of the now-debased Arts in comparison to the Sciences. The subordinated status 
of `word people' in the future world is exemplified by Crake's manner of introducing 
Jimmy to other scientists when he visits the Watson-Crick Institute: "`This is Jimmy, 
the neurotypical"' (p. 239); while the polarisation of the `two cultures' is emphasised by 
Jimmy's observation that, at Watson-Crick, `Crake's fellow students [... ] referred to 
other students in their own faculties as conspecifics, and to all other human beings as 
nonspecifics' (p. 245). As a word person, Jimmy is employed in the Compounds 
because of his skills in writing creative advertising campaigns and persuasive marketing 
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materials, yet he is acutely aware of the deceitful nature of the language he uses to sell 
the products of science. He recalls, for instance, when he worked at the AnooYoo 
Compound that he noticed his hair thinning, `despite the six-week AnooYoo follicle- 
regrowth course he'd done'. The disingenuousness of the product's claims are revealed 
in his subsequent comment that he `ought to have known it was a scam - he'd put 
together the ads for it - but they were such good ads he'd convinced even himself (p. 
296). Jimmy is prepared for a life of `wordmongering' (p. 342) by his `Problematics 
courses' at the Martha Graham Academy, which include `Applied Logic, Applied 
Rhetoric, Medical Ethics and Terminology, Applied Semantics, Relativistics and 
Advanced Mischaracterization, Comparative Cultural Psychology, and the rest' (p. 
221), courses which enable him to participate in the culture of science, even if 
peripherally. Working at AnooYoo, `cranking out the verbiage', Jimmy recalls 
spending `ten-hour days wandering the labyrinths of the thesaurus' (p. 291) and 
producing advertising copy for: 
Cosmetic creams, workout equipment, Joltbars to build your muscle-scape 
into a breathtaking marvel of sculpted granite. Pills to make you fatter, 
thinner, hairier, balder, whiter, browner, blacker, yellower, sexier, and 
happier. It was his task to describe and extol, to present the vision of what - 
oh so easily! - could come to be. 
(p. 291) 
The influential and far-reaching hegemony of science - and especially the language of 
science - is evident in Jimmy's admission that: 
Once in a while he'd make up a word - tensicity, fibracionous, 
pheromonimal - but he never once got caught out. His proprietors liked 
those kinds of words in the small print on packages because they sounded 
scientific and had a convincing effect. 
(pp. 291-292) 
Jimmy's recognition of the persuasive power of language contributes to the novel's 
didacticism, since he exposes the potential for duplicity and equivocation in the 
language of advertising and marketing (seen in his comment `[h]e loved those two 
words: practically, almost' (p. 298), for instance). More specifically, however, as 
shown by his remark that if words `sounded scientific' they `had a convincing effect', 
Jimmy draws attention to the supposed authority of scientific language within the limits 
of the text. By constructing the dystopian world in the terms of analogous speculative 
scientific-commercial language, Atwood simultaneously draws the reader's attention to 
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the same phenomenon in the world outside the limits of the text: her speculative 
language is, like the dystopian near future she depicts, extrapolated from trends visible 
in her historical spacetime. 
In recognising both the dominion of science and the power of language, Jimmy, 
like other dystopian protagonists, is positioned close enough to the controlling 
structures of power to be informed, yet detached enough to avoid being drawn in. He 
also, like the other protagonists - Winston Smith, Offred, Jael 97, for example - is the 
novel's bilingual character, conversant with both speculative and reflective language; he 
understands both the language of the future and the language of the past. In a 
conversation with Crake, Jimmy comments on his friend's pondering of humankind's 
`imperfectly monogamous' characteristics. Unknown to Jimmy, Crake is already 
designing a genetically engineered super-race who would have `no more sexual 
torment' and `would never want someone [they] can't have' (p. 195). "`But think what 
we'd be giving up"' Jimmy replies, and continues: 
"Courtship behaviour. In your plan we'd just be a bunch of hormone 
robots. " Jimmy thought he should put things in Crake's terms, which was 
why he said courtship behaviour. What he meant was the challenge, the 
excitement, the chase. 
(p. 196) 
That Jimmy has the competence to `put things in Crake's terms' illustrates his bilingual 
ability. His understanding of the language of science, however, is less important to 
Jimmy than his understanding of the language of the long-distant past: `old words [... ] 
of a precision and suggestiveness that no longer had a meaningful application in today's 
world' (p. 230). §5.3.2 examines Jimmy's - or Snowman's - collection of old words, 
or reflections on the past; in advance of that, I consider linguistic reflections of the 
present (that is to say, Atwood's historical spacetime) in Oryx and Crake. 
5.3.1 Reflections of the present: `pointless repinings' 
Reflective language - the language that identifies the author's historical spacetime, and 
positions it as the past from the perspective of the future - occurs entirely in Snowman- 
Jimmy's consciousness, since the narrative is focalised wholly through this one 
character; no other narrative voice mediates. As with Offred's reflective language in 
Atwood's earlier dystopia, The Handmaid's Tale (see §4.5), the focus is on personal 
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recollections, but the reader learns more about the dominant cultural ideology of the 
controlling powers in Oryx and Crake than is the case in The Handmaid's Tale. The 
ascendancy of the culture of science and commerce is richly detailed through 
Snowman's reminiscences when compared to the limited knowledge Offred has of the 
controlling theocracy of Gilead, although, like Offred's, Snowman's narrative has the 
immediacy of first-person experience. The post-apocalypse sections of the novel are 
narrated in the present tense, while Snowman's memories of the events of his life prior 
to the disaster are narrated in a more conventional simple past tense. 
As with other dystopias considered in this study, reflective language typically 
occurs in the absence of books: in the future Atwood envisages, `[b]etter libraries [... ] 
had long ago burned their actual books and kept everything on CD-ROM' (p. 229), and 
knowledge of history is influenced by the internet and computer games. As adolescents, 
Jimmy and Crake play `for a whole month', a game called `Barbarian Stomp (See If 
You Can Change History! )' in which a player may trade a `human atrocity' for a 
`human achievement' ('one Mona Lisa equalled Bergen-Belsen, one Armenian 
genocide equalled the Ninth Symphony plus three Great Pyramids') (pp. 88-90). While 
knowledge of history is not restricted or proscribed as in some dystopian fictions, it is 
deprecated, distorted, and reduced to trivia by the far-reaching influence of computer 
games and the internet, which are figured as at least as definitive of character, and as 
psychologically formative, as parental or societal input. Language is not subject to 
overt control in Atwood's twenty-first century dystopia; however, only the language of 
science - and the scientists - has legitimacy and prestige. By becoming the dominant 
mode of discourse, scientific language has displaced literary, poetic, or otherwise 
artistic language, and has replaced it with functional, unyielding, precise discourse. 
The cultural move towards the Sciences and away from the Arts is played out 
against a background of increasing environmental disintegration, which Atwood hints 
may be the inevitable result of privileging science over nature. Global warming and the 
depleted ozone layer mean that venturing outdoors without adequate sunscreen is 
hazardous, and violent storms strike daily. These changed climatic conditions are 
emphasised by reflective language: the noon sun is so hot that Snowman is `sweating so 
hard he can almost hear it' (p. 44) and, while seeking shade, he notes `the sun is at full 
glare; the zenith, it used to be called' (ibid). A similar instance of reflective language 
marks the collapse of seasonal variation in the damaged world of the future: when 
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recalling Crake's arrival at HelthWyzer High, Snowman remembers it was `in 
September or October, one of those months that used to be called autumn' (p. 81). As 
seen in other dystopian fictions discussed in chapter four, this pattern of reflective 
language relies on the existence of a bilingual character to act as interpreter / translator 
between the language of the future and the language of the past. Also as seen in those 
other dystopias, a model of presentation recurs in relation to this kind of reflective 
language: the narrator negotiates the temporal boundaries between the language of his 
or her present (the reader's future) and the language of the narrative past (the reader's 
present). So while the reader is familiar with the words and what they denote - here, 
autumn, and zenith - the narrative defamiliarises and destabilises the denotation by 
claiming that it no longer exists in the future. The same characteristic verb-group 
construction - used to be called - marks both nouns here, and carries the implicature 
that, in the dystopian future, the concepts are no longer `called' anything at all, since 
they no longer are. 
The proposition that words can `represent' a certain era is one that is axiomatic 
within the genre of dystopia. Just as Offred's narrative draws the reader's attention to 
language symbolic of the 1970s and 1980s (networking, humungous, and zilch in 
particular; see §4.5), Snowman's post-disaster musings return him to language 
emblematic of his teenage years, spent largely playing computer games and surfing the 
internet with Crake. The words upon which he focuses - awesome and bogus, for 
example - are generation-specific slang variations of existing language adopted by the 
teenage generation of the base-reality late 1980s and 1990s. Bogus, Snowman recalls, 
was a word `he'd got [... ] off an old DVD', and which he and Crake would use `to tear 
each other down for being pompous. "Way too bogus! "' (p. 88). Awesome, similarly, 
`was another old word, like bogus, that he'd dredged out of the DVD archives' (p. 95). 
That the relatively recent (in real-world terms) technology that produced DVDs is 
described as `old' and stored in `archives' signals temporal dislocation in itself, but the 
insight the reader gains from seeing fashionable language of his or her base-reality 
being presented as outdated is abundantly disquieting. Awesome, `in trivial use, as an 
enthusiastic term of commendation; `marvellous', `great'; stunning, mind-boggling. 
slang' appears in the Oxford English Dictionary in this particular sense with illustrative 
quotations dating from 1980 onwards; bogus, a more recently adopted colloquialism, 
while appearing in unattested online slang dictionaries as a feature of 1980s culture, 
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does not appear in this sense in the OED at all. Both terms, bogus and awesome, were 
popularised by the (1988) film Bill and Ted's Excellent Adventure, directed by Stephen 
Herek, and starring Keanu Reeves and Alex Winter in the title roles. Since DVD 
players - and films on DVD - did not become available until the mid-1990s, it is likely 
that Herek's film would be one of the earliest available in this format. 
In alluding to popular culture of the later twentieth century, Atwood's reflective 
language depends on a level of intertextuality between the cultural artefacts of the base- 
reality recent present and the perception of the same in the dystopian future. These 
intertexts, while employed satirically in Oryx and Crake, crucially identify the author's 
historical spacetime as the dis-placed, re-placed precursor to the horrors of the future. 
Once again, Snowman's recollections best exemplify this. He remembers, in his `Life 
Skills' class at `junior high', where he studied such areas as `banking by fingertip [... ] 
negotiating your own marriage-and-divorce contracts, [and] wise genetic match- 
making' (p. 47), the teacher had been: 
[A] shambling neo-con reject from the heady days of the legendary dot. com 
bubble, back in prehistory. He'd had a stringy ponytail stuck to the back of 
his balding head, and a faux-leather jacket; he'd worn a gold stud in his 
bumpy, porous old nose, and had pushed self-reliance and individualism and 
risk-taking in a hopeless tone, as if even he no longer believed in them. 
Once in a while he'd come out with some hoary maxim, served up with a 
wry irony that did nothing to reduce the boredom quotient; or else he'd say, 
"I coulda been a contender, " then glare meaningfully at the class as if there 
was some deeper-than-deep point they were all supposed to get. 
(p. 46-47) 
Snowman's typically wry and mordant tone is apparent in the reflective language of `the 
legendary dot. com bubble, back in prehistory'; prehistory is clearly droll overstatement; 
the legendary dot. com bubble, however, is not. While legendary suggests an 
indeterminate time has elapsed since this phenomenon, dot. com bubble is located in a 
distinctly defined temporal moment: 1997-2001 circumscribes the period of rapid 
growth and investment in internet-based companies, and the subsequent collapse of the 
market. This linguistic construction, dot. com bubble, defines a specific phenomenon 
which occurred in a localised, delimited time, one that is - at least for contemporary 
readers - cognitively available within living memory. It is also within living memory of 
the teacher, whose `bumpy, porous old nose' (as it is described by Snowman) suggests 
that he has aged considerably since the dot. com stock-market rise and crash. His 
advocacy of the future-outdated concepts, `self-reliance and individualism and risk- 
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taking', further demonstrates connections with the author's historical spacetime, since 
these concepts are no longer valid in the dystopian future. Atwood's pastiche of the 
teacher as a washed-out, hopeless renegade also links, by way of `dated' language, to its 
intertext in the author's historical spacetime: the teacher's futile "I coulda been a 
contender" references the classic (1954) film, On the Waterfront, directed by Elia Kazan 
and starring Marlon Brando as a failed ex-prizefighter whose memorable lines `you 
don't understand. I could have had class. I could have been a contender. I could have 
been somebody' have become celebrated and often-quoted in Atwood's historical 
spacetime. Thus, the construction `I coulda been a contender' is as linguistically bound 
to the second half of the twentieth century as `dot. com bubble' is bound to the years 
around the turn of the century. 
The reflective language considered here symbolises the reflections of the 
author's historical spacetime that typify dystopia. Signalling the temporal co-ordinates 
of the genesis of the thought-experiment that considers, as Atwood notes, what if?, this 
language locates the beginnings of the dystopian nightmare in the contemporary 
world. " Awesome, bogus, and dot. com bubble define the era just preceding the 
millennium, while I coulda been a contender indicates an era reaching a little further 
back into the twentieth century. Autumn and zenith, while stretching back considerably 
further etymologically, have meaning only outside of the dystopian world. As noted at 
the beginning of chapter three, the reader's perception of the socio-historical 
circumstances in which the dystopian fiction originates may be affected by the passage 
of time, thus varying the emphasis of either speculative or reflective language (see 
§3.2). At the time of writing (2006), the publication of Oryx and Crake (2003) is 
virtually cotemporaneous, so the base-reality referents of Atwood's reflective language 
are as visible to the current reader as to the author, and largely coincide with the same 
referents as seen from the perspective of the author's historical spacetime. Reflective 
language which is less temporally bound looks back into the more distant past from the 
point of view of the author's historical spacetime to supply reflections on that past. 
From the future-based dystopian perspective, this is a distant past at a further remove - 
perhaps best conceptualised as a more distant past. From the perspective of the reader 
of dystopia, here, specifically the reader of Oryx and Crake, this temporal kaleidoscope 
positions him or her as an intermediary between the future and the past, as s/he 
assimilates the language of the past as it is presented from the perspective of the future, 
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while simultaneously being aware that this the language of his or her own past. As with 
the reflections of the present detailed above, reflections on the past foreground and 
defamiliarise language, and draw the reader's attention particularly to words as 
`containers' of meaning. In Oryx and Crake, the language reflecting the distant past is 
in danger of disappearing altogether. 
5.3.2 Reflections on a Golden Age: `Hang on to the words' 
Science has adopted new linguistic formulations of the old facts, and now that 
we have become at home in the new dialect, certain traits of the old one are 
no longer binding upon us. 
Benjamin Whorf (1940) 'Linguistics as an Exact Science' 
Science dominates the society Atwood delineates; the culture of science is enabled by 
the authority of its language, and the authority of its language is empowered by the 
culture of science. This symmetrical and self-perpetuating reciprocation of power and 
prestige excludes and continually diminishes other, non-scientific language. Language, 
in this future world, is not valued for aesthetic reasons; its purpose is exactitude and 
functionality rather than elegance and artistry. The polarisation of these two modes of 
discourse, or what Locke terms their antithesis, 12 is mirrored by the depiction of the 
`two cultures' in Atwood's dystopia, with Snowman-Jimmy's language inclining 
predominantly to the aesthetic, and Crake's tending primarily to the systematic and 
functional. A conversation between the two demonstrates the depth of the cultural 
schism: when Crake - still secretly planning his genetically engineered `perfect' race - 
complains of the imperfections of humanity, Jimmy's response is to ask "`Well, what 
about art? [... ] It's been an inspiration [... ]. Think of all the poetry - think Petrarch, 
think John Donne, think the Vita Nuova, think ... "' (p. 196). He continues: 
When any civilisation is dust and ashes [... ] art is all that's left over. 
Images, words, music. Imaginative structures. Meaning - human meaning, 
that is - is defined by them. You have to admit that. 
(p. 197) 
Crake's logical scientific approach to the locus of `human meaning' is explicitly in the 
rational and empirical domain. His response to Jimmy's argument is to claim that: 
The archeologists are just as interested in gnawed bones and old bricks and 
ossified shit these days. Sometimes more interested. They think human 
meaning is defined by those things too. 
(p. 197) 
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One of Snowman's later recollections is of discovering that Crake, as head of the 
`Paradice Project' at the RejoovenEsense Compound, has succeeded in genetically 
engineering a race of `perfect' hominids, the `Children of Crake', or `Crakers'. These 
disease-resistant creations, who survive the destruction of humanity, are Snowman's 
only companions in the post-catastrophe world. Their linguistic competence, however, 
is limited: as Snowman notes, on first encountering the Crakers, `these people didn't go 
in for fancy language: they hadn't been taught evasion, euphemism, lily-gilding. In 
speech they were plain and blunt' (p. 406). Crake's scientifically generated race is 
intricately designed with a range of enhanced features which facilitate continued 
survival in ecologically hostile conditions - the Crakers eat grass, leaves, and berries, 
procreate without emotional involvement, and reach maturity rapidly, for example - yet 
they are also deliberately designed without any aesthetic ability or appreciation. Indeed, 
the opposite is true: Crake's scientifically utopian intention is to circumvent art and 
what he believes are the consequences of art. Snowman recalls: 
Watch out for art, Crake used to say. As soon as they start doing art, we're 
in trouble. Symbolic thinking of any kind would signal downfall in Crake's 
view. Next they'd be inventing idols, and funerals, and grave goods, and 
the afterlife, and sin, and Linear B, and kings, and then slavery and war. 
(p. 420) [original emphasis] 
Art - or symbolic thinking - it seems, from Crake's purview, is more deleterious to 
civilisation than science - or rational thinking. However, having become cynical and 
embittered with his world, and especially what he perceives as the imperfection and 
inadequacy of humankind, his response is to eradicate this `flawed' humanity and 
replace it with a fresh, carefully adapted, non-artistic new species. In so doing, one of 
his aims is to erase history, and to reinscribe it, this time, without art. While Crake 
looks back to earlier times and perceives a developmental correlative from `Linear B' 
leading in incremental stages to `slavery and war', Jimmy looks back to earlier times as 
a Golden Age, when art - as language - did enjoy the `meaningful application' and 
`precision' (p. 230) that, in the pre-apocalypse present, is only accorded to science. 
When Jimmy - now Snowman - finds himself the only human survivor of the 
civilisation destroyed by science, he is the sole repository of art. This art takes the form 
of his collection of old words, culled from `the more obscure regions of the library 
stacks' at the Martha Graham Academy, a library too poorly funded to transfer all of its 
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books to CD-ROM. `Part of what impelled him' to collect all this `arcane lore' is, he 
notes, `stubbornness; resentment, even' at the inequality of a society which `had filed 
him among the rejects' (p. 229). In addition, his accumulation of archaic language is 
his personal act of resistance against the hegemonic power of science; his rebellion 
against a system and a society that considers these words - and word people - 
inconsequential and anachronistic. Jimmy explains: 
[W]hat he was studying was considered - at the decision-making levels, the 
levels of real power - an archaic waste of time. Well then, he would pursue 
the superfluous as an end in itself. He would be its champion, its defender 
and preserver. 
(p. 229) 
The `lists of old words' (p. 230) Jimmy compiles are symbols of a culture of art which 
the culture of science has rendered redundant; as remnants of an outmoded way of life, 
these words he treasures no longer have a function. Even so, words such as lodestone, 
the archaic term for magnetite, feature on Jimmy's lists. While such words may once 
have had an application in the field of early science, they are dispensable to scientists 
(both in the present and in the proposed future), since scientific language moves on and 
develops in parallel with its own continuing development: the terminology of science, 
once superseded by more advanced discovery, names the new concept and discards the 
old. But to Jimmy, as a word person, old words still have value: he `memorized these 
hoary locutions' and `developed a strangely tender feeling towards such words, as if 
they were children abandoned in the forest and it was his duty to rescue them' (ibid). 
Memories, moods, and milestones for Jimmy are inextricably linked to his 
collection of words. Like Offred in The Handmaid's Tale, who muses on old words 
from her previous life, Jimmy measures and constructs his life around words. Just as 
Offred says (of her contemplations on words and their meanings) `[t]hese are the kinds 
of litanies I use, to compose myself (The Handmaid's Tale, p. 120), so Jimmy 
composes himself by way of words: `he'd turn off the sound, whisper words to himself. 
Succulent. Morphology. Purblind. Quarto. Frass. It had a calming effect' (p. 401). 
Language is deeply sensual for Jimmy. Thinking back to his passionate affair with 
Oryx before the virus destroyed all, for example, he recalls her kissing him. `Unguent, 
unctuous, sumptuous, voluptuous, salacious, lubricious, delicious, went the inside of 
Jimmy's head. He sank down into the words, into the feelings' (p. 372). For Jimmy, it 
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is `comforting to remember that Homo sapiens sapiens was once so ingenious with 
language' (p. 114). 
Throughout the flashback sections of the narrative, Jimmy charts his life through 
his relationship with words, often making an explicit connection between the language 
and the experience. When he recalls, for example, his depression and disillusionment 
following his mother's execution for treason (on suspicion of having divulged classified 
scientific information), he traces his descent into despondence by way of language: 
Everything in his life was temporary, ungrounded. Language itself had lost 
its solidity; it had become thin, contingent, slippery, a viscid film on which 
he was sliding around like an eyeball on a plate. An eyeball that could still 
see, however. That was the trouble. 
(pp. 305-306) 
At his lowest point - `the worst nights' - Jimmy almost loses faith in his collection of 
words: 
[O]nce in bed he'd stare at the ceiling, telling over his lists of obsolete 
words for the comfort that was in them. Dibble. Aphasia. Breast plough. 
Enigma. Gat [... ]. Knell. Kern. Alack But there was no longer any 
comfort in the words. There was nothing in them. It no longer delighted 
Jimmy to possess these small collections of letters that other people had 
forgotten about. It was like having his own baby teeth in a box. 
(p. 307) 
Later, in the early post-disaster days, when he is at his most optimistic, and his instinct 
for self-preservation is strong, he reminds himself he must "`Hang on to the words"', 
since, as the only surviving recorder of this archaic language - `odd words, the old 
words, the rare ones. Valance. Norn. Serendipity. Pibroch. Lubricious' - he must act 
as their custodian. `When they're gone out of his head, these words', he reminds 
himself, `they'll be gone everywhere, forever' (p. 78). Yet, subsequently, when he is 
becoming weakened by `slowly starving to death', he realises the lack of protein is 
causing him to become confused. Losing his mind, for Jimmy, is measured by losing 
his `words': 
[H]e has a vision of the top of his neck, opening up into his head like a 
bathroom drain. Fragments of words are swirling down it, in a grey liquid 
he realizes is his dissolving brain. 
(p. 175) 
Although Jimmy briefly considers teaching the Crakers his treasured words when he 
finds them still alive in the Paradice Compound soon after the chemical disaster takes 
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hold - he could, he muses, `[l]eave a legacy of knowledge. Pass on all my words' (p. 
396) - he quickly realises their primitive development would preclude this option, and 
concludes there is `[n]o hope there' (ibid). Despite the fact the Crakers do not yet 
understand metaphor (p. 112), they are quickly developing a rudimentary culture of art 
of their own: they make idols and an effigy (p. 418), musical instruments (p. 419), and 
begin to deify the now-dead Oryx and Crake. Their fundamental language and 
understanding expand as they question one another, and question Snowman. In essence, 
despite Crake's careful design, a culture of art begins to reassert itself naturally in this 
uncultured primitive post-apocalyptic civilisation. 
In the dystopian future Jimmy inhabits, `all the entries on his cherished wordlists' 
(p. 43) are `obsolete' (p. 307); none has currency or application. However, many of the 
words he gathers are still an active and meaningful part of the lexicon of the author's 
historical spacetime, and, by extension, the reader's. Of those quoted above, succulent, 
enigma, valance, and serendipity, for example, are familiar and present in the 
contemporary English language. Others, however, are more archaic or less used. The 
entire catalogue of Jimmy's wordlists is listed below, together with the date of first 
recorded use of each, as it appears in the Oxford English Dictionary: 
Valance (1463), Norn (1450), Serendipity (1754), Pibroch (1719), Lubricious 
(1583), Mephitic (1623), Metronome (1816), Mastitis (1827), Metatarsal (1702), 
Maudlin (c1300), Dibble (1450), Aphasia (1867), Breast plough (1725), 
Enigma (1539), Gat (1723), Knell (c961), Kern (1351), Alack (1480), Berating 
(1548), Bemoaning (c1000), Doldrums (1811), Lovelorn (1634), Leman (1205), 
Forsaken (1305), Queynt (1225), Unguent (1440), Unctuous (1387), Sumptuous 
(1485), Voluptuous (1374), Salacious (1645), Delicious (c1300), Fungible 
(1818), Pullulate (1619), Pistic (1646), Cerements (1602), Trull (1519), 
Prattlement (1579), Opsimath (1883), Concatention (1603), Subfusc (1763), 
Grutch (1225), Windlestraw (1513), Laryngeal (1795), Banshee (1771), Woad 
(c1000), Succulent (1601), Morphology (1828), Purblind (1297), Quarto (1589), 
Frass (1600), Wheelwright (1281), Lodestone (1515), Saturnine (1433), 
Adamant (885) [italicisation reproduced from text]. 
It is immediately obvious that these are predominantly `old' words. That is to say, the 
earliest record sourced by the editors of the OED (which is taken as an approximate 
indication of when the word first entered the language) is, in every case, before the end 
of the nineteenth century. The oldest recorded is adamant, with an illustrative quotation 
dating from 885, while the most recent, opsimath, dates from 1885. Some - alack, for 
instance - are classified `archaic or poetic', while others are simply categorised 
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`archaic' (leman: `beloved, sweetheart', for instance). Others which first appeared in 
the language centuries ago - voluptuous, delicious, and sumptuous being examples - 
have remained operative in English over time. A distinct temporal division is apparent 
between the speculative language of Oryx and Crake and the reflective language of the 
novel: all of the listed words Jimmy `rescues' pre-date the beginning of the twentieth 
century in origin, while none of the language which describes the human genome 
project - either real or invented - existed before the twentieth century. Oryx and Crake 
was published, as Howells points out, `on the fiftieth anniversary of Crick and Watson's 
discovery of the structure of DNA and in the same year that the entire human genome 
was sequenced' (2006: 163). Consequently, the scientific language which describes 
these developments began to emerge from around the middle part of the twentieth 
century, and continues to develop today. 
The full list of Jimmy's precious words, to the contemporary reader, is a 
combination of both familiar and unfamiliar words, some known, and some unknown. 
Importantly, the reader is given to understand that all of these words are unfamiliar and 
unknown in the world of the future, except to Snowman-Jimmy. As with the reflective 
language which reflects the author's historical spacetime (as discussed in §5.3.1 above 
and chapter four), much of this language represents that which used to be called, or they 
used to say, when viewed from the perspective of the contemporary reader. One of the 
most powerful didactic warnings of the text is that so much of the language the reader's 
familiar base-reality language could be lost to the lexicon in a science- and commerce- 
dominated future: the almost exponential neologisation practices in these fields have the 
potential to dominate language; to overwhelm and subordinate the non-scientific; that is 
to say, the literary and the poetic. 
5.4 The future meets the past: `old neurological pathways die hard' 
In the twentieth century our world is shaped by science. It is only reasonable 
then that our atavistic urges to escape must deal with science. But science 
and atavism are enemies. Science allows no retreating in time, and insists on 
contemplating the consequences of actions. 
Scholes and Rabkin (1977) Science Fiction: History, Science, Vision 
The `two cultures theme' of Oryx and Crake is illustrated through cultures separated by 
walls; cultures separated by wealth, class, and education; cultures separated by cerebral- 
hemisphere-determined aptitudes. But nowhere is this cultural division so pronounced 
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as it is in the depiction of two cultures separated by language. Atwood's speculative 
language constructs an appalling and deficient future, while her reflective language re- 
visits a temperate and sufficient past. The dystopian temporal illusion means, of course, 
this past is the reader's present and recent past, rather than the distant past the text 
declares it to be, while the fictional future is just one realisation out of innumerable 
possible directions in which the world could evolve. Oryx and Crake, as is typical of 
dystopia, conflates these temporal dimensions into one narrative present which 
examines trends emerging in the author's historical spacetime and demonstrates the 
consequences if these tendencies continue unchecked. Just as the past and future merge 
into a narrative present in dystopia, so the language of the past and the language of the 
future co-occur within the temporal aspect of the narrative. Thus far, this study has 
created an artificial separation of these linguistic dimensions: chapter three considered 
speculative language, chapter four examined reflective language, and the foregoing 
discussion of Atwood's novel divides speculative and reflective language along cultural 
lines. However, in Oryx and Crake, as in all the dystopian fictions included in this 
study, neither speculative language nor reflective language functions in isolation. 
Indeed, the interanimation and juxtaposition of dystopia's `two languages' creates the 
tension and energy which drives the narrative and sustains its didactic force. 
As Scholes and Rabkin note, in the epigraph which heads this section, science 
and atavism are antagonistic, temporally exclusive objectives, since science pushes 
relentlessly forwards while atavism yearns for a return to an earlier time. This conflict 
is played out thematically in Oryx and Crake as scientific advances transmute the 
fundamental composition of humanity and other organisms, while non-scientists look on 
in horror at the aberration of nature, the vacuous artifice of life according to the new 
scientific principles. Science is portrayed as violating moral and ethical boundaries in 
its haste to refine and re-define the essential genetic constituents of being, especially 
when impelled by financial investment and reward. The atavistic impulse of the text, 
meanwhile, retreats to a past where the essential genetic code of the natural world is 
unadulterated, food is more than `junk-gene cardboard' (p. 273), and `word people' are 
valued as highly as their `numbers' counterparts. As the foregoing discussions have 
demonstrated, these divided, now-incompatible cultures are marked by different 
languages: speculative language delineates the culture of science, while reflective 
language reaches back in time to reclaim the culture of the arts. Throughout the novel, 
203 
these two languages interact but never integrate: the relationship between the two is 
always contrapuntal; each acts as a foil for the other, contrasting and emphasising the 
discord and antithesis of the two cultures. Both the speculative language Atwood 
creates, and the reflective language she (re)covers, act to nurture an illusion: the 
speculative language of the novel does not exist, but the text makes the claim that it 
does; the reflective language of the novel, on the other hand, does exist, but the text 
makes the claim that it does not. Neither element of this paradox is true outside of the 
boundaries of the text: consequently the reader is positioned as an intermediary, 
continually negotiating a route through this complex linguistic disordering of the 
unfamiliar made familiar and the familiar made unfamiliar, experiencing the continual 
clash and contrast of cognitive estrangement. 
Crucially, both linguistic strands of dystopia are bound directly to the reader's 
own language. Atwood's speculative language never loses sight of the language of 
base-reality; it never fails to adhere to the `principle of limited novelty', and is thus 
decodable on the same terms that real-world scientific language is decodable. Her 
reflective language, while claiming obsolete status within the text, is, of course, nothing 
more or less than the language of the reader's base-reality. The reader, in his or her 
position as intermediary, encounters each as a foregrounded entity: speculative language 
because of its novelty, and reflective language because of its defamiliarisation. This 
foregrounding is central to an understanding of the ways in which these doubled 
languages of dystopia contribute to the reader's process of (re)cognition, since this 
(re)cognition is essentially Whorfian in nature. Considering each of the stages of 
Whorfianism-as-process identified in chapter two, it becomes possible to see the ways 
in which reading dystopian fiction - more specifically here, reading Oryx and Crake - 
engenders a renewed awareness of language and world-view, through which the reader 
may (re)cognise the world beyond the fiction. 
As noted in chapter two, Whorf was at pains first of all to establish the habitual 
nature of language; to establish the idea that our own conception of our world-view is so 
indivisibly bound into our habitual language that it remains customarily unnoticed. The 
habitual world of `linguistically conditioned features of our own culture' is one with 
which we have, Whorf notes, `a deeply ingrained familiarity' (1956: 152). This 
familiarity, or automaticity of language functions in two distinct but related ways in 
respect of reading dystopian fiction. Firstly, as with `normal' spoken language, so with 
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`normal' narrative language: just as our perceptions are neither challenged nor brought 
into consciousness in the routine, ordinary course of language use, so the standard, 
unmarked descriptive narrative prose which surrounds instances of speculative and 
reflective language invites the reader's own habitual, automised response. Secondly, 
the characters' own use of language is presented as habitual, even where that includes 
speculative language with which the reader is unfamiliar. Whorf understood 
automaticity as the first hurdle to be overcome in recognising that other languages may 
encode reality differently, and, as he suggests, this is problematic chiefly `because of the 
difficulty of standing aside from our own language, which is a habit and a cultural non 
est disputandum, and scrutinizing it objectively' (1956: 138). When reading dystopian 
fictions, however, even if the reader does not initially recognise his or her own use of 
language as being automatised, s/he is confronted by automaticity in undeniable form 
within the text, as characters habitually use their own automatised language. Just as the 
narrator of Rand's Anthem habitually uses the plural pronoun to refer to the self as an 
individual (see §2.2.2), so Crake, the scientist of Oryx and Crake uses scientific 
language habitually - much of which is speculatively constructed. 
In drawing attention to the normative, habitual nature of language in this way, 
Oryx and Crake denies, for the reader, the possibility of an automised reading: that is to 
say, the languages of Oryx and Crake, both speculative and reflective, conspicuously 
act as what Whorf describes as `an interruption of [the] regularity [of our natural 
language]' (1956: 209). This is equivalent to the second stage of Whorfianism-as- 
process, which necessitates some cognition that there may be language which 
`packages' reality differently. Whorf's description of this process in his exploration of 
natural languages perhaps best explains these phenomena: 
The participants in a given world view are not aware of the idiomatic nature 
of the channels in which their talking and thinking run, and are perfectly 
satisfied with them, regarding them as logical inevitables. But take an 
outsider, a person accustomed to widely different language and culture, or 
even a scientist of a later era using somewhat different language of the same 
basic type, and not all that seems logical and inevitable to the participants in 
the given world seems so to him. 
(Whorf 1956: 222) 
The reader of Oryx and Crake is positioned, in relation to the world of the text, as the 
`outsider' to whom Whorf refers. They may not, as Whorf suggests, initially be `aware 
of the idiomatic nature of the channels in which their talking and thinking run', but 
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upon encountering the `widely different language and culture' of the dystopian world, 
there is a realisation that `not all that seems logical and inevitable to the participants [for 
which, read `characters'] in the given world [for which read `dystopian world'] seems 
so to him [for which read `the reader']. Of more direct relevance to the particular text 
under consideration in this chapter, Whorf notes that the `outsider' effect could also 
apply to `a scientist of a later era using a somewhat different language of the same basic 
type'. Oryx and Crake reverses this positioning somewhat: the `scientist of a later era', 
rather than being analogously the reader-as-outsider, is the character, Crake, so it is the 
task of the reader to decode his `language of the same basic type' rather than the task of 
scientist himself. However, the same fundamental parameters apply: the reader-outsider 
encounters the language of the character-insider(s), and is compelled to realise that his 
or her own `channels of thinking' are being challenged and defamiliarised by the 
linguistic indications of the text. As Whorf notes elsewhere, in encountering `exotic 
language' we are `pushed willy-nilly out of our ruts' of habitual thought (1956: 138). 
The third stage of Whorfianism-as-process is, as noted in chapter two, to 
examine the alternatively constructed world-views encoded in the alien language(s). 
Through the study of `an exotic language', Whorf claims, `we find the exotic language 
is a mirror held up to our own' (1956: 138). The English-speaking reader of dystopian 
fiction written in English cannot read the text without assimilating numerous examples 
of `exotic' language: s/he must negotiate both the `exoticism' of speculative language 
and the (re)cognition of his or her language being rendered `exotic' when presented (or 
(re)presented) as reflective language. However, rather than being the entirely alien 
foreign languages of Whorf's investigations, the language(s) of Oryx and Crake are 
truly `a mirror held up to our own': the text's speculative language is constructed from 
the familiar morphemes - sometimes even the familiar lexemes - of base-reality 
scientific English, while its reflective language, by definition, is a defamiliarised 
version of base-reality English. For this reason, it remains lucid; always 
understandable, even though not sufficiently familiar to yield a wholly automatised 
reading. Yet these languages plainly bespeak a different reality: speculative language 
presents the reader with an unfamiliar new world, while reflective language presents 
him or her with the familiar world made new. This invokes the fourth stage of 
Whorfianism: the final realisation and conviction that, not only do different world- 
views exist, but that they are, in Oryx and Crake, linguistically encoded. 
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Just as Whorf gained access to the language and insights of the Hopi (among 
others), so the reader, through reading Oryx and Crake, gains access to the language and 
insight of the characters inhabiting the future dystopian world. And just as Whorf 
analysed and measured the similarities and differences between his own language and 
the language of the `other', so the reading process encourages comparisons to be made 
between the language of the reader's base-reality and the language of the `other' 
dystopian future. In terms of reading Oryx and Crake, the task of comparison is 
considerably more straightforward for the reader than was the task of comparative 
analysis for Whorf. `We tend to think in our own language', Whorf remarked, `in order 
to examine the exotic language' (1956: 138); in the case of either speculative or 
reflective language, the language is, at heart, `our own language', yet it is our own 
language defamiliarised, transmuted or transformed, reformulated or re-formed. In 
short, it is our own language (re)cognised, and this linguistic (re)cognition reaches out 
from the text, through the reader's renewed consciousness, to engage with its own 
referents in the real world, albeit referents `made strange' by their (re)presentation in the 
fictional world. 
Both Atwood's speculative language and her reflective language contribute to the 
capacity of Oryx and Crake to change - or (re)cognise, in the sense `to know again' - 
the reader's perception not only of the world within the fiction, but also of the world 
beyond the fiction. Moreover, what is true of Atwood's twenty-first century dystopia 
remains true of all dystopian fiction. This dystopian genre-wide propensity to enable its 
readers, through language, to make triangulating connections between the past, the 
present, and the future; between the world within the fiction and the world beyond the 
fiction, is summarised in the concluding chapter which follows. 
207 
6. Conclusion: Dystopian wor(l)ds 
[T]he primary, survival-effective uses of language involve stating alternatives 
and hypotheses [... ] leaps and cross-links and spiderwebs between here and 
there, between then and now, between now and sometime, a continual 
weaving and restructuring of the remembered and the perceived and the 
imagined. 
Ursula K. le Guin (1989) Dancing at the Edge of the World 
I have argued throughout this thesis for language, in its particular dystopian genre- 
specific realisations, as constitutive of world-view. Furthermore, I have illustrated that 
the different world-views insinuated in dystopia's `two languages' - speculative 
language and reflective language - encourage and facilitate the reader's (re)cognition of 
his or her own world, as he or she is enabled to see beyond the automatised channels of 
thought that circumscribe his or her habitual consciousness. In arriving at this 
conclusion I have drawn on Whorfianism - more specifically, a reinterpretation of 
Whorfianism as a process - and cognitive estrangement; two previously unconnected 
theoretical perspectives which, when brought together, illuminate and help to account 
for the ways in which the reader may return from the fictional world to the real world 
with a revised understanding of self and society. 
The reinterpretation of Whorfianism as a process is suggested and supported by 
Whorf s own accounts of his research into the connection between language and the 
perception of reality. As noted in chapter two, Whorf writes often on the subject of his 
own cognitive processing as he approaches the complexities of linguistic relativity, and 
frequently describes the activity of understanding that different conceptions of reality 
may be intrinsic to different languages. Whorf s reconstruction of the dynamic process 
of linguistic relativity relates his experience of breaking out of, and looking beyond, the 
ruts, channels, or grooves of his habitual thought world. Only by considering language 
within his experience is he able to consider the possibilities of language beyond his 
experience; and only by considering language beyond his habitual thought world is he 
able to return to the language of his original habitual thought world and see it anew 
from the new perspective gained. The process he describes is one which necessitates 
measuring the familiar against the unfamiliar: measuring known language relative to 
unknown language, and then making the cognitive return journey to measure unknown 
language relative to known language. 
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The process of conceptualising the known in terms of the unknown and the 
unknown in terms of the known finds echoes in the concept of cognitive estrangement, a 
process which similarly defines itself as a relationship between the familiar (that is, the 
cognitive, or known) and the unfamiliar (that is, the estranged, the unknown). The 
genre of science fiction (of which dystopia is a sub-genre) has long been understood as 
the prototypical site of cognitive estrangement, since it exemplifies `the presence and 
interaction of estrangement and cognition' (Suvin 1979: 8-9). Moreover, the 
characteristic invented language of science fiction narrative has long been recognised as 
typifying the `other-worldly'; the linguistic construction of alterity par exellence. This 
study has demonstrated that while dystopian narrative shares its parent genre's capacity 
to facilitate cognitive estrangement via language, it does so in ways that are explicitly 
connected to the linguistic circumstances of the historical spacetime of the author. In 
short, a distinction has been made between the language that characterises science 
fiction and the language that characterises dystopian fiction. Close attention to the 
stylistic qualities of dystopian fiction reveals that the genre's word-formation processes 
closely adhere to the same `principle of limited novelty' (Hudson 2000: 241) that is 
seen in base-reality neologism. While science fiction often intentionally invents 
language that has no apparent association with the language of base-reality, dystopian 
fiction seldom does. Instead, the connection with `place' (that is to say, the author's 
and/or the reader's empirically observable world) that is so crucial to the didactic force 
of dystopian fiction demands that the connection be made explicit in the language. 
This argument is sustained by examination and close analysis of the textual 
patterning of dystopian texts, in particular, those patterns which recur across the genre. 
Two distinct yet interconnected discourses are identified as characteristically occurring 
in these fictions, each of which has a demonstrable conjunction with time and space: 
speculative language constructs the world of the future (which is typically an 
extrapolative reconfiguration of the author's present), while reflective language re- 
constructs the world of the author's present as if it were the past when viewed from the 
perspective of the future. Crucially, dystopia presupposes that the reader will be 
amenable to the genre's central proposition: that defamiliarised language constructs and 
communicates defamiliarised worlds; in short, that language somehow `contains' 
meaning, and therefore conceptualises - or even actualises - world-view. The Whorfian 
view of language which underpins this thesis depends on the notion that, as Whorf 
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himself stated: `every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others' (1956: 
252). The three chapters of textual analysis which precede this chapter demonstrate that 
both speculative and reflective language are `different pattern-systems', each of which 
uses different - but consistent - models for communicating a particular way of 
conceptualising world-view. Whorf notes that within the `pattern system' of each 
language are: 
the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, 
but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and 
phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his 
consciousness. 
(Whorf 1956: 252) 
The specific realisations of language in dystopian fictions both build and re-build the 
`house of [the reader's] consciousness'. Speculative language builds the house of the 
future by using materials reclaimed from the house of the past in such a way that the old 
remains visible in the outline of the new. In other words, in dystopia, the language of 
the author's present provides the building blocks of the language of the future, thus 
maintaining continuity and connection with the past. Reflective language revisits the 
original building, which, from the perspective of the dystopian future has become a 
museum, ostensibly now a construction belonging to an earlier civilisation, yet the 
reader recognises - or (re)cognises - the building as belonging to his or her own world. 
Cognition and estrangement - the defining constituents of cognitive estrangement - are 
present in both constructions. The interplay of the known with the unknown which 
typifies cognitive estrangement also typifies dystopian language: the familiar building 
blocks in the unfamiliar configurations of the future - or speculative language - act to 
defamiliarise the reader's habitual response, while the familiar-made-unfamiliar - or 
reflective language - similarly destabilise his or her perceptions. In each case, the 
renewed awareness, the (re)cognised consciousness, encourages readers to examine 
their own world-view from an expanded and developed perspective. 
The dystopian fictions considered in this study exemplify language within and 
beyond experience: reflective language is that which is familiar to the reader - within 
his or her experience - but not to the inhabitants of the future, while speculative 
language is unfamiliar - beyond the reader's experience - but indicative of the world- 
view of the future. Each dystopian text elucidates its concern with worrying trends in 
its author's historical spacetime - again, within experience - and gives them form and 
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consequence in the future - beyond experience - through language. As noted in §2.3.2, 
dystopian authors are keenly aware of the ways in which existing language constrains 
perception to what is; the examples in this study have illustrated the ways in which 
these authors have harnessed the potential of language to delineate what could be. In 
breaking out of the habitual thought-worlds of language, these texts are effectively 
attempts to negotiate with language in order to conceptualise, or lexicalise, states of 
being beyond those which are known, and bring them into the reader's consciousness. 
Yet, as this thesis insists, dystopian fictions never construct a world which is entirely 
disconnected with the author's or the reader's own: unlike their extra-terrestrial science- 
fictional counterparts, in which language may, as discussed in §3.3.1, eschew 
connotations with words familiar to the reader, dystopian fictions invariably emphasise 
the connections between language as it exists in the future and language as it exists in 
the reader's base-reality. 
While I acknowledge that to elicit such a direct relationship between fiction and 
reality is an unusual - and unfashionable - approach to the study of literature, I am 
guided by the widespread acceptance of dystopia's genre-specific location in a 
recognisable `place' which is - at least analogously - the reader's own `place' 
(re)placed or (re)presented. The tracing of this dystopia-specific movement towards 
acceptance of dystopia's (re)construction of the author's historical spacetime, discussed 
in § 1.2.1, is extended in this thesis to incorporate language as a (re)construction of the 
language of the reader's base-reality. My aim, in drawing explicit connections between 
the language(s) of dystopia and the reader's own experience of language, is to draw 
attention to the ways in which the macrocosmic didactic aims of dystopian fictions are 
played out at a microcosmic level through the reader's interaction with, and 
(re)cognition of, the language. The empirical studies noted in § 1.4 provide evidence of 
the propensity of these texts to alter readers' perceptions; this study, in turn, 
demonstrates one of the ways in which this changed post-reading conception of self and 
society - or self in society - may be located in the reader's relationship with language. 
While it remains the task of future research to establish empirically the degree of 
modification of world-view occasioned by the reading of dystopian fiction, this study 
has, I hope, contributed to the ways in which we understand the role language plays in 
forming and (re)forming readers' perceptions, not just of the textual world, but of the 
world beyond the text. It is also the task of further research to investigate and evaluate 
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the application of the theoretical precepts advocated here to other literary genres, and to 
other discourses. While this study has focused on literary dystopian conceptions of 
alterity, there are many literary utopian versions of alternative worlds which may lend 
themselves to stylistic analysis mediated through a dynamic Whorfian reading. Moving 
beyond prose literature, poetry suggests itself as a potentially productive area for 
analysis using this framework, as does drama, given its recognised propensity for the 
creation of alternative spaces and realities. The most immediate potential for future 
investigation, however, lies not in other genres, but in other discourses. Textual 
representations of dialect, for example, would seem to offer a specific world-view 
which begs exploration via Whorfianism-as-process (Irvine Welsh's Trainspotting 
(1993) or his Ecstasy: Three Tales of Chemical Romance (1996), for example, both of 
which suggest a discourse-bound world-view); or those texts which propose a 
particular, character-specific world-view through their discourse (Mark Haddon's The 
Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (2004) being an example). 
The relationship between language and perception, or the ways in which 
language may influence perception (or, indeed, language may be influenced by 
perception) is a broad field, and one which is of interest to literary criticism, linguistics, 
and stylistics. This study has taken an interdisciplinary approach to the examination of 
one small area of the field; an intervention which will perhaps contribute some insight 
to each of these disciplinary areas. In particular, I hope it may have made a direct and 
immediate contribution to understanding the ways in which dystopian narrative 
disaggregates and re-forms, destabilises and (re)cognises, defamiliarises and 
reconstitutes the wor(l)d. 
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Notes 
Notes to chapter one 
1 Sheffield Galleries and Museums Trust, 'The Real Ideal: Utopian Ideals and Dystopian Realities' 
(exhibition at Millennium Galleries, 17 September -II December 2005). For an account of the effect of 
letter randomisation, see Graham Rawlinson's (1999) 'Reibadailty' in New Scientist 162: 2188, p. 55, 
and also his (1976) 'The Significance of Letter Position in Word Recognition' (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, University of Nottingham). 
2 Steam stylistics, by Carter's own definition, is 'that version of stylistics which bears the closest relation 
to practical criticism. It has all the problems of text immanence and simplistic form-meaning correlations 
and, like steam trains, goes pretty much in an interpretive straight line; but it continues to generate a lot of 
power and influence, even if other technologies have now superseded it' (personal communication, 
23 January 2006). 
3 In positing stylistics as a 'practical instrument' I am adhering to the conceptual isation of stylistics as 
outlined in both Ronald Carter's (1982) Introduction to Language and Literature: An Introductory 
Reader in Stylistics (London: George Allen & Unwin), pp. 1-17, and in H. G. Widdowson's (1992) 
Introduction to Practical Stylistics: An Approach to Poetry (Oxford: OUP), pp. viii-xiv. My choice of 
stylistics as a foundational methodological framework finds rationalisation in Paul Simpson's account in 
his (2004) Stylistics: A Resource Bookfor Students (London: Routledge) where he explains stylistics is 'a 
method of textual interpretation in which primacy of place is assigned to language [ ... ] because the 
various forms, patterns and levels that constitute linguistic structure are an important index of the function 
of the text. The text's functional significance as discourse acts in turn as a gateway to its interpretation. 
While linguistic features do not of themselves constitute a text's 'meaning', an account of linguistic 
features nonetheless serves to ground a stylistic interpretation and to help explain why, for the analyst, 
certain types of meaning are possible' (2004: 2). 1 am guided also by Widdowson's statement: 'What is 
important here is not the interpretation itself, but the process of exploration of meaning; not the assertion 
of effects but the investigation into the linguistic features which seem to give warrant to these effects' 
(1992: xiv), and Carter's belief that 'the primary interpretative procedures used in the reading of a literary 
text are linguistic procedures' (1982: 4). 
4 See, for example, Jean Baudrillard (1994) Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press). Baudrillard argues that we are so completely ideologically bound 
that there can be no neutral perception of reality such as could be articulated in language. Because we are 
so reliant on language to structure our perceptions, any representation of reality is always already 
ideological, therefore always already constructed by simulacra. In this view, each of the various realities 
I discuss would be, in itself, a simulacrum. While this approach may provide a productive way of 
understanding language in dystopian fiction, I do not engage with postmodemist theories here, or with the 
postmodemist stance which denies the possibility of an external, objective reality; I prefer instead to 
appeal to an understanding of reality as that which is (or has been) empirically observable. 
5 In order to acknowledge the inherent complexity of interpretation of the notion ofplace, both within and 
beyond fictional constructions of the same, I enclose the word in quotation marks ('place') throughout. 
While somewhat clumsy, this concedes to the indeterminacy of conception that surrounds unmarked uses 
of the word, as attested by Albert Einstein in his (1953) Foreword to Max Jammer's (1969) Concepts of 
Space (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp xi-xv. Einstein notes the 'eternally problematic 
character' of the concept (1953: xi), and continues: 'If two different authors use the word "red, " "hard, " 
or "disappointed, " no one doubts they mean approximately the same thing, because these words are 
connected with elementary experiences in a manner which is difficult to misinterpret. But in the case of 
words such as "place" or"space, " whose relation with psychological experience is less direct, there exists 
a far-reaching uncertainty of interpretation' (1953: xii). 
6 Throughout this study I capitalise Utopia only when referring to More's text or the fictional island 
therein; utopia, in lower case, refers to the literary genre. 
7 From 'A short metre of Utopia, written by Anemolius poet Laureate and nephew to Hythloday by his 
sister', reproduced from ancillary materials which appeared in some early editions of More's Utopia. See 
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Susan Bruce's (1999) Introduction and Notes to Three Early Modern Utopias: Utopia, New Atlantis, The 
Isle ofPines (Oxford: OUP), pp. ix-lxi and pp. 124-148. 
a David Roseman, 'Nusquamus'. Roseman claims 'More did not originally call his Island kingdom 
"Utopia", he called it "Nusquamus" [ ... ]. Thus I would claim, More was essentially a outopian, rather 
than a eutopian [ ... ] he was more concerned with 
ideals that could apply "not anywhere in particular" (Ou 
topos) than the idiosyncrasies of a particular good place far away (Eu topos)'. Available online at: 
<http: //www. rosemanl2l. btintemet. co. uk/utopia/nusquamus. htm. > [accessed 15 December 2003] (para. 
16 of 65). 
9 In respect of the distinction between dystopia and anti-utopia, see Lyman Tower Sargent's (1975) essay, 
'Utopia -the Problem of Definition' Extrapolation 16: 2, pp. 13 7-148. 
10 Margaret Atwood, 'Writing Oryx and Crake', published online in January 2003 
<http: //www. randomhouse. com/features/atwood/essay. html> [accessed II May 2003] (para. 7 of 9). 
11 Anne Cranny-Francis' (1990) Feminist Fiction: Feminist Uses of Generic Fiction (New York: St. 
Martin's) includes her definition of dystopia - 'the textual representation of a society apparently worse 
than the writer's/reader's own' - which neatly circumvents this problem by thoughtful use of epistemic 
modality to suggest possibility in her use of 'apparently' (1990: 125). 
12 From a literary perspective, Mark R. Hillegas' (1967) The Future as Nightmare: H. G. Wells and the 
Anti-Utopians (Oxford: OUP) reviews the development of the dystopian tradition in the early part of the 
twentieth century, while Krishan Kumar's (1987) Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (Oxford: 
Blackwell) takes a broader historical view of the emergence of the 'formal' anti-utopia (under which 
heading Kumar includes dystopia). 
13 Marge Piercy's (1976) Woman on the Edge of Time could be seen to challenge this hypothesis, since it 
juxtaposes the utopia of Mattapoisett with 1970s Manhattan by way of psychic 'journeys' taken by its 
protagonist, Connie. This text depicts the present as dystopian, and the future as utopian. However, it 
arguably has greater claim to be considered primarily utopian, rather than dystopian in its generic 
classification. 
14 For economy of citation, where they refer to primary texts, page references will be given in this form 
(i. e page number without further citation). 
13 Terry Eagleton (2005) 'Just My Imagination' in The Nation 13 June 
<http: //www. thenation. com/doc/20050613/eagleton > [accessed 20 November 2005) (para 3 of 17). 
16 V. G. Belinskij, as cited in Gary Saul Morson (198 1) The Boundaries of Genre: Dostoevsky's Diary of a 
Writer and the Traditions ofLiterary Utopia (Austin: University of Texas Press), p. 15 and p. 190 n 17. 
17 Edward Mozejko, review of Erica Gottlieb (200 1) Dystopian Fiction East and West: Universe of Terror 
and Trial in University of Toronto Quarterly 72: 1 Winter 2002/3 
<http: //www. utpjoumals. com/product/utq/721n21-review-mozejko. html> [accessed 12 July 2004] (para. 
2 of 4). 
18 For a discussion of the intersections between dystopia and satire (more specifically, Menippean satire), 
see Carter Kaplan's (1999) essay, 'The Advent of Literary Dystopia' Extrapolation 40: 3, pp. 200-213. 
19 For a discussion of the intersections between dystopia and fantasy, see John H. Timmerman (1983) 
Other Worlds: The Fantasy Genre (Ohio: Bowling Green State University Popular Press), pp. 5-2 1. 
20 For a discussion of the intersections between myth and science fiction, see Damien Broderick's (1995) 
Reading by Starlight: Postmodern Science Fiction (London: Routledge), pp. 8-10 & pp. 121-123. 
21 Although on the question of purposelessness, it could also be argued that, in Kafka's The Trial, the self- 
perpetuating nature of bureaucracy (that is to say, its 'purposelessness') brings under critique the real- 
world experience of bureaucracy. 
22 See Stockwell (2000) The Poetics of Science Fiction which examines this aspect of dystopian fiction 
from a cognitive poetic stance, in terms of the mapping of the real world onto the text world 
metaphorically via a particularised form of constitutive isomorphism (2000: 202-204). 
23 Andrew Stone, 'Orwell Centenary: From 2003 to 1984', The Socialist Review July 2003. 
<http: //www. socialistreview. org. uk/article. php? articienumber--85 I 0> [accessed 14 February 2006] (para. 
14 of 18). 
24 The title of Steven Carter's text also useftilly illustrates a conception of the term dystopla which differs 
from the sense in which it is used in this work: his recontextualised usage denotes an understanding of 
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dystopia as 'bad place' in antonymical relation to a utopian 'good place', and is used to describe aspects 
of contemporary American reality. The use of dystopia in this sense has increased in recent years, and it 
is no longer unusual to see the term used to connote any unpleasant or oppressive circumstance or 
location. (Newspaper journalism abounds with this sense of dystopia. See, for example, Isabel Hilton's 
Special Report: 'China's leap backward', The Guardian, 17 December 2003, where, she notes, 'A 
combination of greed, corruption and bad planning has transformed many of China's cities into polluted 
dystopias'. ) 
25 Many critics and commentators, like Sargent, use the terms utopia and utopianism to refer to any text 
exhibiting the narrative features of either dystopia or utopia. I prefer to use dystopia, but do not intervene 
textually in others' use of utopia (or its many variants) when quoting their comments unless this is 
necessary for clarity (see, for instance, n27 below). 
26 Sargent's 'topos -a location in time and space', which I refer to throughout as 'place', is precisely 
what distinguishes dystopia from utopia, according to Chris Ferns (1999) Narrating Utopia: Ideology, 
Gender, Form in Utopian Literature (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), who claims: 'unlike the 
traditional utopia, dystopian fiction posits a society which - however outlandish - is clearly extrapolated 
from that which exists. Where utopian fiction stresses the difference of the society it depicts, often 
obscures the connection between the real world and its alternative, and rarely indicates how such an 
alternative might be created, the dystopian writer presents the nightmare future as a possible destination 
of present society, as if dystopia were no more than a logical conclusion derived from the premises of the 
existing order, and implies that it might very well come about unless something is done to stop it' (1999: 
107). 
27 Frye uses 'utopian satire' in the sense of 'dYstopia', a distinction which he explains in the same essay, 
arguing for: 'two kinds of utopian romance: the straight utopia, which visualizes a world-state assumed to 
be ideal, or at least ideal in comparison with what we have, and the utopian satire or parody, which 
presents the same kind of social goal in terms of slavery, tyranny, or anarchy' (1973 [1965]: 28). 
28 Lucy Sargisson, 'Utopia in the Twenty-First Century, Part One: anti-utopianism, religion and 
fundamentalism', unpublished conference paper delivered at 'is there a Role for Utopia in Twenty-First 
Century Ideology? ' Conference at the University of Sheffield's Centre for Political Ideologies, 17 June 
2005. 
29 Carey is perhaps misguided on this point: the Inner Party of Orwell's dystopia does not, in fact, have 
any intentions of creating a utopia; as O'Brien tells Winston Smith during his interrogation in Room 10 1: 
'Do you begin to see, then, what kind of world we are creating? It is the exact opposite of the stupid 
hedonistic Utopias that the old reformers imagined' (Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 279). 
30 For the origins of the notion of focalising characters, see Genette (1980) Narrative Discourse (New 
York: Cornell University Press), pp. 188-192. On the stylistics-based application of this idea to narrative 
language in terms of the communication of ideology, see Simpson (1993) Language, Ideology and Point 
of View (London: Routledge). For a dystopian text-specific application, see Fowler (1995) The Language 
ofGeorge Orwell (London: MacMillan), pp. 181-227. 
31 1 follow Simpson's (1993) definition of ideology, since it emerges from the critical linguistic 
perspective best suited to this study. In Simpson's formulation, an ideology: 'derives from the taken-for- 
granted assumptions, beliefs and value-systems which are shared collectively by social groups' (1993: 5). 
32 Since this is only a preliminary study, it lacks the methodological rigour of a full-scale study in terms 
of participant selection and statistical analysis, and so is perhaps best regarded as a general indication of 
the ways in which readers are likely to respond. 
33 Suvin usefully demonstrates the ways in which apparently sound definitions of science fiction, when 
analysed, entail contradictions, unqualified assumptions, and general indeterminacy (1979: 37-62). It is 
also notable that Suvin does not explicitly include dystopia in this early definition of science fiction, in 
fact, as Moylan notes, he 'did not turn his attention fully to the question of dystopia until 1998' (Moylan 
2000: 127), which is the point at which he outlined the definition of dystopia reproduced in this work on 
P. 10. 
34 'Reader's Companion to The Handmaid's Tale', Section 2: 'An Interview with Margaret Atwood' 
<http: //www. randomhouse. com/resources/bookgroup/handmaidstale_bgc. html> [accessed 7 July 2005) 
(para. 2 of 24). 
35 Margaret Atwood, 'Writing Oryx and Crake', published online in January 2003 
<http: //www. randomhouse. com/features/atwood/essay. html> [accessed II May 2003] (para. 7 of 9). 
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36 Atwood's comments are reproduced in Robert Potts' article 'Light in the Wilderness' The Guardian 26 
April 2003, available online at 
<http: //books. guardian. co. uk/departments/generalfiction/story/0,6000,943485,00. html> [accessed 7 July 
2005] (para. 2 of 52). 
37 Margaret Atwood, 'Aliens Have Taken the Place of Angels', The Guardian 17 June 2005, available 
online at < http: //arts. guardian. co. uk/fridayreview/story/0,12102,1507718,00. html> [accessed 7 July 
2005] (para. 2 of 11). 
33 ibid. 
39 Atwood does note the fluidity and unfixity of the boundaries she would draw around her own 
categorical distinctions: in her estimation, 'speculative fiction may be used as the tree, for which science 
fiction, science fiction fantasy, and fantasy are the branches. The beast has at least nine heads, and the 
ability to eat all other fictional forms in sight, and to turn them into its own substance genres may 
look hard and fast from a distance, but up close it's nailing jelly to a wall' (2004: 513). 
40 Although extra-terrestrial life forms may be read - or, in Ketterer's words, 'mundanely recuperated' - 
in terms of their representative qualities, successful execution of such reading requires, as Damien 
Broderick argues, readers 'with specialised training in the codes of construction and reception' of science 
fiction (1995: xiii). The genre 'is written in a kind of code', he continues, 'which must be learned by 
apprenticeship' (ibid). On 'experienced' readers of science fiction, see also Stockwell (2000: 7), and 
Moylan (2000: 6-8). 1 make no claim to be a 'trained' reader of science fiction in its wider sense; and 
while I remain aware that I write here about a sub-genre of science fiction, I do not venture to write about 
it as science fiction; rather, I confine my discussion to merely that area where science fiction overlaps 
with dystopia. 
41 Gary Saul Morson's distinctions between the novel form and the utopia / dystopia lie in the latter's 
didactic tendency. In his (1981) The Boundaries of Genre: Dostoevsky's "Diary of a Writer and the 
Traditions of Literary Utopia (Austin: University of Texas Press), he argues that the 'interpretive 
conventions of utopias are radically different from those of novels -a difference which, as we shall see, 
reflects the two genres' antithetical philosophical assumptions. First, in the novel, unlike the utopia, the 
narrative is to be taken as representing a plausible sequence of events (i. e., as designed to be 'realistic'). 
Second, in a novel, the statements, actions, and beliefs of any principal character (or the narrator) are to 
be understood as a reflection of his or her personality, and of the biographical events and social milieu 
that have shaped it. An important corollary for our discussion of utopias follows from this second 
interpretive convention. The sort of unqualified, absolute truths about morality and society that constantly 
occur in utopias have no place in novels' (1981: 77). 1 agree with Morson's distinctions, and, within this 
study, proceed from the supposition that dystopia differs fundamentally from the novel form in exactly 
this respect. 
42 The concern that dystopia's didactic political 'message' undermines the 'literary' quality of the genre 
resonates with similar concerns expressed in relation to the political content of postcolonial literature. 
Edward W. Said (1993) responds to this criticism of the latter genre in his Culture and Imperialism 
(London: Vintage) with sentiments that, mutatis mutandis, represent my own in relation to dystopian 
fiction. Said explains: 'The novels and other books I analyse here I analyse first of all because I find 
them estimable and admirable works of art and leaming, in which I and many other readers take pleasure 
and from which we derive profit. Second, the challenge is to connect them not only with that pleasure 
and profit but also with the imperial process of which they were manifestly and unconcealedly a part; 
rather than condemning or ignoring their participation in what was an unquestioned reality in their 
societies, I suggest that we learn about this hitherto ignored aspect actually and truly enhances our 
reading and understanding of them' (1993: xv) [original emphasis]. Like Said, I believe that the 
didacticism of dystopian fictions, and their 'participation in [ ... ] an unquestioned reality in their societies' 
does indeed enhance, rather than detract from, our reading of them. 
43 1 follow Baldick's (1990) definition of didactic in his Dictionary oftiterary Terms (Oxford: OUP) here 
- that is to say, [of literature] 'instructive; designed to impart information, advice, or some doctrine of 
morality or philosophy' (1990: 57) - however, I note (and accord with) his caveat that the 'boundaries of 
didactic literature are open to dispute, since both the presence and the prominence of doctrinal content are 
subject to differing interpretations' (ibid). I make no categorical claim that all readers will necessarily 
reach the same interpretations. I do, however, believe that didacticism is explicitly retrievable from the 
dystopian texts I later analyse. 
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44 Rabkin uses `transformation' in a subtly different sense than the one to which I adhere in this study; his 
transformations are reworkings of `canonical phrases we all recognize' which `make us aware that this is 
not quite our own language, though like enough to it that we can map the transformations and know their 
causes' (1979: 86). While broadly following the same line, I do not confine my conception of 
transformations to `canonical phrases'; rather I consider a variety of orthographical, typological, and 
lexical variations, alterations, and conversions under the designation of transformation. 
as Fowler acknowledges the origination of the term anti-language in this context in the work of M. A. K. 
Halliday (1978) `Anti-languages', in Language as a Social Semiotic (London: Edward Arnold), pp. 164- 
182. 
46 Fowler's analysis here is mediated through a Bakhtinian theoretical standpoint. While acknowledging 
the relevance of such theoretical frameworks as polyphony and heteroglossia to a discussion of dialectic 
or dialogic languages, I do not pursue this in detail here. See §2.2.3 for acknowledgement of 
heteroglossia as support for the notion of dystopian fiction being comprised of `two languages'. 
47 Beauchamp does concede that `Orwell in 1984 and Eugene Zamiatin in We manage, where most 
dystopian novelists fail, to solve these problems successfully' (1974: 464). 
48 Throughout this study I use the term standard language to mean something close to - but not quite the 
same as -` standard narrative language'. Speculative and reflective language are contrasted to what I am 
calling `standard language', but not necessarily to what is normally termed `non-standard'. That is to say, 
standard, in the context of this study, includes the dialect representation accorded to Orwell's `proles' in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, for instance, while speculative and reflective language `deviate' from this 
standard. 
49 To fully appreciate the gravity of this conceptual realignment of science from benevolent, intellectually 
rigorous advancement of humanity to malevolent, unethical eugenic programming, it is crucial to take 
account of socio-historical aspects of Huxley's historical spacetime, which, in 1932, pre-dated procedures 
such as in-vitro reproductive techniques. Socio-historical perspective is treated at greater length in the 
discussion of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four (see §3.2). 
Notes to chapter two 
' In using the term (re)cognise in this form my intention is to draw attention to the process of recognition 
as 'knowing again', or `re-knowing'. This sense, marked in this study by enclosing the prefix 're-' in 
parentheses, returns to the Latin etymological origin, recognoscere: `to know again'. 
2 This statement of Whorf s `linguistic relativity principle' represents one of just two occasions in his 
extant writings where his concept is outlined as a principle. The only other construction of it is found in 
his paper entitled `Science and Linguistics', where he states: 'We are thus introduced to a new principle 
of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture 
of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated' (1956: 
214). 
3I have adopted a slightly unconventional format for referencing quotation where it is taken from John B. 
Carroll's volume of Whorf s selected writings, Language, Thought, and Reality, since this has become 
the standard source for Whorls views. References made to this volume are, for economy of citation, 
cited with Whorls name, rather than Carroll's, and with pagination from this volume, except where 
references are taken from Carroll's introductory biographical sketch (1956: 1-34). 
° While I prefer the term Whorfianism, and use it to differentiate Whorls own work from that of Sapir 
and Boas, I reproduce the term Sapir-Whorl hypothesis without comment or amendment where it has 
been used by other commentators. 
3 See Lucy (1992) pp. 11-68 for the distinctions between Whorls theories and those of Boas and Sapir, 
and also for an overview of the ways in which Whorf's position developed out of those of his 
predecessors. 
6 On the over-simplification, reduction, and misinterpretation of Whorf, see also Explorations in 
Linguistic Relativity (2000) ed. by Martin Putz & Matjolijn Verspoor (Amsterdam: John Benjamins). 
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7 John Leavitt does however claim that the hypothesis was named in its enduring form as the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis by Hoijer at a conference in 1954 (Leavitt 2006: 70). 
8 Daniel Alford (2002) agrees with the estimate that there may be 'over 200 different conceptions of 
Benjamin Whorf in academic literature - basically one per researcher, all different'. Daniel (Moonhawk) 
Alford, 'The Great Whorf Hypothesis Hoax', available at: <http: //www. enformy. com/MH- 
Whorflntro. htm> [accessed 17 March 2006] (para 2 of 34). Alford's extensive writings on Whorf and 
Linguistic Relativity are also available online at: <http: //www. enfortny. com/alford. htm#papers> 
[accessed 19 May 2006]. 
9 Whorf comes closest to the idea of a two-way exchange when he asks: 'Which was first: the language 
patterns or the cultural normsT His response, though, suggests contiguity rather than bi-directionality: 
'In main they have grown up together, constantly influencing each other' (1956: 156). 
10 A spectacularly inaccurate definition of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis occurs in Lena E. Hall's (2005) 
Dictionary of Multicultural Psychology. Issues, Terms, and Concepts (London: Sage), which includes: 
'the Whorf hypothesis states that it is not the way things are actually said but the environmental factors 
that produce the reason for saying it' (2005: 169), and 'Whorf fully believed in linguistic determinism - 
that what one thinks is fully determined by one's language. He also supported linguistic relativity' (ibid). 
This is followed by several comments attributed to 'Orwell 1990', including 'Orwell notes that the Sapir- 
Whorf hypothesis is generally associated with the position that language structures entail a general 
philosophical system for perceiving, ordering, and acting on reality' (ibid). The references citing Orwell, 
it transpires, refer to a 1990 edition of the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. Given that such flawed 
definitions exist, predictably - and inevitably - there will be misunderstandings and misapplications of 
the theory. 
11 Penny Lee points out Whorf's deliberate use of 'a new principle of relativity' which was intentionally 
a reference to Einstein's Theory of Relativity (Lee 1996: 86). 
12 Eleanor Rosch's (1977) 'Human Categorization' in N. Warren, ed. Advances in Cross-Cultural 
Psychology (London: Academic Press), pp. 1-49 provides an overview, while Ekkehart Malotki's (1983) 
Hopi Time: A Linguistic Analysis of the Temporal Concepts in the Hopi Language (New York: Mouton 
de Gruyter) argues that Whorf was misguided in his view of Hopi time. G. K. Pullum (1991), in The 
Great Eskimo Snow Hoax and Other Irreverent Essays on the Study ofLanguage (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press) takes an anti-Whorf stance, as does Steven Pinker (1994) in The Language Instinct. Lucy 
(1992: ch. 3) reviews the anthropological and linguistic studies by Trager, Hoijer, Lee, Casagrande, and 
others, while chapter 5 of the same volume reviews the psychology-based colour testing experiments of 
Lennenberg, Brown, Stefflre, and others. Daniel Alford robustly defends Whorf's position in several 
essays available online at: <http: //www. enformy. com/alford. htm#papers> [accessed 19 May 2006]. 
13 There are exceptions to this generalisation, however: for an interesting discussion of dystopia in respect 
of a posited 'language of the future', see Peter Stockwell's (2000) 'Futuretalk: one small step towards a 
Chronolinguistics' Nottingham Linguistics Circular 15, pp. 5 5-68. 
14 M. A. K Halliday's seminal essay, 'Linguistic Function an Literary Style: An Inquiry into the Language 
of William Golding's "The Inheritors"' is reproduced in Donald C. Freeman, ed. (1981) Essays in 
Modern Stylistics (London: Methuen), pp. 323-360, as is Stanley E. Fish's acerbic response, 'What is 
Stylistics and Why are they Saying Such Terrible Things About itT (ibid), pp. 53-78. Other contributions 
to the debate are Leech and Short (1981) Style in Fiction: A Linguistic Introduction to English Fictional 
Prose (London: Longman), pp. 31-38 and 54-57; Fowler (1996) Linguistic Criticism, 2 "d edn. (Oxford: 
OUP), pp. 210-220; Simpson (1993) Language, Ideology and Point of View (London: Routledge), pp. 
109-114. 
15 John Walsh, 'Weird and wonderful vocabulary from around the world', review of The Meaning of 
Tingo (2005), The Independent (Online Edition) 
<http: //enjoyment. independent. co. uk/books/features/article3l5207. ece> [accessed 5 December 2005]. 
16 Personal correspondence by email in response to an enquiry (7 December 2005). The original edition 
of this text was published in 198 1, and, after being out of print for several years, was re-issued in 2000. 
" Aldous Huxley (1963) 'Culture and the Individual' available online at <http: //www. psychedelic- 
library. org/huxcultr. htin> [accessed 20 June 2005]. The essay is also available in hard copy, in Moksha: 
Writings on Psychedelics and the Visionary Experience 1931-1963 (1980), ed. by Michael Horowitz and 
Cynthia Palmer (London: Chatto & Windus). All references to Huxley's essay here are taken from the 
online version. 
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18 ibid (para. 10 of 24). 
19 ibid (para. 6 of 24). 
20 ibid (para. 17 of 24). 
21 Question mark [1940? ] as it appears in original: `New Words', in Ian Angus, George Orwell, Sonia 
Orwell (2000) The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell Vol. 2 (Boston: David R. 
Godine), pp. 3-12 (p. 10). 
u Kim Wells, `Interview: Suzette Haden Elgin' available online at: 
<http: //www. womenwriters. net/editorials/hadenelgin. htm> [accessed 11 September 2004] (para. 12 of 
42). 
23 ibid (para 31 of 42). 
24 Suzette Haden Elgin, `Läadan, the Constructed Language in Native Tongue' 
<http: //www. sfwa. org/members/eigin/laadan. html> [accessed 11 September 2004] (para. 3 of 8). 
25 "`Afterthoughts": A conversation between Ira Wood and Marge Piercy', available online at: 
<http: //www. margepiercy. com/interviews/afterthoughts. htm> [accessed 11 September 2004] (para. 74 of 
83). 
26 In respect of the relationship between dystopian writing and the ineffable, see also Peter Schwenger 
(1986) `Writing the Unthinkable, ' Critical Inquiry 13: 1, pp. 33-48, and the same author's article on 
Hoban's Riddley Walker: Peter Schwenger (1991) 'Circling Ground Zero', PMLA 106: 2 pp. 251-261. In 
the latter, Schwenger suggests that '[s]omething beyond knowing [... ] must be called on if we are to come 
to terms with that which is called the unthinkable' (p. 261). Also relevant is Eddie Marcus (1999) 
`Speaking the Ineffable: Language and Dystopia' available online at: 
<http: //www. gradnet. de/pomo2. archives/pomo99. papers/Marcus99. htm> [accessed 22 August 2002]. 
Marcus argues that `[d]ystopian writers demonstrate that there are things to know and experience outside 
of language, and that while language may mediate reality, it does not master it' (para. 4 of 31). 
27 My understanding of Saussure's notion of what may appear in the paradigmatic axis differs from 
Delany's as he expresses it here, since I would anticipate anything from the `expected' to the 
`unexpected' (or even bizarre) might possibly occur in the paradigmatic axis. However, since this is not 
essential to the direction of study, I leave Delany's comments uncontested. 
Notes to chapter three 
' An indication of the continuing critical interest in Orwell's dystopia is found in R. R. Bowker, `Books in 
Print With Book Reviews', which records 25 book-length treatments of Orwell and Nineteen Eighty-Four 
published or distributed in the US between the years 2003 and 2005 alone. 
2 All page references to Nineteen Eighty-Four in this chapter are to the (2000) Penguin Classics edition, 
and are given, without any other citation, in parentheses immediately following any direct quotation. 
3 Department of Trade and Industry Consumer and Competition Policy Directorate, `Report (1968) by the 
Standing Joint Committee on Metrication' available at www. dti. gov. uk/ccp [accessed 8 January 2005]. 
4 Interestingly, Orwell chooses to use Standard English orthography in all instances of units of 
measurement even while the US equivalents (i. e. centimeter, meter) were possible options. In doing so, 
Orwell ties the presentation of `place' in Nineteen Eighty-Four to a demonstrably British model. 
s The British TV programme, Big Brother, has doubtless contributed something to modern perceptions of 
the term, with its 24-hour surveillance and authoritarian control of a group of participants. 
6 In this respect, the term Big Brother validates what Stockwell (2000a) terms chronolinguistics in his 
article `Futuretalk: one small step towards a Chronolinguistics' Nottingham Linguistics Circular 15 
(2000), pp. 55-68. In this article, which outlines some preliminary criteria for predicting language change 
(especially through futuristic fiction), Stockwell suggests utopias and dystopias, or architexts ('richly 
imagined and detailed alternative worlds' (p. 61)) as the model `empirical testbed' for his hypotheses. 
`Theorisation', Stockwell says, can be `validated or falsified by the actualisation of a state-of-affairs in 
the future, as the passage of time turns the future into the present. In this way, fiction becomes the 
laboratory of chronolinguistics' (p. 66). Since Orwell's predicted language has post-dated his predicted 
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future, it seems reasonable to suggest that the then-speculative, now actualised, language which has 
permeated the extra-textual world as testable data for these hypotheses. 
In Reading by Starlight, Broderick outlines what he calls a mega-text, a scheme of reading protocols and 
characteristics which distinguish sf as a genre. Although my principal aim in this study is to provide an 
account of the ways in which speculative and reflective language interact with and impact upon the 
perceptions of the readership, part of that aim is realised by noting recurring patterns and structures of 
language across many dystopian texts. One consequence - or by-product - of this cross-textual 
assessment is the outlining of a preliminary framework for a dystopian linguistic mega- (or meta-) text, 
more modest in its comprehensiveness than Broderick's sophisticated account of the sf mega-text, but 
applicable in a similarly genre-specific way. 
8 Meyers takes this example from Poul Anderson, `Lodestar' (1973) H. Harrison, ed., Astounding: John 
W. Campbell Memorial Anthology), which is cited in the main text, but not in the bibliography, so 
incomplete publication details are reproduced here. 
9 Hudson acknowledges that the `claim that new word formation typically involves either new form or 
new meaning but rarely both' was known in the field of historical linguistics prior to his expression of it 
as the `Principle of limited novelty' (personal communication by email 1 March 2005). 
10 Anthony Burgess's A Clockwork Orange (1962) would appear to contradict my assertion here, since it 
is, as Beauchamp (1974) notes `perhaps the most linguistically innovative novel of the future' (1974: 
475). However, Beauchamp also outlines a very compelling language-based argument which explains 
why he considers this text not to be representative of dystopia in terms of its language. I reproduce 
Beauchamp's extended note here, since it exactly represents my own view on the subject: `A Clockwork 
Orange, narrated by its teenage punk of a protagonist in an argot called nadsat, which is composed (a 
psychologist in the book explains) of "odd bits of rhyming slang. A bit of gypsy talk, too. But most of 
its roots are Slav. " [... ]. Despite the dazzling tour de force Burgess brings off, I have not included A 
Clockwork Orange in my discussion for several reasons. First, nadsat is primarily a parody of the 
exclusiveness and ephemerality of teenage slang: the older generation of this society cannot understand it, 
but even more significantly, Alex (the narrator, age sixteen) cannot himself understand the equally 
exclusive slang of the "rising generation" of twelve year olds. After two years in prison, Alex finds 
nadsat already obsolete. Second, and concomitantly, nadsat reflects the social-technological realities of 
the society (which is but vaguely sketched) only in the sense that it demonstrates the alienation of the 
young from the old - and the younger from the young - and thus indicates the fragmented, uncohesive 
nature of this slightly futuristic world. Nadsat, that is, reflects the power structure only negatively, as one 
"unofficial" discourse in an increasingly officialized society' (Beauchamp 1974: 475). 
" The term auctorial would seem to be Delany's own, and is understood here as broadly synonymous 
with authorial. 
Notes to chapter four 
1 Pimlott's `Introduction' refers to the (2000) Penguin Classics edition of Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: 
Penguin). All subsequent references to Nineteen Eighty-Four are to this edition, and are given in 
parentheses, without any other citation, following any direct quotation from this text. 
2 All references to Patai's `Introduction', and the text are to the (1985) edition of Swastika Night (Oxford: 
First Feminist Press), and are given in parentheses, without any other citation, following any direct 
quotation from this text. 
For a detailed discussion of the correspondences between the two texts, see Patai's (1984) 'Orwell's 
Despair, Burdekin's Hope: Gender and Power in Dystopia', Women's Studies International Forum 7: 2, 
pp. 85-95, and also her (1984) The Orwell Mystique: A Study in Male Ideology (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press), pp. 253-263. See also M. Keith Booker's essay, `English Dystopian Satire in 
Context', in Shaffer, Brian W., ed. (2005) A Companion to the British and Irish Novel 1945-2000 
(Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 32-44. 
4 All references to Friedrich von Hess's untitled history appear simply as `the book' in Burdekin's text. 
In the interests of clarity, I have capitalised `Book' on each occasion I make reference to it, although I 
acknowledge that nowhere in the original text does it appear in this capitalised form. 
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S This, and all subsequent references to this text are to the (1987) Oxford 20'" Century Classics edition of 
Facial Justice (Oxford: OUP), and are given in parentheses, without any other citation, following any 
direct quotation from this text. 
6 This, and all subsequent references to The Handmaid's Tale are to the (1996) Vintage edition (London: 
Vintage), and are given in parentheses, without any other citation, following any direct quotation from 
this text. 
Notes to chapter five 
' All references to Oryx and Crake are to the (2004) Virago edition (London: Virago), and are given in 
parentheses, without any other citation, following any direct quotation from this text. 
2 Margaret Atwood, `Writing Oryx and Crake', published online in January 2003 
<http: //www. randomhouse. com/features/atwood/essay. html> [accessed 11 May 2003] (para. 7 of 9). 
3 Many parallels are evident between Atwood's satire on science and Swift's treatment of the same in 
Gulliver's Travels, notably in his Book III, chapter V, which satirises the irrelevance and futility of 
science as observed at `The Academy of Lagado'. A detailed consideration of these correspondences is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is worth noting that, while Swift, like Atwood, satirises the 
language of science, the scientists of Lagado are a small group of curious eccentrics contained within the 
Academy; in Atwood's novel, such characters dominate and shape the world. 
°I follow Halliday and Martin's model in including the prepositional clause here in the calculation; the 
examples of clauses they cite include both prepositional and co-ordinated clauses: cf 'Griffith's energy 
balance approach to strength and fracture also suggested the importance of surface chemistry in the 
mechanical behaviour of brittle materials', and `The model rests on the localized gravitational attraction 
exerted by rapidly oscillating and extremely massive closed loops of cosmic string' (1993: 76). 
s Anthony Griffiths (2004) `Genetics according to Oryx and Crake' in Canadian Literature: A Quarterly 
of Criticism and Review <http: //www. canlit. ca/archive2004/181/181. griffiths. on. html> [accessed 12 
November 2004]. 
6 ibid (para. 3 of 16). 
7 ibid (para. 4 of 16). 
$ ibid. 
9 ibid (para. 8 of 16). 
10 ibid (para. 6 of 16). 
11 Margaret Atwood, `Writing Oryx and Crake', published online in January 2003 
<http: //www. randomhouse. com/features/atwood/essay. html> [accessed 11 May 2003] (para. 7 of 9). 
12 Locke notes that `[s]cientific writing is traditionally viewed as the antithesis of literary writing' (1992: 
2-3). 
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Appendix I 
Results of a reader-response pilot study conducted in May 2003 with 9 student- 
participants who had recently read George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and Margaret 
Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale. 
The participants were asked the following question: 
`For each of the listed characters from [each novel], please rank - on a scale of 
1-5 (where 1= completely dystopian; 2= mostly dystopian; 3 aspects of both in similar 
proportions; 4= mostly utopian; 5= completely utopian), how dystopian or utopian 
you, as a reader, judge the fictional society to be when viewed from the perspective of 
the character. ' 
The following results were obtained: 
Nineteen Eighty-Four 
Character RI R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 
Winston 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 
Julia 2 2 2 2 4 3 2 2 2 
O'Brien 3 3 5 5 5 4 3 5 1 
Big Brother 4 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 1 
Goldstein 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 
Charrington 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 1 
Syme 2 4 3 3 1 1 3 1 1 
Parsons 2 4 4 3 2 4 3 4 1 
The Handmaid's Tale 
Character RI R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 
Offred 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 1 1 
Aunt Lydia 3 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 
Moira 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 3 3 
Serena Joy 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 
Ofglen 1 2 2 3 4 2 2 1 2 
Commander 3 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 1 
Janine 1 3 3 2 2 1 2 3 3 
Nick 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 
R= `reader' (i. e RI = Reader # 1) 
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